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Within  H.  G.  Wells’s  (1866-1946)  short  novel  The  Time  Machine  (1895)  a 
peculiarly resonant sense of materiality is articulated. The novel can be defined in 
terms of the ways in which not just objects, but rather a more encompassing sense of 
materiality  has  been  meticulously  arranged  so  as  to  convey  a  detailed,  familiar 
environment into which a fantastic element is introduced. This sense of a graspable 
everyday setting is dependent on a solidity of detailed materiality, as are the fantastic 
elements that disrupt them. This suggested quality of materiality and material culture 
relates  not  only  to  recognisably  object-based  artefacts  but  also  to  notions  of 
selfhood.  From this single text, I  will  attempt to construct a speculative notion of 
material culture, or rather, I will  be analysing the presence of material culture and 
materiality, and attempting to build  upon  it.  In this way, I  will  move towards the 
construction  of a  speculative  notion  of material  culture,  making  the case for the 
novel as a valuable and privileged form as a generator of hermeneutic possibility.
2Table of Contents
Introduction  p.4.
Chapter 1: Purloining Material Culture  p.9.
Chapter 2: Text and Utopia. Materiality and Portent  p.47.
Chapter 3: The Material Presence of Bodies in The Time Machine  p.84.
Chapter 4: Time and Temporality  p. 142.
Chapter 5: The Spatial Zones of The Time Machine  p. 189.
Chapter 6: Writing and Possibility  p.252.
Notes  p. 271.
Bibliography  p.287.
Illustrations  p.296.
3Introduction
In the final  version  of Berlin  Childhood  around  1900,  Walter  Benjamin 
recalls how he was able to stage an adventure within the confines of his own room 
through  the  exploration  of  his  wardrobe.  He  would  delve  inside  among  the 
nightshirts and undergarments, until he was able to find and remove pairs of socks, 
rolled up and turned inside out.  Each of these became for him a small pocket, which 
contained ‘the little present’.1  Benjamin describes first grasping this present within, 
composed of a woollen mass, and then unveiling and unwrapping the present as it is 
pulled out from within the interior. Disconcertingly, as the present was revealed, the 
pocket would,  of course,  disappear.  Yet rather than linger on  this often  repeated 
process as a confession of a psychically revealing compulsion, Benjamin recalls this 
memory to demonstrate its pedagogical impact, and the importance of this odd game 
in relation to his thinking in later life. This present is not like a toy wrapped in shiny 
paper, but rather is the tangible sense that inside the rolled up sock, is indeed, more 
sock. Within the interior space of the exterior is something that is indivisible from 
exterior. This is not just an infantile aporia, but is, according to Benjamin, the means 
by which he learnt about how to practice criticism:
I could not repeat the experiment on this phenomena often enough. It taught 
me that form and content, veil and what is veiled, are the same. It led me to 
draw truth from works of literature as warily as the child’s hand retrieved the 
sock from ‘the pocket.’2
There is on the one hand a specificity of interior and exterior that inform this thesis, 
in part on the level of indivisibility of form and content, but also the thematising and 
enacting  of  a  dissolution  of  boundaries.  However,  there  is  a  more  pertinent 
instruction in Benjamin’s memoir. This is the not to say that an object should act as 
an illustration of discourse, but that the pleasure one takes in an object can embody, 
perform and instruct acts of critical agency.
4My own object of illumination is H. G. Wells’s (1866-1946) short novel The 
Time Machine (1895). The novel can be defined in terms of the ways in which not 
just  objects,  but  rather  a  more  encompassing  sense  of  materiality  has  been 
meticulously arranged so as to convey a detailed, familiar environment in which a 
fantasy  narrative  can  play  out.  This  sense  of  a  graspable  everyday  setting  is 
dependent on a solidity of detailed materiality, as are the fantastic elements. This 
suggested quality of materiality and material culture relates not only to recognisably 
object-based artefacts but also to notions of selfhood. From this single text, I will be 
analysing the presence of material culture and materiality, and building upon it. In 
this way, I will move towards the construction of a speculative notion of material 
culture,  making  the  case  for  the  novel  as  a  valuable  and  privileged  form  as  a 
generator of hermeneutic possibility.
This thesis has emerged out of a process of thinking about artworks as forms 
of material culture.  Implicated in this are considerations of a broader cultural  and 
historical set of realms in which artworks operate. Simultaneously this process seeks 
to generate an understanding of material culture that may contribute to new ways of 
encountering artworks.  This has led to a consideration of material  culture from a 
vantage point located outside of, but looking inwards at, its more generally-accepted 
dominant disciplinary forms within anthropology, archaeology and museum studies. 
Therefore this is a project concerned with providing a new and hitherto neglected 
account  of the  notion  of  material  culture,  and  sets  out  to  expand  the  use  and 
understanding of the term beyond its current definitions and limitations. Whereas the 
dominant uses and descriptive accounts of material culture as a form of knowledge 
and set of disciplinary concerns relate to the inalienable artefact in space and time -  
in  particular  one  that  is  available  through  an  analysis  of  its  context  through 
fieldwork -  it is my contention that interpretations of phenomenological encounters 
with  and  manifestations  of  material  culture  should  not  be  determined  by  an 
ontological privileging of physical objects.
While  the  disciplinary  origins  of this  thesis  can  be  located  in  a  fine  art 
context, the object of analysis can  not. This standpoint, of being able to consider 
material culture from within a fine art context, is significant in that it has allowed a
5process  of  analysis  and  reflection  that  while  learning  from  the  disciplinary 
frameworks that constitute the field of material culture studies, can enable a kind of 
cognitive audacity. I would describe this project as audacious in that it is defined as 
a discussion and analysis of a material world that is in fact constituted by a work of 
narrative fiction. Such a choice might also seem contentious for a fine art thesis. If 
any  such  contention  exists,  it  is  necessary  to  remember that this  is  not a thesis 
written in an art history department, but rather as a piece of research undertaken at 
The  Slade  School  of  Fine  Art  recognises  the  potential  that  the  School’s  PhD 
programme enables for interdisciplinary approaches to the subject of fine art. In such 
an environment, where there is no concrete disciplinary form as such, it is necessary 
to acknowledge that the forms of knowledge that now (but not only now) surround 
and permeate artworks are in fact shared with and built upon a much larger set of 
epistemological fields. This speculative notion of material  culture is then  itself, I 
would suggest, made available as an interpretative context with which to think about 
not just  artworks,  but  a  more  general  and  universal  realm  of material  practice, 
objecthood, text, environment and constitutions of subjectivity. This thesis sets out 
to consider aspects that might loosely fit within the domains of art history, visual 
culture studies,  anthropology and  literary criticism. The overlapping use of these 
discourses fits uncontroversially within the general terrain of art theory, but it is my 
intention to carve out a particular set of routes through this amorphous landscape 
that could be mapped by an expanded and boundless sense of material culture.
This thesis is divided into six chapters. The first of these purloins material 
culture  as  a  disciplinary  form  and  reconfigures  it  as  an  interpretative  tool,  a 
hermeneutic  device  for  criticism.  Set  out  here  is  the  intention  to  reconfigure  a 
terrain, to move from an operation of criticism of artworks to criticism of forms of 
material  culture.  Material  culture  can  be  made  to  work  as  an  interpretative  tool 
through a specific act of critical  reading. The specificity of the choice of Wells’s 
novel - as the device that is used to employ material culture as a hermeneutic process 
-  is attended to in Chapter 2. In considering The Time Machine through notions of 
text and context, the text is bound not only to the genre of science fiction, but more 
significantly, to traditions of utopian discourse. I put forward here that the novel’s
6articulation of materiality and material culture constitutes a very particular form of 
utopian object.
Chapter 3  focuses  on  the  presence  of bodies  as forms  of materiality  and 
material culture. Working on the assumption that anatomically defined bodies are 
also social forms, and as much defined as within the field of the gaze of material 
culture as any other form or artefact, this chapter addresses the extreme and heavily 
coded forms of the Eloi and Morlocks - humanity’s degenerate descendants in the 
year 802,701  - as corporeal beings. As forms of abhuman representation, they both 
conform to a loose generic tradition, and suggest radical new forms of subjectivity 
that are  locked  into  Wells’s  allegorical  concerns.  The chapter also  addresses the 
unstable body of the Time Traveller as a fin-de-siecle embodied subject thrown out 
of a normative context, and draws on a number of models in order to theorise its 
manifestation in the text.
Chapter 4 addresses the broad themes of time and temporality in The  Time 
Machine.  A  number of different models of time  and temporality from  the  novel 
make  themselves  available  for  analysis  here.  The  manifestations  of  time  and 
temporality are  broken  down  within  this chapter under the categories of Time as 
Medium and Evolutionary Time. The first of these relates to the shape and form that 
time  takes  as  a  substance  to  be  traversed.  This  category  also  investigates  the 
instrumental device of the time machine itself. Yet then there are forms of biological 
and social time, all of which are conflated and rematerialized within the substance of 
the text. These are addressed within the section on Evolutionary Time, and are read 
through  the  lens  of  temporality  as  it  appeared  as  a  Victorian  discourse,  with 
reference to the Albert Memorial in Kensington Gardens, the Pitt Rivers Museum in 
Oxford  and  the Crystal  Palace,  which together constitute  nodes  of intensity  in  a 
network of display, collection and spectacle.
Travelling in time, not in space, the protagonist of this novel  never really 
leaves his home. Space -  architecture and landscape -  is composed of forms that are 
never exclusive or distinct. Rather the spatial constructions of the novel are blurred, 
infected,  permeated,  by  temporally  distant  neighbours.  Chapter 5  addresses  the 
fictive space of The Time Machine. The grandeur of the future landscape is tempered
7by an attention to modest detail, that contains the sense of space and all its artefacts 
within  a framework that is  peculiarly  quotidian.  This  chapter also draws  out the 
dominant characteristics of materiality and material culture in The Time Machine -  
determined  by  the  very  indeterminacy  that  characterises  Wells’s  use  of  spatial 
differentiation. The suggestive and emergent properties drawn out through the thesis, 
represented as overlaps and slippages between chapters, are addressed. As a project 
that generates its arguments, rather than mapping them onto an object, the prevalent 
tendencies  of materiality  and  material  culture  as  they  are  rendered  in the  novel, 
degeneration and uncertainty, are attended to. Chapter 6 functions as a coda for the 
thesis,  moving  away from  the  close  and  thematic  readings  of the  previous  three 
chapters,  to  consider  the  overall  textual  nature  of  this  material  world.  The 
complexity  of textual  encounter is  drawn  out as the  binding together of writing, 
material  culture and  utopian  impulse, through the impossibility of sustaining any 
irresolvable oppositions between subject and object.
8Chapter 1: Purloining Material Culture
The challenge of engaging in a discourse that concerns itself with artworks is 
one that has necessitated and fostered an interdisciplinary approach. This approach 
does not lack a history, or recurring points of reference, but it cannot be described in 
terms  of a  concrete  disciplinary  form,  and  is  constantly  reiterated  in  terms  of a 
dependence upon a greater set of epistemological fields, such as was convincingly 
demonstrated  by  Victor  Burgin  in  ‘The  End  of Art  Theory’.  Burgin  traces  the 
developmental genesis of art theory and concludes that it is at an end.3 This is not 
because  models of theory are no longer applicable,  or that there is any  sense,  as 
recently  suggested  by  Gavin  Butt,  that  artworks  may  have  passed  through  their 
useful encounter with theory,4 but because it no longer seems appropriate to confine 
the study of artworks to artificially narrow conceptual or institutional limits. Rather, 
the study of artworks:
now ranges across the broader spectrum of what I have called elsewhere the 
‘integrated  specular  regime’  of  our  ‘mass  media  society.  ‘Art  theory’, 
understood  as  those  interdependent  forms  of art  history,  aesthetics,  and 
criticism which began in the Enlightenment and culminated in the present so- 
called  ‘postmodern’  era  the  end of art theory  now  is  identical  with  the 
objectives of theories of representations in general: a critical understanding 
of the modes and  means of symbolic articulation of our critical forms  of 
sociality and subjectivity.’5
Burgin’s  account  places  artworks  within  a field  of representation,  which  makes 
possible  the  conflation  of forms  and  approaches  at  work  in  this  thesis  which  is 
intended to work towards a critical understanding of a form of symbolic articulation 
-  one that 1  would argue is itself a critical form of sociality and subjectivity. While 
the analysis of my chosen material world will not depend upon references to specific 
artworks, the process contributes to a more general theory of representation in which
9artworks are situated. Burgin’s account, based on lectures given in the mid 1980s, is 
twenty years old, but that it is not to say it is obsolete. Rather, it serves as a reminder 
of the terrain in which those concerned with interpreting cultural forms and artworks 
operate, and provides a call to action in response to it.6 Much has been built upon the 
moment of Burgin’s assertion, or perhaps, copious wreckage has been accrued upon 
it.7 Nevertheless, as I shall discuss subsequently, if some relatively current debates 
are anything to go by, we may need to be reminded of some theoretical articulations 
from recent history.
Burgin asserts as priority the need to build forms of what might be called ‘art 
theory’. This is more urgent and valuable than any apparent necessity to reiterate, 
negate,  affirm,  revise  or expand  a clear set of disciplinary  interests or neglected 
topics. It is this approach that provides both motivation and methodology within this 
thesis:  an  expanded  and  hopefully  innovative  understanding  of material  culture, 
through focusing on a particular and distinctive novel to modify existing concepts of 
what might usefully constitute its qualifying forms. In doing so, material culture as 
an interpretative device can be brought into a more general field of expounding on, 
unravelling,  performing and transcribing cultural  objects:  material  culture can  be 
brought into the discursive realm of art theory. In this thesis, the object is a novel. 
By  implication,  this  can  also  apply  to  readings  of  artworks.  Artworks  make 
occasional  contributions  to  the  aggregation  of  this  particular  configuration  of 
material culture.
Through a discussion of existing areas of relevant and overlapping forms of 
interpretation, I would like to suggest that this thesis about a novel is both born out 
of issues of material culture relating to artworks, and will ultimately prove useful in 
thinking about how artworks might be read as forms of material culture. As well as 
shifting the focus of material culture studies towards text and narrative fiction, this is 
a chance to reflect upon processes of interpretation which could apply to various 
forms of cultural object, in particular objects as complex, contentious and elusive as 
artworks. I would like to differentiate this project from any superficial resemblances 
to  previous  engagement  with  scritpo-visual  propinquities  or  comparisons.  In 
particular, this has little to do with the essentially formalist critical investigations of
10theory and art object undertaken by Art and Language8, and is distinct from W.J.T. 
Mitchell’s  often  insightful  reflections  on  image/text.9 While there is a useful 
emphasis in  Mitchell’s Iconology (1986) on the absence of an essential difference 
between, in particular, poetry and painting, there is no attempt in my thesis to forge 
any kind of unity between visual and textual signs, or to engage in an exegesis of the 
historical  conflict  between  the  two  registers.  Rather,  my  project offers forms  of 
interpretation from across disciplinary boundaries. Yet I would also like to suggest 
that  this  project  can  bind  such  disparate  forms  through  the  bringing  about  of a 
generative agency within the framework of material culture as a space for engaged 
acts of reading.
The  methodological  possibility  of an  interdisciplinary  approach  that  the 
Slade  School  of Art  offers,  in  its  remit  to facilitate  innovative  contributions  of 
research  in  both  the  theory  and  practice  of  art,  was  effectively  realised  as  an 
outcome thanks to an interdisciplinary scholarship from University College London. 
This  enabled  me  to  spend  a  year  as  a  guest  in  the  University’s  Department  of 
Anthropology. I would like to emphasise the need to acknowledge the significance 
of this department in developing the field of material culture studies in recent years. 
Of particular importance  is  that the  department is  home  to the  Material  Culture 
Group, whose members, include Barbara Bender, Victor Buchli, Susanne Kuechler, 
Daniel  Miller,  Christopher Pinney,  Michael  Rowlands,  Nicholas J.  Saunders and 
Chris Tilley.1 0  During the research process of writing this thesis, and particularly 
during the period of my year-long scholarship, I had the good fortune to encounter 
the  members of the  group directly1 1  and to learn from their varied approaches to 
material culture in person. Collectively, their work provides a broad scope, but it is 
always  determined,  and  restricted,  by  a  disciplinary  understanding.  As  Bender 
suggests:  ‘where possible and appropriate, anthropological insights can and should 
move into the public arena (...) and we have the right and the duty to offer, if not 
answers  then,  at least,  insights.’1 2  The claims that this thesis makes towards an 
understanding of material culture certainly encompass ‘insights’. Any sense of entry 
into an explicitly public arena are subservient to a need to consider interpretation 
and criticism of cultural  forms,  which  in themselves,  I  intend to  suggest,  can  be
11motivated by and contributory to, forms of social  engagement and responsibility, 
desire and hope.
The  significance  of  the  Material  Culture  Group  in  pushing  forward 
understandings of the discourse cannot be overestimated. The activities of the group 
and  those  associated  with  it  -  particularly  those  who  publish  work,  through  the 
facilitation of the Group, in the Journal of Material Culture and through publishers 
Berg -  offer a unique sustained and consistent set of engagements with the idea of 
material  culture. This  perspective privileges explicit accounts of material  culture, 
rather  than  any  texts  that  might  suggest  its  importance  through  accidental 
association.  Elsewhere,  such  an  explicit emphasis  is  inconsistent and,  unlike the 
presence  of forms  material  culture,  is  not  ubiquitous,  as  Michael  Brian  Schiffer 
demonstrates by his need to emphasise the need to address the centrality of objects 
and materiality. In The Material Life of Human Beings, he makes a case for material 
culture as an ontological primer of definitions of humanity:  ‘human life consists of 
ceaseless and varied interactions among people and myriad kinds of things. These 
things are called ‘material culture’ or, better, artifacts. (...) Incessant interaction with 
endlessly varied artifacts is, I maintain, the empirical reality of human life and what 
makes  it  so  singular.’1 3   Schiffer’s account is an attempt to think of artefacts as 
indispensable  participants  in  forms  of  communication  and  behaviour.  While 
acknowledging that forms of material  culture have  been attended to in respect to 
social actions, he argues that the study of artefacts as social forms is marginalised 
within social science disciplines, and that in terms of quantity of research, it is only 
within anthropology that it is recognised to any degree above a bare minimum.
Yet  he  suggests  that  even  within  sociocultural  anthropology,  the  role  of 
material  culture within communication is not recognised:  ‘If, as I maintain, every 
realm of human behaviour and communication involves people-artifact interactions, 
then all studies in the social and  behavioral  sciences ought to attend diligently to 
artefacts.’1 4  Schiffer is also critical of work that views forms of material culture as 
secondary objects or processes. In short, he objects to acts of projection. If I were to 
place this within the influence of the discussion of artworks, this is something akin 
to Yves-Alain Bois’ proposition to allow artworks to shape their own accounts and
12interpretations.1 5  In order for a discourse on material culture to realise the 
interpretative  possibilities of its  subject,  I  would  like to assert the  need to resist 
imposing singular forms of interpretation upon objects, and to allow disciplinary and 
epistemological  spaces  to  become  manifest  as  conditions  of the  generative  and 
interpretative possibilities of what might be called material culture.
However, Schiffer’s study is somewhat limited in focus. This is in part due to 
his  emphasis  on  social  sciences  in  North  America,  where  there  is  perhaps  a 
disproportionately  small  emphasis  on  artefacts  and  material  culture  as  forms  of 
discourse in their own right. He also emphasises a ‘rigorous study of artefacts’1 6 , the 
model  of  which  is  based  upon  archaeological  training.  This  is  a  limited 
understanding of how  to  conceptualise  and  read  objects  of material  culture,  one 
which this thesis collides with head-on. Schiffer’s study is one that is concerned with 
how  material  culture  must  be  acknowledged  as  a  primary  and  central  means  of 
intersubjective communication. Yet, it is a literal understanding of how objects and 
materiality is always a part of, or generative of, forms of human communication. He 
fails  to  acknowledge  the  possibility  that  forms  more  generally  regarded  as 
communication,  such  as  narrative  fiction  and  text,  might  also  be  mutually 
constitutive of materiality and material  culture.  It is my intention to facilitate this 
possibility,  through  the  action  of renaming the  objects  and forms  that are  being 
discussed, as well  as the objects and forms that constitutes the discussion.  Rather 
than see artefacts as knowable only through an archaeological understanding, I wish 
to provide a new understanding of what might constitute an artefact -  that is a form 
of materiality that is experienced and manifested through text. Through text, and in 
particular,  through  The  Time  Machine,  material  culture  is  both  enacted  as  a 
substance through phenomenally embodied encounters with text, as well as through 
layered processes of codification.
While  I  agree  that  the  field  is  still  often  characterised  by  work  that  is 
‘superficial and incomplete’17 , Schiffer’s account of work that constitutes a discourse 
on  material  culture is myopic and  perhaps  suffers from the presence of the  same 
qualities.  For example, he cites accounts of material culture that view the topic as 
one of many arenas in which meaning and identity are negotiated, but that privilege
13culture over material culture, subordinating objects and artefacts to a cultural frame 
of reference. A specific culprit is identified as Mary Douglas and Baron Isherwood’s 
The World of Goods. Yet Schiffer fails to identify a significant detail in that work. In 
their introduction, they specify that what is really important about artefacts are their 
place in other forms of communication, their transferability to information as forms 
of intersubjective relations. This is what they describe as ‘naming’, in opposition to 
the ‘proving’ of actual expenditure, ownership, use and exchange of physical things 
and processes. Perhaps an even greater omission is Schiffer’s failure to acknowledge 
any  work published  after  1995,  or to recognise the  work of the  Material  Culture 
Group,  with the exception  of a  small  number of works from  the  early  1990s  by 
Daniel Miller.1 8  There is therefore no insight into Miller’s suggested emphasis on a 
methodological approach to material culture that places a reading of an object above 
the mapping of an interpretation upon it.
Miller’s approach to material culture is formative, both to this thesis and the 
general discourse. Miller argues, in a manner that is not dissimilar to Schiffer’s call 
for studies of communication to recognise the primacy of artefacts, for the practice 
of a form of material culture analysis that is not reduced to the mapping of social 
models  onto  objects,  or using  materiality to simply  reiterate  singular arguments. 
Rather the potential is to be able to build on the presence of materiality.1 9  This use of 
material  culture  relies on a degree of specificity.  Primarily this is defined  by the 
choice  of the  material  world  to  be  analysed  -  in  this  instance  identified  by  the 
selection of the single novel, the significant characteristics of which are addressed in 
Chapter 2. Within this object will be considered the specificities of the relationships 
that can be identified. In drawing upon the selected fictional work as the source, this 
is a material culture that is defined by a double absence. The first is that determined 
by  historical  distance,  the  other  by  its  status  as  textual,  manifested  by  acts  of 
reading. An expanded understanding of material culture is required here, which does 
not  rely  on  traditional  statistical  or  artifactual  analysis,  and  which  can  also  be 
usefully  conceptualised  through  the  psychoanalytical  rethinking  of selfhood  and 
phenomenally accessible, anatomical  bodies, articulated by Judith Butler in which 
bodies  themselves  are  read  as  contested  sites.201  am indebted to the complex
14articulations of this discourse, in which bodies, in any sense, cannot be anterior to 
the realms of material culture and notions of selfhood cannot be critically sustained 
as purely reliant on biological, rather than cultural, determinants.
Material culture itself is something of a borrowed term, removed from the 
disciplinary  restraints  of  its  anthropological,  museological  and  archaeological 
context. Within that context, its use is generally defined by the evidentiary status of 
the object of analysis within a phenomenally accessible and statistically definable 
social reality. However, while taking place from outside of that disciplinary context, 
it is  these  dominant constitutions  of material  culture that shape  my fundamental 
understanding of the term. This thesis is therefore an attempt to think through the 
idea  of  material  culture  and  how  it  might  be  conceptualised  not  only  as  an 
interdisciplinary  set  of  concerns,  relating  primarily  to  anthropological, 
archaeological  and  museological  issues,  but  also  as  a  more  fundamental  set  of 
encounters and readings. I wish to undertake a specific analysis in order to explore 
and even invent modes of thinking about material culture which fall outside of the 
more conventional  and stable forms of its discussion.  In utilising the disciplinary 
codes of material culture as an underlying and enabling set of articulations, I hope to 
extend the reach of the term and its implied interpretative power.
A discussion of the presence of materiality and material culture in The Time 
Machine suggests an apparent difficulty, or at least incongruity, of approaching a 
novel  as a material  world, as one might identify, for example, a social  group in a 
region  of Papua  New  Guinea,  or perhaps  to  read  the  text as  if it  were  a  set  of 
specifically identifiable objects or structures that could be read within the context 
and use of a culturally identifiable group.  In order to start to think this through, it 
will be useful to address a comment by Susan M. Pearce, whose museological work, 
in  the  form  of both  writing  and  teaching,  has  been  highly  influential  to  recent 
discussions  of  material  culture.  Here,  she  notes  that  in  what  she  describes  as 
‘popular fiction’:
objects are not simply the necessary furniture of the story; they provide goals
and ends, they animate the relationships between the actors, and they give
15structure to the narrative and mechanisms to the plot. Equally, they give their 
own colour and tone to what is going forward.2 1
Despite  a  simplistic  understanding  of  ‘popular’,  this  statement  is  nonetheless 
valuable in thinking through how it is that The  Time Machine might be utilised as 
the  source of a reading of material  culture.  The  value of this  statement is that it 
appears to recognise  something of the  very  quality  that I  wish to identify  in  my 
selection of Wells’s originary and formative work of utopian science fiction.  Not 
only this, but perhaps also there is something of this quality that resonates through 
its genre descendants.
Pearce’s own definition -  made elsewhere - of the material world, referred to 
as that which is available to museums and subject to analysis as material culture, is 
so broad that it seems impossible to sustain her account of ‘popular fiction’, as it can 
in no way be limited to isolated objects:
The  material  world,  that  is,  the  world  outside  each  individual,  may  be 
defined  as  including  the  whole  of  humankind’s  physical  environment, 
embracing the landscape, the air which is manipulated by flesh into song and 
speech, the animals and plants off which humans live and the prepared meals 
which come from them, our own bodies and those of other human beings. All 
of these are  raw  material  capable of organisation into the  kind of cultural 
construct which we call human society.22
I do not intend to argue that this sense of the presence of material culture in certain 
works  of formative  science  fiction  is  something  that  is  absent  elsewhere.  More 
generally, the tentative implication, that through this thesis I would like not only to 
sustain but to amplify, is one that encompasses all forms of fiction to the extent that 
none might be excluded from the categorisation of material world. The nineteenth- 
century  novel  that  perhaps  best  exemplifies  this  tendency  is  Herman  Melville’s 
Moby Dick (1851). With its seemingly endless and exhaustive accounts it constitutes 
not only an encyclopedic realisation of the world of whaling and whales, but serves
16as a vast and  spectacular museum,  leaving no detail  unattended in its dizzyingly 
complete collection. Likewise, Emile Zola’s The Ladies Paradise (Au Bonheur des 
Dames) (1883) reconstructs the radically new world of the late nineteenth-century 
department store in Paris, dramatised through people, objects and architecture as an 
intense point of articulation for capitalist modernity. This potential within narrative 
fiction was, I would like to suggest, recognised and exploited by Wells. Perhaps, as 
shall  be  argued  subsequently,  there  is  some  play  on  Pearce’s  emphasis  on  the 
privileged status of material culture genre fiction in my reading of Wells. The Time 
Machine  can  be  characterised  as  a  work  of fantasy  literature,  in  the  form  of 
(arguably) the first work of science fiction,  but also as existing  very  specifically 
within  a tradition  of utopian  narratives.  These are the terms that account for the 
function of materiality within the novel. Materiality is situated within, and enacts, a 
utopian  discourse  to  constitute  a  textual  encounter,  which  itself is  bound  to the 
phenomenally accessible material reality that constitutes the world of the reader.
Pearce  is  also  able  to  provide  a  useful  definition  of what  constitutes  the 
(generic or possible) artefact of material culture itself. It is expandable to the extent 
that ‘the whole of cultural expression, one way or another, falls within the realm of 
material culture’.2 3 As material culture, this becomes potential museum material, as 
does a more conventionally scaled ‘thing’ or ‘specimen’:
Strictly speaking, the lumps of the physical world to which cultural value is 
ascribed include not merely those discrete lumps capable of being  moved 
from one place to another...  but also the larger physical world of landscape 
with all the social structure that it carries, the animal and plant species which 
have been affected by humankind (and most have), the prepared meals which 
the animals have become, and even the manipulation of flesh and air which 
produces song and speech.24
This  straightforward  assertion  is  itself  an  announcement  of  conceptual  and 
methodological possibility. Material culture, then, need not be reduced to the study 
of forms of architecture, visual  arts, or moveable objects.  However,  if this is the
17case, then it seems that exactly what might constitute material culture might still be 
somewhat vague.
In order to continue to think this issue through, it is necessary to concentrate 
as much on the mode of approach to material culture as on definitions of what the 
subject of analysis  and  scrutiny  might actually  be.  One model  to  which  I  owe  a 
significant debt, and will therefore here devote a sustained discussion to, is provided 
by Preziosi and Hitchcock in their study of the Bronze Age Aegean. It is of value 
here  not  because  it  asserts  that  objects  have  meanings,  but  rather  because  the 
discussion is of what kinds of meanings they have.  Preziosi and Hitchcock  write 
‘with  the  understanding  that  the  visual  and  material  cultures  of a  society  (...) 
constitute forms of individual and social technologies or instruments for the active 
construction, maintenance, and transformation of individual  and social realities.’2 5 
These  visual  and  material  cultures, as they are described, include what might be 
accounted for today in terms of art and architecture. Material culture, as it might be 
described, is therefore read as much as a set of active social processes as it is a set of 
objects or built environments. Although such things as objects and architecture may 
by the very things that are read in close detail, it is not a process of framing them as 
either reflection, trace or residue of social  activities.  Preziosi  and Hitchcock also 
stress  the  need  to  question  the  sequential  order  of such  an  assumption,  that  in 
deliberately not reading objects as reflections of ideas, attitudes or mentalities is the 
asseveration that such acceptably social forms do not precede any form of material 
expression in which they are given long lasting form. Implied is a sense of mutual 
interdependence  between  on  the  one  hand  the  construction  of social  forms  and 
modes  of identity  and  on  the  other  forms  of objects  that  do  not  only  serve  as 
representative shadows of the former, but are active forms of their constitution. That 
they remain after their living culture has ceased to exist is misleading if it gives the 
impression that they were not a living part of it.
The form of reading that Preziosi and Hitchcock adopt is not straightforward. 
Their interpretation of artefacts is determined  by the view that they are  ‘as much 
instruments that function  to fabricate and  maintain  social  realities  as  themselves 
products of such ongoing and dynamically challenging realities.’26 Their position is
18situated between two perspectives of reading objects as surviving fragments of a past 
only  available through the  piecing together of various elements.  One  side of the 
division is determined  by the assumption that an object’s meaning is fixed as an 
imprint of the intention of its makers. These are likened to the physical and chemical 
properties of an object which are retained, fixed and readable. The task of the reader 
is then one of deduction and reconstruction of original intentions. An object of this 
kind of analysis becomes analogous to a ‘text’, with the use forming a ‘con-text’. 
This object/context relationship is privileged, in this model, as the only legitimate 
source  of its  interpretation,  which  is  to  be  executed  by  the  relevant expert.  The 
metaphor  here  is  a  distinctly  modern  one  in  which  the  object  is  analogous  to  a 
medium of communication.  Ideas or values move from maker or maker’s  society 
through to an attendant viewer or reader. This is a model that also privileges the role 
and function of the trained expert who can stand as sanctioned interpreter.
Yet on the other hand of the division in which Preziosi and Hitchcock situate 
their own position is a mode of thought that might be held up as the opposite to the 
one just described: ‘the notion that the meaning of an object is entirely or largely in 
the  eyes  and  imagination  of its  beholders  or  users.’27 This opposition is perhaps 
usefully  understood  in  analogy  to  Kant’s  view  the  aesthetic  interpretation  of an 
object.  The  subjectivism  that  Kant  introduced  as  formulated  in  detail  was  an 
important  feature  in  his  Critical  philosophy,  particularly  in  The  Critique  of 
Judgement  (1790)  and  had  been  a  strand  growing  in  complexity  and  substance 
throughout his work, although the space between Observation on the Feeling of the 
Beautiful and Sublime (1764) and Judgement represents a sharp u-tum in his opinion 
of the location of aesthetic judgement. His later work represents not only a relatively 
novel view, but a more fundamental paradigm shift. Kant’s solution to the question 
of  whether  beauty  is  objective  or  subjective  was  to  recognise  the  apparent 
phenomenal presence of beauty that belongs to an object, but also to recognise that a 
feeling  of beauty  is the sign of harmonious  workings of the  mind  brought about 
through the attendant consideration of the object.28 What I would like to suggest is 
that Kant’s theorising of subjective judgements relating to the apparently objective 
qualities of a particular artefact or phenomenally accessible ‘thing’ serves indirectly
19as the very model of opposition that Preziosi and Hitchcock wish to use to counter 
the  contextual  reading  of an  object’s  fixed  and  inherent  meaning,  and  is  even 
perhaps the very ur-form that makes such an understanding credible.
What  is  described  here  is  a  compatible  and  simultaneous  plausibility  of 
apparently antagonistic positions. The reading of The Time Machine that I employ 
here is one that is likewise situated between such two distinct positions; between that 
of considering the object or novel as a clear and legible text that can be attentively 
read and its meanings carefully reconstructed, and an imaginative and unexpected 
re-use of the original, that it is defined primarily in each form of use that it finds 
itself.  Preziosi and Hitchcock describe this position as being made available by the 
relative  permanence  that  artefacts  display,  or in  this  case  the  textual  world  of a 
novel:
(...) they remain to be used and reused, and thought about in potentially new 
and possibly quite unforseen or unintended ways over time -  unlike a spoken 
utterance, which materially disappears unless it is recorded.29
It is the temporal endurance of things that allows them to be read outside of their 
original conditions, while still retaining varying degrees of that originary context and 
meaning. (It is worth noting here that this process is one that is not dissimilar to the 
role of the Time Traveller as interpreter of the future: an observation to which I will 
return subsequently.)
The  mode  of analysis  that Preziosi  and  Hitchcock  lay  out here  is  one  of 
fundamental  importance,  both  in  informing  the  study  of cultural  artefacts  more 
generally and within the specific context of reading The Time Machine. It is one that 
recognises  the  limitations  of adhering  either to  a  pure  model  of holding  that an 
object’s significance is embodied within the object itself, or that it can only be found 
in  the  perception  of the  viewer.  By  granting  that  both  seemingly  irreconcilable 
positions are not only plausible, but necessarily compatible, their position allows for 
readings that acknowledge original  intentions and function, while recognising the 
likely impossibility of any such meanings being fully reconstructed. Perhaps even
20more significant is the facilitation of interpretations that are not only multiple, but 
perhaps  conflicting  and  antagonistic.  This  position  is  one  that  is  usefully 
contextualized by Derrida’s description of authorship -  discussed later in the thesis - 
which  sees the  reliance of any  inscription of meaning through a medium upon a 
culturally  specific  system  of  language.  This  system  cannot  be  dominated  or 
controlled  by  an  author.  The  attentive  and  critical  act  of  reading,  both  as 
phenomenological  and  hermeneutic  act,  must  therefore  be  one  that  looks  for 
relationships  between  what  an  author does  or does  not command.  It  is  reading, 
therefore,  that  enables  the  production  of a  signifying  structure  of interpretation 
around the object.30
The scope of Preziosi and Hitchcock’s analysis is one that encompasses what 
is  understood  here  as  material  culture,  but  is  perhaps  significantly  different  to 
warrant  an  account  of how  I  would  like  to  diversify  from  their  methodological 
position. They are concerned with the ‘visual and material cultures of a society’. My 
contribution to the work already done here is to suggest that such boundaries may be 
transgressed in the attempt to think through the limits and possibilities of what might 
constitute material culture. Another point of divergence is the limit of what these 
terms might include:
The visual or material culture of the Bronze Age Aegean -  and here a useful 
generic term might be simply the built environment -  will be understood as 
encompassing the broad range of objects and artefacts of all kinds as well as 
their  changing  spatial  and  temporal  interrelationships:  pots,  paintings, 
gemstones, buildings, furniture, graves; artefacts both portable and fixed in 
space and place.3 1
This valuable description of a given material world also opens up new possibilities 
in its focused specificity by suggesting its own restrictions. Again, I would like to 
work with such a boundary by imagining its exterior. Where I would extend Preziosi 
and Hitchcock’s description further is to think of material culture as a realm where 
bodies  and  objects  become  entangled  to  the  extent  that  thinking  about  one
21necessitates the inclusion of the other. Alternatively, this may be accounted for by 
the inclusion of embodied subjects themselves within the field of material culture. It 
is this model of material culture that I will theorise through the presence of bodies in 
The Time Machine in Chapter 3.
Material  culture  can  also be thought of as a means  of thinking through  a 
reconciliation of views on the relationship between past and present.  Mark Leone 
rejects the view that the past is nothing but the creation of the present.32 Conceptions 
of  the  past  are  necessarily  constrained  through  material  culture,  which  in  its 
archaeological form is the past that remains. For Leone, social  systems exploit the 
ambiguous gaps  left by  incomplete  evidence  and fill  these gaps  with  ideological 
messages that serve as forms of cultural reproduction, reinforcing and replicating the 
existing social order of the present. The presence of material culture from the past 
can serve as a counter to this process through being the past’s active representative. 
However, one problem with this argument is that this distinction between present 
and  past seems to naturalise the two as  distinct and  independent entities.  In  this 
model,  the  past is  over-determined  as  both  a historicised form,  and  an  objective 
condition,  of  something  that  once  was.  The  risk  here  is  in  ontologising 
archaeological  practice  as  an  disciplinary  activity  that  is  immune  to  the 
contingencies of a relativist framework.  Implied within this risk, as a factor that I 
would like to propose and exploit, is the need for a certain built-in set of vigilant and 
generative  perspectives  in  thinking  through  notions  and  possibilities  of material 
culture.
The disciplinary history of material culture as a definable field of study is 
relatively  short,  and  has  somewhat  unclear  origins  traceable  to  the  nineteenth 
century, when it became a fundamental element of anthropology. The paths of these 
ideas were bound to the extent that by the later years of the century, it was almost 
impossible to separate the two.3 3 The narrating of a strictly rendered disciplinary 
history is perhaps impossible,  and the limitations of material  culture as an actual 
contained discipline are permeable to the extent that they are left as nothing but the 
ephemeral  likenesses  of  boundaries.  Yet  the  term  itself,  and  its  adherence  to 
anthropological and archaeological practices, at least seems to have a recorded first
22appearance. According to Victor Buchli, despite the murky origins of the term, there 
is  a  reference  in  the  Oxford  English  Dictionary  made  in  1843  on  the  ‘material 
civilization’ of Mexico.34 This sense of the term referred to a specialised relationship 
with objects and materiality, one that flourished in museums in Europe and America. 
Yet its implications and influences were extensive. The study of material culture had 
a coldly functional edge, in that it was employed as a device with which to measure 
the degrees of technological and social sophistication of given groups, which could 
then be placed within evolutionary hierarchies. Invariably European society served 
as the apex in these schemes, with hunter-gatherer groups at the bottom. This both 
justified imperial expansion and intervention, as well as serving the universality of 
Enlightenment liberalism:
(...) which advocated the universality of human experience and justice. The 
various  ‘uncivilized’  peoples  of the  world  were  all  subject  to  the  same 
technical  and  social  processes  albeit at different  levels,  thereby  ensuring 
European dominance. All of humanity’s inventions and institutions could be 
used as an indicator of this inexorable dynamic of inclusive progress.35
Also implied is a temporal distortion, the notion that to look down this hierarchy was 
to look back at oneself at a past moment, that the hunter gatherer was at a prehistoric 
stage of development, and  so was a representative of an early moment of human 
development. The past of an essentially European humanity could be found in the 
material cultures that made up the rest of the world.
While  the  first  stage  of  modern  material  culture  was  shaped  as  an 
evolutionary and specifically temporal discipline, it is worth thinking about some of 
the deeper origins of pseudo scientific intellectual traditions that may be linked to 
the form as a general discipline. The general roots of anthropology could be located 
within  pre-Socratic  thought.  In  the  cosmological  speculations  of the  origins  of 
nature,  materialistic  causes  were  often  presented  in  favour of supernatural  ones. 
Rather than conforming to religious mythology as the explanatory narratives of the 
world,  pre-Socratic thought recognised the origin of the  world as  something that
23could  be  accounted  for  by  the  world  itself,  and  therefore  also  implicated  a 
connection between all the material things within it; including people. Thales, the 
Greek philosopher, suggested in the 7th century B.C., that water was the source of all 
matter  in  the  world,  while  Anaximander,  one  of  his  students  disagreed  and 
speculated  that  rather  than  coming  from  a  known  material,  everything  in  the 
universe had its physical origins in some unknown, boundless, yet undifferentiated 
material. Democritus suggested that both people’s bodies and their behaviour were 
derived  from  and  influenced  by  changes  in  the  shape  and  velocity  of universal 
particles -  atoms.  Centuries  later,  Epicurus and  Empedocles  sustained  an atomic 
theory,  but one that saw  people composed out of atoms,  which  were returned to 
nature after death.
These  approaches  suggest  a  more  long  lasting  and  fundamental  set  of 
concerns that are not solely defined in terms of such a negative set of conditions as 
characterised nineteenth-century material culture as an indicator of progress. Rather, 
there  is  a  recognisable  sense  of urgency  in  these  attempts  to  think  through  the 
physical conditions of things/subjects. However, one strand of pre-Socratic thought 
was proto-evolutionary in form. The 5th-Century philosopher Empedocles saw the 
cosmos  as  an  evolutionary  process.  In  this  scheme,  elements  encountered  one 
another, forming larger bodies that would survive if they were useful. Despite baring 
some resemblance to a crude form of natural selection, this is clearly distinct from 
the evolutionary model that characterised early material culture studies in its modem 
form.  Given the usefulness in looking beyond the strictest sense of the origins of 
material  culture as a disciplinary form,  it is therefore worthwhile sketching out a 
more general sense of anthropological thought, as well as that specifically relating to 
material culture.
As Erickson and Murphy point out, travel writing represented another form 
of secular ancient Greek tradition. Best represented by Heroditus writing in the 5th 
century B.C., he ‘observed diversity in a relatively objective, or non-ethnocentric, 
way,  by  correlating it with  geography,  climate,  and  other features  of the  natural 
world.’36 His emphasis on human acts as opposed to religious explanations suggests 
the  possible  status  of his  writing  as  an  ancient  precursor to  ethnography.  While
24Athenian philosophy may represent a significant form of epistemological and social 
shift, the consistency of humanist thought is sustained through Socrates, Plato and 
Aristotle:  ‘Aristotle was curious about the relationships among natural and social 
objects,  which  he  assumed  existed  and  were  knowable’.37 Through the linear 
sequence of Aristotle’s tutoring of Alexander the Great, this scientific materialism, 
complete with its emphasis on the teasing out relationships between people and the 
material  world,  was  carried  and  transmitted  through  the  actions  of Alexander’s 
campaigns.  Indeed, the  great and lost Library at Alexandria is  hailed as the first 
museum. These strains of antique thought represent a process of questioning both 
humankind, and the relationships that people have, both physically and socially, to 
the world and each other. Therefore, these are distant origins that see what might be 
characterised as anthropological enquiry as a pragmatic study of matter itself.
Although denying that material culture exists as a firmly delineated subject, 
providing it with a certain sense of freedom from reductionism, Miller suggests that 
the development of material culture studies as a contemporary disciplinary subject 
may be seen as a two-staged process. He divides the first stage of its disciplinarity as 
‘the insistence that things matter and that to focus upon material  worlds does not 
fetishize them since they are not some separate superstructure to social  worlds.’38 
Coming into fruition in the  1980s, key theories in material culture in this first stage 
of its disciplinarity demonstrated that social worlds could not be differentiated from 
materiality or material culture. Rather they were as much constituted by materiality, 
as materiality was constituted by the social or cultural. In this phase, the emphasis 
was on the  notion that things  mattered, that material  culture  was a serious topic, 
worthy of revival, and not just an indulgent or reactionary fetishism.  He cites as 
important examples of this Bourdieu’s Outline of a Theory of Practice and Arjun 
Appaduria’s (Ed.) Social Life of Things, and suggests that such texts gave rise to a 
variety of approaches, including Chris Tilley’s conceptualisation of material culture 
as analogous with text, to which I shall return subsequently.
Miller writes that now that the first stage is in a sense complete, in that its 
essential points have been clearly demonstrated, the work of the second stage can be 
described as different but equally relevant: the diversity of material  worlds can be
25viewed  as  each  others  contexts.  The  study  of the  diversity  of material  forms  is 
therefore the thing that might characterise this secondary stage. The sheer scale and 
variety that this suggests is:
perhaps  one  of the  main  stumbling  blocks  in  the formation  of a material 
culture studies (...) but it also offers a huge potential if we try to consider 
what it might offer academic analytical concerns. The clear imperative then 
is  to  turn  what  at  first  seems  daunting  and  problematic  into  the  very 
significance and interest of material culture studies.39
This is in contrast to the possibility of purely reducing material worlds to models of 
the social world, to simply map pre-existing theories from elsewhere onto forms of 
material  culture.  It  is  also  depicted  as  an  opportunity  to  resist  the 
compartmentalisation  of  the  diversity  of  material  worlds  into  ‘specific  sub- 
disciplinary concerns such as the study of textiles or architecture.’40 Part of what it is 
that Miller seems to be getting at with his call for an active second stage is a clear 
differentiation from the first. This differentiation is characterised by bodies of work 
that  are  best  understood  in  relation  to  the  issues  that  they  address,  making  up 
relatively  discreet arguments formed  around  very  specific  and  particular  sets  of 
issues. Miller also argues against readings in which objects and materiality may be 
read as representational symbols, or as text to be analyzed.
Instead he calls for an attention both to the generality of materiality and to 
the  specificity  of  particular  manifestations  in  order  to  address  what  is  both 
problematic with the field of material culture studies, and how this might actually 
provide it with its significance as a site of enquiry:
To do this, I  want to suggest that the generality of materiality, that is any 
attempt to  construct  general  theories  of the  material  quality  of artefacts, 
commodities, aesthetic forms and so forth, must be complemented by another 
strategy that looks to the specificity of material domains and the way form 
itself is employed to become the fabric of cultural worlds.4 1
26Miller’s concern with the ways in which this might have come about so far, with the 
establishment of journals and academic  departments that adopt a narrowly defined 
subject  area  of material  culture  is that  through  pragmatic  and  even  commercial 
concerns, there is no sense in which these activities are perceived internally as part 
of a broader commitment to the investigation and analysis of material culture:
One of the disadvantages of the  present state of academic study is that the 
specificity of material forms are most likely to be of interest and concern if 
they  happen  to  fall  within  what  has  already  become  constituted  as  an 
institutional domain such as building studies or food studies.42
There is little sense of the activities cited by Miller viewing themselves as part of a 
larger study of material culture. The cost of this is that there is not much attention 
given to Miller’s preoccupation with the ways in which specific material domains 
might contribute to an understanding of the larger generality of difference.
Miller’s argument, while perhaps so straightforward that it is potentially easy 
to overlook, is, I would suggest, resonant and convincing enough to warrant thinking 
through as a source of methodological value. For one thing, he advocates a creative 
selection of topics of enquiry, a description that might well fit my own choice of 
study in this instance. To use a novel as a material world in this manner is, as far as I 
can tell, unprecedented, and so might well represent such a ‘creative’  approach to 
selection.  Yet it is the degree of attention given to the specificity of forms that is 
really Miller’s point in differentiating a second stage of material culture studies and 
the potentialities implied therein. This involves a narrow focus upon the object of 
study, yet Miller refers to the field’s troubled past, and the possibility of accusations 
of fetishism. In defence, he suggests that the studies with which he is involved, as 
practising anthropologist, teacher and editor, belong to a tradition that prevents the 
fetishization of material forms:
27Indeed we feel it is precisely those studies that quickly move the focus from 
object to society in their fear of fetishism and their apparent embarrassment 
at being, as it were, caught gazing at mere objects, that retain the negative 
consequences of the term ‘fetishism’.4 3
The assertion he makes is for work (as exemplified by the texts collected by Miller 
within the volume that his text serves as introduction for) that may often dwell on 
more  mundane  qualities  of materiality,  ‘we  are  able  to  unpick  the  more  subtle 
connections with cultural lives and values that are objectified through these forms, in 
part, because of the particular qualities they possess.’44
While there is a sense of Miller’s generative approach to material culture that 
is exciting and appealing in thinking through how the field itself might be thought 
through, perhaps the claims to differentiate a ‘progressive’ second stage in contrast 
to a flawed, and somewhat stagnant first stage, is over-determined. This is pointed 
out as 1  would like to sustain and to some extent recover the value of this first stage. 
In this first stage, the point that material things are important, as Miller says, that 
they ‘matter’, had been theorised, despite the manner in which it is accounted for by 
Miller:
There was, however, a major fault with the body of work that established this 
theorizing of cultural forms, much of which came out of various versions of 
formal,  structural  and  semiotic  analysis  associated  with  writers  such  as 
Barthes, Baudrillard, Douglas and Levi-Strauss. In formal analysis the major 
technique was to reveal the homologies between distinctions drawn in one 
sphere with those of another. So, for example, a dimension already regarded 
as important such as class or gender could be shown to be reproduced in part 
through a host of material taxonomies as in clothing, building or systems for 
the classification of time, which may at first have appeared to be based upon 
the  same  structural  order but through analysis were revealed to  be  part of 
what Bourdieu called the same ‘habitus’.45
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accusation that seems equally applicable to his dismissal.  While this scepticism is 
useful in striving to think beyond and avoid the simple mapping of social forms onto 
convenient  material  examples,  a  process  that might tend  to  simply  reiterate  the 
models that one started with, his actual objection may be rooted in an antagonism 
between complex theoretical  argument over straightforward  statistically  provable 
ethnographic fieldwork, or at least to contributions that can prove their apparently 
objective value. Miller’s status as self-appointed guardian of material culture studies 
is  both frustratingly  narrow-minded,  yet excitingly  generative  in  what might  be 
possible within the field and the importance of its growth. This thesis will make no 
such distinctions between work which is and is not permissible, but will attempt to 
build upon the sense of the study of material culture as more than the straightforward 
reiteration  of  external  models  folded  upon  a  world  of  objects.  This  work,  if 
necessaiy, can be seen as situated within an emergent third stage of material culture 
studies - building upon the larger generality of difference. Rather than constraining 
itself within  over-determined  disciplinary  restrictions, the  discussion  of material 
culture may be brought into a more general discursive arena.
It is important to emphasise material culture here, rather than just approaches 
that relate to anthropology, ethnographic or even archaeological approaches. I make 
no  claim  to  be  the  first  to  explore  overlaps  between  art  or  visual  culture  and 
anthropological  concerns.  This  is  an  established  field  of  enquiry,  as  is  well 
demonstrated by, for example, Alex Coles (Ed.), Site Specificity: The Ethnographic 
Turn (2000) and Lucien Taylor (Ed.)  Visualizing  Theory (1994).  Yet such works 
concentrate far  more  on  a  politics  of observation,  and  rather  exotic  acts  of one 
discipline learning from another, than on anything that might touch on generalities 
or specificities of material culture. Rather, this thesis is far closer in intention to the 
sentiment articulated in the closing lines of Preziosi’s Rethinking Art History:
‘art history’ might be the history, theory, and criticism of the multiplicity of 
cultural processes that can be constru(ct)ed as enframing: an accounting for 
objects and their subjects, with all that that might entail.46
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implied interpretative possibilities. Yet if I can make a single contribution to this 
discussion, it would be to suggest an alternate reiteration of Preziosi’s statement. 
The only variation is the replacement of the term ‘art history’ with ‘material culture’. 
Such a substitution is necessary only to expand the disciplinary horizon of the term 
art  history,  as  well  as  its  allied  fields:  ‘art  criticism,  aesthetic  philosophy,  art 
practice, connoisseurship, the art market, museology, tourism, commodity fashion 
systems, and the heritage industry’.47 Material culture as a term might also substitute 
the use of ‘postmodern’, a problematically indefinite expression much in use at the 
time of Burgin’s End of Art Theory, but the value and consistency of which has long 
since appeared increasingly questionable.48 It is necessary to continue to develop 
critical forms that reflect Burgin’s account that acknowledge not only objects that 
might  be  hard  to  incorporate  within  an  art historical  context -  and  of course  of 
particular significant in this instance are forms of literature and text -  but also to 
recognise  that  the  category  boundaries  of  art  and  its  fields  are  necessary  for 
sustaining and engaging with the all that might fall within its associated fields. Art 
may  be  incorporated  into  a  larger  sense  of material  culture,  but  it  is  a  distinct 
category within it. I’d like to suggest that to make this substitution is actually to act 
upon Preziosi’s propositional description: ‘A disciplinary account that attends to all 
this -  whether we name that art history or not -  would itself be worth attending to.’49 
This thesis is a tentative and exploratory attempt to do just this.
As  stated earlier, there is a tendency for writing influenced  by encounters 
between art and anthropology to emphasise notions of ethnographic gaze or an ethics 
of observation/participation,  as  well  as  privileging oppositions  of difference  and 
alterity. Here I  am not talking about the practices of artists as such, which are of 
course  generators of meaningful  forms  of material  culture.  Rather I  am drawing 
attention to some discursive responses around practice, such as Susanne Kuechler’s 
writing on Sophie Calle (an example of the possible reflexivity of anthropological 
discourse -  an anthropologist writing about art) or Mi won Kwon’s identitfication of 
an  ethnographic  approach  in  the  works  of Lan Tuazon  and  Nikki  S.  Lee  (an  art
30historian  interpreting art with an anthropological  twist to its form/content).50 This 
latter example  is characteristic  of a kind  of borrowing of forms from one to the 
other, adding both some frisson to the proceedings, as well as drawing on the exotic 
other as a form of legitimising authority. This is in no small part due to the influence 
of the work of James Clifford, and in particular The Predicament of Culture,5 1  which 
traces  specific  historical  relationships between art, ethnography and ethnological 
object,  but  also  sets  out  to  trace  and  evoke  a  more  general  global  terrain  of 
representation and responsibility determined by mutable encounters with otherness.
The dominant characterisation of art’s relevance to anthropology, and vice 
versa, is critiqued in Hal Foster’s ‘The Artist as Ethnographer’.52 Foster’s scathing 
essay  denounces  a  quasi-anthropological  scenario  of unreflective  practices  and 
discourses. The object of his critique is what Foster describes as an ‘ethnographic 
paradigm’,  identifiable  during  the  1980s  and  90s  in  contemporary  art  and  its 
interpretative confabulations. This paradigm is structurally similar to a model taken 
from Walter Benjamin’s ‘The Author as Producer’. While Benjamin demands that 
artists transform the techniques of media and force change  in the  apparatuses  of 
culture in order to side with the proletariat, Foster suggests that the ethnographer 
paradigm has seen the displacement of the social with the cultural/anthropological, 
class and capitalist oppression replaced by race and colonialist oppression.  While 
this  is  valuable  in  identifying  the  apparatus  to  transform  as  the  exclusionary 
institutions of art, and the articulation of struggles made in the name of the culturally 
and  ethnic  other,  Foster  finds  the  paradigm  ultimately  problematic.  This  is 
problematic not just in the act of displacement -  displacing the social and economic 
-  but also in the un-reflexive essentialising of race and otherness. The politics of 
alterity can  be  made to form  an  uncritical  core of practice and discourse.  Foster 
reminds us that we must question the ‘realist assumption’, the automatic coding of 
essentialised  identity.  Engagements  in  the  ethnographic  paradigm  must  retain  a 
sense of the  historical,  and develop an  unfaltering  sense  of reflexivity.  As  I  will 
describe subsequently, this is an important notion to retain in a reading of The Time 
Machine, both as a general set of methodoligcal approaches, but also that the coding
31of essential!sed identity will emerge as a significant quality of the novel’s sense of 
materiality and material culture.
An  exception  amongst  the  tendency  for  engagements  between  art  and 
anthropology  to  privilege  a  sense  of the  artist  as  ethnographer  paradigm  exists 
amongst the series of publications and projects undertaken by Neil Cummings and 
Marysia Lewandowska, which have managed to establish an engagement between 
art and anthropology through an explicit emphasis on material culture. This is in part 
carried out through the extension of their practice as artists into forms of critical 
writing, and the production of books as either the work as singular object of practice, 
or a component of a project.  In  1997, they curated Collected, an exhibition at the 
Photographers’  Gallery in London, which included work in a number of different 
locations outside the gallery. Their own contribution to the show was a small leaflet 
entitled  Browse.  In  its  original  form,  Browse  was  available,  as  a  kind  of free 
promotional guide, in both Selfridges and the British Museum.  In their book,  The 
Value  of Things,  the  pamphlet  has  been  adapted  and  reproduced  as  a  chapter, 
demonstrating with efficacy the central premise of the book: the close proximity of 
the  department  store  and  the  museum  as  sites  that  organize  and  facilitate  an 
encounter with objects. Browse combines photographic images of carefully selected 
objects  from  Selfridges  and  the  British  Museum,  arranging  them  alongside  one 
another, destabilizing their familiarity and implicating their place within a broad, 
complex  set of processes and values.  A  pair of immaculate Dr Martins shoes are 
partnered by the remains of Roman boots, both pragmatically described in minimal 
terms and given dates. The Value of Things perhaps best represents the commitment 
of Cummings and Lewandowska to understandings of and engagement with material 
culture. They have also recognized that interpretive and analytical writing can be a 
part of contemporary art practice that is as relevant as showing gallery-based work. 
Their historical and theoretical research was developed in parallel to a huge archive 
of photographs  taken  in  both  institutions.  The  visual  material  and text  has  been 
arranged with particular attention to an overall design. While the contents pages look 
like a departmental map, the book itself is chaotic in its appearance and takes some 
getting use to. It is not possible to read it directionally and uninterrupted from cover
32to  cover.  Texts  are  subdivided,  sometimes  with  two  or three  strands  across  two 
pages, as well as images and their captions. This is a space that must be navigated, 
rather than one that the reader is directed through. This suggests comparisons with 
potential  ways  of seeing  that  contradict the  ordered  narratives  of museums  and 
departments  stores.  It  also  suggests  a  phenomenally  orientated  manifestation  of 
materiality in acts of reading.
The  historical  sequence of the  book opens  with an account of the  British 
Museum  and  is  mirrored  further  on  by  a  subsequent  chapter that  addresses  the 
general history of the department store, leading up to the opening of Selfridges on 
Oxford Street in 1909 and its early development. This privileges a familiar narrative 
of ‘late modernity’, that the fabric and structures of our society are essentially an 
extension  of the  rapid  change  and  development  seen  throughout the  nineteenth 
century.  The  danger here  is  of presenting  a narrow  view  that only  recognized  a 
particular,  perhaps  over-familiar,  historical  trajectory.  However, the  narrative  of 
modernity is further complicated and multiplied by the possibilities that have been 
opened up by the systems of arrangement that shape the book as an object. Histories 
are  laid  out  in  parallel  sequences,  fractured  by  keyword  subheadings,  floating 
paragraphs  and  a  systematic  variety  of  formats,  with  the  overall  intention  of 
structuring  a  new  constellation  of elements,  brought together to form  a  specific 
perspective that can help to describe a present moment of confusion.
The stories of both museum and shop are punctuated and contextualized by 
an intriguing series of interruptions. Most explicitly, they are partnered respectively 
by sections on the Great Exhibition of 1851  and the First World War, ideological 
breaks  in  the  narratives  of the  museum,  commodities  and  a  broader  history  of 
material culture. The Great Exhibition helped forge a modem understanding of the 
concepts of display, spectacle, surveillance and commodity, determining the form of 
the  modern  museum  and  gallery  as  well  as  spaces  of  commerce,  denying  the 
possibility of conceptually separating these sites. The First World War has long been 
recognized  as  a  tear  in  the  psychic  and  social  fabric  of  history  that  violently 
separated the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Within this story, it is also the end 
of the nineteenth century as the first great era of industrialized material expansion.
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to its temporary closure. When it reopened, the Museum is pictured as a nineteenth- 
century institution that is out of touch with the new social and cultural environment. 
The old department stores were also increasingly threatened as the economic climate 
changed. The war ensured the end of a model of culture disseminated by museums 
and department stores that was built around stable hierarchies of knowledge. These 
inflexible institutions relied on the consistency of their public, principles that were 
destabilized, along with many other certainties, by the trauma of the war. Cummings 
and Lewandowska sustain this sense of inadequacy until the 1980s when the policies 
of Thatcherism attempted to sever the link between state and cultural institutions in 
favour of a market orientation.  The museum moves towards the store, while in  a 
parallel  development, the dinosaur-like department store, under threat from more 
efficient retail operations, reverted to the spectacle of its origins, dazzling visitors 
with displays of lifestyle choices.
Despite  the  promise  of a  richly  detailed  historical  constellation,  it  is  the 
present moment that is really being addressed. These narratives are employed as a 
practical device, the whole functioning as a kind of handbook for encountering our 
densely layered environment. The sites chosen for analysis become the focus for an 
attempt to  understand  a  broader culture  that  seems  incomprehensible.  Although 
providing a set of poignant descriptions, Cummings and Lewandowska fall short of 
employing, in a substantial manner, some of the disciplines that would appear to be 
useful in theorizing this field and that have obviously informed and influenced their 
work, such as psychoanalysis, anthropology and post-structuralist thought. However, 
material  culture  -  here  understood  as  objects,  the  institutions  in  which  they  are 
gathered, interpreted and sold, history, social forms, interpretation, value, desire - is 
articulated through  the  book as  it operates  as  an  accomplished  research  project, 
encountering  the  British  Museum  and  Selfridges  and  the  presentation  of  that 
fieldwork  within  a  broader theoretical  and  historical  context.  The  visual  impact 
generated by this is, at its best, remarkable and demonstrates the successful  use of 
both image, text and the very object of the book as part of a critical and engaging art 
practice  that  never  ceases  to  concern  itself  with  its  surroundings.  The  whole
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articulated as a model for reform, but might more fully realise the notion of artist as 
ethnographer.  Foster argues that the spatial logic of postmodernism, visible in the 
themes and territories of exploration predominantly characterised  by a politics of 
alterity, must be tempered by an intersecting temporal axis. This might be enough to 
rescue a practice or discourse from quasi-anthropology and restore some sense of 
Benjamin’s  historical  avant-garde.  The  Value  of Things is historical, as well  as 
spatial,  in  its  analysis,  and  certainly  makes  reflexivity  a  central  device  of  its 
operation. Yet more significantly, it demonstrates an ability to discursively articulate 
material culture outside of an anthropological context but in a manner that does not 
restrict the field of the work within its originary disciplinarity -  that is, coming from 
a fine art context.
The  Value of Things demonstrates an unorthodox possibility for a complex 
engagement with material culture.  Yet it is one that although a book, is closer to 
forms of art’s practice than its theory. Nevertheless, I would argue that it is still the 
closest form of approach to material culture that can serve as a direct precedent for 
this thesis. While the form of the thesis is far more conventional than Cummings and 
Lewandowska’s skilful use of book design, text and image, it is far more radical in 
its choice of object. The case 1  wish to make for a discussion of material culture, 
through  a  reading  of Wells’s  novel,  is  not  that  objects  possess  communicative 
properties  or  can  be  read  as  capable  of transmitting  meaning.  While  I  will  be 
building upon traditions of writing that have asserted how  such meanings can be 
read, and what sort of messages things might be capable of suggesting, this thesis is 
actually  concerned,  through  a  specific  act  of  critical  reading,  with  how  an 
understanding of material culture might function as an interpretative tool for looking 
at a range of objects and cultural forms.
The preoccupation with material culture that this thesis articulates, and the 
disciplinary context of the thesis’s writing, must be recognised as being within the 
field  of fine  art.  I  am  operating  with  an  understanding that historical  notions  of 
material culture are common to the development of art history and theory as a field 
of enquiry, but also that material culture is a useful way of conceiving of artworks
35and their place within a broader set of cultural  contexts. This is in part articulate 
through the parallel  histories of The  Value  of Things,  but,  as discussed,  is more 
explicitly addressed by Preziosi5 3 and also by Matthew  Rampley’s ‘Anthropology at 
the Origins of Art History’.54 Art, or at least a limited understanding of modernism 
and its variations, could be thought of as a bounded yet diverse category of material 
culture,  one  that  functions  accordingly  within  that  category,  but  not  as  a  set 
autonomous objects -  and it is important not to assume that artworks can always be 
characterised as objects rather than cultural forms in an expanded sense - isolated 
from a larger sense of the culture in which they exist.
My own engagement with such objects, as well as with forms from related 
but  external  spaces,  is  often  as  -   perhaps  for  want  of a  better term  -  a  critic.5 5 
Criticism, as an act of reading and of generative interpretation, is central within the 
imaginative core of this thesis, although not its primary theme.  Nevertheless, this 
thesis is an attempt to think about acts of reading which cannot be alienated from 
criticism, as a method that can reflect and articulate forms of material culture, rather 
than  obscure them.  Henri  Focillon  described  artworks  as forms that rise  proudly 
above forms of interpretation thrust upon them. A work of art ‘serves to illustrate 
history, man and the world itself, it goes further than this: it creates man, creates the 
world and sets up within history an immutable order.’56 Focillon concedes that under 
such conditions a wilderness of criticism may spread up around an artwork: ‘flowers 
of interpretation that do not adorn, but completely conceal.’57 In response, I would 
like to suggest the need for acts of criticism that attend to forms of material culture - 
those things that create the world - which can help to illuminate, reveal, and engage 
with forms that are profoundly generative.
Criticism is, I would like to suggest, a necessary term to sustain, as opposed 
to a singular reliance upon its sibling, theory.  As Joseph Leo Koerner states, the 
etymological root of ‘theory’, the Greek theoros, denotes ‘spectator’.58 This might 
imply notions of passivity and distance, of looking to, and from, afar.59 In contrast, I 
would like to assert that criticism, and its root ‘critic’, allow us to think of krinein -  
to ‘judge’ or ‘decide’. Judgement and decision are, I would argue, issues of urgency 
in reading and interpreting the objects that fall within an analytical gaze. Similarly,
36they are issues that I wish to bind to an understanding of material culture. And while 
this  text may  be  read  as  an  act  of literary  criticism,  I  would  like  to  suggest an 
expanded notion of criticism, that is coextensive to, and dependent on, an expanded 
sense of material culture and its relationship to text.
In order to frame an introduction to the issue of criticism, I would like to 
recall a recent event at London’s Tate Modem to launch the book Art Since  1900: 
Modernism, Antimodernism, Postmodernism.™ This is a useful point to introduce 
early  in thesis,  as  it will  open  up not only  a discussion on  criticism,  but help to 
suggest a context for both the spectral presence of art in this thesis, and of the shared 
tradition of thinking about material culture, as it casts its shadows over art history, as 
well as the other fields of enquiry that constitute i t . As one of the book’s authors, 
Rosalind Krauss provided a significant reminder of her actual role and of that of her 
fellow co-authors -  Yve-Alain Bois, Benjamin Buchloh and Hal Foster. Her claim, 
was that it was misleading to think of this esteemed panel as art historians as such, 
but rather that it should  be  acknowledged  that they are also,  and  predominantly, 
practicing critics, who still publish regularly as such within the pages of Artforum 
magazine, the journal October,61 and elsewhere. That these four figures, who have 
now provided a weightily authoritative history of twentieth-century art in their own 
terms,  should be seen as critics, seems  significant.  It does, after all, reinforce the 
distinction between  ‘spectator’  and  ‘judge’. Through their influential  writing and 
editorial pre-eminence, they have participated in and helped shape an art history as 
an expanded discipline, which has arguably embraced, adapted, fostered, distorted, 
abused  and  advanced  aspects  of  areas  of  thought  such  as  structuralism, 
poststructuralism,  Marxism,  feminism,  psychoanalysis,  and  postcolonialism.6 2 
Krauss seeks to remind her audience that her role in this theoretical terrain, and in 
relation to the artworks she discusses, is as much as critic as it is as historian.
Such a claim should not come as a surprise to attentive readers of Krauss’s 
work.  Indeed,  it is important to remember that her now  seminal  ‘Sculpture in the 
Expanded Field’ written in 1978, and first published in October in 1979, focused on 
practices that were recent at the time of writing,  such as a work by  Mary  Miss - 
Perimeters/Pavillions/Decoys -  from the year the article was written. It is only really
37historical in its temporal distance from us in the present. I will return to this essay 
subsequently in the thesis to discuss its relationship to methodologies of thinking 
about  material  culture.  However,  for  now  it  is  Krauss’  short  text  from  1981, 
‘Poststructuralism and the Paraliterary’, which provides a more useful and explicit 
discussion of criticism. Krauss is writing not about artworks, but what she describes 
as the ‘paraliterary’ in a discussion about poststructuralism and its perceived threat 
to literature. Like Krauss, I would also suggest that this account, once a response to a 
present  condition,  now  a  historical  precedent,  ‘is  of  much  wider  conceptual 
interest’,6 3 than to a hermetic field of literature and literary criticism, which as a 
generalised  discipline  is  identified  and  defined  by  its  fear  of  structuralist  and 
poststructuralist critical  theory,  and  ‘the  deepening technocratization of graduate 
studies’64. Rather, Krauss’ very suggestion of a  paraliterary space is that of a general 
and constructive use of structuralist and poststructuralist writing. The later work of 
Barthes, she writes, cannot be called either criticism or non-criticism:
Rather,  criticism  finds  itself  caught  in  a  dramatic  web  of  many  voices,
citations, asides, divigations. And what is created, as in the case of much of
Derrida, is a kind of paraliterature.65
The paraliterary space that Krauss describes is one that is now familiar to acts of 
reading, whether they be of texts as conventionally understood, or objects that may 
be  read  as  texts.  It  is  the  space  of  ‘debate,  quotation,  partisanship,  betrayal, 
reconciliation’.66 It is certainly an important description, and one that I recognise 
both  enacted  in  the  material  world  that constitutes  The  Time  Machine, and as a 
general principle by which artworks may be interpreted.
That an object or text not correspond to ‘the space of unity, coherence, or 
resolution that we think of as constituting the work of literature’ certainly seems an 
obvious possibility now, as does the procedure of Barthes’ writing in S/Z taking on a 
hallucinatory  slowness  in  the  unravelling  of the  codes  of  Balzac’s  Sarrasine. 
However, this clearly  needed  some more persuasive handling in  North American 
academic realms in  1980, a fact that should persuasively make the case that such
38discussions and the modes of reading made available by them have become taken for 
granted.  The  descriptive  action  performed  by  Krauss  in  arranging  Barthes  and 
Derrida within the  context of her discussion is as follows:  if modernist literature 
demanded reflection upon the conditions of its construction, insisting on reading as a 
critical act,  ‘then it is not surprising that the medium of a postmodernist literature 
should be the critical text wrought into paraliterary form. And what is clear is that 
Barthes and Derrida are the writers, not the critics, that students now read.’67 Both 
Barthes and Derrida are formative presences that haunt my text, but whose verifiable 
presences might be more elusive.  Nevertheless, implicit in the thesis is a move to 
view  them as critics -  an act that also suggests a reminder and recovery of their 
status  as  critics.  This  is  therefore  an  attempt  to  rethink  such  paraliterary 
engagements in general. To read, for example, the work of both Barthes and Derrida 
not as a set of slightly exotic forms of paratliterary writing, but in terms of how their 
work may still suggest forms that can operate as, and inform, acts of criticism.
Krauss’  assertion  that  she  and  her  colleagues  are  in  fact  critics  perhaps 
reflects an anxiety recently described by Foster, one which  suggests a crisis, and 
therefore a sense of urgency in the need to address the status and possibilities of 
criticism:
The art critic is an endangered species. In cultural reviews in North America 
and Western Europe one finds writers moonlighting as critics, artists switch- 
hitting as the same, or philosophers unwinding, but almost no one tagged as 
‘art critic’  pure and simple. Odder still is that art critics are fairly scarce in 
prominent art magazines like Artforum.  What has happened to this figure 
that, only a generation or two ago, strode through the cultural landscape with 
the force of a Clement Greenberg or a Harold Rosenberg?68
To simplify this question and facilitate a rather flippant response, it could be said 
that this image itself perpetuates a resistance to the figure of the critic, and further 
endangers the species. Perhaps it is the result of my having spent too long immersed 
in literatures of the fantastic in researching this thesis, but Foster’s account suggests
39notions  of gigantic  and  monstrous  creatures,  dinosaurs,  literally  embodying  the 
metaphorical suggestion that such things as art critics be extinct.
The image is an apt one in beginning to respond to Foster’s problem.  It is 
precisely this notion of the extinction of a particular form of critic, predominantly as 
formalist, that suggests that writing about art needs to be addressed in a different 
manner. Greenberg and Rosenberg have been subject to a degree of often irrational 
opposition  in  the  last  four  decades,  becoming  very  much  the  thing  in  which 
discursive strategy or position is placed in relation to (As discussed by Bois69). In 
particular, within the historical North American trajectory evoked by Foster, Donald 
Judd’s text  ‘Specific  Objects’70 seems particularly noteworthy. Not only does it 
serve  as  a  reminder that artists  were  established  writers  of criticism  in  the  mid 
1960s,  but  demonstrates  that  extant  and  dominant  forms  of  criticism  failed  to 
recognise and respond to the works that artists were making, and that new forms of 
vocabulary and interpretation were require to respond to new types of objects.
Foster’s  question  falls  short  of  really  addressing  the  situation  and  the 
proposed crises of criticism.711  would like to argue that there are two significant 
omissions  that  would  be  useful  to  explore  here.  Both  are  straightforward,  un- 
contentious, and constitute formative principles in the fields of both forms visual 
culture/art  historical  analysis,  and  more  disciplinarily  conventional  studies  of 
material culture. The first of these comes from Roland Barthes’  essay from  1968, 
‘The Death of the Author’.72 Foster seems to have omitted, perhaps because of its 
age  and  very  obviousness,  one  of the  critical  and  theoretical  devices  that  have 
shaped his conundrum.  It is Barthes, after all, who suggests that to destabilise the 
mythic and ideological form of the author is also to bring about an end of the reign 
of the critic as uncontested arbiter of judgement and interpretation.
The second omission is one already raised by  Burgin and Preziosi  in this 
thesis, and that is the need to acknowledge that Foster’s account must be seen within 
a broader set of concerns, which can be identified as a cultural field as understood by 
Pierre Bourdieu.7 3 This is an intellectual field that is both comparable to a economic 
one, but that is also in part economic in nature, and which reorganises the role of 
cultural  producer within  it.  As  the field’s  definitions,  conditions  and  boundaries
40change,74 so do the roles of producer, be they artist, critic, curator,  gallerist,
educator, or, as is often the case, a combination of any number of these.75 Bourdieu’s 
notion  of cultural  fields,  one  of which  might  constitute  the  general  category  of 
contemporary  art,  inform  the  methodology  of this  thesis.  While  this  aspect  of 
Bourdieu’s work  does not refer specifically to ways of reading artefacts -  unlike his 
structuralist reading of a Kabyle house as divided into symbolic regions of male and 
female76 -  it is nonetheless essential for understanding artworks as contextualised 
rather than essential forms, and for thinking of a broader set of relationships between 
different aspects of material culture. It does so by placing art in relation to, as well as 
within, a set of other fields, suggesting both connections and structural homologies.77
Such an oversimplification, as sketched out be Foster, of the economic and 
ideological landscape of art’s production, distribution and interpretation, is bound to 
lead to caricature, which is precisely what Alex Coles provides with a deliberately 
absurd  image  of the  art  critic  as  bathroom  critic,  evoking  the  fictional  Waldo 
Lydecker, penning his vitriolic newspaper column from a tub overflowing with soap 
suds. The real-life counterparts of Lydecker were superseded by what Coles refers to 
as the  critic  of the  study.  The  difference,  he  argues,  is one  of how  the  art work 
appears in the text. Or rather, it is how the critic is positioned in the act of writing:
(...)the difference turns on how the critic relates to the artwork through the 
texture  and  tenor  of  their  prose.  While  the  bathroom  critic  shuffles  in 
parallax with the work, the critic of the study just stands still in front of it. As 
with their attire, the critic's posture is vital to their output.78
Coles’s account is simplistic, and does little more than caricature the so called critic 
of the  study,  which  he  sees  as  a  stilted form  of writing  dependent on  academic 
practice. Criticism, he suggests somewhat literally, is always limited to the printed 
page, while art is able to adapt and exploit new forms of media and technology. He 
likens this situation to be like as if artists were ‘forever confined to canvas and oil 
paint’.79 The critic, he suggests, always lags behind the potentially radical and 
innovative forms that an art object can take. This is account displays characteristic of
41both amnesia and myopia. It is forgetful of the very forms of criticism that Krauss 
makes the focus of her paraliterary discourse, which recognises the technological 
possibilities  of theory  in  writing,  and  too  short  sighted  to  recognise  that  such 
engagements with theoretical and academic writing are the discourse that allow such 
a conversation about criticism to take place. Art practice is given the privilege of 
radical status, whereas criticism seems in nature to be essentially divorced from any 
other forms  of radical,  and  critical,  thought.  This  is  not only to  ignore forms  in 
which text can  be considered and  written,  but also to  ignore the  voices that can 
speak,  particularly in  relation to issues, for example,  of gender, race, nationality, 
class, sexuality.
While he berates the generalised caricature of the academic critic, there is at 
least some degree of a concession to academic criticism, that such issues have been 
made problematic, or addressed, in the first place. Coles says this is the motive for 
critics  either proceeding  towards  academicism,  or towards  a  kind  of journalistic 
sloppiness. Either way: ‘ensuring something of the gist of the artwork finds its way 
into  the  register  of the  writing  has  become  increasingly  rare.’80 This simplistic 
relationship, does, however, get to the point of this thesis, which is itself a call for 
criticism,  or an  attempt to employ  a  methodology  of criticism,  that does  indeed 
allow  the work to  suggest its interpretation, rather than  impose either theoretical 
schema, or tight methodological formula, upon an object. Another recent challenge 
to processes of decisive interpretation, one that suggests that the reading of (art) 
objects must privilege some more direct forms of engagement, has been made by 
Mark Wilsher (in an article mentioned towards the beginning of this chapter). This is 
of particular interest here as it offers an intersection between approaches to criticism 
(and a more general  attitude to artworks) and notions of material culture and the 
ways in which objects may be thought to signify. It has something to offer as a call 
against a kind of over-determined approach to reading objects. That rather, objects 
should be acknowledge as generator of their readings.
His argument is that acts of interpretation and explanation, whether they 
come from artists, or a stigmatized version of a writer of ‘theory’, have an impeding
42effect on the ways in which artworks might be encountered and experienced. This is 
at odds with what Wilsher sees as an inalienable quality of art practice:
‘From seeing images in stains on the wall to embracing playfulness and risk
more generally, the role of the artist is one that naturally incorporates large
amounts of managed undecidability.’8 1
For Wilsher,  art must be allowed this  sense of play,  and that in contrast,  acts of 
explanation are deadening.  Yet his notion of play, of audiences  being allowed to 
make their own interpretations, is simplistic. It firstly suggests that individuals are 
able to act independently, uninfluenced by any other epistemological, ideological or 
intstitutional factors, as long as they aren’t provided with anything that constitutes 
either  an  explanatory  or  interpretative  opinion.  Secondly,  in  an  unlikely 
contradiction,  it also suggests that art-viewing  subjects are incapable of thinking 
anything other than what such an interpretative account may be, that they can only 
think what they are told,  whether in the  briefest of explanations or in  theoretical 
extrapolations.  Instead,  Wilsher  argues  for  a  form  of vagueness,  which  itself is 
frustratingly vague.
He criticises an extraordinarily undefined field of ‘art theory’  as trying to 
account for that which cannot be articulated by language. In doing so, he claims that 
it restricts and attempts to contain anything that might be seen as either dangerous or 
attractive.  He  makes  another disturbing  generalisation  in  claiming  that  what  he 
describes as ‘academic cultural theory’ has, it needs to be recognised, been proved 
inadequate  and  run  its  course.  This  is  disturbing  not just  in  its  formless,  and 
boundless, scope, but the force of its negation. He rests this argument upon Gavin 
Butt’s  recent  book After  Criticism,  which  Wilsher  reads  as  an  account  of  the 
ossification of postmodern undecidability. Wilsher’s reading of Butt echoes Krauss’s 
discussion  of  paraliterary  forms.  This  time  though,  the  argument  lacks  any  of 
Krauss’s  sense of critique and utility, and instead forms a rather muddy account, 
citing Butt in describing the generalised matter of a theory as ‘a body of work that is 
renowned for its destruction of authorial value’ which ‘comes to be accredited with
43precisely such forms of authority’.82 Quite where this notion of ‘deconstruction of 
authorial value’ is drawn is unclear, and provides little insight into the relationships 
between artworks and text.
There  is  also  a  fundamental  misunderstanding  about  the  readability  of 
artworks. Wilsher feels it is necessary for the artist to say nothing in order to allow 
the artwork to  speak, to leave all  avenues open, as if interpretation is impossible 
against the stated intentions of the artist.  Perhaps Wilshire needs to actually read 
some of that ‘theory’ which he seems to think has passed through its encounter with 
art. It is precisely his lack of specificity that reveals the same problematic conditions 
that he is describing.  He is failing to acknowledge his objects of criticism, which 
here  are  text  based  discourses  generalised  as  some  abstract  notion  of  ‘theory’. 
Perhaps  Wilsher’s  argument  is  most  useful  in  that it could  be  read  to  suggest a 
category of cultural object for artworks, for marking out something that is different 
about  artworks,  that  they  are  best  served  by  a  recognition  of  a  resistance  to 
interpretation.  This  could  constructively  be  thought  of  as  contributing  to  an 
understanding of the boundaries that define artworks and differentiate them from 
other forms of material culture.
In response to Wilsher, Peter Suchin cites Barthes from The Responsibility of 
Forms: ‘Meaning sticks to man’,8 3 reiterating the obvious, that meaning is inevitable, 
unavoidable, and he rejects Wilsher’s simplistic position:
Strong work is not destroyed by its destroyed by its engagement with critical 
theory;  it  may  in  fact  be  opened  up,  energised,  reinscribed  with  new 
meanings through such an encounter whilst avoiding reduction to any single 
definition. If a particular work can be explained away by theory then it can 
hardly be claimed to have that supposedly indefinable quality which allows it 
to resist ‘being put into words’.84
However,  Suchin  shifts  the  emphasis  of  the  discussion  and  points  out  that 
relationships between art and textual interpretation need to be placed within a recent
44historical context, that in Britain since the  1960s, art education has been orientated 
to come closer into line with university degrees, establishing a move that ‘meant that 
art history and, in due course,  ‘theory’, became an inescapable component of art 
school  studies.’85  Suchin is critical of the fine art PhD, as a culmination of 
theoretical,  written  work,  and  studio-based  practice.  Ultimately,  he  reads  it  as 
symptomatic of ideological structures within higher education institutions and:
the radical redefinition of research that has taken place within the university 
context within the last few years. The word no longer means sitting in the 
library pouring over books and learned journals or getting information and 
resources for the making of a work of art. Rather, research is now that which 
results from these and related activities, the product or ‘outcome’ of practice, 
and not its basic conditions of possibility. If it doesn’t generate money in the 
Research Assessment Exercise then, these days, it just isn’t ‘research’.86
Suchin is justified in emphasising a shift in the meaning of ‘research’ from process 
to product -  in particular as the kind of product that constitutes research in an art 
context has generated much intellectual  and practical  activity that feels distinctly 
artificial. There is also now a dubious sense of arbitrational power wielded by those 
who control the forms of distinction that validate the genuine and therefore money- 
generating forms of research. However, his account falls short of a more balanced 
understanding of the issues raised in his discussion. For one thing, Suchin fails to 
acknowledge that this actually enables and encourages much varied activity within 
art schools. More importantly, he fails to acknowledge that generally, one of these 
factors  precipitates  the  other,  that  in fact  in  order to  achieve  the  outcomes  that 
constitute ‘research’ in this way, there will have been much of the studious activity 
that he  describes,  as  well  as  recognising  that the  ‘work’  that  artists  and  writers 
actually do may take forms other the most direct forms of production.
Perhaps more significantly, Suchin concentrates his discussion on practice- 
based  doctorates,  and  fails  to  acknowledge  that  alongside  these  are  written 
doctorates within the same courses, which demand as much as they would in any
45other discipline.  In fact,  the  issue  of discipline  is  an  important and  problematic 
factor, that without the relationship to practice, there is no disciplinary framework 
for  a  thesis-only  doctorate  taken  in  an  art  department  or  art  school.  This  very 
destabilization  of  discipline  resonates  with  the  apparent  need  to  rethink  how 
artworks  can  relate to theory  and  interpretation.  Here,  the  potential  of a fine  art 
doctorate resonates with Hal Foster’s description of his own recent methodological 
ambition:  ‘not to  impose  theory  on  art,  but to  see  how  one  might  implicate  the 
other’.87  While some projects may take on the form of an art historical thesis as a 
model, many theses are engaged in a performative act of constituting new forms of 
disciplinary engagement and configuration. This of course leads to contention and 
disagreement about what the aims and outcomes of a thesis may be,  but offers a 
valuable space for innovative research and thought -  and perhaps acts of criticism - 
in  ways  that  employ,  exploit,  abuse  and  cross  disciplinary  and  intellectual 
boundaries, and perhaps ultimately help to rethink them.
46Chapter 2: Text and Utopia, Materiality and Portent.
Imagine yourself looking out onto a silent landscape of verdant hills and lush 
vegetation, punctuated by magnificent yet seemingly derelict palaces. After having 
embarked  on  a  perilous journey  and  travelling far,  perhaps further than  anyone 
before, you have found yourself, as much by accident than design, in this uncharted 
place. You are effectively alone here, or at least the only one of your kind. This land 
is disturbingly strange and unfamiliar, its alterity emphasised by the great distance 
traversed. Yet although different, it still has some kind of vital connection to your 
point of origin, and forces you to think as much of home as of the scene before you.
This sketch relates to a particular form of narrative contrivance.  It fits into 
the specific tradition of utopian fiction; not so much a loosely defined genre as it is a 
uncanny and recurring spectre. Alternatively it could be seen as a kind of chronic 
hunger that nags away from within the history of social reflection. Or maybe this 
type of persistent fantasy could be seen as a form of that universal  peculiarity of 
human  experience  and  desire  -  the  overstepping  of  boundaries.88 All of these 
possibilities  evoke  Ernst  Bolch’s  resolute  commitment  to  an  understanding  of 
utopia,  or  more  specifically  a  utopian  impulse,  as  a  mode  of observation  and 
interpretation. Bloch’s work has come to form something of a foundation for those 
engaged in utopia studies. This loosely defined field’s most well-known proponent is 
Fredric Jameson, who advocates Bloch’s writing in determining the possibility of 
utilising utopia:
Bloch posits a Utopian impulse governing everything future-orientated in life 
and culture; and encompassing everything from games to patent medicines, 
from myths to mass entertainment, from iconography to technology, from 
architecture to eros, from tourism to jokes and the unconscious.89
However,  Jameson  detects  a  hermeneutic  problem  in  Bloch’s  near  universal 
recognition of the utopian impulse. What happens when the object being interpreted
47is actually in a utopian form? The interpretative principle that Bloch articulated in 
The Principle of Hope (1959) is, according to Jameson, at its most effective when 
unveiling the utopian  impulse as  something concealed  within  unlikely  locations. 
How, then, might this impulse be read within more explicit articulations of utopia? 
Is the interpretation of the future no longer necessary when addressing a text that 
looks  directly  to  that  which  might  take  place  far  from  now?  The  problem  is 
articulated by Jameson as a hermeneutic paradox, which he likens to that faced by 
Freud when seeking to identify prior analytic forms of considering the relationship 
of dreams to waking life.  ‘[H]e finally identified one obscure aboriginal tribe for 
whom all dreams had sexual meanings -  except for overtly sexual dreams as such, 
which meant something else.’90 Jameson then suggests the positing of two branches 
of utopian thought that can be viewed as distinct.
This  is  a  useful  act  of  differentiation,  in  that  it  helps  to  separate  the 
specificity of Bloch’s hermeneutics from a more general recognition of a thematic 
and quotidian understanding of utopia as relating to ill-considered, over ambitious 
and  unrealisable  forms  of social  organisation.  Yet  I  would  like  to  suggest  that 
Jameson’s  opposition  might  be  a  somewhat  artificial  and  ultimately  flimsily 
constructed opposition. Rather than focus on the utopian impulse exclusively in its 
more covert expression, as Jameson argues, perhaps the world of utopian fantasy 
that is evoked by my introductory sketch above might be a site where impulse and 
self-conscious reflection are as indivisible as the interior and exterior of Benjamin’s 
rolled-up socks. Johanne Lamoureux points out that Progress is defined by Diderot’s 
and Alembert’s Encylopedie as a ‘movement toward the future’.9 1  But above is a 
scenario  in which  while  progress  is  longed for,  the future  inverts the  seemingly 
irreversible character of progress. This allows for an alternate form of thinking about 
progress, that is not imperative or positivist, but that facilitates an active tension that 
plays on hope and the possibility of change. Utopia as impulse is subject to an active 
form of reflection, as both a  ‘within’  (in the form of text) and from a position of 
authorial exteriority (context).
The specific fantasy of the future under discussion here is, of course,  one 
invented by H.G. Wells at the end of the nineteenth century. Consistently engaged in
48shaping ideas relating to modes of social reform, Wells’s career was animated by the 
appearance of utopias.92 These both mirrored his idiosyncratic brand of socialism 
and stepped beyond it as his futuristic visions took their re-arrangement of society to 
severe extremes. Politically, he appears as a confused and confusing figure, but the 
sustained,  urgent  and  ultimately  hopeful  presence  of  utopias  suggests  some 
consistency amongst contradictory elements. To a degree, Wells’s utopian thinking 
has been sullied irrevocably by his enthusiasm for eugenics as a solution to what he 
identified  as  degenerative forces  at work amongst working class  populations.  In 
Anticipations (1901) he went even further with this disturbing tendency, targeting 
non-European  races  with  the  same  disdain  as  he  did  the  poor  of  London,  and 
suggested that they too were in need of purification. Without specifying as much, the 
implication  is  inescapably  a  genocidal  solution.9 3 As if such thinking wasn’t 
controversial enough, Wells’s thoughts on processes of genetic cleansing have been 
framed by their realisation in Nazi ideology and the atrocities of the Holocaust -  the 
twentieth century’s most appalling realisation of utopian thought.
Yet perhaps it is unfair to characterise Wells’s legacy in terms of such an 
interpretation.  Indeed, I would argue that rather than let the spectre of this racism 
prohibit the discussion of Wells as the author of a generative model for hermeneutic 
practice, it is necessary to attend momentarily to A Modern  Utopia (1905).  Wells 
makes it clear that his will differ from many its predecessors in that it is a world 
utopia, ‘and so we must needs face the fact that we are to have differences of race.’94 
This is a discussion of utopia that posits as necessary the recognition and presence of 
alterity  that  is  as  startling  as  it  is  radical,  despite  a  somewhat  crude  form  of 
describing this variety:  ‘white and black, brown, red and yellow, all tints of skin, all 
types of body and character, will be there.’95 Wells was a pacifist and an egalitarian 
socialist  motivated  by  an  inalienable  sense  of  social  justice,  albeit  abiding  by 
standards of his own definition. Eugenics was a minor facet within Wells’s utopian 
discourse, which spanned the closing decades of the nineteenth century, and half of 
the  twentieth.  While  his  arcane  solutions  to the  world’s  ills  -  articulated  in  the 
speculative  Anticipations  (1901),  which  imagined the  necessary  possibility  of a 
world  state  -  may  have  (and  again  I  need  to  emphasise  the  speculative  and
49deliberatively provocative nature of the statement) endorsed compulsory sterilisation 
amongst the  masses,  he  also advocated  games  with  toy  soldiers.  In Little  Wars 
(1913),  he  set out a system of rules and  conditions for adults to  stage  miniature 
battles on the living room floor.  Written on the eve of the First World War, this 
wasn’t just a guide for a recreational hobby, but actually a proposed means of ending 
hostilities  between  the  nations  of the  world.  His  logic  was  that  if generals  and 
politicians were to play at war with toy soldiers, they would calculate the cost in life 
required for even the smallest manoeuvre. To see the price of war enacted in play, 
Wells argued, would eradicate its possible realisation in life.  However trivial  and 
ridiculous, viewed through the lens of the carnage that followed, his plea for peace 
through a diverting pastime stands out, bizarrely, in sharp clarity.
Patrick  Parrinder  provides  a  more  generous  account  of Wells’s  sense  of 
social responsibility and political engagement than I have so far suggested here:
By the  1920s, Wells was not only a famous author but a public figure whose 
name was rarely out of the newspapers. He briefly worked for the Ministry of 
Propaganda  in  1918,  producing  a  memorandum  on  war  aims  which 
anticipated the  setting-up of the League of Nations.  In  1922 and  1923  he 
stood for Parliament as a Labour candidate.  He sought to influence world 
leaders, including two US Presidents, Theodore Roosevelt and Franklin D. 
Roosevelt. His meeting with Lenin in the Kremlin in  1920 and his interview 
in  1934 with  Lenin’s  successor Josef Stalin  were  publicized  all  over the 
world. His high-pitched piping voice was often heard on BBC radio. In 1933 
he  was  elected  president of International  PEN,  the  writers’  organization 
campaigning  for  intellectual  freedom.  In  the  same  year  his  books  were 
publicly  burnt  by  the  Nazis  in  Berlin,  and  he  was  banned  from  visiting 
Fascist Italy.  His  ideas  strongly  influenced  the  Pan-European  Union,  the 
pressure group advocating European unity between the wars.96
Parrinder  usefully  provides  a  counter-balance  to  those  elements  that  seem 
indefensible  by  association  in  Wells’s  work.  Perhaps  more  importantly  here,
50Parrinder’s  emphasis  on  this  period  of Wells’s  life  makes  clear that  his fantasy 
writing must always be read in relation to his engagement with social reality, and in 
particular, as engaged in a lifelong exploration of utopian impulses.
Between  the  chilling  suggestions  of  genocide  and  the  endearingly 
preposterous little wars, Wells takes a reader of his utopian thought across a range of 
emotional responses. Like the totality of his written output, Wells’s utopian thought 
should  be  read  as  varied  and  complex,  determined  by  a  set  of  apparently 
contradictory impulses. These incongruous drives are, I would like to suggest, what 
is significant about the presence of utopian impulses within his writing. More than 
this, these impulses are characteristic of the contested and unstable nature of utopian 
thought itself, and possibly invest Wells’s utopian thinking with a critical potential. 
And it is with this in mind that I will attend to an early crystallization of Wells’s 
utopian  thought,  in  the  form  of  The  Time  Machine.  It  is  from  this  that  my 
introductory landscape-sketch is drawn, and in which rather than set out an idealised 
future,  he  sets  out to consider the  worst that  can  happen.  This  is  in  contrast to 
Wells’s  A  Modern  Utopia  which  lacks  the  formal  tightness  that  constitutes  an 
intensively rendered material world in The Time Machine. Wells positions the later 
work as an explicit articulation of his utopian desires, therefore I would argue that it 
lacks the complexity and critical potential that I would like to argue saturates the 
substance  of his  first  novel.  However,  I’d  also  like  to  suggest  that  Parrinder’s 
account  of  Wells’s  prolonged  effort  to  engage  in  political  debate  and  change 
retrospectively  transforms  The  Time  Machine from  a  narrative  of despair to a 
discourse of hope.
This  short novel was the first of a sequence - The  War of the Worlds, The 
Invisible Man,  The Island of Dr Moreau and The First Men in the Moon - written 
between 1895 and  1901, that he described as ‘Scientific Romances’. As a formative 
work of modem science fiction, it has an originary resonance. It precedes the forms 
of codification  that  populate  science  fiction  in  its  generic  forms  and  signal  its 
presence elsewhere. In particular, Wells’s novel exploits that essential element that 
Darko Suvin argues make possible the  ‘basis for a coherent poetics’97 of science 
fiction: the aspect of strange newness, or novum. Suvin distinguishes science fiction
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‘novum ’  (novelty,  innovation)  validated by  cognitive  logic'.98 As I shall argue 
subsequently,  Wells  configured  his  fantasies  according  to  a  very  particular 
arrangement of cognitive logic and fictional novum, and The Time Machine serves 
as a generative model for Suvin’s influential work on science fiction."
However, while The Time Machine may hold some claim as a template for 
subsequent science fiction  stories,  it would  be  misleading to overly  privilege  its 
ontological  status.  Rather,  it  is  worth first  recognising  the  quantity,  variety  and 
histories of fantastic and futuristic narratives, or early science fiction, that abounded 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.1 0 0  Patrick Brantlinger links this 
tendency within Victorian fiction to an ‘increasing explanatory power and hegemony 
of the  sciences’.1 0 1  As will become apparent, it needs to be stated that this is 
especially explicit in Wells’s scientific romances, given Wells’s scientific interests 
and activities prior to the writing of the novel. More generally, Brantlinger asserts 
that an  epistemology  and  mode of objectivity  popularised  as forms  of scientific 
method  became  an  analogue  for  novelistic  realism,  while  scientific  and 
technological  developments  spurred  on  forms  of narrative  outside  of the  realist 
paradigm. These are the texts that are now  identifiable as science fiction, closely 
related  to  a  tradition  of  non-realistic  narratives  -   particularly  those  relating  to 
fantastic  voyages  (For  example,  Swift’s  Gulliver's  Travels  (1726)),  but  more 
specifically  bound  to the  Gothic  Romance.  Frankenstein  (1818)  is  posited  by 
Brantlinger  the  ‘most  frequently  claimed  as  the  first  work  of  modern  science 
fiction’,1 0 2  which belongs clearly within its Gothic romance/horror genre. The 
presence of science fiction in the long nineteenth century is one that could be read in 
opposition to the dominance of realism and the format of the triple-decker novel. 
Brantlinger instead stages a conflict in  which the dominance of realism weakens 
towards  the  end  of  the  nineteenth  century,  resulting  in  a  vigorous  market  for 
romance  and fantasy  in the  1880s  and  1890s.  In this account, the demise  of the 
triple-decker  novel  is  mirrored  by  a  rise  of  mass-circulation  newspapers  and 
magazines, encouraging the writing of shorter stories and a tendency towards ‘non- 
realistic stories’.1 0 3  This conflict of fictions can be seen in action in the 1870s:
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various responses among novelists, some of whom wrote, instead of works of 
evolutionary  realism  or naturalism  such  as  George  Eliot’s  Middlemarch 
(1871),  stories  now  recognised  as  science-fiction  classics.  These  include 
Edward  Bulwer-Lytton’s  The  Coming Race  (1871)  and  Samuel  Butler’s 
Erewhon (1872). Several tales of future wars and dystopias also appeared in 
the  1870s, such as George Chesney’s The Battle of Dorking (1871). And in 
that decade,  Jules  Verne’s  works  began to  appear in  translation  (Twenty 
Thousand Leagues Under the Sea, for instance, in 1873).1 0 4
Alternatively,  Brantlinger’s  account  might  provide  a  view  of poles  of fictional 
possibility that indicate a less opposed and more contested possibility of text based 
fiction.  It  is  possible  to  assert  that  Wells  uses  a  scientific  paradigm  in  the 
constitution of his material world, not just as a source of evolutionary fantasy, but as 
an epistemological and methodological form of realism in the putting together of his 
material world. It is possible, that despite, as will be discussed subsequently, his own 
contrasting assertion  about the role of science as replacing the traditional  use of 
magic  in  stories, the epistemological  import of science on fiction is not alien to 
science  fiction.  His  is  an  approach  that in  Brantlinger’s  dichotomy  is  scientific, 
rather than  based  purely  upon the  use  of science  and  technology  as  a  source  of 
fantasy, but that it is clearly science fiction.
Yet, in order to comprehend the nature of the context for Wells’s work, and 
to further think through the dissolution of these oppositions asserted by Brantlinger, 
it is necessary to return to the issue of the scale of science fiction produced, not just 
in the last decades of the nineteenth century, but between the romantic period and 
World  War  I.  Brantlinger,  while  privileging  the  aforementioned  temporal  and 
generic  oppositions,  cites  Suvin  on  his  attempt  to  map  the  terrain  in  Victorian 
Science Fiction in the  UK.1 0 5  Suvin’s account is one that moves from expecting to 
undertake in the making visible an iceberg, the bulk of which lies hidden beneath the
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describes nineteenth-century science fiction as:
mountainous territory which still remains to some extent impenetrable and 
charted. The obvious high points are well-know: it is easy enough to map a 
mountain range from the air by noting those peaks which emerge from the 
clouds.’1 0 7
James  indicates  such  a  case  in  the  form  of Brian  Aldiss’s  survey,  Trillion  Year 
Spree,1 0 8  which proceeds from Mary Shelley’s  Frankenstein (1818), travels between 
Britain, France and America, to arrive at the safe and charted plateau of Wells. In 
opposition  to  this  James  suggests  that  the  landscape  has  only  gradually  been 
revealed, and he questions the validity of the category, in that it provides ‘a spurious 
kind of unity to what is, in fact, a collection of disparate sub-genres, with differing 
literary histories and characteristics.’1 0 9  In particular, the texts that James cites as 
revelatory regarding the range of material are I.F. Clarke’s Voices Prophesying War 
(1966) and Lyman Tower Sargent’s British and American Utopian Literature, 1516- 
1975U0. Yet it has been this diversity that has raised the question, as articulated by 
Suvin, of what constitutes science fiction. The category will be retained here, but as 
it will be retained with this wariness of a spurious appearance of unity, it is worth 
attending for a moment more to James’s discomfort on the issue. In considering the 
term, he determines that it first appears - with a coincidental  but, as will  become 
clear, appropriate timeliness -  in 1851. The context for this use is in a treatise on the 
poetry of science by English writer William Wilson:
Campbell [the Scottish poet Thomas Campbell] says that ‘Fiction in Poetry is 
not the reverse of truth, but her soft and enchanting resemblance’. Now this 
applies especially to Science Fiction, in which the revealed truths of Science 
may be given, interwoven with a pleasing story which may itself be poetical 
and true -  thus circulating a knowledge of the Poetry of Science, clothed in a 
garb of the Poetry of Life.1 1 1
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‘the fact that a tear-drop ‘holds locked in its transparent cells an amount of electrical 
fire equal to that which is discharged during a storm from a thunder-cloud” . James 
discerns Wilson’s close relationship to a more general sense of wonder that pervades 
many  forms  of  science  fiction,  but  also  points  out  that  the  pleasure  taken  in 
reflecting  upon  technological  change  is  undoubtedly  bound  a  more  general 
celebration of technology  from 1851 -  The Great Exhibition. For Wilson, this was a 
violent and spectacular revelation of radical newness that threw  ‘deeply into shade 
the old romances and fanciful  legends of our boyhood’.1 1 2  However, according to 
James -  with a single exception in the form of an editorial comment in Amazing 
Stories: The Magazine of Scientification in 1927 -  science fiction was not used again 
as a term until 1929, when former Amazing Stories editor, Hugo Greenback, founded 
the  magazine Science  Wonder Stories.  Before  1929, James argues, there was no 
singular or generally accepted terminology for narratives that dealt with the future or 
amazing inventions, and no particularly recognisable form of linking these stories to 
older narratives. Verne’s fantastic tales were published as voyages extraordinaires in 
France, translated into scientific romances in Britain -  the term that Wells himself 
adopted to describe  his first five  novels.  The  sense of temporal  imposition from 
present to past might be a way of loosening the rigidity of Brantlinger’s distinction 
between science fiction and realism, primarily as there was not any unified sense of 
science  fiction.  Yet  also  there  is  a  slippage  between  the  terms  of Brantlinger’s 
definitions  by  these  narratives that,  in  Wilson’s terms,  elucidate  the  wonder of 
science both in terms of their structure, ordering, division methodology and style, as 
well as their imaginative improvisations and borrowings.  It is the truth, as well as 
poetry, in science that excites Wilson, and therefore refers to principles of mode and 
method that must, in Brantlinger’s account, verge on the ‘realistic’.
It must also be acknowledged that to consider Wells’s novel in relation to the 
term  science fiction  necessitates the  inclusion,  of Sir Thomas  More’s  Utopia of 
1516, which Suvin claims must share with The Time Machine its  status as principle 
point of departure for modem science fiction.1 1 3  It is with this in mind that I intend to
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of Wells as a writer of utopias must recognise not only that his work has generated a 
substantial amount of interpretation and reflection around the theme of utopia, but 
that it occupies a privileged position in the field of utopian studies, particularly as 
the  field  intersects  with  science  fiction  studies.  As  Tom  Moylan  proposes,  the 
convergence of two concurrently emergent fields, particularly in the  1960s and 70s, 
was  driven  by  a  shared  interest in the  possibility  of engaging  with  social  reality 
through  readings  of narrative fiction.  In  particular,  this  was  brought  about  by  a 
resurgence of interest in utopian themes in much of the science fiction writing of the 
period:
The  resurgence  of  utopian  writing  within  the  textual  universe  of  sf 
guaranteed  that  many  scholars,  and  some  writers,  chose  to  work  at  the 
intersection of utopian and sf studies, and the affiliation of the new utopian sf 
with  the  growing  oppositional  culture further ensured  that these  twinned 
intellectual  projects  would take  up the challenges of an engaged  political 
critique.1 1 4
Moylan  emphasises  a  link  between  emergent forms  of  science  fiction  (or  ‘sf’) 
scholarship and utopian studies in the manner in which objects of study, whether 
they be text, community or theory, are addressed with a degree of specificity and 
were  increasingly  concerned  with  clarifying  the  formal  operations  by  which  a 
utopian form enters a historical moment.
I  would like to briefly reconsider Moylan’s framework for describing this 
moment in utopian studies, which through its relationship with forms of scholarship, 
privileges fiction from the last quarter of the twentieth century. The position of The 
Time Machine  is  as  a  distant  predecessor  of forms  of critical  utopian  thought 
described as ‘more cunning as the century moved on’.1 1 5  Both the forms and degrees 
of crises that shaped twentieth-century manifestations of the utopian imagination 
may  be  historically  specific  and  bound  to  forms  of  neo-liberalist/conservative 
governments and configurations of global  capitalism.  However, the opening of a
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the  definitive  construction  of  time  in  the  formation  of  theoretical  and 
epistemological models.
In The Life of Forms, Henri Focillon argues that a quotidian normalisation of 
chronology has been habitually extended into historical organisations of time, as a 
necessary  means  of  construction  to  secure  the  possibility  of  meaning.  Stated 
intervals  both  classify  objects  and  events  and  facilitate  their interpretation.  For 
Focillon, days, weeks and months offer the evidence of their own beginnings and 
endings, providing inalienable authenticity to reckonings of time:
We are exceedingly reluctant to surrender the isochronal concept of time, for 
we confer upon any such equal measurements not only a metrical value that 
is beyond dispute, but also a kind of organic authority. These measurements 
presently become frames, and the frames then become bodies. We personify 
them. Nothing, for instance, could be more curious in this respect than our 
concept of the century.1 1 6
Focillon  proposes that this  model  of time  has the tendency  of shaping  centuries 
within the ages of a human life, parenthesized by birth and death. Time is organised 
according to a known architectural plan, allocated galleries and display cases as in a 
museum, and is moulded into discrete and efficient partitions.
While  I  enthusiastically acknowledge Moylan’s history of critical  utopian 
thought and fiction, I would like to suggest that it is useful to apply this suspicion of 
(violent)  historical  organisation.  While  I  do  not contest the  conditions  for  such 
practices, models of history and their reflection in fiction should perhaps be defined 
less by convenient and normative temporal boundaries. For example, one could take 
conditions from the long and varied nineteenth century that are as much fuel for a 
critical and sustained engagement with utopian thought: the transformation of living 
conditions  under rapidly  developing forms  of capitalist modernity,  imperial  and 
colonial  expansion,  war,  and  constitution  of  subjects  according  to  ideological 
extremes of class, gender and race.1 1 7  It need not be stated that the nineteenth century
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While Moylan situates the nineteenth century as a primer for the articulation and 
textual manifestations of critical utopian impulses in the twentieth century, this is 
can be countered by Francis Wheen’s observation that Wells’s A Modern Utopia ‘is 
a creature of its time, and the fact that he wrote such a book at all shows how well 
attuned he was to the Zeitgeist:  almost a hundred Utopian fantasies were published 
between  1875 and  1905, an efflorescence unparalleled before or since’.1 1 8  Moylan, 
I’m sure, would beg to differ that such a prevalence of utopian fiction has remained 
unparalleled since the beginning of the twentieth century. However, I would like to 
detach Moylan’s notion of a critical utopian imagination from its ontological bind 
with late twentieth century criticism, and reinvest it into the fiction of a more distant 
past.
Rather  than  a  remote  ancestor,  The  Time  Machine  is  a  more  direct and 
immediate progenitor of a more recent body of work.  Recent manifestations of a 
utopian imagination shared by science fiction and criticism both map the present and 
suggest or  stimulate  both  psychic  and  social  transformations.  (This  intersecting 
terrain is described thoroughly in Moylan and Baccolini’s edited collection Dark 
Horizons:  Science  Fiction  and  the  Dystopian  Imagination  (2003).)  These 
characteristics,  that  have  become  expectations  for  critical  utopian  thought,  are 
already  present  in  a  sophisticated  and  developed form  in  The  Time  Machine.1 1 9  
Perhaps more significant is my claim that while Moylan’s account is clearly of a 
convergence  of theoretical  or  scholarly  writing  and  science  fiction,  Wells  had 
already sought to unify such concerns within an overall practice of writing. He was 
aware of traditions of utopian thought, which are engaged with throughout The Time 
Machine. More generally, his fiction was inseparable from an outlook defined by his 
sustained interest in politics, science and the possibilities of social transformation.
My  approach  to  describing  this  utopian  form  is  to  interpret  The  Time 
Machine as a very specific kind of object. The novel is characterised -  as, I would 
like to suggest, are all of Wells’s Scientific Romances - by the articulation of, and 
dependence  on,  a  peculiarly  resonant  sense  of  materiality.  The  presence  of 
materiality  and  material  culture  in  the  novel  could  be  addressed  as  a  means  of
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building -  a term that has been borrowed from Moylan.1 2 0  This sense of mutually 
constitutive experiences of text and reading both further destabilises the distinction 
between  fantasy  narratives  and  realism,  while  also  perhaps  offers  a  mechanical 
explanation  for the functional  operations of science fiction  stories.  For Suzanne 
Keen, the assemblage of narrative is accounted for by the term  ‘fictional  world’, 
which constitutes the perception by a reader of the imagined materials deployed by 
an author. All that is denoted, implied, or described takes on a psychic manifestation 
as  an  imagined  world.  The  appearance  of allusion  to a  phenomenally  accessible 
actuality that is asserted by a forms of supposedly realistic narrative is bound to, and 
relies upon, ‘the reader’s capacity to generate a sense of wholeness and actuality of a 
finite  number  of  references.’1 2 1  A gothic romance necessitates a process of 
engagement in which an  implied reader must imagine a world that is opposed to 
their own quotidian frames of reference. Likewise, a reader who had not personally 
visited the less hospitable streets of the East End, or the industrial  centres in the 
north of England must also simultaneously assemble its fictional world and learns 
the  norms  implicit in  its  inclusions  and  omissions.’1 2 2  This mutually constitutive 
process  of  textual  and  psychic  building  has  the  implication  that  in  terms  of 
exploration  of the  boundaries  of fictional  representation,  the  process  of testing, 
violating and reinventing these boundaries is one that is carried out by both author 
and reader.
In this  sense, text can of course defy,  or rather must defy, and transform 
relationships  between  objects  and  their  interpretation.  Keen’s  sense  of  a 
phenomenology of reading as a testing and violating of boundaries also serves her 
own exegesis on forms of division and boundary, shifts in time, place and mode for 
the sake of what can be represented only within a zone of alterity, that she describes 
as narrative annexes. These spaces of difference and possibility within a novel are 
important devices within Victorian fiction, but also provide a continuity of narrative 
technique from the sixteenth to the twentieth centuries. They prefigure  ‘Imjuch of 
what  is  putatively  modern  about  the  twentieth-century  novel’1 2 3  by decades,
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narrative continuity:
Related to the  ‘second  worlds’  or ‘green  worlds’  of early modern literary 
kinds, narrative annexes preserve in the Victorian novel fiction’s ability to 
shift  time  place  and  mode  for  the  sake  of what  can  be  represented  in  a 
specially  circumscribed  zone.  Spenserian  romance;  dream-vision; 
Shakespeare’s gardens, forests, and islands; and More’s Utopia;1 2 4
Keen posits a desire or an appetite for fictional worlds that differ explicitly from the 
reader’s  own,  and  cites  Wolfgang  Iser’s  Prospecting: From Reader Response to 
Literary Anthropology (1993) in suggesting that the presence of the (non-Lacanian) 
imaginary  instigates  the  awareness  of a  difference  between  actual  and  fictional 
worlds.
This posited  imaginary  is not of a necessarily fantastic kind,  but rather is 
constituted by the very notion of fictional world as other:
if we regard the world of the text as being bracketed off from the world it 
represents, it follows that that which is within the bracket is separated from 
the reality  in  which  it is  usually embedded.  Consequently  there  will  be a 
continual oscillation between the bracketed world and that from which it has 
been separated.1 2 5
The bracketed world of fictional text becomes a medium that unveils what may be 
concealed within the world from which it has departed, that is, in the (non-Lacanian) 
real. The ‘as if world’ is necessary for bringing about this interplay. Keen points out 
that this ‘as if world’ need not be that of a fictional narrative, or even a constructed 
artwork of any kind. Rather, it ‘may be scientific, philosophical, etc., so long as it 
has been constructed through a process of worldmaking, entailing composition and 
decomposition,  weighting,  ordering,  deletion  and  supplementation,  and 
deformation.’1 2 6  The positing of the ‘as if world’ and the actual, and this generative
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at the core of The  Time Machine.  This impulse  might also contribute towards an 
understanding of, as well as an operational methodology for, hermeneutic practice.
Moylan employs his own account of world-building as a formal and logical 
characteristic of the mechanics of science fiction, an ‘ability to generate cognitively 
substantial  yet estranged  alternative  worlds’.1 2 7  For Moylan, this is the greatest 
pleasure to be found in science fiction. However, he also argues that it is the source 
of its subversive potential:
(...)for if a reader can manage to see the world differently (in that Brechtian 
sense  of  overcoming  alienation  by  becoming  critically  estranged  and 
engaged), she or he might just, especially in concert with friends or comrades 
and allies, do something to alter it.1 2 8
Moylan’s sense of world-building could be read as mutually constituted by author 
and  reader.  This  mechanism  of  imagining  an  elsewhere  at  the  same  time  as 
providing  a  cognitive  map  of  contemporary  actuality,  goes  some  way  towards 
envisioning the sense of materiality that is detectable in The Time Machine.
However, to better understand the quality I wish to evoke, it is necessary to 
trace Wells’s attempts to differentiate the  Scientific  Romances from the work of 
Jules  Verne.  Wells  objected  being  compared  to  Verne  -  an  objection  that  was 
mutually upheld by Verne himself. The distinction Wells makes between their work 
is very specific. He says of his own early novels:
As a matter of fact there is no literary resemblance whatever between the 
anticipatory inventions of the great Frenchman and these fantasies. His work 
dealt almost always with actual possibilities of invention and discovery, and 
he made some remarkable forecasts. The interest he invoked was a practical 
one; he wrote and believed and told that this or that thing could be done, 
which was not at that time done. He helped his reader to imagine it done to
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inventions have ‘come true’.1 2 9
In  contrast,  Wells  describes  the  Scientific  Romances  as  fantasies.  Rather  than 
projecting  a  conceivable  possibility,  their conviction  is  analogous  to  that  of an 
dream.  After  reading  one  of  these  novels,  one  wakes  up  to  its  impossibility. 
However,  these  are  dreams  that  may  not  relate  to technological  possibility,  but 
certainly  relate  to  social  possibility.  The  dream  is  one  that takes  place  within  a 
recognised and politicised configuration of social reality, which it offers a contrast 
to.  Like that of William Guest, the protagonist and somnambulant time traveller in 
William Morris’s News from Nowhere (1890), the dream Wells describes is one of a 
possible future experienced from the present.
Wells  describes  the  ‘living  interest’  of these  novels  as  lying  in  the  non- 
fantastic elements:  ‘(...) the fantastic element, the strange property or the strange 
world, is used only to throw up and intensify our natural reactions of wonder, fear or 
perplexity’.1 3 0  The invention in itself is nothing, it is only the translation of a singular 
fantastic  element  into  a  commonplace  world  that  invests  the  narrative  with  the 
values  of literary  interest and  engagement that Wells describes as  ‘human’.  It is 
essential to isolate the fantastic, to restrict it to a singular contrivance. Wells’s logic 
is predicated on the possibility of identification, of the sense of readers projecting 
themselves into the fictional circumstance and asking what might happen to them if 
they were in this situation:
But no one would think twice about the answer if hedges and houses also 
began to fly, or if people changed into lions, tigers, cats and dogs left and 
right,  or  if everyone  could  vanish  anyhow.  Nothing  remains  interesting 
where anything may happen.1 3 1
There is a correlation with Wells’s rules for what constitutes the interest value in his 
scientific romances in Suvin’s assertion that science fiction can be usefully thought 
of as the literature of cognitive estrangement.
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folktale:
The stock folktale accessory, such as the flying carpet, evades the empirical 
law of physical gravity -  as the hero evades social gravity -  by imagining its 
opposite. This wish-fulfilling element is its strength and its weakness, for it 
never pretends that a carpet could be expected to fly -  that a humble third 
son could be expected to become king -  while there is a gravity.1 3 2
In attempting a rigorous understanding of science fiction as a category of literature, 
Suvin’s example binds a specificity of literary form to a particular relationship with 
materiality.  I  would  like  to  read  Suvin’s  emphasis  on  the  conditions  in  which 
cognitive estrangement can usefully take place within literatures of the fantastic as a 
means of interpreting a connection between a crude sense of material possibility and 
social  possibility, which  seems latent in  Wells’s early utopia - A more believable 
constitution  of materiality  and  its  inherent potential for  transformation  in  text 
suggests a more profound impulse for change in the mind of the reader.
In  his  own  account of the  scientific  romances,  Wells’s  own trick  was  to 
domesticate the impossible. A plausible illusion allows the  story to play out, and 
science becomes a modern substitute for magic, which Wells thought had lost its 
narrative currency by the late nineteenth century:  ‘I simply brought the fetish stuff 
up to date, and made it as near actual theory as possible’.1 3 3  It is worth noting that 
this trick, this desire to renew the conventions of fantasy was itself, nothing new, as 
the same desire prompted Shelley to make Victor Frankenstein a scientist, purely as 
a  means  of  differentiating  her  story  from  the  tired  conventions  of  Gothic 
Romance.1 3 4   But aside from the presence of trickery, Wells sees the business of the 
fantasy  writer as  maintaining  a  sense  of reality:  ‘Touches  of prosaic  detail  are 
imperative and a rigorous adherence to the hypothesis. Any extra fantasy outside the 
cardinal  assumption  immediately  gives  a  touch  of irresponsible  silliness  to  the 
invention’.1 3 5  Used in this precise way, fantasy holds the potential, in Wells’s 
argument, to provide a  new  and  novel  angle  on  telling stories which themselves
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might well fit Brantlinger’s account of an epistemological presence of science within 
nineteenth-century realism. If so, it is held within the thrall of non-realist narrative 
traditions. Wells admits the presence of his admiration for Swift’s Gulliver's Travels 
throughout the Scientific Romances as a profound influence, ‘and it is particularly 
evident in a predisposition to make the stories reflect upon contemporary political 
and social discussions’.1 3 6
Writing  soon  after  Wells’s  death,  Jorge  Luis  Borges  also  set  out  to 
distinguish Wells from Verne. He writes that Wells ‘bestowed sociological parables 
with a lavish hand’.1 3 7  Yet it is Borges's own poem  Things that might be equally 
appropriate in characterising the Scientific Romances:
My cane, my pocket change, this ring of keys,
The obedient lock, the belated notes,
The few days left to me will not find time 
To read, the deck of cards, the table-top,
A book encrushed in its pages the withered 
Violet, monument to an afternoon 
Undoubtedly unforgettable, now forgotten, 
the mirror in the west where a red sunrise 
blazes its illusion. How many things, 
files, doorsills, atlases, nails, 
serve us like slaves who never say a word, 
blind and so mysteriously reserved.
They will endure beyond our vanishing;
And they will never know that we have gone.1 3 8
Borges  thematises  a  range  and  scope  of material  culture  beyond  any  simplistic 
notions that artefacts carry semiotic meanings. Rather the poem suggests that notions 
of  self  are  bound  up  with  seemingly  trivial,  but  invasively  intimate,  things. 
Similarly,  I  would  like  to  suggest  that  while  The  Time  Machine  is  a  utopian
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It needs to be stressed that this quality is not limited to definitions of relationships 
with things  but,  as  in  Borges’  poem,  materiality concerns the  nature  of subjects, 
rather than merely a static notion of objects.
In referring to the text of a novel as my material world, it seems appropriate 
to  think  through  some  forms  of authorship  in  order  to  attempt  to  describe  the 
presence of materiality and material culture within this world. The use of the term 
‘authorship’ here is derived from accounts by Roland Barthes, Michel Foucault and 
Jacques Derrida.1 3 9  As formative impulses that underlie the loosely-bound terrain of 
poststructuralist thought, it might be stated that these are hardly contentious, and 
might  even  appear as  somewhat  self evident.  However,  this  very  appearance  of 
obviousness makes possible the relegating of any need for an attentive return, and 
threatens to blunt the discursive edge of criticism. In all these readings of authorship 
and text, I would like to suggest not only an analytical trajectory that informs my 
reading of The Time Machine as a novel, but also the substitution of textual language 
with the notion of materiality and material culture.
Barthes' model of the Death of the Author is useful and constructive in this 
context.  His  text  functions  as  a  means  of  articulating  an  unstable  model  of 
authorship with no small amount of currency, primarily through his identification of 
an author as an ideological construct.  In describing a passage from Balzac's story 
Sarrasine, Barthes asks who is speaking, whose opinion and voice is represented:
We shall never know, for the good reason that writing is the destruction of 
every  voice,  of every  point of origin.  Writing  is  that  neutral,  composite, 
oblique space where our subject slips away, the negative where all identity is 
lost, starting with the very identity of the body writing.1 4 0
The ontological, bodily, authentic author is lost within the codified  substances of 
text and language. This process is mirrored as a multiple effect in the text of The 
Time Machine, as the narrative is narrated once by the Time Traveller to a living,
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novel's outer narrator:
As soon as fact is narrated no longer  with a view to acting directly on reality 
but intransitively, that is to say, finally outside of any function other than that 
of the very practice of the symbol itself, this disconnection occurs, the voice 
loses its origin, the author enters into his own death, writing begins.1 4 1
To believe in an author is to conceive of him (and in his essay, it is always a him -  
further highlighting the  status of ideological  construction) as the past of his own 
book. The author is thought to suffer for it, live for it, to nourish the book, like a 
father to a child. This idea that the author is regarded as the Father and owner is 
important, as it identifies an ideological imperative in the affirmation of the author. 
This  immediately  provides  the  text  with  a  social  and  cultural  set of contextual 
conditions, rendering it analogous to the reading of any other material world in terms 
of what objects might mean,  their meanings  being determined by their positions 
within such contexts.
Yet such a notion of paternal authorship seems incongruous in relation to 
how material culture might be read. The life of an object, and its place in the lives of 
subjects and  societies,  is not inscribed from above,  but is,  perhaps, a continuous 
process of writing and reflection; the material thing being shaped by, while shaping, 
those  who  encounter  it.  This  is  an  intuitive  reading  made  possible  by  Barthes' 
alternative model  of authorship -  the  scriptor. The scriptor is bom with the text, 
rather than preceding or exceeding the writing. The idea of origin is questioned here. 
The  scriptor  makes  a  gesture  of  inscription,  not  expression,  in  a  text  that  is 
conceptualised as a field that has no origin other than language. Instead of coming 
from elsewhere, content comes from language. This once radical enquiry not only 
rethinks  the  position  of author,  and  provides  a  resonant  and  convincing  set  of 
possibilities for reading text and thinking through its significations and relationships, 
but  is  also  suggestive  of  readings  of  material  culture  that  could  be  equally 
illuminating. Like text, material culture itself is generative, giving birth to forms of
66voice, such as authorship, shaping the interpretative structures around it, determining 
contexts, functioning within and breaking rules and codes.
Our relationship with materiality and material culture is one of co-existing in 
an  unprivileged  simultaneity,  not  one  element  pre-or-anteceding  the  other.  The 
slippery openness of such a description is echoed in Barthes; for him the idea of 
deciphering  a  limited,  final  meaning  is futile.  It  has  been  convenient to literary 
criticism to find this meaning, to uncover an author and explain the text. This is of 
principle importance to my reading of Wells. There is no attempt to uncover material 
culture as a locked secret, or a final meaning, but rather the aim is to draw out the 
presence of one aspect of the language of the text. Once identified, again, there is no 
attempt to suggest a definitive interpretation of its presence within the text. Barthes’ 
pairing of the reign of the author as being one in the same as the reign of the critic 
who has the final say couldn’t be more appropriate in my efforts to avoid writing a 
piece  of  literary  criticism.  Barthes'  notion  of  disentangling  a  text,  rather  than 
deciphering it, is of primary significance. There is no ultimate, secret, meaning that I 
need  to  unlock,  rather the  suggestive  presence  of something  that  seems  both  of 
significance in thinking through Wells’s novel, and that may be useful in thinking 
through a more general and universal sense of materiality and material culture.
For Foucault, the coming into being of the notion of 'author' constitutes the 
privileged moment of individualization in the history of ideas. Foucault’s approach 
is to historicise what appears natural, to give a history to dominant cultural ways of 
thinking that give the appearance of having always been so. Foucault says that the 
author is a certain functional principle which imposes limits, excludes, and chooses; 
in short, it impedes the free circulation, the free manipulation of fiction. It is a kind 
of  regulatory  device  that  our  culture  imposes  upon  forms  of creative  activity, 
enabling fiction to take place within a set of rules that can themselves be regulated 
by the those who might be in a position to do so:1 4 2
Referring only to itself, but without being restricted to the confines of its 
interiority, writing is identified with its own unfolded exteriority. This means 
that it is an interplay of signs arranged less according to its signified content
67than according to the very nature of the signifier. Writing unfolds like a game 
(jeu) that invariably goes beyond its own rules and transgresses its limits. In 
writing, the point is not to manifest or exalt the act of writing, nor is it to pin 
a subject within language; it is, rather, a question of creating a space into 
which the writing subject constantly disappears.1 4 3
Foucault may be read here as celebrating an emancipation from the dimension of 
expression in this apparent disappearance of the subject. However, this account of 
writing is closer to a space of becoming. That this disappearance into the space of 
writing is constant and necessarily repetitive, rather than static or permanent, depicts 
an author that is both present and absent within text. This space of becoming is one 
that is both inexorably tied to, and analogous to, materiality and material culture as a 
space of interdependence between subject and object.
The writing subject may constantly disappear, but is not absent. Without one, 
it  would  seem  hard  to  imagine  a  text  stabilised  as  a  unified  'work'  that  can  be 
distinguished from the rest of the world:
Consequently,  it  is  not enough  to  declare  that  we  should  do without the 
writer (the author) and study the work itself. The word work and the unity 
that it designates are  probably as  problematic as the  status of the author's 
individuality.1 4 4
Following from this suggestion, I would like to maintain Wells as a presence within 
my analysis.  Rather than effacing him altogether, he will appear explicitly, as an 
unstable  yet  necessary  and  informative  presence.  However,  any  notion  of  his 
authorial supremacy will be resisted, as will an excessive tendency towards clarity of 
intention or biographical explanation, although both these forces are in play within a 
reading  of  The  Time  Machine.  It  is  not  enough,  Foucault  maintains,  to  keep 
repeating the affirmation that the author has disappeared:
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follow the distribution of gaps and breaches, and watch for the openings that 
this disappearance uncovers.1 4 5
Foucault's argument is one that preserves the author as a privileged figure in the life 
of the  text,  while  simultaneously  describing  a  space  in  which  the  author  is  not 
present as an ontological  source  of origin and authenticity.  Such a  space  as this 
virtual disappearance creates, I would like to suggest, makes possible the re-reading 
of  space  within  text,  as  one  of  materiality  and  material  culture.  Again,  the 
destabilization  of  authorship  opens  up  a  deregulated  space  of  interpretation, 
precisely because there is no clearly defined sense of differentiation between text, 
materiality,  and  subject,  but  there  is  instead  an  ongoing  and  reiterative 
interdependence.
The  account  of this  mutually  constitutive  activity  is  also  addressed  in  a 
passage from On Grammatology. Derrida discusses the act of writing, or any form of 
the inscription of meaning through a medium, as reliant upon a culturally specific 
system of language that cannot be dominated by an author. A critical reading must 
look for a relationship between what an author does or does not command, therefore 
enabling the production, through reading, of a signifying structure:
The writer writes in a language and in a logic whose proper system, laws, 
and life his discourse by definition cannot dominate absolutely. He uses them 
only by letting himself, after a fashion and up to a point, be governed by the 
system.  And  the  reading  must  always  aim  at  a  certain  relationship, 
unperceived by the writer, between what he commands and what he does not 
command of the patterns of the language that he uses. This relationship is not 
a certain  quantitative distribution of shadow  and  light,  of weakness  or of 
force, but a signifying structure that critical reading should produced
The term production suggests a link to the world of materiality and objects. In this 
instance however, while it is suggestive simultaneously of the making of artefacts or
69goods,  to  forces  of  economic  production,  it  refers  specifically  to  a  search  for 
signification.  So it is the reader again  who is in  a position of responsibility,  but 
rather than making meaning, the reader must identify the differences between what 
might come from an author,  what might come from the  surrounding culture  and 
society, and what might come from the traditions and rules of the format. It is in acts 
of critical  reading that meaning must be produced from a text.  It is this position, 
which in a sense appears as a resolution between the previous two, that this thesis 
finds its model for acts of critical reading. This act of critical reading is one that here 
will not only be of a text, but rather a critical reading that will allow text to be read 
as material culture.
The definitions that Wells has furnished of his early novels, including the 
analogy that they are like a dream, that upon finishing one of them, one wake’s up to 
its  impossibility,  come  from  a  text  that  was  first  published  as  a  preface  to  a 
collection  of his  Scientific  Romances  in  1933,  and  which  has  come  to  stand  as 
something of an authoritative account of this body of work. The readings within it 
are suggested from a significantly retroactive position, that allows these early works 
to be situated within a precise  contextual configuration that includes Wells’s general 
career up to that point. Wells takes issue with criticism of his work in this text in a 
manner that is revealing. He eschews the description of ‘the English Jules Verne’, 
and places his fantasies amongst ‘a class of writing which includes the Golden Ass of 
Apuleius, the True Histories of Lucien, Peter Schlemil and the story of Frankenstein. 
It includes too some of the admirable inventions by Mr David Garnett, Lady into 
Fox for instance.’1 4 7  That they can be coherently grouped together as a set of closely 
related novels is itself of importance.  It affirms the shared properties that I would 
like to emphasise in this thesis: their reliance on a constitutive and reflective set of 
properties that could be imagined as materiality and material culture. Yet here, Wells 
makes  it clear  that  the  point of such  qualities  is  never  reduced  to  that  of pure 
narrative entertainment, but rather in order to critically engage with social reality.
Wells emphasises the presence of Swift within his scientific romances:  ‘it is 
particularly  evident  in  a  predisposition  to  make  the  stories  reflect  upon
70contemporary political and social discussions.’1 4 8  While Wells admires Swift for his 
use  of narrative  as  the  medium  of reflection,  he  is  somewhat belligerent  in  not 
fixating upon the form of his earlier writing in relation to his more openly polemical 
and political works in the early 1930s:
It is an incurable habit with literary critics to lament some lost artistry and 
innocence in my early work and to accuse me of having become polemical in 
my later years. That habit is of such old standing that the late Mr Zangwill in 
a  review  in  1895  complained  that  my  first  book,  The  Time  Machine, 
concerned itself with ‘our present discontents’. The Time Machine is indeed 
quite as philosophical and polemical and critical of life and so forth, as Men 
like Gods written twenty-eight years later. No more and no less. I have never 
been  able  to  get  away  from  life  in  the  mass  and  life  in  general  as 
distinguished from life in the individual experience, in any book I have ever 
written. I differ from contemporary criticism in finding them inseparable.1 4 9
The temporal distance between these reflections and the writing of the novels would 
also seem to allow a broader set of genre contexts than was available at the time of 
their writing. Yet, Wells seems to avoid bringing his early novels into propinquity 
with recognisable forms of science fiction. It is also worth considering that by 1933, 
it was possible to recognise some form of science fiction cinema: Georges Melies’ 
Le  Voyage de  la Lune (1902),  Rene Clair’s Paris  Qui Dort (1925), Fritz Lang’s 
Metropolis, (1927)  James Whale’s Frankenstein (1931), Dr Jeykl and Mister Hyde 
(1931), and James Whales’  adaptation of Wells’s own  The Invisible Man (1933). 
Wells himself was to go on to write for film when he adapted his novel The Shape of 
Things to  Come (1933) as the screenplay for Things to Come (1936), directed by 
William Cameron Menzies.
Instead Wells emphasises satire and  Swift.  On the one hand,  he  seems to 
miss the radical specificity of science fiction as a means to contextualise his practice. 
Yet  on  the  other,  he  is  still  inventing  it.  Although  in  this  preface  he  fails  to 
historicise the genre as it solidified and diversified in the early twentieth century, I’d
71argue that his sense of the tradition is focused through such an awareness. After all, 
it is the popularity of the twentieth century science fiction that is keeping his stories 
in  print and generating the demand for new  editions, such as the collection he is 
prefacing here.  However, the temporal distance may also hint at a more complex 
understanding  of the  dream  of his  narrative  worlds  from  which  one  awakes,  as 
something that is not discrete and contained by the hours of sleep, but rather as a 
constitutive and  symptomatic force that cannot be dismissed as  mere reverie,  but 
rather is central to notions of both individual subjectivity and society. It is, perhaps, 
a dream that can be rearticulated as utopian impulse.
For Wells, the desire to move beyond  boundaries, and the imagination  of 
change, was not only bound to the fate of humanity, but was personal. There is a 
form of redemptive movement, both redemptive and transgressive, that is performed 
biographically as well  as through Wells’s output.  Wells was the first to recognise 
this  affinity,  and  his  life  was  dramatised  as  textual  narrative  in  Experiment in 
Autobiography (1934).1 5 0  This was a means for Wells to both provide his own 
interpretative  commentaries  on  his  practice  as  a  writer,  and  to contextualise  his 
writing within a self-made textual mythology. It provides an extraordinary account 
of Wells, but has of course been accompanied by other forms of biographical work 
concerning themselves with his life, such as these recent inclusions: Michael Foot’s 
H. G .: The History of Mr. Wells (1995), (foot was able to draw on his memories of a 
friendship with  Wells.)  and  Vincent Brome’s  H.  G.  Wells: A  Biography  (2001) 
which together with notes by Parrinder and Lawton,1 5 1  collectively contribute to my 
own extremely brief account of his life.
Herbert George (or Bertie, as he was known) was bom in Bromley, Kent,1 5 2  
on  21  September  1866  into  a  family  that  teetered  precariously  on  the  edge  of 
financial and personal  insolvency.  Despite early signs of academic success and a 
voracious literary, historical and scientific curiosity, Wells was taken out of school 
at the age of thirteen so that he might earn his an income of his own. Between  1881 
and 1883, Wells’s endured a tedious and disastrous run of apprenticeships that lasted 
until  he  was  able  to find  his  way  into  a teaching  assistant  position  at  Midhurst 
Grammar School in West Sussex. In 1884 he subsequently won a scholarship to the
72Normal  School  of Science  (Now  Imperial  College) to  study  biology  under T.H. 
Huxley. That such an opportunity existed was due to the slow  process of reform 
initiated by the Education Act of 1871. When he left in  1887, Wells took up a post 
as a science master in a school in North Wales, where he was knocked down by a 
student during a football match and suffered severe kidney and lung injury. After 
months  of convalescence,  he  continued  teaching  biology,  predominantly for the 
University Correspondence College. He married his cousin Isabel in  1891, but the 
relationship was not a successful one, and by 1893, Wells was living (scandalously) 
with Amy Catherine Robbins (referred to by Wells as ‘Jane’), who had been one of 
his students. They were married two years later after his divorce from Isabel  was 
finally agreed.
He began publishing his writing in the first issue of Science Schools Journal 
in December 1886 (not, as John Lawton claims, in May  1887).1 5 3  His first article, an 
essay titled  ‘Socrates’,  saw  Wells,  publishing  under the name  Herbert G.  Wells, 
posing  as  successor to  Plato’s  narrating  philosopher  in  The  Republic.  It is odd 
reading  ‘Socrates’  in the light of his speculative and utopian writing.  It reads as a 
history, but prefigures his later works on futurity. The past is read in terms of the 
present, much as he was later to read invented futures. He reads the past in terms of 
‘utility’  and  ‘profit’,  an  approach  with  which  he  would  also read the future.  As 
Stover’s account of this earliest published essay indicates,1 5 4  this apparently caused 
some  umbrage  amongst  his fellow  students,  after  which  Wells  used  a  series  of 
pseudonyms when writing in the Science Schools Journal, to provide a degree of 
distance and anonymity, albeit with a negligible effectiveness, with which he could 
express ideas that might be seen as both pretentious and contentious. After all, who 
else, I would like to suggest, would constitute his readership other than the student 
body who he had so offended with his immodesty?
The content of an issue of Science Schools Journal was diverse to say the 
least. It acted as a site for a range of different interests and accounts. As well as an 
obituary to a late professor, the contents for the first issue includes articles on ‘The 
Existing Distress Not Due to Over-Population’, ‘On the Structure and Homology of 
the  Pineal  Gland’,  ‘Fingers  and  Fins’,  ‘The  Refreshment  Room  Club’,  ‘Some
73Customs and Manners of China’ and ‘Sports’ -  the latter being a list of recent results 
in football, rugby and swimming competitions. Additionally, in the editorial for the 
first  edition,  ‘To  the  Average  Man’,  Wells  sets  out  to  establish  a  relationship 
between  knowledge  and  writing,  establishing  the  complete  dissolution  within 
Wells’s practice of Brantlinger’s opposition between realism that follows a scientific 
methodology, and fiction that takes as its diegetic contrivance some principle culled 
from scientific discourse or technology:  ‘Clearness of perception, imagination, and 
order are alike the  mental  requirements of the  scientist and the  writer.’1 5 5  This is 
followed  by  a  passage  of some  urgency  that  makes  an  evocative  claim  for the 
necessity of writing itself:
That our fellow-students have no time for writing, which implies that they 
are committing to memoiy classified facts without opportunity for exercise in 
the re-sorting and displaying thereof; that, like athletes who, professing to 
train, merely eat, they are fraudulently cramming; or, that they are incapable 
of  writing,  which  (as  above  hinted)  condemns  the  whole  magnificent 
examination fabric of the Science and Art Department.1 5 6
Another student essay,  ‘Mammon’  represents  an  early  musing on  the  subject of 
utopia.  Wells  published  the  essay  under the  name  Walter Glockenhammer.  The 
piece ends with an editorial note that makes fun of his use of an assumed identity, 
characteristic of the somewhat crude humour that appears in his earliest work:
Such inquiry as we have been able to make fails to discover further evidence 
of  the  existence  of  Mr.  Glockenhammer.  Will  he  oblige  us,  in  strict 
confidence, with his real name.1 5 7
Leon Stover emphasises the pretentious nature of ‘Mammon’, which  ‘is of course 
not diminished by assigning it a foolish byline’.1 5 8
The structure of Science Schools Journal prefigures the format of Wells’s 
serialised publications. It is, in fact, not only the site of his first serialised fiction, but
74also  the  site  of the  earliest  version  of  The  Time  Machine.  The  story  is  barely 
recognisable, and it was never actually completed. Titled ‘The Chronic Argonauts’, 
it was published in three parts in 1888. Wells submitted the story after he had left the 
Normal  School  of Science in  1887, and it saw the return to print of Wells’s own 
name, which was formalised here for the first time as H.G. Wells. It was at the same 
time  that  he  also  published  an  essay  of  scientific  speculation,  ‘The  Fourth 
Dimension’,  which formalised  Wells’s  recognition  that time  was  a medium that 
needed to  be exposed to speculation and reimagining.  It is telling that he  did  so 
concurrently with this gothic romance that explored the same idea through narrative 
fiction. These three episodes, which leave the story incomplete, are the only version 
of the story available, running to about 9000 words. Two further attempts to develop 
the  story  have  since  been  lost.  However as  John  Lawton  points  out there  is  an 
account  of their  content  available  through  Wells’s  friend,  Professor A.  Morley 
Davies,  who  recalled  the  content of one  of the  subsequent tales  concerned  with 
upper  and  lower  worlds  in  far futurity  and  two  subspecies  of humanity,  while 
another depicted a future world ruled by an elite through the use of mass hypnosis to 
control the masses.1 5 9
It is therefore possible to see some germs of the specific situation that the 
final version of the Time Traveller ultimately encounters in the novel. However, the 
time traveller in The Chronic Argonauts is quite unlike the scientifically curious, and 
generally benevolent, inventor who undertakes a journey to the future in The Time 
Machine.  Dr Moses  Nebogipfel  is odd in  appearance,  mysterious,  alienated and 
closer in demeanour to Griffin, the mad scientist who transforms his body in The 
Invisible  Man.  Wells names this time traveller,  somewhat clumsily, through two 
biblical  references.  One is obviously to the long-lived Moses,  while the peculiar 
Nebogipfel suggests Mount Nebo, which appears in the Old Testament. This act of 
naming prefigures the later classification of one of humanity’s future descendents -  
the  Eloi  -   with  a  more  specific  set  of  codifications,  which  will  be  described 
subsequently.
The  story  situates  him  in  a  makeshift  laboratory  in  Llyddwdd,  a remote 
Welsh village. It seems likely that the story was written or at least originated during
75Wells’s own stay in Wells, and so perhaps was a less than subtly veiled reflection of 
his own relationship to social and physical context. He is alienated from the local 
population of villagers, a subject of mystery and dreadful threat. People fear him and 
suspect him of murder.  Not only is he severed from mankind, but his home is the 
centre of:
a constant flux of crates filled with grotesquely contorted glassware, cases of 
brazen  and  steel  instruments,  huge  coils  of wire,  vast  iron  and  fire-clay 
implements, of inconceivable purpose, jars and phials labelled in black and 
scarlet -  POISON, huge packages of books, and gargantuan rolls of cartridge 
paper, which set towards his Llyddwdd quarters from the outer world.1 6 0
This modern-gothic feel is somewhat comedic, particularly in retrospect. The 
establishing  scenario  ‘resembles  nothing  quite  so  much  as  the  point  of  every 
Universal  horror  film,  from  Frankenstein  to Abbott  and  Costello  meet  the 
Wolfman.,161 There is something of Wells’s early humour here, characteristic of his 
student writing, such as Mammon. It was an aspect he was to learn to channel with 
more subtlety and to greater effect by the time he became a novelist. Rather than feel 
a need to emphasise his knowledge and humour, naming became, by the stage of the 
recognisable versions of The Time Machine something both more philosophical and 
visceral.
As Lawton points out, The Time Machine was Wells’s first novel, but it was 
not his first book.1 6 2  By the time of the publication of the first edition of the novel, 
he was living as a writer.  He had been writing professionally for the Fortnightly 
Review since the publication of his first article - outside of a student publication - in 
1891, ‘The Rediscovery of the Unique’. Prior to this, Wells had failed to convince 
editor Frank Harris to publish his ‘The Universe Rigid’, in which he speculated on 
time  as  Four-Dimensional  geometry.  In  1893  Wells  published  A  Textbook  of 
Biology, which remained in print for over forty years. Wells was already, and very 
much needed to continue, writing for money. By this time, his health problems were 
so severe that it was, at least temporarily, impossible for Wells to continue teaching,
76and he therefore had to rely entirely on his income through writing for publication. 
James points out, as there was no self-conscious genre until  1929, (and as we have 
seen even then one not recognised by Wells writing in 1933) when writers chose to 
produce work that broke out of the mimetic form of realism, there must have been 
clear reasons for doing so. The first of these, according to James, was that writers 
wished to express future possibility:
warning of the possibility of a French invasion, or of the chaos that would 
result  from  Irish  Home  Rule  or  from  allowing  women  the  vote,  or, 
alternatively, advocating the desirability of living in a socialist future, or a 
society in which technological advances had made life easier and happier for 
the majority of citizens.1 6 3
Secondly, writers were attracted to science fiction because there was amongst them a 
clear recognition of an audience that could make fantasy fiction pay:
They  knew,  as  commercially-minded  authors,  that  there  was  a  growing 
audience  for romance  and  adventure,  for tales  of the  marvellous  and  the 
exotic, whether those tales were set on the uncharted frontiers of the British 
Empire, or the mysterious jungles of Central America, or the red plains of 
Mars.1 6 4
The  commercial  impulse  is  no  doubt  present  in  Wells’s  writing  of  The  Time 
Machine, yet as the Victorian science fiction writer W.H. Hudson, cited by James, 
states: Romances of the future, however fantastic they may be... are born of a very 
common  feeling  -   a  sense  of dissatisfaction  with  the  existing  order  of things, 
combined with a vague faith or hope of a better one to come.’1 6 5  Less a reiteration of 
the Blochian utopian impulse, more its pre-figuration.
The evolution of The Time Machine as an artefact in the present provides a 
convoluted narrative.  In the most general  sense, the texts/objects to which I  refer 
when discussing The Time Machine are something of a composite, but ultimately, I
77am referring to it as a very short single-volume novel, in the form of the Heinemann 
(London) first edition. This is the version from which I quote and that I posit as the 
ontologically binding document of the novel. Good contemporary printings of the 
novel are studiously derived from this via a convoluted route, such as John Lawton’s 
Centennial  Edition  for  Everyman,  and  Patrick  Parrinder’s  superb  very  recent 
Penguin edition. John Lawton traces the genealogy of this version as based upon the 
1935 Everyman edition, which was in turn based on a revised version that appeared 
in the Gollancz Collected Scientific Romances of 1933, for which Wells wrote his 
revealing premise. This revised text contained small modifications from the version 
of The Time Machine published in Collected Short Stories from 1927. This derives 
from the Essex  Collected of 1926-7  vol. 16.  which is itself based on the Atlantic 
Collected of 1924 vol. I.
The first impression of the novel was published in Britain by Heinemann and 
in the USA by Holt. These two versions are not the same, and the Holt has led to 
some  speculation that it was put together before the original  serialization as it is 
thought to be incomplete. The American first edition is also significantly different to 
the latter definitive versions from the 1930s onwards. In particular, the introductory 
section of the novel, while describing the same basic scenario as the London edition, 
is  a  different  text  altogether.  It  is  less  subtle,  evocative  and  missing  the  very 
characteristics that I will go on to describe in subsequent chapters from the earliest 
passages of the book. It was the Heinemann that was chosen by Wells to be revised 
for the  1924 Atlantic Edition, which he then read as the definitive version, despite 
having made some further minor revisions for the 1927 version. The revisions from 
this  period  were  brought  together  in  the  Random  House  edition,  which  was 
illustrated by W.A Diggins.
The text suffered from various reprints that were inaccurately transcribed and 
poorly proof-read, and the Random House edition has served as a consistent point of 
reference for the stability of a text whose fabric has altered,  albeit in with minor 
distinctions, over the past century. The text was further multiplied in its variations 
when in 1946, as a gesture to mark Wells’s 80th birthday, Penguin re-issued the 1895 
edition.  In  1960, Dover republished the  1895 edition in the  USA together with a
78section of text that had been cut after serialisation. John Lawton’s  1995 Centennial 
edition  (Reprinted  in  2000  -   the  date  of my  own  copy)  based  upon  the  1935 
Everyman edition, itself derived twice removed from the 1924 Atlantic, regards this 
edition as the model. This is in part based upon the same assertion by David Lake, 
whose  work  in  the  late  1980s  identified  changes  across  the  versions.  The  1995 
Centennial edition for Everyman is a corrected version of the 1994 Everyman, which 
served  as  an  example  of the  accumulation  of errors that had  built up  over time. 
Lawton  checked  this  version  against  the  Gollancz  1933,  and  any  anomalies  or 
suspicions were then tested against the Atlantic, Heinemann and occasionally the 
Essex Collected. Lawton states that his is an error-free edition of the story, not ‘the 
‘definitive Wells” .1 6 6  According to Parrinder,  Pawton’s Centennial edition does not 
improve  upon the  Random House text.  He  argues that it is a Penguin  version of 
Wells’s Selected Short Stories, containing The Time Machine, which was ‘arguably, 
closer  to  Wells’s  final  intentions  than  any  of its  predecessors  except  Random 
House’.1 6 7
It becomes clear that many of these versions of The  Time Machine present 
the work not as a singular novel, but as a short story. Parrinder comments on this as 
evinced by the amendment of the Heinemann’s chapter structure, reduced to  12 in 
the  Atlantic  edition,  with  chapter titles  deleted.  By  removing  this  structuration, 
Parrinder suggests ‘he had come to regard it as an expanded tale or novella, rather 
than a novel divided into named chapters.’1 6 8  It is therefore presumptive on my part 
to continue to refer to it as a novel. Yet I justify this specifically by referring to a 
singular version of the text. Despite Wells’s ongoing corrections, which were largely 
due to the mistakes made in subsequent printings of the story, the Heinemann is in 
my view the closest that one can get to the actual original version of the novel. The 
Heinemann is also the choice of Leon Stover, whose extraordinaiy close readings in 
his 1996 edition of The Time Machine inform much of the critical insight that I draw 
upon in reading this novel.1 6 9  In its singular form, although short, it seems justifiable 
to refer to it a novel in the form of a singular volume of text. Its current status as 
commodified artefact also suggests that it is currently consumed as a novel.
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serialisation. However, rather than interpret this as a preferred form for Wells, it is 
my  assertion  that  this  staggered  form  was  one  that  provided  an  opportunity  to 
publish the novel. This is opposed to the Heinemann being read as a collection of an 
ontologically  prioritised  serial.  It  was  primarily  an  economic  necessity,  and  a 
publishing  convention  of the  time,  for Wells  to  publish  in  this  way.  Publishing 
fiction in instalments took hold in the early decades of the nineteenth century within 
British publishing as a means for publishers to stay solvent, and to open the market 
for readers  who  might  be  reluctant or  unable  to afford the  price  of cloth-bound 
novel.1 7 0  By the 1890s, serialised fiction was economically most useful as a method 
of testing the popularity of a story and an author before mass producing their work 
as an affordable single volume.
While  I  acknowledge  the  attempts  of Wells  and  others  to  constitute  the 
definitive or accurate forms of The Time Machine, it is to the Heinemann, the form 
most viably claimed as a singular artefact, that I refer unless otherwise stated. Most 
published variations present only minor differences:  I  have  noticed colons in the 
Heinemann that are, for example in the Penguin (2005) and Everyman (1995) semi­
colons. These are, as far as I can tell, Wells’s own amendments. The repeated use of 
hyphenation  (a  stylistic  preference  of Wells  in  1895,  but  not  1924),  such  as  in 
‘weather-worn’, has been largely removed, instead leaving the phrase reading as a 
less cluttered ‘weather worn’.
The other form of difference between the Heinemann and, as a specific and 
most recent point of reference, the Penguin (2005) is what I would describe as an 
architecture of the page: there are, as a loose guide, approximately 8 words per line, 
with 26 lines, on a page of the Heinemann. This makes roughly 208 words on an 
average given page, over  152 pages of story. This is comparable to  11  words per 
line,  with  38  lines,  estimates  of 418  words  per  average  page,  and  89  pages  of 
narrative in the Penguin 2005 edition. This creates a qualitative spatial difference. 
The Heinemann is much more intimate in its form. It feels compact but strangely 
inhabitable. The pages are physically small, particularly in height when compared to 
the  format  of  a  contemporary  paperback  novel.  The  font  is  smaller,  but  the
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reading,  one  is  drawn  into  the  limited  information  available  on  the  pages,  as  a 
discreet and distinct space. This also, of course, necessitates the act of page turning 
at a more accelerated pace than required by a more recent edition.
The accelerated pace would also have been a quality of reading a serialized 
episode of The Time Machine, which then would have been interrupted by the need 
to wait for the following issue of the host periodical. After Chronic Argonauts was 
published, Wells continued to rework the story, gradually accumulating elements 
that would  be  ultimately  retained  in  its  Heinemann form.  In  1894,  the National 
Observer published  sections of a  narrative  between  March and June.  It was left 
unfinished when the commissioner, W.R. Henley, left to take up a post as editor at 
the New Review. He re-commissioned Wells in December 1894. The Story ran as a 
monthly serial in New Review from January to May 1895. The singular book version 
was also published in May  1895 by William Heinemann, publisher of New Review. 
The  serialisation  already  had  a  chapter  structure  rather  than  being  structured 
according to the five published episodes. The notable difference between the serial 
and the novel was the omission of a section of text that Henley has seemed to have 
wanted in the serialisation, but that Wells clearly did not, as he omitted it from the 
Heinemann and all subsequent printings. It was originally part of Chapter 14 of the 
serialisation. It seems that Henley wanted this as textual padding, or as Wells puts it, 
‘to  put a  little  ‘writing’  into the  tale’.1 7 1  This is perhaps an editor’s attention to 
making more full  an edition of New Review.  It reads now as an unnecessary and 
interruptive addition to the flow of Wells’s narrative.
The story of The Time Machine, is hereby summarised: Hillyer, the narrator, 
or more appropriately, the ‘outer narrator’, is a friend and regular guest of the central 
protagonist. Referred to only as ‘the Time Traveller’, he could be described as the 
‘inner narrator’, whose account is contained within that of the ‘outer narrator’. In the 
1931 Random House edition, this distinction is marked in an unusual but satisfying 
manner; the text of the outer narrator is printed in brown ink, while the inner voice 
of the Time Traveller is in black. Hillyer’s narration begins with a scene in the Time 
Traveller’s  home,  where  in  front  of an  audience  of  guests,  the  Time  Traveller
81attempts to describe time in terms of a speculative theory of four dimensionality. He 
then reveals a miniature but fully operational time machine.  Before the assembled 
guests, the machine vanishes, to a suspicious and incredulous response. After stating 
his  intention  of travelling  in  time,  he  reveals  the  actual  machine  housed  in  his 
workshop, not yet complete. The following week, another group of guests, which 
includes  Hillyer,  have  assembled  at  the  Time  Traveller’s  house.  They  wait 
impatiently as their host has not yet arrived, and  sit down to dinner without him. 
Suddenly, the Time Traveller makes a dramatic entrance, demanding food and drink, 
disturbingly haggard in appearance. He explains that he has been to the future and 
from this point, the ‘inner narrator’ takes over as he relates the events of his journey. 
That morning, he had tried out his machine in a reckless and unprepared leap into 
the future, arriving in the year 802,701.
The future  world that he  encounters  is  a landscape  punctuated  by ruined, 
palatial  structures  and  populated  by  the  descendants  of late  nineteenth-century 
humans.  After  this  huge  period  of  time,  humanity  has  evolved  into  two 
distinguishable species: The Eloi and the Morlocks. The Eloi are regarded by the 
Time  Traveller  as  beautiful,  androgynous,  physically  frail,  and  as  intellectually 
regressive.  All  their material  needs  are  catered for by the  subterranean,  ape-like 
Morlocks. As the Time Traveller eventually deduces, the Eloi are cattle reared by 
the  Morlocks  as  food.  The  Time  Traveller  also  discovers  that  his  machine  has 
vanished, dragged inside the base of a statue by Morlocks, and its recovery becomes 
the focus of the Time Traveller’s activities in the future. He eventually succeeds in 
finding it and  makes a frantic  escape, accidentally  hurtling even further into the 
future.  He finds himself on the shore of a sea in a world that continually faces a 
static and bloated red sun, watching the final generations of the last forms of life on 
earth. This scene of a grotesque sunset populated by bizarre creatures is literally the 
twilight of the earth and its life. The Time Traveller then begins his return journey.
Upon  his  return,  the  voice  of the  novel  then  switches  back to the  ‘outer 
narrator’,  Hillyer.  After the  Time Traveller tells  his  story  to  an  entertained  but 
unconvinced  audience,  Hillyer  returns  the  following  day,  unable  to  come  to  a 
conclusion as to whether or not the story was true.  He meets the Time Traveller,
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asked to wait for him,  but manages by chance to see the faint image of the time 
machine disappearing, the Time Traveller an indistinct figure in a whirling mass as 
he disappears. Hillyer explains in his account that he waited at the Time Traveller’s 
house for his return but then feared that he would have to wait a lifetime, and that 
three  years  had  now  passed.  As  an  epilogue,  Hillyer imagines  what could  have 
become of his friend, comforted  by two shrivelled white flowers of an  unknown 
order, material evidence brought back from the future. With this ending begins the 
discussion of the novel as a textual/material world.
83Chapter 3: The Material Presence of Bodies in The Time Machine.
If  the  suggested  qualities  of  materiality  and  material  culture  under 
examination here relate not only to recognisably object-based artefacts but also to 
notions of selfhood and the construction of individuals and cultures, then it must 
also  take  into  account  the  terrain  of  anatomically  defined  bodies  as  sites  of 
investigation. I’d like to argue that implicit in this process of identifying the body as 
a form of material culture is also the identification of text as an integral site of the 
body. Not only does the acknowledgement of anatomical corporeality as a form of 
material culture render the analysis of text an unproblematic approach for thinking 
about material culture in general, it suggests some degree of necessity in such a task. 
It is necessary in that text is implicated not just as a means of representing bodies, 
but as a site for the manifestation and materialisation of bodies. It is a place where it 
can be argued that the body is located.
While this chapter is an attempt to make such an assertion explicit within the 
fabric of the text of The Time Machine, this account of the body in text is in need of 
some initial  clarification.  For this  purpose  I’d  like to draw  upon Mary  Douglas's 
argument concerning  what  she  describes  as  ‘the  two bodies’;  a  description  of a 
subject's singular body as something that might be more accurately described as two. 
Douglas suggests that the body, no matter how reducible to anatomical, biological 
and phenomenological definition, can only be expressed through social systems. The 
physical  body  is  constrained  by  the  social  body.  Building  upon  Marcel  Mauss’s 
work on theorising bodies as social forms, Douglas sustains his critique of the very 
idea of straightforwardly natural behaviour. Actions carry the imprint of learning; 
from feeding to sex:  ‘Nothing is more essentially transmitted by a social process of 
learning than sexual behaviour, and this of course is closely related to morality.’1 7 2  
Yet she states that his denial of natural behaviour is confusing and that the relation 
between nature and culture is falsely posed. Douglas, instead, attempts to identify a 
natural, that is universal and unconscious, tendency to express certain situations in 
appropriate bodily styles:
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manifold ways. The care that is given to it, in grooming, feeding and therapy, 
the theories about what it needs in the way of sleep and exercise, about the 
stages it should go through, the pains it can stand, its spans of life, all the 
cultural categories in which it is perceived, must correlate closely with the 
categories in which society is seen in so far as these also draw upon the same 
culturally processed idea of the body.1 7 3
Natural expressions of bodily movement therefore take place, which are culturally 
determined.
The body, as such, is therefore more accurately defined as ‘the two bodies’. 
Between these two is a continual exchange of meanings. In this process, each body 
reinforces the category of the other. In thinking about the part it might play within 
this scheme, fiction could be an integral  component in one of those categories.  It 
serves to express the body as a restricted medium comprised of a set of processes. If 
this principle is taken as sound, then the expression of bodies through text requires 
no great conceptual leap. If the body is indeed a materially and socially constituted 
form,  recognisable  in  its  status  as  an  aspect of material  culture,  I  would  like to 
suggest  that  the  complex  and  concrete  manifestations  that  appear  in  The  Time 
Machine help to prove the status of this form as depending upon and existing within 
text. The novel not only contains depictions of bodies, but constitutes one half of a 
set of bodies, which although never existing in an anatomically verifiable state, take 
as their reference a world that is very real.
Bodies, as they are discussed here as forms within The Time Machine, enact, 
prefigure  and  echo  modes  of conceptualising  corporeal  materiality  as  textual  in 
relationships  that  not  only  refuse  to  privilege  a  primacy  of  the  referent,  but 
complicate the very equation of signifier and signified. The discursive terrain into 
which I introduce Wells’s treatment of embodied subjects is mapped in the form of a 
detailed  but  broad  overview  by  Vicki  Kirby.  Rather  than  retaining  value  as 
irresolvable  oppositions,  Kirby  suggests  rather that  ideality  and  materiality  are
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both.1 7 4  Kirby reiterates  Saussure’s argument that the substance of reality, what 
might  be  taken  in  the  most  general  sense  as  the  referent,  is  produced  through 
language.  Rather than  itself acting  as the determining precursor of meaning,  the 
meaning of the referent itself is determined through language.
Despite a contradiction within the argument of Saussure’s Course in General 
Linguistics (1916), in which there is a conflation of signified concept with thing or 
object,  Kirby  places  an  emphasis  on  reading  within  Course  distinctions  and 
boundaries as inscribed by language forming the appearance of meaning objects in 
the  world.  Kirby  moves  towards  a  resolution  of  this  contradiction  through  a 
reminder of the  need  to  maintain the  referent,  while  simultaneously  calling  into 
question its status as generative origin -  the identity of the sign characterised by 
unending  referral  yet  positioned  against  the  transparency  of  reality’s  apparent 
immediacy.1 7 5  This resolution forms an origin in its own right, as a constitutive 
referent for relationships  between  sign/text and object/body.  From this originary 
signified  can  be  traced  of  Saussurian  semiology,  a  science  of  signs  of  which 
linguistics  are  only  a  part,  through  to  Barthes’  reversely  corrective  system  of 
semiology as a part of linguistics. Yet this is still a discrete and closed system, one 
that Kirby  seeks to overturn,  in keeping with familiar history, with an expanded 
sense of writing made possible through arche-writing.  As  a  sign,  writing as  it is 
accounted for in  Derrida’s  Of  Grammatology is  no longer just a literary notion 
because  its  purview  extends to  cinematography,  choreography,  the  pictorial,  the 
musical, the sculptural, the athletic, the military, the political, and  ‘the entire field 
covered by the cybernetic program\ ’1 7 6
I will return to Derrida’s Of Grammatology in the final chapter of this thesis. 
For now, I will posit here from Kirby’s argument what she describes as the  ‘anti- 
essentialism’  that characterises  structuralist and post-structuralist accounts of the 
limitless play of the  signifier.  However,  this very assertion disavows  itself in an 
essentialist conceptualization of matter. The dismantling of this spurious opposition 
is mirrored as an intention of my own thesis. Rather, Kirby applies the range of the 
play of the signifier to the substance of the feminized body. This destabilises, rather
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together in corporeal representation, and writing assumes the substance and solidity 
of nature as cause, as presence of a subject.1 7 7
The presence of embodied subjects and physiology throughout all of Wells’s 
Scientific Romances is usefully contextualized by a compatibility with a form of 
British literature that Kelly Hurley describes as fin de siecle Gothic. At the point of 
transition  between the  19th  and  20th centuries,  she  characterises this  in particular 
according to the ruination of the human subject in British fiction:
In place of a human body stable and integral (at least, liable to no worse than 
the ravages of time and disease), the fin de siecle Gothic offers the spectacle 
of a body metamorphic and undifferentiated; in place of the possibility of 
human transcendence, the prospect of an existence circumscribed within the 
realities of gross corporeality; in  place of a unitary  and  securely bounded 
human subjectivity, one that is both fragmented and permeable.1 7 8
Hurley’s  description  of the  presence  of bodies  and  degeneration  in fin de siecle 
Gothic  is  summarised  as  the  abhuman.  The  term  is  borrowed  from  the  author 
William Hope Hodgson (1877-1918), whose fiction fused maritime adventure with 
supernatural fantasy, and refers to a subject who is not-quite-human. The condition 
is one of instability, in constant danger of becoming. Hurley suggests a resonance 
between this model and Kristeva’s description of abjection in Powers of Horror. The 
status of such a subject is ambivalent,  on the one hand  working to maintain the 
illusion of an autonomous identity, while on the other welcoming the pleasures of 
indifferentiation brought about by the collapse of ego boundaries. Hurley describes 
fin de siecle Gothic as ‘positioned within precisely such an ambivalence: convulsed 
by  nostalgia  for  the  ‘fully  human’  subject  whose  undoing  it  accomplishes  so 
resolutely, and yet aroused by the prospect of a monstrous becoming’1 7 9 . Within the 
genre, she identifies abhumanness as an exorbitant variety of spectacle as the human 
body  collapses  and  is  re-shaped:  ‘into  slug-men,  snake-women,  ape-men,  beast
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transformations are acts of defamilarisation and reconstitution.
Hurley  draws  on Terry  Eagleton’s  argument from Marxism  and  Literary 
Criticism which suggests that such a new mode of form may come from a collective 
demand, with roots in an ideological shift. This is applicable to genres, to popular, 
like-minded texts, widely produced and consumed. Gothic is thought of as a genre 
‘reemerging cyclically, at periods of cultural stress, to negotiate the anxieties that 
accompany  social  and  epistemological  transformations  and  crises’.1 8 1  As Hurley 
points out, it is possible to identify a general anxiety concerning the nature of human 
identity within late Victorian and early Edwardian culture, generated by discourses 
that were dismantling conventional notions of the human subject. As a literary form, 
fin de siecle Gothic could be read as something of a response to these recently arisen 
discourses.  Theories  relating  to  evolution,  anthropology,  embodied  criminality, 
degeneration, and psychology might all  be read as new  and threatening forms of 
imagining the body. Wells can therefore be read as working within a set of specific 
conditions in the form of a loosely defined genre in his depiction of the body as a 
fantastic  form.  This  fantastic  form  must  still  maintain  that  sense  of believable 
familiarity which constitutes The Time Machine, as well as the Scientific Romances 
in general. The particular configurations of bodies as contested and scripted forms 
occupy  a  primacy  of place  within  the  novel,  serving  as  the  key  to  reading  its 
principle allegorical significance.
Another useful  perspective  is  Martin  Gliserman's  account of the  body  in 
relation  to  the  novel,  which  describes  the  body  as  integral  to  the  text,  and  as 
something that is  revealed through the  language of the text.1 8 2  It is encoded and 
communicated through language. This presence of the body is described as a core 
phenomenon  of  language.  What  is  communicated  in  a  novel  includes  as  a 
fundamental  presence  the  notion  of  a  universal  and  recognisably  ontological 
anatomical body. He draws on an idea from Noam Chomsky:  ‘language is an organ, 
an organ about organs, and an organ that writes itself into its communications. And 
it replicates itself where  and  when it can.’1 8 3  Clearly, manifestations of bodies in 
fiction are  heterogeneous;  sentences  can  be  composed to depict the  physical,  or
88temporal  movement  of a  protagonist,  yet  those  sentences  themselves  take  on  a 
physical form and structure.  So, in addition to the diegetic presence of bodies in a 
novel, the structure of the printed form of language expresses a codified sense of the 
body. The movement and tensions within the language suggest and articulate the 
body through a sense of textual  dynamics.  On a more literal level, this suggested 
physicality of sentences is actually physical in that it positions the reader's body, as 
well as positioning readers psychically.
The complicity of a reader in this process of codification and reading appears 
ambiguous,  and Gliserman argues that this non-diegetic  structure is a  suggestive 
physicality  that  is  easily  passed  over in favour of narrative  momentum.  In  this 
scheme, readers pass over or through sentences under the influence of architectural 
structures. This appears analogous to the actions of social space upon subjects who 
may not be aware of the degree to which their actions are influenced, but is perhaps 
more accurately defined in terms of architectonic properties. The systematic internal 
layout of text comes to be defined and differentiated by other sentences around it. 
Sentences are embedded ideograms, abstract forms read in relation to one another. 
As  a  vehicle  for  conveying  information,  language  operates  through  carrying  a 
multitude of messages simultaneously. One of these messages generated is described 
as 'from the body, about the body, to the body, for the body.'1 8 4  Reading this body is 
less a case of studying the flow of syntactic forms but rather involves looking at the 
patterns  woven  by  those  syntactical  forms.  It  is  a  case  of  picking  semantic 
relationships out of their flow and looking at them as intricate networks.
The population encountered in the year 802,701  are described according to 
grotesquely  exaggerated  physiognomic  principles.  Their  bodies  are  codified  to 
suggest their species characteristics. The historical struggle which has been the cause 
of their evolution and that has led to this cannibalistic resolution is firmly rooted in 
Wells’s present. The differentiation of their physiology is unambiguously rendered: 
the Morlocks as ape-like beasts in contrast to the fragility of the Eloi, their features 
described  as  a  ‘Dresden  china type  of prettiness’1 8 5 , beautiful but infantile. It is 
worth noting that in Wells’s Experiment  in  Autobiography,  when  discussing  his
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terms of Dresden china. This comparison with a particular quality of a category of 
object in relation to a quality of a person conveys a physical and physiognomical 
delicateness and fragility which embodied his (first and second) wife’s difficulty in 
responding to Wells’s sexual appetite. This quality of the Eloi, which is more than 
sexual  and actually accounts for a whole form of society,  is contrasted with The 
Time Traveller’s impressions of the Morlocks:
I felt a peculiar shrinking from those pallid bodies. They were just the half­
bleached  colour of the  worms and  things one  see  preserved  in  spirit in  a 
zoological museum. And they were filthily cold to the touch.  Probably my 
shrinking was largely due to the  sympathetic influence of the Eloi, whose 
disgust of the Morlocks I now began to appreciate.1 8 6
Patrick Parrinder has commented on this relationship of ‘sympathetic influence’, a 
process of partial identification that the Time Traveller admits he felt for the Eloi. 
The first of their kind he meets face to face is described as ‘indescribably frail. His 
flushed face reminded me of the more beautiful kind of consumptive -  that hectic 
beauty of which we used to hear so much’.1 8 7  Parrinder suggests that this is evidence 
of a kind of authorial affinity with the Eloi:
Since tuberculosis had  been (wrongly) diagnosed, it is significant that the 
first of the Eloi whom the Time Traveller meets face to face has the ‘ ‘hectic 
beauty” of a ‘ ‘consumptive’1 8 8
Not only are they more human than the grotesque Morlocks, but the Eloi also have a 
quality of vulnerability that can tenuously be biographically linked to Wells’s own 
poor  health,  albeit  with  a  degree  of  specificity.  This  is  a  society  that  Wells’s 
protagonist is ultimately able to display a great deal of identification with, wreaking 
violent destruction upon the predatory creatures that feed upon them. While I will 
subsequently  suggest  an  alternative  reading  of this  account of the  consumptive
90beauty of the Eloi as a connotation of degeneracy, I’d like to sustain the simultaneity 
of readings in this passage.
These radical differences between the two species, one inducing  ‘peculiar 
shrinking’, the other ‘sympathetic influence’, are both physiological and indications 
of character, and the distinct responses described by the Time Traveller seem to be 
generated  and  sustained  as  a  mutual  effect,  ‘peculiar  shrinking’  made  more 
pronounced  by  ‘sympathetic  influence’.  The  split that constitutes these  radically 
contrasting species has been brought about by some form of evolutionary principle 
but this is not something that can be accounted for as strictly the result of a purely 
Darwinian process  of selection  and adaptation,  but rather,  as the Time Traveller 
eventually hypothesises, has been brought about by perpetuation of social conditions 
that  exist  within  his  own  epoch.  This  transformation  of  bodies  is  purely 
physiognomical. On the one hand, these descriptions seem to mark a distinct sense 
of contrast between  rational,  classificatory  discourses associated  with  specimens 
from a zoological museum, and both the Eloi and Morlocks: as races whose cultures 
are embodied in their physical forms, and whose cultures are incapable of supporting 
something as  complex  as  museological  activity.  They  are  therefore  clearly  both 
differentiated from the form of humanity represented by the Time Traveller. This 
cultural alterity, embodied in difference of species, is reinforced subsequently by the 
discovery of the Palace of Green Porcelain, an abandoned ruin of a vast museum, 
that retains none of its original  significance to either Eloi  or Morlock. Yet it also 
introduces a pseudo-scientific perspective on these bodies, through a suggestion of 
scientific  objectivity,  and  an  associative  connection  between  physiognomy  with 
rational  classificatory  discourses.  While from  a  rational,  late  nineteenth-century 
perspective, such an emphasis on physiognomy appears irrational and in opposition 
to  any  scientific,  classificatory  discourse,  assumptions  based  on  appearance  are 
deeply rooted and persistent long beyond the point of Wells’s writing of The Time 
Machine.
Physiognomy  in  its  loosest  sense  has  been  a  historically  enduring  set  of 
ideas,  and appears to be as old  as recorded culture.  It is arguably described as a 
fundamental and cross-culturally universal issue, in the sense that it is concerned
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some culturally assigned values located within. Its perceptual assumptions find voice 
in Socrates and Plato, in the certainty of an uncoincidental propinquity of vice and 
ugliness, and physical beauty reflecting inner beauty respectively:  ‘(Socrates) would 
advise youths to look in their mirrors every morning to note what progress they were 
making along the  path of virtue.’1 8 9  Aristotle’s  Physiognomonica, which until the 
eighteenth century was generally  regarded as the  standard work on physiognomy, 
relied upon symmetry and proportion as a register of moral disposition.  While its 
systematic tabulation  gives the  appearance  of believable  solidity,  there are  more 
incredulous parallels drawn between human and animal nature, where the qualities 
of a lion depict properties of masculinity, and a panther femininity. Yet despite the 
persistence of a connection between outward appearance and inner self, the idea of 
physiognomy  was  most  clearly  articulated  and  popularised  as  a  rational  and 
scientific form in the late eighteenth century by the Swiss theologian, philosopher 
and physiologist Johann Caspar Lavater (1741-1801). His work, with its reliance on 
painfully detailed rules concerning the smallest details of physical appearance, was 
often confused with phrenology, and the two fields were viewed as extremely close, 
often indistinguishably so, in the nineteenth centuiy.1 9 0
Graeme Tytler has argued that the nineteenth century novel as a general form 
shares an unshakeable link to Lavater’s physiognomical writings, in particular, his 
Physiognomische Fragmente (1775-8):
(...) European literature as a whole, and most particularly the novel, with its 
detailed  descriptions  and  analyses  of  human  beings,  landscapes,  house 
interiors,  and  inanimate  objects,  is  in  many  ways  an  expression  of that 
physiognomical atmosphere whose beginnings can be traced primarily to the
Physiognomische Fragmented9 1
The  limits  of Tytler's  survey  of this link  between  the materiality encoded  within 
literary  texts  and  physiognomy  are  defined  by,  and  mirror,  the  popularity  of 
physiognomy  as  a  credible  discourse  between  the  1770s  and  1880s,  a  period  he
92describes  as  ‘essentially  ‘Lavaterian” .1 9 2  By the end of the nineteenth century, 
modes  of  rationalist  and  empiricist  thought  had  largely  dispelled  the  scientific 
appearance  of  physiological  disciplines,  in  part,  due  to  the  discrediting  of 
phrenology,  which  although  distinct,  appeared  as  a  specific  science  of a  general 
principle. While Tytler describes an analogous decline in literary portraiture, he also 
asserts its continuing presence in the twentieth centuiy. The ur-form of the novel is 
one of Lavaterian origins which are reiterated through the perpetuation of fiction as 
the literary forms of novels and short stories. Wells is cited as one of these twentieth 
century novelists whose work is haunted by the spectre of physiognomy. It seems 
safe to assume that in particular he is mentioned due to the  Scientific Romances, 
rather than for the majority of his fiction, which is unremarkable in all but the most 
general  sense  suggested  by  Tytler  in  its  relationship  to  physiognomy.  Wells’s 
exclusion from the temporal boundaries of Tytler’s study is unfortunate, as The Time 
Machine,  like  the  other  Scientific  Romances,  is  a  self-conscious  and  deliberate 
engagement  with  physiognomy  at  an  allegorical  level,  rather than  an  attempt to 
perpetuate  a literal  concurrence  with the correlation of appearance and character. 
The  ‘Lavaterian’  character of the  Scientific Romances  should be read a device; a 
literary conceit rather than a literal reflection and reproduction of ideology.
The bodies of humanity’s future, the distinct species of Eloi  and Morlock, 
can  be  characterised  in  terms  of degeneration,  and  it  is  this  in  particular that  is 
suggested through the deliberately ‘Lavaterian’ character of The Time Machine. The 
idea of the embodied ruination of the human subject is prevalent in British fiction at 
the turn of the century, and in particular is most evident within fin de siecle Gothic. 
The  bodies  in the Time  Machine are consistent with this notion of a loose  set of 
genre  concerns  and  strategies,  in  which  human  subjects  are  defamiliarised  and 
violently  reconstituted  within text.  Such fictional,  and  alarmist,  rearticulations of 
embodied subjectivity can be placed within a general set of anxieties around notions 
of degeneration,  which  by  the  end  of the  nineteenth  century  were  prevalent and 
concrete in their manifestations. Such anxieties are well described by Max Nordau’s 
Degeneration (1893; English trans.  1895) Nordau’s ideas are descended from the 
those of Cesare Lombroso, whose fame comes from his investigations of criminal
93anthropology:  in  particular  his  theory  of the  ‘born  criminal’.1 9 3  For  Lombroso, 
criminal  behaviour  was  understandable  in  terms  of atavism,  or rather how  latent 
characteristics from earlier points of species history might reappear. The form of the 
physical body revealed with readable precision the intellectual, moral and emotional 
nature of the subject. Criminality was therefore innate and recognisable as a set of 
varied  physical  characteristics.  These were absent from a normative model of the 
Caucasian western subject, but present in the from of features such as an irregular 
cranium, an asymmetrical face, large ears or disproportionate limbs.
These  anomalies to the  normative  body  were  signs of reversion  to earlier 
stages  in  humanity’s  evolutionary  development  as  a  species,  as  well  as  finding 
analogous comparisons with other species. While an obvious comparison might be 
thought  to  have  been  drawn  up  with  apes,  Lombroso’s  list  of  physical 
correspondences is drawn from an extensive and absurdly inconsistent selection of 
possible ancestral forms, including:  ‘dogs, rodents, lemurs, reptiles, oxen, birds of 
prey, and domestic fowl, to name a few.’1 9 4  These traces could be found across the 
whole exterior of a body, as well  as inside:  for example in abnormalities of brain 
structure. Their presence in humans did not itself cause criminal behaviour, but did 
reveal a savage or animal-like set of characteristics within a subject that were likely 
to  prompt acts  of criminal  behaviour,  which  might  generally  be  thought  of as  a 
beast-like  transgression  of  civilized  restraint  and  morality.  Hurley’s  reading  of 
Lombroso’s atavism is a description of a type of embodied subjectivity which is too 
full of varied and incompatible histories. This is a reading of human bodies that is 
potentially ‘utterly chaotic, unable to maintain its distinctions from a whole world of 
animal possibilities.’ 1 9 5
As a student and zealous advocate of Lombroso, Nordau sought to convey, 
through  a  specificity  of investigated  form,  a  sense  of  urgency  in  his  argument 
concerning  the  snowballing  perpetuation  of  decadence  as  a  genuine  threat  to 
civilization,  the  effects  of which  were  already  well  established.  He  lays  out  his 
intentions in a letter to Lobroso:
94Now I have undertaken the work of investigating (as much as possible after 
your method) the tendencies of the fashions in art and literature; of proving 
that they  have their source in the degeneracy of their authors, and that the 
enthusiasm of their admirers is for manifestations of more or less pronounced 
moral insanity, imbecility, and dementia.1 9 6
Nordau’s views of progress were established upon the redemptive potential of the 
natural  sciences.  Humanity’s future can only lie in its elevation and development, 
based upon a form of progress which is inseparable from rational scientific thought. 
For  Nordau,  who  adopted  a  mainstream  view,  science  operates  according  to 
irrefutable and unchangeable physical laws ‘which apply to man as much to nature 
itself.’1 9 7  Clarity of formulation, observation and mental discipline, characterised as 
‘attention’,  are  vital  in  his  concept of progress.  Therefore  the  description  of the 
Morlock, a monstrous abhuman being, in terms of a formaldehyde-preserved natural 
history specimen could be read in terms of its opposition to a progressive, orderly 
sense  of zoological  classification.  However,  the  notion  of degeneration  is  much 
more prevalent in the embodied forms of future human than just in the animal-like 
appearance  of the  Morlocks.  It  is  inscribed  within  the  embodied  forms  of both 
populations and every aspect of their praxis.
The  Time  Traveller’s  account  of  these  populations  is  a  linear  and 
accumulative account, which goes from first impressions to increasingly elaborate 
speculations about the parallel histories of the two cultures. Almost as soon as he 
arrives  in  the  year  802,  701,  the Time Traveller  sees  a  group  of Eloi  who  have 
noticed his arrival, but his speculations about the future are described during his first 
journey in the time machine:
What strange developments of humanity, what wonderful advances upon our 
rudimentary civilization,  I thought, might not appear when  I came to look 
nearly in the dim elusive world that fluctuated before my eyes! I saw a great 
splendid  architecture rising about me,  more massive than any buildings of 
our own time, and yet, as it seemed, built of glimmer and mist. I saw a richer
95green  flow  up  the  hill-side,  and  remain  there  without  any  wintry 
intermission. Even through the veil of my confusion the earth seemed very 
fair.1 9 8
The visual evidence seen from the machine suggest a certain sense of optimism, of 
architectural wonders and a gradual improving of climate. In comparison, the Time 
Traveller’s own era is derided as only a  ‘rudimentary  civilization’. Yet it is from 
these debased seeds that transformations taking place have grown.
When the Time Traveller finally brings the machine to an abrupt halt, there is 
a  sudden transformation from fair weather and optimistic  vistas.  As the  machine 
reels over, flinging its passenger through the air, the Time Traveller finds himself in 
a thunderstorm, being lashed by hailstones. The idealised distance of his panoramic 
view shattered, he is physically soaked, and his senses momentarily assaulted by the 
weather. This slows down his first impressions of the surroundings, but provides a 
dramatic introduction to a key object in the future landscape:
I  stood  up  and  looked  round  me.  A  colossal  figure,  carved  apparently  in 
some white stone, loomed indistinctly beyond the rhododendrons through the 
hazy downpour. But all else of the world was invisible.... As the columns of 
hail grew thinner, I saw the white figure more distinctly. It was very large, 
for a silver birch tree touched its shoulder. It was of white marble, in shape 
something  like  a  winged  Sphinx,  but the  wings,  instead  of being  carried 
vertically at the sides, were spread so that it seemed to hover. The pedestal, it 
appeared to me was of bronze, and was thick with verdigris. It chanced that 
the face was towards me; the sightless eyes seemed to watch me; there was 
the faint shadow of a smile on the lips. It was greatly weather-worn, and that 
imparted an unpleasant suggestion of disease. I stood looking at it for a little 
space -  half a minute, perhaps, or half an hour. It seemed to advance and to 
recede as the hail drove before it denser or thinner.1 9 9
96The  Sphinx  is  gradually  revealed  to  the  Time  Traveller  over  an  indeterminate 
duration, his sense of time passing seemingly as distorted as it had been during his 
journey into the future. This fragmentary perception is shattered by another sudden 
transformation  due  to  meteorological  phenomena.  As  the  storm  clears,  the Time 
Traveller is overwhelmed by the growing clarity of the Sphinx:
I looked up at the crouching white shape, and the full temerity of my voyage
came upon  me.  What might appear when that hazy curtain  was altogether
withdrawn?200
The emphatic presence of the Sphinx can also be read in Wells’s insistence that its 
image be used on the cover of the Heinemann edition. It has also been described in 
terms  of a figurative  embodiment of the  conjunction  of the  Eloi’s  world  on  the 
surface and the subterranean world of the Morlocks,2 0 1  and it is to these differences I 
wish to return.
The differences  between  the  two sub-species  have  been  brought about  by 
some  form  of  evolutionary  principle  but  they  are  not  the  result  of  Darwinian 
selection and adaptation, but rather, as the Time Traveller eventually hypothesises, 
have been brought about by the perpetuation of social conditions that exist within his 
own epoch. This discourse is solidified by the image of the Sphinx that dominates 
the  immediate  landscape around the Time Traveller’s point of arrival,  and  inside 
which his machine is later hidden by Morlocks. For this reading of the Sphinx, I am 
indebted to  Leon  Stover’s  detailed  critical  reading  of The  Time  Machine.™2 The, 
statue alludes to an essay by Thomas Carlyle from his collection Past and Present 
(1843),  which together with his Sartor Resartus (1838) -  referred to by the Time 
Traveller - was ubiquitously familiar to Wells’s late nineteenth-century audience. 
The  degree  of Carlyle’s  status  as  indispensable,  ubiquitous  and  well  known  is 
demonstrated in Conan Doyle’s A Study in Scarlet (1887) as Watson, the narrator, 
describes his bewilderment at his new  acquaintance,  Sherlock Holmes.  While his 
knowledge  of some fields  was  astoundingly  extensive,  there  seemed  to  be  some 
radical gaps in Holmes’s field of learning:
97His  ignorance  was  as  remarkable  as  his  knowledge.  Of  contemporary 
literature, philosophy and politics he appeared to know next to nothing. Upon 
my quoting Thomas Carlyle, he inquired in the nai'vest way who he might be 
and what he had done.2 0 3
The  radical  inconsistencies  in  Holmes's  knowledge  mean  that  he  also  has  no 
knowledge of the structure or planets of the Solar System, which is also described as 
a comparison to put the strangeness of his ignorance of Carlyle into perspective.204
Carlyle’s  essay  draws  upon the allegory  of the  Sphinx.  This  concerns the 
myth that certain death  was  promised to anyone that could not answer her riddle. 
The essay prophesised a similar fate if his own question relating to the organisation 
of labour and management of the working classes were to remain unanswered. For 
Carlyle, decadent generations of factory owners had allowed labour to organize itself 
with  “ ape’s freedom’  in pursuit of sectarian class interests at the expense of social 
duty; with the ‘liberty of apes,’  Labour seeks its own greed no less than its nominal 
masters given only to profiteering.’205 Carlyle’s solution to this unsustainable system 
was the militarising of Labour. In Wells’s future, this problem has been allowed to 
escalate,  giving  his  fear  of  an  organised  working  class  bestial  and  predatory 
materiality.  Stover makes the point that in recognising his own social context,  ‘the 
Time Traveller realizes that he has never left home; that the future is but a mockery 
of his own time.’206 Through their characterisation as ape-like beasts, the working 
classes have taken on this outward appearance.
An  equivalent physiognomy  applies  to the  Eloi.  Their name  is  the  plural 
version  of Elohim,  who in the Olds Testament are  lesser Canaanite  gods.  Stover 
makes clear that the term has a more general biblical usage referring to personages 
of royal  dignity,  such as kings and the pharaoh, but points to a particularly ironic 
usage. This single instance, in the 82nd Psalm, alludes to potentates, who although 
mortal, style themselves as gods:  ‘You are Eloi, sons of the most High, all of you; 
nevertheless,  You  shall  die  like  men,  and fall  like any  prince.’207 It is this ironic 
usage that is employed in Wells’s classification of this species of future humanity.
98They are failed gods, heirs to a generations of ruling classes whose actions have led 
to degeneration and destructive failure. This ruling class are the subjects at which 
Carlyle  aims  his  discourse.  They  are  based  upon  Carlyle’s  notion  of Dandies,  a 
leisure class who allow the perpetuation of a volatile class situation:
In Sartor Resartus he speaks of the Dandies as a leisure class living for show 
on the surface of life. The Drudges dig and work in the earth, living there in 
dark dwellings  where they seldom see the sky.  ‘To the eye of the political 
Seer,  their  mutual  relation,  pregnant  with  the  elements  of  discord  and 
hostility, is far from consoling.’208
The  lack  of any  apparently  Darwinian  explanation  for  the  physical  differences 
between the Eloi and Morlocks seems explicit and deliberate, and seems to bear little 
correlation  to  any  idea  of adaptation  that  would  appear  obviously  beneficial  to 
reproduction  and  survival;  why  would  ape-like  features  be  better  suited  to  an 
underground, industrial  society? This is purely physiognomical, an embodiment of 
social discourse.209
The  populations  of the  Eloi  and  Morlocks  are  certainly  compatible  with 
mainstream notions of degeneration,  but in terms of their behaviour, the Eloi  are 
closest to  the  kind  of decadence  that  Nordau  warns  against.  This  decadence  is 
codified  in  their  beautiful  but  frail  physical  appearance,  but  is  also  actively 
performed.  The Time Traveller’s first close  look at an  Eloi  comes  soon  after he 
arrives, and a group of Eloi  who had observed his materialisation from a distance 
come over to investigate his presence:
He was a slight creature -  perhaps four feet high -  clad in a purple tunic.... 
He  struck  me  as  being  a  very  beautiful  and  graceful  creature,  but 
indescribably frail. His flushed face reminded me of the more beautiful kind 
of consumptive -  that hectic  beauty of which we used to hear so much. At 
the sight of him I suddenly regained confidence.210
99The description of the Eloi as ‘the more beautiful form of consumptive’ appears to 
be  a  specific  reference  to  that fin-de-siecle  decadence  which  Nordau  sought  so 
vigilantly to oppose.  With a particular emphasis on Aubrey  Beardsley and Oscar 
Wilde, McConnell suggests that with their ‘unorthodox eroticism and their defense 
of ‘pure’  (i.e.  non-functional, non-mechanical) art, the decadents are an important 
source for Wells’s conception of the Eloi’.2 1 1  In making this association, the Time 
Traveller transposes  his  prejudice onto the appearance of this new  race, although 
only  does  so  completely  when  their actions  seem to confirm  his  assumptions.  A 
group of eight or ten Eloi quickly assemble around the Time Traveller, but even so 
he still describes a certain lack of interest in their behaviour towards him, which is 
conveyed in amongst the physical descriptions of the Eloi:  ‘The eyes were large and 
mild; and -  this may seem egotism on my part -  I fancied even then that there was a 
certain lack of the interest I might have expected in them.’212
As well  as this lack of visible interest, partly conveyed  by the eyes of the 
Eloi, there is no apparent attempt on the part of the Eloi to establish communication 
with the Time Traveller. He therefore attempts to suggest something of his means of 
arrival to them, by pointing to the machine, then to himself, and then as a means to 
suggest time, to the sun. One of the Eloi follows his gesture, and imitates the sound 
of thunder. This gesture makes the Time Traveller ask himself if the people of the 
future are fools:
You see I had always anticipated that the people of the year Eight Hundred 
and Two Thousand odd would be incredibly in front of us in knowledge, art, 
everything. Then one of them suddenly asked me a question that showed him 
to be on the intellectual level of one of our five-year-old children -  asked me, 
in  fact,  if  I  had  come  from  the  sun  in  a  thunderstorm!  It  let  loose  the 
judgement I  had  suspended  upon their clothes, their frail  light limbs,  and 
fragile features.213
Such  a judgement  seems  to  encompass  the  distaste  associated  with  fin-de-siecle 
decadence  as  well  as  the  childlike  outward  appearance  of the  Eloi.  In  itself,  the
100judgement seems rash, as it is no clear indication of the Eloi’s intellectual capacity. 
It is just as absurd to imagine that the Time Traveller arrived from the past as it is to 
think that he came from the heavens in a storm.
Although  it  is  consistent  with  subsequent  speculative  encounters  and 
experiences, the conclusion is more a confirmation of the Time Traveller’s reliance 
on  appearances  and  his  late-Victorian-morality than  it is  any  kind  of objectively 
reasoned account. But nevertheless, this is exactly how appearance and intellect are 
conflated in material forms within the text of the novel. This material constitution is 
contradictory,  and  never  particularly  stable.  In  this  way,  it  is  reflective  of the 
suggested condition of the protagonist/inner narrator. For almost as soon as the Time 
Traveller condemns the Eloi, feeling disappointment in the idea that he had built his 
machine in vain, he is enjoying their beauty:
Then one came laughing towards me, carrying a chain of beautiful flowers 
altogether new to me, and put it around my neck. The idea was received with 
melodious  applause;  and  presently  they  were  all  running  to  and  fro  for 
flowers, and laughingly flinging them upon me until I was almost smothered 
with blossom. You who have never seen the like can scarcely imagine what 
delicate and wonderful flowers countless years of culture had created.214
It seems here as if the Time Traveller is as much describing the Eloi  as he is the 
flowers being placed on him.
The very  presence of degeneration within a work of popular fiction might 
risk characterising The Time Machine in terms of Nordau's very objections, but here 
degeneration is made the overt subject matter, and dealt with in a clearly codified 
and ultimately explanatory manner. The Time Traveller's sequential commentaries 
that punctuate his stay in the future function to provide a set of shifting accounts of 
the  world  he  finds  himself  in,  and  that  through  a  process  of  rethinking  his 
conclusions  through  subsequent  experience  his  account  is  one  of degeneration, 
although it retains its speculative status. However, while the account of degeneration 
as it can be seen in humanity's descendants is made clear and forms Wells's thesis in
101the  novel,  the  status  of the  Time  Traveller  is  less  clear  cut.  In  the  subsequent 
sections, I would like to suggest that the novel's protagonist is precisely one of those 
figures in both the production of literature, and as characters in fiction, that Nordau 
identified as so threatening. Nordau's reading of fin de siecle decadence is one in 
which stability of masculinity is undermined. For Nordau, masculinity must retain 
its  assumed  status  as  a  stable  and  coherent  normative form.  In  corrupt forms  of 
decadent representation, morality is rendered insecure and unregulated, and aberrant 
types  present  a  very  real  and  contagious  threat  to  both  the  appearance  and 
maintenance of a secure and normative status quo. The Time Traveller's experience 
of the  future,  as  I  will  attempt  to  argue,  is  one  that  from  Nordau's perspective 
represents a fundamentally destabilising and threatening encounter.
The  Eloi  are  characterised  by  a  relative  androgyny.  There  are  males  and 
females,  but  they  are  not  as  clearly  differentiated  as  late-nineteenth-century 
modernity would demand.
Then, in a flash, I perceived that all had the same form of costume, the same 
soft  hairless  visage,  and  the  same  girlish  rotundity  of limb.  It  may  seem 
strange,  perhaps, that I had not noticed this before.  But everything was  so 
strange.  Now,  I  saw  the  fact  plainly  enough.  In  costume,  and  in  all  the 
differences of texture  and  bearing that now  mark off the  sexes from  each 
other, these people of the future were alike. And the children seemed to my 
eyes to be but the miniatures of their parents.215
While  the  sexes  are  not  identical,  they  are  described  in  terms  of  a  ‘close 
resemblance’, which  is accounted for by the Time Traveller by a cumulative and 
degenerative absence of gender roles brought about by affluence, complacency and 
decadence:
102Strength is the outcome of need; security sets a premium on feebleness. The 
work of ameliorating the conditions of life -  the true civilizing process that 
makes life more and more secure -  had gone steadily on to a climax.216
According to the Time Traveller’s speculations, social change has found its forms 
within the Eloi bodies. Strength, as muscular and masculine, is based upon need, and 
is devolved  by the  unchecked and excessive processes of civilization.  For at this 
stage, the Time Traveller still believes that this society is one of untroubled luxury, 
the  pinnacle  of civilized  progress,  which  appears  Eden-like  through  a  range  of 
stratified manifestations:
The air was free from gnats, the earth from weeds or fungi; everywhere were 
fruits and sweet and delightful flowers; brilliant butterflies flew hither and 
thither. The ideal of preventative medicine was attained. Diseases had been 
stamped out. (...) And I shall have to tell you later that even the processes of 
putrefaction and decay had been profoundly affected by these changes.217
The  struggles  of nature  that impose themselves  on  a  social  body  have  also  been 
eradicated from the general  landscape of the future, which is depicted here as an 
extension of the body, as an environment that is classified in terms of its alterity and 
hygienically sterile perfection. There is a conflation of two factors of change and 
variation  upon  the future  human  bodies  here,  environment and  habit.  While  the 
factors  of  environment  have  little  to  do  with  elements  of  Eloi  and  Morlock 
physiology that would be reproductive benefit as in the general  Darwinian model, 
there is  a concession to the possible  influence of habit as an influential  force for 
change from Darwin's perspective:
Habit also has a deciding influence, (...) for instance, I find in the domestic 
duck that the bones of the wing weigh less and the bones of the leg more, in 
proportion to the whole skeleton, than do the same bones in the wild-duck; 
and I presume that this change may be safely attributed to the domestic duck
103flying  much  less,  and  walking  more,  than  its  wild  parent  The  great and 
inherited development of the udders in cows and goats in countries where 
they are habitually milked, in comparison with the state of these organs on 
other  countries,  is  another  instance  of the  effect  of its  use.  Not  a  single 
domestic animal can be named which has not in some country drooping ears; 
and  the  view  suggested  by  some  authors,  that the  drooping  is  due  to the 
disuse of the muscles of the ear, from the animals not being much alarmed by 
danger, seems probable.218
By analogy, the decadent comfort of the Eloi landscapes has mimicked the process 
of domestication in animals. The need for masculine strength has been eradicated, as 
have qualities of overtly defined distinction between sexes, which no longer appear 
necessary.
A regulatory, normative, ideal of sex may be in place but it is not exactly that 
which  the  Time  Traveller  is  accustomed  to.  The  reiterated  norms  of  sexual 
difference  have  been  abandoned  with  the  rest of human  knowledge  and  culture. 
Without  the  highly  regulated  practices  through  which  nineteenth-century  sex  is 
materialised, sexual difference itself has shifted. This is not a differentiated culture 
imposed  upon  the  body.  The  materiality  of these  bodies  is  inseparable from  the 
materialization  of the  absence  of the  regulatory  norm.  The  Eloi  have  not  gone 
through the  subjective forming  processes  associated  with the  assuming  of a  sex, 
providing  an  additional  degree  of alienation from the Time Traveller.  However, 
despite  this,  the  Time  Traveller  is  still  able  to  develop  a  type  of heterosexual 
attachment to Weena, one of the Eloi, through the imposition of his own regulatory 
sexual ideals upon her embodied self.
The Time Traveller’s relationship with Weena does not begin immediately 
after  his  arrival,  but  after  the  time  machine  has  disappeared.  He  subsequently 
resolves to put the problem of the missing device ‘as much as possible to the comer 
of  my  memory.’219 He therefore uses his time in the exploration of the future 
landscape and to speculate upon the conditions he finds, and the circumstances of his 
meeting with Weena serve to enforce his speculative conclusions:
104That day, too, I made a friend -  of a sort. It happened that, as I was watching 
some of the little people bathing in a shallow, one of them was seized with 
cramp and began drifting down stream. The main current ran rather swiftly, 
but not too strongly for even a moderate swimmer. It will give you an idea, 
therefore, of the strange deficiency in these creatures, when I tell  you that 
none  made  the  slightest  attempt  to  rescue  the  weakly-crying  little  thing 
which was drowning before their eyes.220
The  presence  of  ‘strange  deficiency’  is  interesting,  as  it  indicates  a  lack  not 
specifically of muscular strength, but also an embodied absence of moral strength. 
Weakness of body is conflated with a weakness of resolve, character, responsibility. 
This Eloi’s drowning could have been prevented even by one of the physically frail 
‘little people’.  However, upon realising that this is not going to happen, the Time 
Traveller  performs  his  own  rescue:  ‘...  I  hurriedly  slipped  off my  clothes,  and, 
wading  in  at  a  point  lower  down,  I  caught  the  poor  mite  and  drew  her  safe  to 
land.’2 2 1  There are some determining conditions to this relationship that might be 
seen to set it up as a heterosexual one. The first is that they have met through the 
conditions of a literary rescue, although in actual fact, the act of wading into the 
river to pick up this Eloi from the water was a relatively understated act for a piece 
of  adventure  fiction.  This  action  is  downplayed  in  order  to  emphasise  the 
degenerative apathy of the Eloi, but also seems to suggest an unstable start to this 
relationship.
Once back on land, the Time Traveller revives the near-drowned Eloi with ‘a 
little rubbing of the limbs’.222 This act of contact between bodies is suggestive of a 
transfer of energy, of the Time Traveller’s comparative vigour, both physically and 
morally, being passed onto Weena. That some form of his own characteristics might 
have been passed on is sustained in her response, as well as developed in the pseudo­
heterosexual relationship that emerges:  ‘I had got to such a low estimate of her kind 
that  I  did  not  expect  any  gratitude  from  her.  In  that,  however,  I  was  wrong.’2 2 3  
Through the rescue, it could be suggested that Weena is transformed. Perhaps this
105necessitates  viewing  the  act  of rescue  as  a  masculine  form,  which  activates  an 
inherent  but  deeply  suppressed  femininity  within  Weena.  That  her  response  is 
surprising may suggest a somewhat ironic depiction of how a woman might respond 
to a man within a dramatic literary situation; that no matter how androgynous, this is 
somehow an essential feminine characteristic.
When  he  next  meets  Weena  after  leaving  her to  recover from  her  near- 
drowning, his error in assuming the Eloi’s ingratitude is demonstrated:
This happened in the morning.  In the afternoon I met my little woman, as I 
believe it was, as 1  was returning towards my centre from an exploration: and 
she received me with cries of delight and presented me with a big garland of 
flowers -  evidently made for me and me alone.224
This is a relationship that is characterised, like every aspect of these future bodies, 
by the  notion  of abhuman  indeterminacy.  In relating his account of events to the 
guests in his house, the Time Traveller shows some self-conscious uncertainty in the 
description of this relationship. The tone of this is rendered by his apparent refusal to 
commit to the description of Weena as a woman. Nevertheless, the Time Traveller 
admits to being taken with this gesture, and ascribes the possibility of his feeling 
desolate  to  account for his  enthusiasm for her action.  Language  proves to  be  an 
obstacle in their relationship, as it does in all the Time Traveller’s contact with the 
Eloi.  Although  having  grasped  some  sense  of  meaning  from  their  speech, 
understanding is limited:  ‘At any rate I did my best to display my appreciation of the 
gift. We were soon seated together in a little stone arbour, engaged in conversation, 
chiefly of smiles.’225 Yet the romantic implications of this scenario are downplayed. 
On the one hand we are told the following:  ‘We passed each other flowers, and she 
kissed  my  hands.  I  did  the  same to hers.’226 Yet her status as a woman is again 
deferred in favour of any other comparison:  ‘The creature’s friendliness affected me 
exactly as a child’s might have done.’227 Weena, whose name the Time Traveller is 
able to ascertain through  a limited  attempt at speech,  is described here  both as  a 
‘creature’ and as if she was a child. As their relationship develops, he reiterates this
106likeness:  ‘She was exactly like a child.  She wanted to be with me always.’228The 
Time  Traveller  also  states  that  although  not  knowing  what  her  name  meant,  it 
seemed somehow appropriate.
However,  while the Time Traveller maintains  Weena’s  distance  from  the 
normative  model  of femininity,  the  tension  between  familiarity  and  alterity  is 
uncomfortably sustained by a novel scene of domesticity, constructing a new form 
of relatively intimate emotional and physical relationship:
I  had  not,  I  said  to  myself,  come  into  the  future  to  carry  on  a  miniature 
flirtation. Yet her distress when I left her was very great, her expostulations 
at the parting were sometimes frantic, and I think, altogether, I had as much 
trouble  as  comfort from  her devotion.  Nevertheless  she  was,  somehow,  a 
very great comfort.  I thought it was mere childish affection that made her 
cling to me. Until it was too late, I did not clearly know what I had inflicted 
upon her when  1  left her.  Nor until it was too late did 1  clearly understand 
what she was to me. For, by merely seeming fond of me, and showing in her 
weak, futile way that she cared for me, the little doll of a creature presently 
gave my return to the neighbourhood of the White Sphinx almost the feeling 
of coming home; and I would watch for her tiny figure of white and gold so 
soon as I came over the hill.229
While in part appearing as a satirical account of romance, this emergent situation is 
constructed from a union of past expectations and new possibilities.
The problematically depicted differentiation of sex, as well as a more general 
sense  of the  late  nineteenth-century  ideological  importance  of a  self-conscious 
manipulation of the body in the form of responsible improvement, is stressed by the 
Time Traveller’s description of degenerate neglect. It is also consistent with other 
forms of discourse concerning the body as a site of articulation and potential anxiety, 
for example as described by Tamar Garb in her account of representations of sexed 
physiology in late nineteenth century art and visual culture:
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science  and  philosophy,  modern  men  and  women  were  expected  to  look 
dramatically different from one another.230
The modern body was always a gendered one. The maintenance of this distinction 
between male and female is not something that was taken for granted. Rather it was 
actively  constructed  and  sustained  as  an  ongoing  process.  In  order to fulfil  their 
social roles and obligations, men and women had to appear in the expected forms. 
To fail to do so flaunted a distinction that was ‘natural’, and which helped to sustain 
a necessary sense of social order:
To the  nineteenth-century  mind,  a  ‘masculine  woman’  or  ‘feminine  man’ 
represented an unnatural aberration, a grotesque distortion of a preordained 
set  of  distinctions  that  were  rooted  in  biology,  decreed  by  nature  and 
endorsed by the complex organization of sexual and social behaviour which 
characterized modem society.2 3 1
This is an order sustained by appearances, held up by distinctions that were visible 
and immediately recognisable as universal differences. The breakdown of this visual 
order is suggestive of a similar collapse of social order.
According to Garb, the burden of visual order belonged to the  body. As a 
form  to  express  inner  identities  that  related  to  external  sets  of social  rules  and 
conventions, representations of bodies shared that burden:
Naked  or  clothed,  the  body  in  representation  is  cloaked  in  convention, 
conforming to society’s expectations in setting, pose, attributes and physical 
characteristics.232
Garb is referring to images of human bodies in painting and photography, but the 
exclusive  privileging  of  visual  forms  of  representation  in  the  maintenance  of  a 
‘visual  order’  might be  an  over-literal  reading, and  is not necessarily implied  by
108Garb’s  argument.  The  status  of  the  body  within  such  an  identified  field  of 
representation, I would suggest, is too pervasive and slippery to be contained within 
the field of French art and visual culture. Instead, where Garb identifies apparently 
anomalous  phenomena,  analogies  may  be  drawn  with  the  bodies  of  The  Time 
Machine, and with the more general  sense of the abhuman in nineteenth-century 
popular fiction.
The tension that Garb constructs is between regimented control of the body 
as  it  appeared  in  art  and  visual  culture,  and  the  apparent failure  of the  body  to 
necessarily  conform  as  required.  This  is  the  human  body  as  rebellious  and 
disobedient. In straining against conventions, it fails to act as a guarantor of sexual 
difference. The resulting suggestions of identity are therefore not secure. They are 
ambiguous,  like  Hurley’s  reading  of the  abhuman.  This  tendency  of failure  is 
characterised as a set of exaggerations, mistakes and slippages:
Flesh  spills  out  of  its  carefully  framed  contours,  muscles  swell  too 
ostentatiously from finely modelled limbs, tightly laced bodies exceed their 
demarcated  boundaries  and  perspiration  blemishes the  polished  veneer of 
external appearances.2 3 3
This  is  in  stark opposition to the  body as the  necessary  site of displaying  sexual 
difference,  shaped,  manipulated  and  decorated  as  the  task  requires,  fixed  and 
inflexible in its relation to the distinct categories of male and female:
For nineteenth-century witnesses, muscles that were rounded and swollen, 
and skin that was rough, textured and covered  with hair (trimmed, waxed 
and  shaved  in  the  right  places)  reinforced  notions  of masculinity,  while 
minute  waistlines,  bejewelled  bodices,  unblemished  complexions  and 
elaborate coiffures affirmed ideas about the feminine.234
Garb’s  point here  rests  on  an  emphasis  of precariousness;  that there  is a fragile 
balance  between  a  stable  order  in  which  sexual  difference  can  be  adequately
109expressed and maintained, and representations that are either deficient or excessive. 
Identified within the practices of painting and photography are forms of subversion, 
which undermine as well as enforce a structure of distinction.235
Yet  while  Garb’s  account of the  instability  of bodies  manifested  through 
contradictory  representations  is  consistent  with  a  reading  of Eloi  and  Morlock 
corporeality, the bodies of The Time Machine seem less like subversive aberrations, 
expressing  anomalous  forms  of deficiency  or  excess.  Rather  they  highlight  the 
precariousness of the normative distinctions themselves. These are, after all, our own 
bodies’  futures.  The  dissolution  of  sexual  difference  is  both  accumulatively 
symptomatic and causal. There is no primacy of difference here, no ontologically 
definable  masculinity  or  femininity.  Yet  the  absence  of  distinction  is  no  less 
catastrophic and grotesque.  While in order to sustain the fiction of this as natural, 
such distinctions needed to appear effortless, the distinction required considerable 
deliberate and often painful effort.  In the hypothesising of the Time Traveller, this 
effort has disintegrated, along with the recognisable aspects of social order that it 
would  have  once  maintained.  The  chaos  which  the  transgressing  of boundaries 
threatened has come to life, and has remodelled  human society in its own grotesque 
and sexually undifferentiated image.
Ultimately,  While  Eloi  sexual  difference  is  relatively  ambiguous  in  its 
manifest distinctions, what characterises Weena is less a sense of her as a masculine 
woman, but rather the sense in which she is female, but not human. This leads to a 
more  general  sense of embodied  subjectivity in  which  sexual  distinction is but a 
manifestation of a more general set of instabilities:
I saw an inscription in some unknown character. I thought, rather foolishly, 
that Weena might help me to interpret this, but I only learnt that the bare idea 
of writing had never entered her head.  She always seemed to me, I fancy, 
more human than she was, perhaps because her affection was so human.236
Her  non-human  status  is  emphasised  firmly  by  the  Time  Traveller,  in 
acknowledgement of his own difficulty to remember the fact. Strangely, he is in part
110defining Weena as not human from her inability to conceptualise writing, rather than 
ascribing this as a straightforward case of perfectly-human illiteracy.
In  order to think through the Eloi  and the  Morlocks  as  bodies  of alterity, 
cross cultural  perspectives may be useful.  Such cross cultural  perspectives can, at 
their most articulate, not just provide straight comparisons, but raise fundamental 
questions about such seemingly immutable categories as sex, and conceivably, even 
humanity. Marilyn Strathem suggests that Western society, with its appearances of 
neutral  categories that seem  to actually  be  nature, fails to  serve  as  an  analogous 
model for the study of other societies. As Christopher Tilley points out in relation to 
the analysis of Melanesian bodies, Strathem argues that bodies become ‘male’ and 
‘female’  not through  their  observable  characteristics  of sexual  determination  as 
demonstrated  by  biology,  ‘but  by  virtue  of nature  of their  positioning  in  social 
acts’.237 Strathem argues that, as a universally applicable tendency, when either an 
individual or group encounter another individual or group, each part is irreducibly 
differentiated from the other. Unity is sustained with respect to the other. The result 
of this is that social structures, like individuals, are forever split:
Social life consists in a constant movement from one state to another, from 
one  type  of sociality  to  another,  from  a  unity  (manifested  collectively  or 
singly) to that unity split or paired with respect to another. This alternation is 
replicated throughout numerous cultural forms, from the manner in which 
crops are regarded as growing in the soil to a dichotomy between political 
and domestic domains.238
According  to  Strathem,  this  alternation  is  most  notably  conceptualised  through 
Melanesian gender.
Whether  a  subject  is  male  or  female  is  not  something  determined,  but 
something  that comes  about through  these  states of alternation.  Being female  or 
male is a process of being, one that emerges as a more or less unitary state. Men and 
women have both male and female constituents. Individuals are not just composed 
of multiple  identities,  but  of male  and  female  elements  that  are  configured  and
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sexual difference has little to do with an established mode of thinking of male and 
female  purely  as  pre-existing  bodily  conditions.  Male  and  female  are  socially 
constitutive  principles,  not attributes  of bodies.  While  Western  notions  of sexual 
difference and the constitution of embodied subjectivity may serve as poor models 
for  reading  Melanesian  bodies,  these  readings  suggest  the  contingent  status  of 
Western categories.  In addition to the radicalising of bodies as the sites of sexual 
difference, the implication is the erosion of boundaries of physical distinctness for 
sexual  and  subjective  constitution,  as  the  socially  defined  coming  to  being  and 
alternation of sexual difference no longer exclusively implicates the body as the site 
of social  subjectivity, but implicates not only the endowment on bodies of gender, 
but as Tilley suggests, on ‘artefacts, events, architecture and spaces’.239
There is a consistency between these positions of anthropological  relativity 
and  the  loosely  defined  field  of poststructuralist  thought.  This  is  no  accidental 
coincidence  of  morphology.  Rather  the  histories  of  anthropology  and 
poststructuralist thought are shared, laced with overlapping strands and influences: 
Bataille’s notion  of an irrational  economy is drawn from anthropological  sources, 
particularly from  a freely  but resonantly  interpreted  reading of Mauss’  The  Gift. 
Derrida  reads  and  critiques  Levi-Strauss  as  a  source  of  the  theorising  of  the 
distinctions between Logos and Tel os in Of Grammatology, while Tilley draws upon 
Derrida  in  the  formulating  of his  argument  in  Material  Culture  and  Text.  This 
consistent overlap of shared histories and concerns is demonstrated by the general 
assumption  concerning bodies as they appear in the context of a poststructuralist 
account.  The  following  is  taken  from  an  analysis  of the  presence  of  gendered 
subjectivity in the work of Irigaray and Deleuze:
In  keeping  with  the  poststructuralist tradition  in  French  philosophy  from 
which this  work is largely  drawn,  I  assume that human  selves  are  neither 
substances  with  determinate  properties  nor  egoic  structures  that  accrue 
personal  histories  in a predictably  orderly way.  Instead,  I  assume that the 
selves we experience as our own are the product of a historically conditioned
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process needs to be instituted and continually reiterated in a social context in 
order  to  give  birth  to  and  maintain  the  subject  at  the  corporeal  level  of 
embodiment as well as the psychic level of self, and that language and social 
positioning within a larger social field play a crucial role in this process.240
This passage articulates the status of bodies as they are extrapolated from The Time 
Machine, and suggests the propinquity of implication that are made available from 
both within the discipline of anthropology and elsewhere.
In her work on body imagery in Fiji, Anne Becker's principle assumption to 
which she applies her ethnographic fieldwork is that core cultural values are encoded 
in aesthetic ideals relating to body shape. This is a universal  process, but one that 
takes different forms in specific contexts. She suggests that the western cultivation 
of the body can be seen in terms of the possibility of personal representation. The 
body  is  a  medium,  a  resource  for  expression  with  which  to  communicate, 
particularly  with  reference to  ideas  of personal  status  and  accomplishment.  It is 
imagined as being under the jurisdiction of the self:
Core cultural values are clearly encoded in aesthetic ideals for body shape. 
Especially  in  the  West,  these  ideals  are  constructed,  homogenized,  and 
reified in the media. In Fijian society, too, there appears to be a consensual 
ideal  with  respect to  the  aesthetics  of bodily  form,  with  admiration  of a 
particular shape corresponding to positive sentiments about what the shape 
encodes or suggests.2 4 1
Yet this comparison makes a distinction clear; the Fijian view sees the cultivation of 
a subject's body as a socially illegitimate means of distinguishing oneself. While a 
central discourse in village life, the distinction is one of personal motivation against 
the notion of body shape as a medium of community participation and idiom of care 
and nurture within a social network.
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outlines  a  tendency  for  women  to  perceive  their  body  image  as  acceptable,  in 
contrast to attitudes in North America, where the same research had outlined a desire 
to modify the body through weight loss. While there was a cross cultural consistency 
in  'mid-  range'  of body  shapes,  thinner  shapes  suggested  a  low  quality  of care, 
whereas physical attractiveness bore a general correlation to a sense of robustness 
and good health. Another distinction to generally Western cultural values and body 
ideals  is  that  of narratives  of alienation,  ways  in  which  self and  body  may  be 
discussed in everyday use as two polarised opposites. Becker's argument privileges a 
mind-body dualism as a dominant attitude in the West, and that becomes particularly 
visible in relation to obesity and to disorders of body image such as anorexia. Rather 
than  the  adversarial  tendencies  by  which  body  and  self are  viewed  in  the  West, 
idealised features in Fiji  such as large calves or a well formed body are associated 
with the ability to work hard and are signs that somebody has been well cared for.
The notion of investment in body image, while universal, is manifested in 
distinct contextual forms. A human body can be described as registering the personal 
and social histoiy that has, at least in part, forged its malleable corporeal form. Yet, 
as Levi-Strauss describes, this act of shaping is one of the body's conformity to its 
social membership:
(...)  all  cultures  leave  their  mark  on  the  human  body:  through  styles  of 
costume,  hair,  and  ornament,  through  physical  mutilation,  and  through 
gestures, they mimic differences comparable to those that can exist between 
races, and by favoring certain physical types, they stabilize and perhaps even 
spread them.242
Becker's reading of Fijian bodies relies heavily upon this observation, in addition to 
drawing on Durkheim's description of social positioning, either within the interior or 
at the  margins  of a  social  group,  either through  the  endorsement or disregard  of 
consensual  standards  of body  presentation.  For Durkheim,  this  is  a  case  of  an 
obligatory  duty  for  a  subject  to  resemble  their  companions,  to  realise  within
114themselves the traits of the collective type. For Becker, the marginal aspects of this 
argument are as prominent and ubiquitous as conformity with a centre:
Identification with a particular subcultural ethos is achieved through visibly 
cultivating the body - through dress, exercise, diet, or hairstyle, for example - 
in ways commensurate with the moral priorities of the community.2 4 3
Although  her  insistence  on  margin  and  centre,  on  mainstream  and  subculture 
distinctions,  seems  clumsy  when  considering  large  and  complex  societies,  in 
particular her reference to a quotidian and familiar contemporary  'West', Becker’s 
comparative insistence maintains its sense of sound utility. The abstract notion of an 
anatomically  defined  body  bound  to  notions  of conformity  is  made familiar and 
ubiquitous.  Whether relating to notions such as beauty, discipline or fertility, core 
values may be represented as ideal types. The Eloi and Morlocks are recognisable in 
their distance from any such historically appropriate models. Their bodies are also 
distant  from  the  idea  of  the  Western  cultivation  of  the  body,  linked  to  the 
manipulation  and  forging  of identity  through  a  body  that  is  embedded  within  a 
structural set of social relations.
One of the more resonant aspects in Becker's scheme of thinking  about the 
body is Pierre Bourdieu's notion of taste as something that is expressed primarily 
through the body:
Taste, a class culture turned into nature, that is, embodied, helps to shape the 
class body. It is an incorporated principle of classification which governs all 
forms  of incorporation,  choosing and  modifying  everything that the  body 
ingests and digests and assimilates, physiologically. It follows that the body 
is the most indisputable materialisation of class taste, which it manifests in 
several ways.  It does this first in the seemingly most natural features of the 
body, the dimensions (volume, height, weight) and shapes (round or square, 
stiff or  supple,  straight  or  curved)  of its  visible  forms,  which  express  in 
countless ways a whole relation to the body, i.e., a way of treating it, caring
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habitus.244
Therefore the radically opposed corporeal manifestations that are the bodies of the 
Eloi and the Morlocks may be read as the indisputable materialisation of class taste. 
Upon further examination  of Bourdieu,  habitus appears  as an  idea that resonates 
through The Time Machine and suggests an alternative form of reproduction to the 
Darwinian model:
The  habitus  is  the  product  of the  work  of inculcation  and  appropriation 
necessary  in  order for those  products  of collective  history,  the  objective 
structures  (e.g.  of  language,  economy  etc.  )  to  succeed  in  reproducing 
themselves more or less completely, in the form of durable dispositions, in 
the  organisms  (which  one  can,  if one  wishes,  call  individuals)  lastingly 
subjected to the same conditionings, and hence placed in the same material 
conditions of existence.245
Biological individuals, or embodied subjects, are grouped together as the product of 
shared objective conditions, and are the supports of the same habitus. The Eloi and 
Morlocks make up a sociologically defined model of two such groups. They are two 
distinct  social  classes,  defined  by  objective  determinations  which  are  radically 
embodied.  The  notion  of reproducible  and  durable  dispositions  is  recognisably 
prefigured in The Time Machine, but articulated in an extreme and literal manner.
An  alternative  but  arguably  consistent  perspective  on  the  embodied 
subjectivity  made  present  in  The  Time  Machine  is  suggested  by Judith  Butler’s 
account  in  Bodies  That  Matter.  Butler  describes  gender  performativity  as  ‘the 
reiterative and  citational  practice  by  which  discourse  produces the  effects that it 
names’.246 She argues that sexual difference is subject to a set of regulatory norms, 
working  performatively  to  constitute  the  very  materiality  of  subjects  who  are 
compatible with heterosexual ideals. The materiality of the body is rethought ‘as the
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bodies is indissociable from the regulatory norms that govern their materialization. 
Her sense of performativity is not an act of agency, but the regulation of hegemonic 
discourse.  Sex is a cultural  norm,  not a body onto which gender is imposed. The 
matrix  of gender relations is prior to the emergence of the  ‘human’. In relation to 
The Time Machine, the interest here is not just sexual difference but the constitution 
of the subject’s body in general: the matter of how bodies are constituted. The notion 
of performativity that she suggests is not necessarily that which is manifested within 
The  Time  Machine.  This  section  will  follow  a  loose  diegetic  arc, from the Time 
Traveller’s exploration of the Palace of Green Porcelain, to his escape from the year 
802,701.  As  the Time Traveller is  detached  from  any  sense  of contextual  social 
framework  that  might  constitute  a  hegemonic  discourse,  perhaps  new  forms  of 
agency are determined.
Yet the status of these bodies, as human or not, is consistently unresolved 
and  ambiguous.  This  indeterminacy,  in  part,  seems  to  be  articulated  by  Butler’s 
sense of bodies as being subject to materialization through discursive performativity. 
The sense of the way in which regulatory structures, morality and law for example, 
define the status of bodies is demonstrated by the Time Traveller’s fashioning of a 
weapon from a metal lever, and his expressed desire to use it to kill Morlocks:
(...) I rejoined her with a mace in my hand more than sufficient, I judged, for 
any  Morlock  skull  I  might encounter.  And  I  longed  very  much  to  kill  a 
Morlock or so.  Very inhuman, you  may think, to want to go killing one’s 
own descendants! But it was impossible, somehow, to feel any humanity in 
the things. Only my disinclination to leave Weena, and a persuasion that if I 
began  to  slake  my  thirst  for  murder  my  Time  Machine  might  suffer, 
restrained me from going straight down the gallery and killing the brutes I 
heard.248
Implied here is the status of Morlock bodies as outside of a regulatory framework 
that would ensure a stable sense of morality, regarding not only their own behaviour,
117but the actions that may be inflicted upon them. Their inability to be constituted as 
fully  human justifies  murderous  intent towards them.  However,  this  sense  of an 
unsuccessful  constitution  of embodied  subjectivity  is  not just  applicable  to  the 
unquestionably abhuman Morlocks, but seems to have infected the Time Traveller 
himself. His own status as a clearly determined and embodied subject seems to have 
been thrown into a state of flux and instability, to the point at which he is eager to 
commit acts of savage violence against the Morlocks.
To openly admit to this desire suggests an equal admission of his own crises 
of humanity. The Time Traveller attempts to depict this as normative behaviour in 
light of a complete absence of a normative framework with which to construct and 
judge  any  behaviour.  It is as  if being thrown  into a situation that reveals a more 
primal sense of humanity, or humanness, in which his own higher judgement must 
determine  his  desires  in  the  absence  of  any  process  of  consistent  behavioural 
reinscription, an abyss appears revealing the lack of any essentialised humanity. It is 
only in retelling the events in the form of narration that the reiterative elements that 
constitute  embodied  behaviour  resurface.  This  leads  the  Time  Traveller to  self­
consciously account for his murderous desires:  ‘Very inhuman, you may think, to 
want to go killing one’s own descendants!’  Without the stable social contexts that 
might make such a judgement, the Time Traveller himself shows signs of abhuman 
behaviour. Just as his own sexual orientation is thrown into instability through his 
attraction to the indeterminately female and not quite human Weena, his very sense 
of himself as a morally constituted human being is questioned in his attitude to the 
Morlocks. In failing 'to feel any humanity in the things', he is also starting to fail to 
feel any humanity in himself.
The suggestion here is one of the interruption of embodied subjectivity as an 
ongoing  and  reiterative  process.  The  interruption  is  temporary,  and  diegetically 
recounted  when  returned  to  that  contextual  framework  of  similarly  constituted 
subjects. The future world is one that disrupts the Foucaultian regulatory ideals that 
Butler argues constitute sexual difference and the stability of an embodied subject. 
Within such regulatory practices is, according to Butler, a kind of productive form of 
power that is able to produce the bodies it controls. In a sense, the perspective of the
118Time Traveller might also constitute such a power, one that is attempting to both 
make sense of, and simultaneously constitute, the bodies he encounters. This process 
of constitution is not physical, but involves the interpretation of their corporeality 
within a system of moral and socially explicable matrices. This correlates initially to 
appearance,  but  also  to  behaviour,  and  perhaps  ultimately,  when  coming  to  the 
conclusion  of  murderous  desire  and  the  right  to  life,  seems  determined  by 
propinquity or distance to his own notion of humanness. This judgement is clearly 
idealised  and  based  upon  an  unreflexive  morality.  He  is  not  prepared  to 
acknowledge the baseness of the Morlocks as at all human because it is grotesque. 
Their  cannibalism  is  perhaps  ultimately  their  most  inhuman  act,  despite  the 
commonness of the activity in human history.
The history of the Eloi and the Morlocks is one that has its own constitutive 
and  product powers,  as  mapped  out by the  speculative  explanations  of the Time 
Traveller.  What is ambiguous in this semantic structure of narrative is where such 
power lies: In the historical forces that have shaped the separation and development 
of two distinct species of humanity, or the interpretative historical narrative offered 
by  the  Time  Traveller?  The  tentative  answer  to  this  would  be  to  point  out  the 
tautological  nature of the question, that, firstly, they are within the  semantic  and 
diegetic structure of the novel, and secondly, within such an interpretative scheme as 
suggested  by  Butler,  there  is  no  clear distinction  between  the  account  (or  more 
significantly the  source  of the account) of the  historical  forces,  and those forces 
themselves. One might be read merely as a reiteration of the other. However, outside 
of this closed circuit represented here is a new process of coming into being, made 
possible by the breakdown of social and physically constituted forms of reiterative 
authority.  Even though the narration of such a process necessitates a prudent and 
thorough  degree  of  self  consciousness  and  self  deprecation,  this  is  a  radical 
experiment in subjectivity.
There  is  undoubtedly an  internalised  set of ideals  relating to heterosexual 
attraction  and  stability  projected  by  the  Time  Traveller  onto  Weena  and  their 
relationship, but this seems to fall short of actually accounting for the relationship. 
This  relationship  is  a  new  and  unique  event  and  contains  a  suggestive  radical
119critique.249 Wells shares with Butler a desire to highlight the socially constructed 
nature  of  sex  and  subjectivity,  and  implicit  within  this  critical  impulse  is  the 
suggestion  of new  and  reflexive  approaches.  The  relationship  between  the Time 
Traveller  and  Weena  is  perhaps  a  positive  enactment  of  performative 
materialisation. It is independent of the durably inscribed historical forces and social 
conditioning that makes up the irreversible split between the Eloi and the Morlocks. 
It is also distant from, although still related to, the wild de-humanisation of the Time 
Traveller and his violent tendencies towards murder.
Butler conceives of sex as neither a simple function of material differences 
nor as a form of difference caused singularly by discourse. Rather, at the very least, 
these must be material differences that are both marked and formed by discursive 
practices. None of these things are in place in any familiar configuration that could 
reductively account for the relationship between the Time Traveller and Weena in 
terms of sexuality and its normative categories. This relationship seems in need of 
some active and creative interpretation by the Time Traveller, as do his activities in 
general. Yet it is that relationship, in part, that serves to restrain the Time Traveller 
from  his  murderous  impulses.  His  sense  of responsibility  to  Weena  is  in  effect 
constituting a new  regulatory framework in which bodily actions and constitutive 
subjecthood may take place. This judgement of restraint in the face of a new and 
violent set of sensibilities is a rationalisation, relating not only to a recognised need 
to stay  with and  protect Weena, but also to a speculative outcome relating to the 
Time Machine itself:  a makeshift moral framework lashed together by immediate 
and practical concerns.
The  restraint and  containment offered  by  this  bespoke  set of constitutive 
guidelines  is,  however,  short lived.  An  incident of restrained  murderous impulse 
takes  place  in the  so-called  Palace  of Green  Porcelain,  an  enormous  museum  of 
relics that includes artefacts from the Time Traveller’s own present, as well as his 
relative  past  and  future.  Upon  coming  across  an  iron  lever,  the  Time  Traveller 
imagines it as an instrument of both specific utility - the opening of the bronze doors 
at the base of the Sphinx where he believes his Machine has been hidden -  and as a 
mace more than sufficient for the crushing of a Morlock skull. Thus armed, together
120with his possession of a box of improbably but perfectly preserved matches and a 
quantity  of camphor,  lends  him  a  sense  of  both  purposeful  hope  and  vigorous 
confidence:
Towards sunset I  began to consider our position.  Night was creeping upon 
us, and my inaccessible hiding-place had still to be found. But that troubled 
me very little now. I had in my possession a thing that was, perhaps, the best 
of all defences against the Morlocks - 1  had matches!250
This confidence is bodily. It is a revived state, or possibly new-found state, of vigour 
and  physical  strength  against  the  Morlocks.  However,  it  is,  at  least  partially, 
accounted for by the most simple of material possessions -  a box of matches. What 
seems  to  have  occurred  is  a  dissolution  of  clear  differentiation  between  an 
anatomically  defined  embodied  subjectivity  of the Time Traveller,  and  the  most 
quotidian and humble of worldly things. One is absorbed into the possibility of the 
other. To possess the matches is to transform the status and possibilities of the Time 
Traveller.  His plans, confidence,  and even  susceptibility to fatigue,  seem to have 
been altered by these objects.
Patrick  Parrinder  has  employed  the  significance  of matches  in  The  Time 
Machine  in  order to make a claim for what he describes as the Time Traveller’s 
‘Promethean ancestry’. According to Parrinder, there are points of connection -  the 
violent thunderstorm in which the Time Traveller arrives, the violent emotionalism 
of elation  and  dispair -  to  not a  only  a  generic  sense  of gothic  melodrama,  but 
specifically  Mary  Shelly’s Frankenstein, subtitled The Modern Prometheus.  This 
subtitle is given in allusion to the myth of Prometheus as the creator of humanity. 
Parrinder argues that just as Prometheus was a Titan, ‘the Traveller is identified with 
the  race  of  ‘giants’  who  preceded  the  Eloi  and the  Morlocks  and  built the  great 
palaces.’2 5 1  This relationship and status of semi-divinity is demonstrated by the Eloi 
who asks if the Time Traveller has come from the sun. However, Parrinder’s model 
of the Time Traveller as Prometheus is most cogently demonstrated by the matches 
in the novel:
121He  brings  a  box  of matches  with  him,  and  when  they  run  out  he  steals 
another box from the Palace of Green Porcelain. Prometheus stole fire from 
Zeus and brought it down to earth as a gift concealed in a stalk of fennel, to 
show his friendship for suffering humanity. But neither the frugivorous Eloi 
nor  the  half-blind  Morlocks  are  fit  recipients  for the  gift  of fire.  Future 
humanity has degenerated so much that the Traveller’s matches are used only 
as purposeless toys, or in self-defence against the Morlocks.252
So  the Time  Traveller is  linked,  through  the  matches  to  a  general  analogy  with 
Prometheus,  suggesting the  possibility of a further mutability  in  his  status  as  an 
embodied  subject,  with  a figure  who  is  pre-human,  and  also  associated,  through 
images of classical antiquity, with its ideal and most vigorous forms. Yet like the 
presence of bodies in The Time Machine, the status and role of matches is not stable. 
Parrinder’s  very  account  lays  out  a  wildly  varied  trajectory  for  matches  in  the 
narrative. From toy to amuse the Eloi, to hopeful reinvigoration for the protagonist.
The Promethean connection made visible by the Time Traveller’s bringing of 
fire  to  this  world  is  also,  in  Parrinder’s  account,  connected  to  his  final 
disappearance:
Can it be that -  punished for his daring to set out to discover the future in 
defiance of the gods -  his fate is to remain bound to his machine, condemned 
to  perpetual  time  travelling just as  Prometheus  was  bound  to  a rock  and 
condemned to perpetual torture?2 5 3
While  this  suggested  reading  of the  Time  Traveller’s  ultimate  fate  is  tenuously 
conjectural  to  say  the  least,  the  negative  and  destructive  aspect  that  the  match 
ultimately plays is made visible in much more concrete and straightforward terms in 
the novel. Whereas this discovery of matches in the Palace is one of embodied hope 
and confidence, the same matches then go on to play an active part in the chaotic, 
violent and somewhat tragic end to the Time Traveller’s stay in the future:  ‘In the
122end his playing with fire causes reckless destruction including, it would seem, the 
death of Weena who is the one friend he has made in the new world.’254 So while his 
sense  of  physical  vulnerability  and  impotence  is  temporarily  negated  by  his 
possession, and assimilation, of the box of matches, the consequences of their use 
will ultimately be devastatingly ruinous. Although this account suggests that through 
the possession, use and then further theft of fire, the body of the Time Traveller is 
one that can be likened to a mythical Titan, within the diegetic flow this new found 
confidence through the physical extension of the body through acquired objects is 
easily countered. The actuality of executing the plan to force open the doors at the 
base of the Sphinx is dependent on yet another stage in the materialisation of the 
bodies of both the Time Traveller and Weena, of further experimental testing of their 
capabilities and limits:
My plan was to go as far as possible that night, and then, building a fire, to 
sleep in the protection of its glare. Accordingly, as we went along I gathered 
any sticks or dried grass I saw, and presently had my arms full of such litter. 
Thus  loaded,  our progress  was  slower than I  had  anticipated,  and  besides 
Weena was tired. And I, also, began to suffer from sleepiness too;255
Here is bodily materialization defined by the straightforward ability to pick up and 
hold sticks or dried grass, and walk with the load. What is not clear is whether or not 
there  is  a  distinction  in  the  limitations  expressed  between  Weena  and  the  Time 
Traveller. Weena is described as  ‘tired’, whereas the Time Traveller admits that he 
begins  ‘to  suffer  from  sleepiness’.  Implied,  perhaps,  is  a  sustained  distinction 
between the frailty of Eloi  physiology in comparison with late nineteenth-century 
humanity.  Is Weena’s tiredness because she is physically  lacking in  strength  and 
stamina? As for the  load-carrying  shortcomings  of the Time  Traveller,  they  are 
accounted for in a further exposition of his lack of sleep:  ‘I had been without sleep 
for a night and two days,  and  I  was feverish and  irritable.’256 This is no ordinary 
tiredness or weakness,  but an  intense and  unstable condition  brought on  by  sleep 
depravation, made more disturbing by the correlation between the impending and
123immanent approach of both that elusive and much needed sleep, and the Morlocks: 
‘I felt sleep coming upon me, and the Morlocks with it.’ While the plan to find a safe 
refuge  had  been  suspended,  the  price  of  such  an  action  makes  itself  a  most 
unambiguously present and embodied danger.
What follows in the narrative is ultimately the failure of the Time Traveller’s 
plan to construct a protective fire that will allow him to sleep safe from the advance 
of the Morlocks. This failure is determined by physical limitations, and results in the 
dramatic climax of the period spent in the year 802,701. These physical limitations 
not only accounted for by the onset of tiredness, whether muscular or due purely to 
lack  of  sleep,  but  also  by  the  Time  Traveller’s  ability  to  simultaneously  carry 
firewood  and  hold  lit  matches  -   required  primarily  as  a  defence  against  the 
oncoming Morlocks. This body, while perhaps Promethean in connotation, is bound 
fatefully by the most quotidian of restrictions.
The Time Traveller is constantly reminded of the limited and crude reality of 
his corporeal existence, and it is generally an uncomfortable, if not life-threatening, 
experience.  This  is first made apparent in  his  initial journey  into the future.  The 
journey itself is unpleasant in its extreme physicality, that is in the intensity of its 
effects upon the body:
I am afraid I cannot convey the peculiar sensations of time travelling. They 
are excessively unpleasant. There is a feeling exactly like that one has upon a 
switchback  -   of  a  helpless  headlong  motion!  I  felt  the  same  horrible 
anticipation, too, of an imminent smash.257
These are both actual, in the sensation of motion, and psychic, in the fearful sense of 
expected impact.
Stupidity  and  a  peculiar  lack  of  common  sense  and  forethought  also 
characterise the violent cessation of the journey to 802,701. For all the brilliance and 
scientific prowess required for the execution of such a singular invention as the time 
machine, the most logical of problems regarding the process of stopping the machine 
suddenly  presents  itself to  the  Time Traveller  as  he  hurtles  through  time:  ‘The
124peculiar risk lay in the possibility of my finding some substance in the space which 
I, or the machine, occupied.’258 His body is suddenly exposed to risk of materialising 
within other matter, and hence being violently destroyed. This danger exposes the 
boy of the Time Traveller to an odd predicament; that his body is analogous to any 
other form of matter. There is nothing unique in his organic and sentient status as an 
embodied subject. He is made of the same stuff as everything else on the planet. He 
is comprised of molecules that constitute solid matter in space. The essential form of 
survival for this materialised being is that it occupies that space singularly. If it were 
to materialise within other matter, then that state of being would come to an abrupt 
end. Judith Butler’s description of the body as a process of materialisation is given a 
potentially horrific literalness. However, the overall sense of equivalence serves as a 
useful metaphor for the general status of bodies as materiality and material culture in 
The  Time  Machine.  That  ultimately  bodies  are  like  any  other form  of artefact, 
structure or landscape.
The Time Traveller likens the status of his body and the machine in temporal 
transit as ‘slipping like a vapour through the interstices of intervening substances!’259 
In the event of such a violent rematerialisation as coming to a stop within some other 
solid form, which he envisions as involving  ‘the jamming of myself, molecule by 
molecule, into what ever lay in  my  way’,260 the Time Traveller speculates that to 
stop within an obstacle in the future would result in the following disaster:
(...) meant bringing my atoms into such intimate contact with those of the 
obstacle  that  a  profound  chemical  reaction  -   possibly  a  far-reaching 
explosion  -   would  result,  and  blow  myself and  my  apparatus  out  of all 
possible dimensions -  into the Unknown.2 6 1
That such a serious and  suddenly obvious concern should only present itself as a 
serious  matter for consideration at this  point appears  as  nothing  short of idiotic: 
‘This  possibility  had  occurred  to  me  again  and  again  while  I  was  making  the 
machine;  but  then  I  had  cheerfully  accepted  it  as  an  unavoidable  risk’.262 The 
sequential consequence of one kind of stupidity in regarding physical embodiment in
125terms  of  this  kind  of  threat  and  crude  limitation  leads  to  another  equally 
embarrassing mistake.
This  mistake  is  overly-rapid  manner in  which  the journey  is  terminated, 
brought about through panic in the face of what had been cheerfully accepted as an 
avoidable  risk  now  becoming  horribly  inevitable.  However,  the  state  of  panic 
induced  by  the  realisation  of this  ill  thought through  plan  is  exacerbated  by  the 
physical and psychic effects of the journey upon the Time Traveller. Not only in a 
state  of panic  due  to  the  likelihood  of total  physical  annihilation  that  could  be 
brought about through stopping within space already occupied, the Time Traveller’s 
judgement is also clouded by the physical effects of the unnerving process of time 
travel:
The fact is that, insensibly, the absolute strangeness of everything, the sickly 
jarring  and  swaying  of the  machine,  above  all,  the  feeling  of prolonged 
falling, had absolutely upset my nerve.2 6 3
What might be seen as the characteristic bad judgement or stupidity that the Time 
Traveller is guilty of, or defined by throughout the novel, is not brought to being 
here  purely  through  an  oversight  (such  as  not  addressing  the  problem  of 
rematerialisation), or bodily limitation (the inability to carry firewood and brandish 
matches at the Morlocks), but through the overwhelming bodily sensations that he is 
subjected to when in temporal motion. His judgement, and actions, become effected 
by a form of travel sickness, likened to the effect of being on an amusement ride. In 
addition, he also describes a ‘confusion’ in his ears, which is both a symptom of the 
effects  of time travel  and a metaphor for his  irrational  status.  His  actions  are an 
irrational response to a situation that he can do noting about:
I told myself that I could never stop, and with a gust of petulance I resolved 
to  stop  forthwith.  Like  an  impatient  fool,  I  lugged  over  the  lever,  and 
incontinently the thing went reeling over, and I was flung headlong through 
the air.264
126And  he  calls  himself a  fool  once  more  immediately  after the  abrupt  end  to  his 
journey through time, when he is thrown off the machine and onto soft turf in the 
middle of a hail storm: ‘Presently I thought what a fool I was to get wet.’265 One way 
to think of the totality  of this frame  of mind that has  been  brought about by the 
sudden realisation of this crises is a sudden realisation of his more general sense of 
vulnerability brought about by the realisation of his status as raw, and fragile, matter.
Judgement and physical limitation are conflated and inseparable at the most 
fundamental, and therefore most banal level. This form of physical stupidity is one 
that manifests itself once the Time Traveller is separated and cut off from his own 
world. It is a new form of being, a process of materialisation that comes into effect 
as soon as he becomes an  ‘anachronism’, in the most literal  sense of being cut off 
from  his  own  time.  Not only  is  he  separated  physically  and  temporally,  but the 
reiterative  and  sustaining  social  and  bodily  practices  that  constitute  embodied 
subjectivity  in  a  particular form,  as  Butler  describes  the  maintenance  of sexual 
difference, are no longer effective.  He is severed from the processes that keep his 
body in its materialised form as a culturally-specific late nineteenth male body. His 
new  form  is  thus  one  of that  often  appears  as  one  of confusion  and  insecurity, 
clumsiness and bad judgement -  almost adolescent in its awkwardness.
The  articulation of the Time Traveller’s  body as  one of instability and of 
often questionable judgement is most dramatically realised perhaps in the extreme 
conditions  that lead  to the  climax  of his  visit in  802,701.  Brought about by  the 
immanent  approach  of  sleep  and  Morlocks,  one  of which  will  ensure  the  fatal 
coming of the other, and unable to carry firewood and fend off the Morlocks with 
matches, the Time Traveller plans to escaped from the grassy scrubland to a nearby 
hillside  where they  might rest in  safety.  To aid their safe  passage,  he lights  the 
firewood  that  he  can  not carry.  What  is  initially  considered  as  ‘ingenious’266, is 
subsequently realised to be an ‘atrocious folly’.267 The ‘atrocious folly’ of this idea 
and act is that this was an environment in which not only modern people as such 
were absent, but also fire. Both the landscape and the population had forgotten fire: 
‘In this decadence, too, the art of fire-making had been forgotten on the earth.’268
127When  lit, this  initially  small  fire has a pronounced effect upon  Weena:  ‘The red 
tongues that went licking up my heap of wood were an altogether new and strange 
thing to Weena.’  While the fire itself takes on an almost bestial character, with its 
red tongues  licking the  pile  of firewood, Weena’s  response  is  a reminder of her 
alterity.  She is not human as such; rather she is characterised by indeterminacy, to 
the  extent that her resemblance to  a human  is made  ambiguous.  Her animal-like 
response  to  fire,  wanting  to  play  with,  even  to  cast  herself  into  it,  is  a  harsh 
characterisation of Weena as ab-human. Her indeterminate status is one where she is 
not quite adult, not quite female, not quite a child.
During  this  episode,  in  which  the  Promethean  yet idiotic  Time  Traveller 
inadvertently  starts  a  cataclysmic  forest fire,  in  which  he  and  Weena  are  at the 
centre,  his  body  is  manifested  in  its  most  extreme  physicality,  and  his  actions 
become a desperate  set of necessary measures for survival, that seem determined 
purely by those conditions.  He is no longer the civilized being he was, but one of 
immediate and violent response. As he heads towards possible safety, away from the 
fire he has started and the Morlocks that lurk and pursue through the undergrowth, 
his lumpen and straightforward physicality is emphasised:
For some way I heard nothing but the crackling twigs under my feet, the faint
rustle of the breeze above, and my own breathing and the throb of the blood­
vessels in my ears.269
In the  darkness,  his  senses are  reduced to the  identification  of the  most basic  of 
sounds, of his body’s interaction with the environment as he crushes and breaks the 
twigs beneath his feet, of the sound of the wind in the trees, and his own blood as it 
courses at an accelerated rate through his body. He is like a machine that can hear 
the operation  of its own  mechanisms. The final  approach  of the  Morlocks  in the 
pursuit is observed as an interruption of these self-contained observations:
128Then  I  seemed to know  of a pattering about me.  I  pushed on  grimly.  The 
pattering grew more distinct, and then I caught the same queer sounds and 
voices I had heard in the Under-world.
Like the Time Travelller’s, their bodies appear in this passage as a series of aural 
phenomena,  as  unseen  sounds  in  the  darkness.  Without the  benefit of the  Time 
Traveller’s  vision  as  an  accurate  source  of narration,  the  chase  and  impending 
conflict of the Time Traveller with the Morlocks is rendered as a primal  series of 
subjectively  experienced  noises  -  the  sound  of his  feet in  the  undergrowth,  the 
throbbing of his own pulse in his ears. The Morlocks, however, possess voices. They 
are the ones capable of rational communication as they hunt down the now animal­
like Time Traveller. The status of these bodies as abhuman here incorporates all of 
the characters, so that there is a degree of uncertainty that falls over not only the 
hideous Morlocks, but also the nearly-bestial Time Traveller. There is no stable or 
noble humanity here.
As  the  Morlocks  catch  the  Time  Traveller,  they  are  still  a  non-visual 
presence, but a monstrously haptic one:
Indeed, in another minute I felt a tug at my coat, then something at my arm. 
(...) Soft little hands, too,  were creeping over my coat and  back,  touching 
even my neck.270
Weena’s response is animal-like. When the Morlocks first grab the Time Traveller 
in  this  chase,  she  has  a  peculiar  reaction:  ‘And  Weena  shivered  violently,  and 
became quite still.’2 7 1  After he has placed her on the ground, in order to light a match 
to fend off the Morlocks, her condition seems to have deteriorated further:
She was lying clutching my feet and quite motionless, with her face to the 
ground.  With  a  sudden  fright  I  stooped  to  her.  She  seemed  scarcely  to 
breathe. (...) She seemed to have fainted.272
129This  is  Weena at her most abhuman -  her status one of indeterminacy  regarding 
whether she is actually alive or dead, which is to be her ultimate fate in the novel.
Throughout  this  narrative  sequence,  which  builds  dramatically  from  the 
exploration of the Palace of Green Porcelain and rushes headlong into his desperate 
escape from  the year 802,701, the Time Traveller’s  Promethean  idiocy is  in  full 
swing. After having flung a lit block of camphor on the forest floor, he makes an 
awful realisation:
In  manoeuvring  with  my  matches  and  Weena,  I  had  turned  myself about 
several times, and now I had not the faintest idea in what direction lay my 
path.2 7 3
The Time Traveller looses all  sense of physical  orientation.  His sense of physical 
isolation  and  vulnerability  is  accentuated  by  this  condition  of being  totally,  and 
stupidly, lost. This situation is indexically manifested by a physiological response in 
the  Time  Traveller:  ‘I  found  myself  in  a  cold  sweat.’274 The emphasis of this 
response is one that clearly marks out his bodily reaction as one that is not brought 
about through laborious exertion, but from the increasing horror of his predicament. 
Weena has entered a death-like  state,  and the Time Traveller’s own death  seems 
immanent. Rather than attempt to flee, he puts down Weena and sets about fuelling 
with sticks and leaves the camphor-induced blaze that defines an unstable perimeter 
against the encroaching Morlocks, whose eyes  ‘shone like carbuncles’275 from the 
darkness around him.
As  the  camphor  flame  dwindles,  he  is  reduced  to  lighting  matches  for 
defence, and his ultimate bodily manifestation as an instrument of brutal physical 
retribution commences:
The camphor flickered and went out. 1  lit a match, and as I did so, two white 
forms that had been approaching Weena dashed hastily away.  One was  so 
blinded by the light that he came straight for me, and I felt his bones grind 
under the blow of my fist.276
130The  abhuman  response to even  a  small  flame,  and  the  extremity  of its  panicked 
response,  seem to  make  it,  for the Time Traveller,  all  the more  appropriate  as  a 
subject of violence.  In this action, the Morlock is reduced to nothing more than a 
grotesque animal of lumpen, yet frail materiality. Its abhuman bones grind beneath 
the fist of a human, his hand  shaped into a tool, one that is knowingly crafted, a 
learnt  skill  for  making  a  weapon  out  of the  body  itself.  The  fist  is  the  trained 
response of organised culture, under which the degenerate cannibalistic bones of the 
Morlocks are ground. Yet this vanquished foe is not an animal:  ‘He gave a whoop of 
dismay, staggered a little way, and fell down’.277 The ability to vocally communicate 
an emotional response is disturbing. It is both perhaps similar to the noise that a dog 
might make,  but also disturbingly anthropomorphic.  When he fights a group that 
have overpowered him, he describes shaking off ‘the human rats’278 from his body. 
While  like  animals,  the  Morlocks’  link  to  humanity  still  grant  the  violence 
committed by the Time Traveller a savagely murderous consequence.
The  excitable  state  of  the  Time  Traveller  as  a  destructive  engine  is 
accentuated by his strenuous efforts to maintain his defensive fire. Noticing how dry 
the branches above his head were, he jumps up to drag them down to the ground. 
Once the fire is replenished he needs to rest: ‘I felt very weary after my exertion, and 
sat down’.279 He is also uncertain as to whether or not Weena still lives. Yet he still 
is unable to stop the involuntary response to his need for sleep. As he seems to drift 
off for an instant, he awakes to the touch of the Morlocks, and realises to his despair 
that  the  fire  has  gone  out,  and  that  he  has  lost  his  box  of matches.  The  Time 
Traveller enters into a new  and mutable bodily  state, first as helpless victim, and 
then as a retaliatory destroyer of the Morlocks. His body is overcome:
I was caught by the neck, by the hair, by the arms, and pulled down. It was 
indescribably horrible in the darkness to feel all these soft creatures heaped 
upon me. I felt as if I was in a monstrous spider’s web. I was overpowered, 
and went down. I felt little teeth nipping at my neck.280
131He  is  described  purely  in  terms  of their  grotesque  touch,  no  more  than  what is 
defined by the pawing hands of his assailants, who mean no less than to consume the 
flesh from his body, to discorporate his physical being for their own sustenance.
Yet in  the  desperate  struggle  to  maintain  any  sovereignty  of what might 
constitute the embodied subjectivity of his own life, the Time Traveller makes an 
accidental discovery:  ‘I rolled over, and as I did so my had came against my iron 
lever. It gave me strength’.2 8 1  It is a truly Promethean moment, of his transformation 
from  helpless  victim  to  sentient  and  empowered,  technologically-sophisticated 
human.  This  rebirth  is  akin to one  of initial  becoming.  It is  a  sudden  process of 
materialisation.  That  the  Time  Traveller  should  undergo  this  process  of 
transformation in which his humanity is both rediscovered and redescribed is a grim 
indictment on Wells’s  part of the  base  reality of the  species.  Endowed with new 
strength,  and  reshaped  with  an  extended  and  indefatigably  destructive  limb,  the 
Time Traveller struggles to his feet, and shakes from him what he calls ‘the human 
rats’. This serves as an image of the Time Traveller as a kind of titanic figure, like a 
mythic warrior or super hero, able to cast his now inferior assailants in the mere act 
standing, like Gulliver shaking off Lilliputians from his giant body.
This  image  rapidly  dissolves  into  a  more  grotesque  manifestation:  ‘(,) 
holding the bar short, I thrust where I judged their faces might be.  I could feel the 
succulent giving of flesh and bone under my blows, and for a moment I was free’.282 
This description, as well  as a disturbingly graphic account of the Time Traveller’s 
acts of violence committed in darkness, hence the emphasis on the haptic sensations, 
also seems to reverse the reduction of his own body to nothing but raw food for the 
Morlocks. The account of this bodily damage as ‘succulent’ has a peculiar resonance 
in conjuring an  idea of the materiality and consumption of food. And that this is 
essentially what this conflict revolves around does not leave the mind of the Time 
Traveller:
The strange exultation that so often seems to accompany hard fighting came 
upon me.  I knew that both I and the Weena were lost, but I determined to 
make the Morlocks pay for their meat.2 8 3
132Yet not only  is  he faced  with  this resolution of the crudest of bodily  states,  as a 
source of food, this sees the completion of the process of coming into being that was 
first  hinted  at  by  the  murderous  impulses  accounted  for in  the  Palace  of Green 
Porcelain.  That  without  the  consistent  reiterative  process  of  normative  and 
hegemonic  social  practices to  define  him,  such  impulses  have  been  increasingly 
present in the constitution of his embodied subjectivity. The Time Traveller’s only 
restraint in the Palace of Green Porcelain had been the presence of Weena. In part, 
his violence was repressed by a need to remain with her, but perhaps her presence 
also  served  as  a form  of social  gaze.  She  is  both  Foucaultian  discipline,  brought 
about through the literal surveillance of her observation, and the implicit suggestion 
of a  modern  moral  framework,  and  imaginary  other,  constituting  an  internalised 
psychic  Lacanian  gaze.  Without this  imagined  order  brought  about  through  the 
other,  the Time Traveller’s  apparently fatal  predicament becomes  an  unhindered 
opportunity to enter into a new temporary state of embodied being.
This exultation is short lived. The fires started by the Time Traveller escalate 
into  a  raging  forest fire,  which  drives  the  Morlocks  into  a  state  of blind  panic. 
Finding himself trapped upon a hill for refuge from the flames, the Time Traveller 
violence towards the Morlocks begins to subside when he realises the extent of their 
incapacity in the face of the overwhelming blaze:
Upon the hill-side were some thirty or forty Morlocks, dazzled by the light 
and  heat,  and  blundering  hither  and  thither  against  each  other  in  their 
bewilderment. At first I did not realize their blindness, and struck furiously at 
them with my bar, in a frenzy of fear, as they approached me, killing one and 
crippling several  more. But when I had watched the gesture of one of them 
groping under the hawthorn against the red sky, and heard their moans, I was 
assured of their absolute helplessness and misery in the glare, and I struck no 
more of them.284
133As the fire has grown, the violent rage of the Time Traveller subsides. Conversely, 
as  the  fire  begins  to  die  down,  he  fears  that  the  Morlocks  blindness  will  also 
disappear,  rendering  him  once  again  as  vulnerable  prey  to  their  cannibalistic 
appetites:
At one time the flames died down somewhat, and I feared the foul creatures 
would presently be able to see me. I was even thinking of beginning the fight 
by  killing  some  of them  before this  should  happen;  but the fire  burst out 
again brightly, and I stayed my hand.285
The actions of the Morlocks are certainly abhuman and beastlike. They are 
unable to see in the bright light of the flames and they are driven into a frenzied state 
of suicidal  panic, running into the fire itself.  However, the behaviour of the Time 
Traveller is  hardly  any  more  civilized  in  his  ability  to  rationalise  the  chaos  and 
destruction that surrounds him, isolated upon the hillside, surrounded by flames and 
desperate Morlocks:
For the  most part of that  night I  was  persuaded  it was  a nightmare.  I  bit 
myself and screamed in a passionate desire to awake. I beat the ground with 
my hands, and got up and sat down again, and wandered here and there, and 
again sat down.286
The  Time  Traveller’s  behaviour  seems  to  not  only  operate  in  sympathetic 
conjunction with the rising and subsiding of the surrounding flames, but here seems 
to mimic the bestiality of the Morlocks. These actions have a peculiar animal-like 
quality to them, almost suggestive of a captive ape as might be on display at a zoo, 
beating the ground and aimlessly pacing the space of its cage. This is the condition 
of the Time Traveller as embodied subject in the face of this apocalyptic carnage. 
His breakdown on the hillside marks a dramatic climax within the narrative. This 
climactic moment is not only one of narrative, but also, perhaps, materialisation. As 
he beats the ground, and ‘rubbing my eyes and calling upon God to let me awake’,287
134the  Time  Traveller  embodies  the  extreme  synthesis  of the  Promethean  and  the 
stupid.  The  flames,  the  result  of his  own  reckless  bringing  of fire  to the  future, 
encircle him and dictate the actions of his body.
The unstable condition of the Time Traveller’s body serves as an analogue of 
the novel as a dramatic and thematic structure. The tensions of the diegetic sequence 
that serve as a dramatic climax to his exploration of 802, 701, as well as the overt 
substructure of degeneration that is the novel’s moral content, are played out within 
the erratic destabilisations and materialisations of the Time Traveller as an embodied 
subject.  Weena’s  role  appears  to  complement  the  shifts  and  transformations 
undergone by the Time Traveller. But this is not to suggest that she is a mere cypher 
for the  embodied  subjectivity  of the  male  protagonist,  no  matter how  fragile the 
constitution  of sex  might be.  Rather Weena’s final  status  in  the  novel  is  one  of 
ultimate abhuman indeterminacy. Her abhuman status is defined in opposition to that 
of the Morlocks.  She responds to the attack by the Morlocks by at first shivering, 
then passing out in a faint-like condition.  Her repulsion towards them seems even 
more drastic than that of the Time Traveller; an embodied trauma is so great that the 
Time Traveller can not even tell whether she is breathing or not after he places her 
body  on  the forest floor.  This  is  echoed  by  her final  disappearance  as  the Time 
Traveller  loses  her  amidst  the  chaos  of  forest  fire  and  Morlocks.  Weena’s 
disappearance is one of finality, yet uncertainty. It is emphatically reiterated by the 
Time  Traveller’s  failure  to  subsequently  find  any  evidential  trace  of  her,  or 
indication  of exactly  what  her fate  was.  There  is  an  explicit and  almost painful 
ambiguity to her disappearance. This is death as a manifestly abhuman form. Instead 
of a body securely bounded and stable fate, Weena’s demise is an undifferentiated 
spectacle,  a  symptom  of the  diegetic  crescendo,  rendered  as  a  permeable  set of 
conditions that deny her a clearly differentiated bodily termination. Enduring a fate 
of ultimate indeterminacy, Weena’s disappearance and apparent death -  mirrored by 
the Time Traveller’s own disappearance - is the apotheosis of uncertainty within the 
novel.
Uncertainty characterises the body of the narrative itself, in a form that is 
more  fundamental  than  a  mere  thematic  tendency  within the  descriptions  of the
135embodied  subjects themselves.  As a  social  medium in  which the construction  of 
bodies may occur, it is full of the qualities set out by Hurley as forms of abhuman 
physicality. The field of the narrative is one, as Hurley describes abhuman bodies, of 
a spectacle of undifferentiated forms metamorphic states of existence. As a fin-de- 
siecle Gothic narrative that is simultaneously a form of thesis on degeneration, the 
‘gothicity’  of The  Time  Machine  is  one  that  is  rendered,  I  would  suggest,  as  a 
doubled  image.  Hurley  suggests that degeneration  itself is  not so much  a  stable, 
objective  and  scientific  form,  but  is  one  that  is  already  gothic  in  character.  By 
elevating this characteristic narrative element of fin-de-siecle Gothic to the status of 
the  novel’s  most  overt  thematic  concern,  Wells  presents  us  with  a  text  that  is 
uniquely reflexive as a form of gothic discourse. Not only is its character one that is 
rendered  by  the  qualities  of the  abhuman  that  the fin-de-siecle  Gothic  is  most 
exemplified  by,  but  is  itself an  openly  critical  form  of discourse  on  those  very 
qualities as articulated by broader discussions of degeneration. Yet despite granting 
The  Time  Machine  an  intriguingly  layered  condition,  the  identification  of the 
prevalent theme of degeneration is not intended as a device with which to iron flat 
the  textured  surface  of the  novel  and  the  presence  of bodies  as  materiality  and 
material culture within it. Rather, it is of more value here to focus on the notion of 
uncertainty  as  an  abhuman  form,  itself a  symptomatic  and  causal  condition  of 
degenerative discourses.  Exemplified by the horrific dissolution of Weena into an 
ultimate status of indeterminate being, uncertainty characterises the entire novel, and 
I would suggest, therefore determines the processes of materialises that bodies find 
themselves subject to within it.
Hurley  describes fin-de-siecle  Gothic  as  a  set  of accounts  of interstitial 
becomings,  of  metamorphoses  and  indifferentiation,  as  human  bodies  between 
species. This certainly reflects the bodies of The Time Machine. The Time Traveller 
himself spends, as I have attempted to argue, the duration of his visit to the future in 
a bodily condition of unstable becoming, separated from the regulatory framework 
of a normative social context. More explicit are the bodies of the Eloi and Morlocks, 
as species that are part-human, descended from, but not quite the same as the Time 
Traveller,  or  as  us.  Their  bodies  are  consistently  depicted  in  an  indeterminate
136manner, oscillating between different registers and as defying any state of secure or 
familiar corporeal stability. In a moment of reversal, the very physicality of the Time 
Traveller represents exactly this form of uncertainty to the Eloi, in a rare display of 
curiosity. Upon first encountering them one of the Eloi addresses the Time Traveller 
through at first through speech, and then through touch:
He came a step forward, hesitated, and then touched my hand. Then I felt 
other soft little tentacles upon my back and shoulders. They wanted to make 
sure I was real.288
The sense of uncertainty of whether or not the other is real is a shared one, and in the 
very act of Eloi investigation, the sensation of their haptic validation of his existence 
upon the body the Time Traveller is decidedly abhuman, their hands described as 
‘soft  little  tentacles’,  suggestive  of a  monstrous  distortion  rather than  anything 
resembling an encounter with familiar human anatomy. That this monstrous quality 
excites no fearful  reaction in the Time Traveller is accounted for by  a sense that 
there  was  ‘something  in  these  pretty  little  people  that  inspired  confidence  -   a 
graceful gentleness, a certain childlike ease.’289 Greater confidence is afforded by the 
Time  Traveller’s  physical  superiority  over the  Eloi,  in  the  sense  of stature  and 
apparent  strength:  ‘And  besides,  they  looked  so  frail  that  I  could  fancy  myself 
flinging the whole dozen of them about like nine-pins.’290 Nevertheless, while the 
Eloi  touch  to  eradicate  uncertainty,  the  sensation  of their  touch  merely  acts  to 
exacerbate their indeterminate status from the normative perspective of the Time 
Traveller.  The  speech  that  precedes  this  act  of  physical  contact  is  equally 
destabilising as an impression. The Time Traveller first hears one Eloi address two 
others in ‘a strange and very sweet and liquid tongue’.2 9 1  It is unfamiliar, obviously, 
but more significantly characterised as ‘liquid’, a state that seems to suggest the very 
qualities of unstable, merging and fluid qualities that Hurley suggests. When an Eloi 
then speaks to the Time Traveller directly, he is surprised by the contrast between 
sound and appearance:  ‘It came into my head, oddly enough, that my voice was too 
harsh  and  deep  for  them.’292 The relationship between sound and appearance is
137rendered  as  a broken  one,  without a consistent link to formulate  a  stable  whole. 
Rather the two jar as irreconcilable elements.
The uncertainty that distorts the stable materialisation of bodies in The Time 
Machine is reflected as a general tendency throughout the novel. The model that the 
Time  Traveller  uses  in  his  initial  demonstration  for  his  guests,  a  miniaturised 
prototype of the machine he uses for his own journey, generates just such a sense of 
unresolved ambiguity.  Between them, he and the guests are unable to account for 
exactly what has happened to this model, or where or when it might be. It simply 
vanishes out of the clarity and apparent stability of the modem interior, filled as it 
was with characters accounted for only as archetypes of disciplinary specialisation: 
Psychologist, Medical Man, Provincial Mayor. The analysis and interpretation of the 
social  structure  and  history  of 802,701  is  also  one  shrouded  in  uncertainty.  It is 
constructed from a series of speculative overviews, which shift and change with new 
information and discoveries. His final account, seen as definitive, is still only one of 
a  narrow  perspective,  and  by  no  means  stands  as  an  exhaustive  and  factually 
accurate exegesis. The narrative of the Time Traveller, is of course, the central point 
of uncertainty, in that its reception  within the novel is one of disbelief. The Time 
Traveller himself begins to doubt its veracity, to the extent that he must look at the 
damaged machine as it stands in his laboratory in order to confirm his fantastic story 
in his own mind.
If uncertainty  is  a  predominant  form  of characteristic  that  describes  the 
overall  presence of bodies in terms of materiality and material culture in the text, 
then I would also like to sustain its influence over a reading of The Time Machine as 
a discourse on degeneration. While the account of the abhuman forms of the bodies 
of the Eloi and Morlocks is one that articulates a clear sense of anxiety relating to 
degenerative discourses, this is mirrored by the rapid  destabilisation of the Time 
Traveller himself. This occurs almost instantly upon his radical separation from his 
normative  social  context.  Implied in this is the lack of stability in his  status as a 
normative model of embodied masculinity. That as soon as he is detached from his 
own  time,  he  is  subject to  shifts  that are  profoundly  troubling  in  the  context of 
degenerative anxiety. His stability of sexuality and moral evenness vanish and are
138reformed by a new  set of conditions in the future. Therefore, the narrative of the 
progress of humanity through the scale of social and evolutionary time is one of an 
unambiguous contribution to the form of discourse on the anxiety of degeneration, 
as exemplified by Nordau. However, the Time Traveller's own encounter with this 
world  is  one  that  displays  a  terrifying  fragility  of the  normatively  configured 
embodied subject, in such a way as to destabilise Nordau's own position. While for 
Nordau, aberrant types represented a threat to the maintenance of a morally concrete 
social order, Wells suggests that normativity itself is a contingent form, one that as 
Butler describes, is in need of constant reiterative input and support. Wells suggests 
that rather than being threatened by deviancy, there was no stability embodied in fin 
de siecle masculinity.
The bodily anxieties  played out here are bound by a specific referent that 
finds material, bodily and social analogues within the text.  While in the Palace of 
Green Porcelain, and undergoing the arming process that is to transform the body 
and potentialities of the Time Traveller as active agent, he  comes across another 
potential tool in his struggle to survive and return to his own epoch: what he initially 
believes to be dynamite, a material that is relatively new to the Time Traveller’s own 
epoch, being only invented by Alfred Nobel in  1867. Two dynamite cartridges are 
discovered in an airtight case, near a model of a tin-mine. However, after testing one 
of them in a side gallery of the museum, the Time Traveller realises that they are 
fakes,  nothing  but  illustrative  props  that  have  happened  to  have  survived  for 
thousands  of years.  This  incident  does  something  to  balance  out  the  fortuitous 
discovery of the matches and camphor, by demonstrating the equal chance of finding 
something that turns  out to  be  unusable,  by  balancing  dance  inducing  luck with 
disappointment.293 Yet there is relief in this. In his unconstrained excitement and 
determination to retrieve his machine, the Time Traveller was prepared to take his 
violent actions to a possibly self-destructive extreme:
I  really  believe  that,  had  they  not  been  so,  I  should  have  rushed  off
incontinently and blown Sphinx, bronze doors, and (as it proved) my chances
of finding the Time Machine, all together into non-existence.294
139The Time Traveller’s propensity for violence being tempered by an external factor, 
which in the absence of a normative regulatory framework for the constitution of 
embodied subjecthood, seems  to provide one in  a contingent or arbitrary manner. 
There  is  also,  as  Leon  Stover  suggests,  a  moral  equivalence  provided  by  this 
dissapointment that relates in a much broader sense to the metaphorical connection 
to Thomas Carlyle’s Riddle of the Sphinx. Stover suggests that the Time Traveller is 
relieved of a suicidal fantasy which would involve both the destruction of the Sphinx 
- the symbol of class relations that form the ontological seed of this future world, an 
originary  spring from  which  the  Eloi/Morlock  split flows -  as  well  as  the Time 
Machine.  Stover’s  reading  is  that the  narrative  makes  it clear that the  Morlocks 
deserve violence, and that their concealment of the Time Machine is  ‘a calculated 
act of entrapment, but the only safe way to confront them is to be more cunning than 
they.’295 This is ultimately a sustained reading of the allegory of the Sphinx:
The  Sphinx  problem  cannot be  solved  by  meeting  the frontal  violence  of 
class war on its own destructive terms. Unionized labor must be subdued and 
made docile under a new directive elite given to uncontestable controls that 
transcend internecine conflict.296
This reading, that is in part interpolation of Wells’s long term social and historical 
views,  renders  the  various  forms  of restraint  that  both  limit  and  constitute  the 
possibilities of violence as nothing more than political metaphor. This is interesting 
in that it is not just constituted through commentary or revealed authorial intention, 
but also through the narrated perspective of the Time Traveller in his attempts to 
rationalise  and  deal  with  the  difficulties  of his  general  predicament,  and  more 
specifically the horror at his realisation that the mankind’s lazy decadence had led to 
the Eloi becoming food for the Morlocks, a realisation made more difficult by the 
sight of Weena dancing alongside him:
140Then I tried to preserve myself from the horror that was coming upon me, by 
regarding it as a rigorous punishment of human selfishness.  Man had been 
content to live in ease and delight upon the labours of his fellow-man, had 
taken  Necessity  as  his  watchword  and  excuse,  and  in the fulness  of time 
Necessity had come home to him.  I even tried a Carlyle-like scorn of this 
wretched  aristocracy-in-decay.  But this  attitude  of mind  was  impossible. 
However great their intellectual degradation, the Eloi had kept too much of 
the human form not to claim my sympathy, and to make me perforce a sharer 
in their degradation and their Fear.297
Yet  the  undoubted  presence  of  Carlyle  fails  to  account  for  what  subsequently 
happens in the narrative, as well as how violence as both possibility and action is an 
integral element of constitutive bodies in the novel.
141Chapter 4: Time and Temporality
A  long  duration  is  sublime.  If it  is  of time  past,  then  it  is  noble.  If it  is 
projected into an incalculable future, then it has something of the fearsome in 
it. A building of the remotest antiquity is venerable. Haller’s description of 
the  coming  eternity  stimulates  a  mild  horror,  and  of the  past,  transfixed 
wonder.298
This chapter is predicated on an assumption that the presence of combined 
and various forms of time and temporality in The Time Machine are identifiable as 
suggested forms  or  manifestations  of materiality  and  material  culture.  One  such 
manner in which temporality and material  culture converge is in the discourse of 
evolution, and the museological discourse identified in the novel, which exemplify 
the organisation  of temporal  representations through architecture and display. As 
perhaps a material form in itself, and certainly an element of the material world that 
the novel constitutes, time might be seen here as definable by its susceptibility to 
analysis  and  ultimately  through  its  apprehension  and  realisation  as  a  navigable 
substance. Likewise, the invention of the time machine itself serves to transform pre- 
Einsteinian  time,  into  something  that  has  both  spatial  substance  and  historical 
resonance. The most certain, yet utterly ambiguous, point on which the novel rests is 
the  eponymous  machine  itself.  It  is  the  dramatic  contrivance  that  Wells  has 
introduced into his mimetic and concrete reality.
In The Time Machine, there is no attempt to explain how such a device might 
work, nor is there a detailed account of the appearance of the machine. Instead, this 
central  object  is  described  in  terms  of a few  loose  details.  This  does  not  seem 
accidental, as the attendance to one would necessitate the elaboration of the other. 
Specifying  particular components  would  indicate  operational  instrumentality  of 
some kind.  It is impossible to discern whether the machine is constructed from a 
novel  configuration  of existing technologies,  or if it relies on  as yet unimagined 
agency.  Its appearance is unfamiliar to the narrator,  borne out by his inability to
142provide an  adequate account or a suitable comparative image.  Its form is also of 
sufficient  complexity  to  defy  a  straightforward  description.  A  relatively 
comprehensive account of the machine actually refers to the working scale model 
used in a demonstration to an audience of assembled guests who meet at the Time 
Traveller’s home:
The  thing  the  Time  Traveller  held  in  his  hand  was  a  glittering  metallic 
framework,  scarcely  larger that a  small  clock,  and  very  delicately  made. 
There was ivory in it, and some transparent crystalline substance.299
The  sense  of what  this  object  is  comes  across  as  vague  and  its  purpose  utterly 
obscure.  It is described only indirectly, in terms of its scale and the quality of its 
construction. There is a hint of some mysterious technology at work but this is not 
developed.  Rather,  the  workmanship  of the  model  is  emphasised.  The  model  is 
imbued with a sense of its value due to the recognition of the labour and temporal 
investment required to make the piece, together with the  skilled use of seductive 
materials. This value is illuminated and accentuated by the sacrifice that is required 
by the act of demonstrating its operational function. The  sacrificial  aspect of the 
demonstration, involving the irretrievable loss of the model time machine, is made 
more poignant in the narrative by the incredulous reactions of the witnesses, which 
ultimately renders the performance as a display of irrational expenditure.
After the demonstration with the model, the actual machine is revealed, but 
little more is given away relating to how it functions or its appearance. The parts are 
suggestive  of  a  machine  with  complex  and  finely  crafted  components  and,  as 
materials, have an odd, domestic familiarity. The Time Traveller’s guests are also 
taken to see the machine after his return, although this time it is more to reassure 
himself than his audience of the veracity of his story. It bears damage and evidential 
traces that appear to corroborate his tale:
There in the flickering light of the lamp was the machine sure enough, squat, 
ugly, and askew; a thing of brass, ebony, ivory, and translucent glimmering
143quartz. Solid to the touch -  for I put out my hand and felt the rail of it -  and 
with brown spots and smears upon the ivory, and bits if grass and moss upon 
the lower parts, and one rail bent awry.
The Time Traveller put the lamp down on the bench, and ran his hand 
along the damaged rail.300
Little  more  is  revealed  of it,  except through fragments  that build,  incrementally 
constituting the qualitative presence of this machine. The vagueness of the form of 
the  machine  itself  is  a  necessity,  facilitating  the  introduction  of  an  unknown 
technology  as  a  narrative  device.  Bernard  Bergonzi  makes  the  following  point 
relating to the vague rendering of the time machine:  ‘The assemblage of details is 
strictly speaking meaningless but nevertheless conveys very effectively a sense of 
the  machine  without putting the author to the taxing necessity of giving a direct 
description.’3 0 1  It could be suggested that this quality of vagueness has echoed 
through the genres of science fiction, where a stylistic blurring of practicalities can 
be used to provide coded and associative imagery. It is the idea of the coded and the 
associative that is important here, and I would differ from Bergonzi’s assertion that 
the fleeting descriptions of the machine can be accounted for out of a necessary and 
somewhat lazily driven sense of economy. Rather, The Time Machine can be seen as 
a formative point in the process of imagining technologies which remain ambiguous, 
yet are compiled out of a constructed set of generalities and specificities. How else 
could this form of technology be conceptualised, except through such a balance of 
vagueness and recognition? The play within this chain of signification relies upon a 
general familiarity with the specific differences between each mark.
From a contemporary perspective, The Time Machine enters into the field of 
influence of antique objects. Not only does it do so on account of its age, but also 
due to the material elements described. Brass, ebony and ivory assume a quality of 
temporal otherness to a contemporary perspective. Evocative of historical furniture 
and interiors. However, their presence within the text suggests an advanced moment 
of  modernity,  dependent  on  the  technological  processes  of their  production  or 
refinement, and on structures of colonialism and international commerce that would
144ensure  their  availability.  These  materials  fluctuate  between  their  status  as 
contemporary, nineteenth-century technology, and their evoking of antique objects. 
But  ultimately  they  gravitate  towards  modernity,  as  a  complex  of technological 
sophistication and a process of movement encompassed by the overarching structure 
of Empire, a spectre that haunts the novel as a material world.
Jean  Baudrillard,  in  his early  work  The System  of Objects,  identified  the 
clock,  as  an  object that  had  vanished  in  later  modernity,  but that  had  formed  a 
central part of the bourgeois interior. Within this context, the machine has qualities 
that equate it with a comforting and traditional domestic scenario:
... they capture time and strip it of surprises within the intimacy of a piece of 
furniture. There is nothing in the world more reassuring. The measuring of 
time produces anxiety when it serves to assign us to social tasks, but it makes 
us feel safe when it substantializes time and cuts it into slices like an object 
of consumption.  Everybody knows from experience how intimate a ticking 
clock can make a place feel; the reason is that the clock’s sound assimilates 
the place to the inside of our own body. The clock is a mechanical heart that 
reassures us about our own heart.  It is precisely this process of infusion or 
assimilation  of the  substance of time,  this presence of duration,  which  is 
rejected, just like all other returns to inwardness, by a modem order based on 
externality, spatiality and objective relationships.302
The  actual  purpose  and  effect  of the  machine  is  all  the  more  disturbing  for  its 
resemblance to a clock,  an  inversion of a  set of familiar values.  It is also  worth 
noting that in an interview conducted in  1897, in which he discusses the scientific 
romances that had  so far been written,  he seems to make a knowing reference to 
clocks and time:
Glancing at the clock, the journalist was horrified to see how late an hour had 
already been reached.
145‘You have plenty of time to catch your train,’ said the novelist.  ‘My 
clock has no connection to the solar system. It only tells me how long I have 
worked.’3 0 3
The clock in Wells’s home gives the interviewing journalist the false impression that 
the hour is later than he thought. However, it bares no connection to Greenwich or 
any  fixed  shared  reference  of time,  it  is  merely  a  chronometer  to  measure  the 
Wells’s working time.
Another  account  of  the  machine  is  given  as  the  Time  Traveller  leaves 
802,701:
One dial records days, another thousands of days, another millions of days, 
and another thousands of millions. Now, instead of reversing the levers I had 
pulled them over so as to go forward with them, and when I came to look at 
these indicators I found that the thousands hand was sweeping round as fast 
as the seconds hand of a watch -  into futurity.304
The machine, with its dials that tell the date as a chronological statistic, is certainly 
allied to clocks and chronometers in nature and appearance.
Yet there is another field of mechanical  instruments to which the machine 
bears a greater resemblance -  the apparatuses of cinema in its formative stages. The 
potential to animate formerly still images, in particular lending itself to novelty and 
illusion,305 is paralleled by Wells’s manifestation of time travel. This propinquity 
was  identified  by  Terry  Ramsaye,  in  a  comprehensive  history  of cinema  from 
1926306 and later reframed by Ann Friedberg.  307 The account is of an inventor of 
early cinematic technologies, Robert W. Paul, who upon reading The Time Machine 
in 1895 recognized a similarity between the description of the machine in action and 
cinematic  principles.  In  this  Paul  saw  the  potential  to  develop  a  new  form  of 
spectacle. Ramsaye concurs with the comparison:
146A  reading  of  The  Time  Machine,  even  now,  leaves  one  with  a  strong 
impression  that  the  story  was  born  out  of  the  direct  suggestion  of  the 
behavior of a motion picture film. Wells, in a letter to the writer in 1924, said 
he was unable to remember details of the relation. But the evidence is such 
that if the story was not evolved directly from the experience of seeing the 
Kinetoscope, it was indeed an amazing coincidence.308
Descriptions of the machine may be scarce in Wells’s text, but there are accounts of 
the visual effects of its operation, both from the point of view of the operator and, at 
the end of the novel, as witnessed briefly by the character Hillyer. The possibility of 
associating the time machine with forms of visual apparatus is first suggested after 
the Time Traveller demonstrates his working model. After it disappears, one of his 
guests asks:  ‘are you perfectly serious? Or is this a trick -  like that ghost you showed 
us last Christmas?’309 This ‘ghost’ refers to a popular trick performed with a magic 
lantern. Creating the illusion of movement through the use of two glass slides, this 
trick from the previous year has been succeeded by the more advanced cinematic 
time machine310 The similarity between the machine and cinematic technology is 
illustrated in the descriptions of the beginning of the Time Traveller’s journey to the 
future.
His first attempts at operating the machine are slow and cautious. At first he 
is so apprehensive that his initial journey is a jump of less than five and a half hours. 
The machine is operated by two levers, one to start and one to stop. Taking one in 
each  hand,  he presses on the  starting lever and almost immediately  operates the 
second. No visual effect is suggested. When he stops, he is at first unaware of any 
change. He then notices that the hands of a clock in his workshop have marked the 
duration of his trip. With nervous anticipation, he then operates the machine again. 
The view of the Time Traveller is described as if he had been watching a speeded up 
film sequence of his housekeeper, Mrs Watchett:
I drew a breath, set my teeth, gripped the starting lever with both hands, and 
went off with a thud. The laboratory got hazy and went dark. Mrs. Watchett
147came in, and walked, apparently without seeing me, towards the garden door. 
I  suppose  it took her a minute  or so to traverse the  place,  but to me  she 
seemed to shoot across the room like a rocket.3 1 1
Ramsaye  points  out  how,  in  the  return  trip,  the  effect  is  accentuated.  As  he 
approaches the day on which he left, the Time Traveller passes through the same 
scene in a manner that is identical to the effect of viewing film in reverse:
But now her every motion appeared to be the exact inversion of her previous 
ones.  The  door  at  the  lower  end  opened,  and  she  glided  quietly  up  the 
laboratory, back foremost, and disappeared behind the door by which she had 
previously entered.312
The key term picked up by Ramsaye in this passage is ‘quietly’. This is interpreted, 
perhaps exaggeratedly so, as ‘silently’. Wells does not actually describe these scenes 
as silent but he does not refer to sound as an experience of time travelling, with the 
exceptions of the initial ‘thud’ as the Time Traveller embarks and what is described 
as an ‘eddying murmur’ accompanied by a ‘dumb confusedness’313, symptoms of the 
general  unpleasantness of the journey which gradually subside.  For Ramsaye, the 
lack of sound is evidence of a cinematic precedent, in particular, forms of novelty 
peep show: ‘One of the earliest novelty effects sought in the Kinetoscope in the days 
when  it  was  enjoying  scientific  attention  was  in  exactly  this  sort  of reversal  of 
commonplace bits of action.’314 The scene is presented as pure image, there is no 
sound  speeded  up  or  reversed.  Ramsaye  argues  that  experimental  phonograph 
reversals were also abundant, but that Wells seems to have concentrated exclusively 
on the visual: ‘It would seem pretty definite that the Time Traveller was all eyes and 
the story all motion picture.’315
In The Time Machine, Paul recognized the potential for a new narrative form, 
and met with Wells to discuss the idea, leading to Paul’s application for a patent in 
October of 1895. The proposed device combined projection lanterns, scenery and 
machinery to simulate motion. Spectators would sit within a time machine situated
148on  a  platform,  suspended  and  rocked,  while  a  current  of air would  circulate,  to 
generate a sensation of movement. That the sensation of movement is experienced 
during  time  travel  is  an  affirmation  of  Wells’s  notion  of  time  as  the  fourth 
dimension,  analogous  the  three  spatial  dimensions.  To  move  through  it  is 
conceptualised  as moving in  the traditional  sense.  But this movement is ascribed 
very  specific associations.  During his first short hop, the Time Traveller feels  ‘a 
nightmare sensation of falling’316. The sensations of time travel are described as 
unpleasant:  ‘There is a feeling exactly like that one has upon a switchback -  of a 
helpless headlong motion! I felt the same horrible anticipation, too, of an imminent 
smash.’317 The use of the term ‘switchback’ is of importance here, as it refers to a 
rollercoaster.  It  is  these  sensations  that  Paul  wished  to  replicate  as  a  form  of 
narrative spectacle  incorporating the thrills of an amusement park, but it is Wells 
who  is  already  writing  in  a  compatible  language.  Paul’s  unrealized  plan  was 
ambitious.  Not  only  would  spectators  ride  in  a  machine  that  appeared,  through 
projected imagery and moving scenery, to be travelling in time, but they would be 
able  to  disembark  at  various  points  on  the journey  and  be  guided  through  sets 
depicting a epoch from the past or future.
Although  never  constructed,  the  imagined  spectacle  of time  travel  was 
mirrored, and in Paul’s case usurped,318 by the public demonstrations of the  Lumiere 
Brothers’ projection device in December 1895.  Friedberg sustains the resemblance 
to cinema in reference to Rene Clair’s 1923 film Paris Qui Dort (The Crazy Ray). In 
the film a mad scientist has ‘frozen’ time using an experimental machine that emits 
an invisible ray. The characters who have not been affected because they were above 
its influence -  the watchman of the Eiffel Tower and five passengers from an aircraft 
-  explore a Paris in which motion has been suspended:  ‘The film narrativizes the 
animated tension between the mobility of the cinema camera and the immobility of 
the  still  photograph.’319 As the effects of the ray are eventually reversed, frozen 
scenes  are  shown  to  return  to  a  state  of animation.  The  play  on the temporality 
suggested within cinematic technology echoes that of The Time Machine. The fabric 
of temporality is suggested by a specific cultural  and material association, that of
149film. Paris Qui Dort, like The Time Machine, does not name this technology as its 
source, but rather illustrates it.
In film as a medium, time  itself is ascribed a material  referent. The Time 
Traveller’s journey  is  likened  to  a  controlled  viewing  of  a  strip  of  celluloid. 
Temporality is characterised by a fixed, linear sequence upon the printed reel. When 
Hillyer witnesses the Time Traveller’s second departure at the end of the novel, his 
presence in the laboratory is marked on the strip of time and included in the account 
of the Time Traveller’s previous return from the future:  ‘...I seemed to see Hillyer 
for a moment; but he passed like a flash.’320
When travelling through time, in the cinematic fourth dimension, the Time 
Traveller  and  the  machine  have  no  detectable  material  presence  in  the  three- 
dimensional  space that they occupy.  This is explored in the discussions that take 
place  in  the  Time  Traveller’s  home  before  his journey.  After  the  small-scale 
demonstration and the  mysterious disappearance of the  model  time machine, the 
Time Traveller admits that he does not know in which direction it has travelled, the 
future or the past. There follows a speculative discussion as to its current trajectory:
After an interval the Psychologist had an inspiration. ‘It must have gone into 
the past if it has gone anywhere,’ he said.
‘Why?’ said the Time Traveller.
‘Because I presume that it has not moved in space, and if it travelled into the 
future it would still be here all this time, since it must have travelled through 
this time.’
‘But,’ said I, ‘if it travelled into the past it would have been visible when we 
came first into this room; and  last Thursday  when  we  were  here;  and the 
Thursday before that; and so forth!’3 2 1
An answer, explained at the Time Traveller’s prompting by a guest known as the 
Psychologist,  refers  to  perception and  provides  another association  with  moving 
image technologies:
150We cannot see it, nor can we appreciate this machine, any more than we can 
the  spoke  of a  wheel  spinning,  or a  bullet flying  through  the  air.  If it  is 
travelling through time fifty times or a hundred times faster than we are, if it 
gets  through  a  minute  while  we  get  through  a  second,  the  impression  it 
creates will of course be only one-fiftieth or one-hundredth of what it would 
make if it were not travelling in time. That’s plain enough.’  He passed his 
hand through the space in which the machine had been.  ‘You see?’  he said, 
laughing.322
The visual effect of its invisibility -  and its immateriality -  is generated by the speed 
of  its  movement,  like  film  travelling  too  fast,  it  is  incompatible  with  human 
perception,  beyond a threshold of comprehension.  If like film, the view of a time 
traveller can be characterised by Walter Benjamin’s optical unconscious, the view of 
the machine from the outside is its inverse. Whereas Benjamin saw the reproductive 
technologies of photography and film as a means to see what had previously been 
invisible, a view permitted to the passenger travelling through time, this technology 
is one, from the outside, of convenient invisibility.
It is clear that the machine is not present, as such, in the time through which 
it moves. This is a detail that needed to be thought through, but one that has become 
typical of the forms of genre codification established in the twentieth century. The 
machine and its passenger are removed from three dimensional materiality for the 
duration  of  the  journey,  and  reappear,  rematerialise,  only  when  the  artificial 
temporal motion has ceased. This raises the problem of shared space, or put another 
way, the problem of stopping:
(...) to come to stop involved the jamming of myself, molecule by molecule, 
into whatever lay in my way:  meant bringing my atoms into such intimate 
contact  with  those  of the  obstacle  that  a  profound  chemical  reaction  -  
possibly a far reaching explosion -  would result, and blow myself and my 
apparatus out of all possible dimensions -  into the Unknown.323
151The displacement of the machine and passenger from everyday three dimensional 
materiality  creates  the  possibility  of this  otherwise  impossible  violent contact,  a 
destructive intimacy of matter at an atomic scale.324
An earlier version of the novel, The Time Traveller’s Story (1894), explores 
the immateriality of the time machine in  motion and the risk of sharing the space 
with another object as elements of a single phenomenon. When questioned as to how 
a  time  traveller  could  pass  in  time  through  a  space  that  may  be  occupied,  the 
immateriality is again explained by the speed of motion, but here it is not related in 
terms  of visual  perception,  but  to  what  is  referred  to  as  ‘Atomic  Theory’.  An 
explanation is offered by the protagonist, referred to as the ‘Philosophical Inventor’: 
it  is  possible,  with  enough  momentum,  to  slip  through  the  gaps  between  the 
molecules of any matter. In this model, the time traveller would be, by virtue of their 
speed,  cutting  through  matter as  if by  some  form  of aerodynamics  that  was  so 
efficient  as  to  be  undetectable.  By  this  same  logic,  stopping  carries  the  risk  of 
disaster:
But pulling  up is a different matter.  There  is where the danger comes in. 
Suppose  yourself to  stop  while  there  is  another  body  in  the  same  space. 
Clearly all your atoms will be jammed in with unparalleled nearness to the 
atoms of the foreign body. Violent chemical reactions would ensue. There 
would be a tremendous explosion. Hades! How it would puzzle posterity! I 
thought of this as I  was sailing away thousands of years ahead.  I lost my 
nerve. I brought my machine round in a whirling curve and started back full 
pelt.325
That Wells’s 1895 Time Traveller suffers no destructive accident in coming to a stop 
is  through  no  effort  or  achievement  on  his  part.  His  mastery  of time  travel  is 
rudimentary, at least initially.  When  making the first journey  into the future,  his 
operation of the machine is so crude that his powers over time travel are pretty much 
limited to the invention of the machine. The experience is one over which he has
152little control, and can do nothing to rectify the oversight of what might happen if he 
were to materialise within something or someone. In a fit of panic in the face of this 
risk,  he  stops  suddenly  and  is  flung  into  the  air  as  the  machine  overturns.  The 
consequences of this sudden stop reveal much about the nature of the journey and 
the  apparatus  of  transportation.  In  making  the  panicked  decision  to  end  this 
unimaginably rapid progression through time so suddenly, the consequences suggest 
an analogy that is all too spatial. That his motion through time is analogous to that 
through  space  is  likened  to  braking too  rapidly  on a fast moving  bicycle.  If not 
moving in  space, then  why should there be an experience of the kind of jolt that 
would be received from an excessively rapid braking that might throw the rider the 
saddle and overturn the bike behind them, or like riding a bike into an obstacle and 
being pitched headlong by the impact? Why should the physical effects of motion be 
so prevalent? Time travel  is therefore a form of motion along a spatial  trajectory, 
and  relative  changes  in  speed  seem to carry  some  physical  consequences,  albeit 
minor when considering the velocity involved, albeit it to some extent virtual.326 So 
the time  machine  itself, and  its  motion through the years, exhibits  some  kind  of 
genealogy  that  connects  it  significantly  to  the  bicycle.  The  Time  Traveller’s 
accident,  Stover  points  out,  even  bares  a  great  deal  of  similarity  to  the  comic 
accidents that populated the volume The Humours of Cycling (1897), a collection of 
stories, pictures and newspaper anecdotes that Wells contributed to.
The Time Traveller experiences difficulties with balance that are equivalent 
to the difficulties of learning to ride, which he gradually overcomes, gaining better 
control of the machine. The machine is equipped with what is specifically described 
as  a  saddle.327 (A reference made early on when the Time Traveller exhibits the 
miniature version of the time machine) As Leon Stover has pointed out,328 for Wells 
bicycles were indicative of a progressive development of locomotive technology that 
heralded the approach of motorization. From the late  1860s onwards, James Starley 
was responsible for the development and variation of improvement of the  French 
‘Model’  bicycle -  which like cinema, provides a link between  The Time Machine 
and the sprawling, international spread of technological modernity:
153Those who remember reading the pungent letters of that date which appeared 
in an influential  London daily paper from its Paris correspondent, will not 
forget the ridicule with which the new machine was assailed. It was made the 
ground upon which to charge the French people with having made a further 
concession  towards  the  fantastic.  However,  the  fact  remained  that  the 
machine  was  popular,  and  was  gradually  becoming  more  so.  One  of the 
reasons of this, no doubt, was that it enabled anyone who had mastered it to 
do something which was not only novel, but which was considered decidedly 
clever -  that of balancing one’s self on a simple bar affixed to two wheels 
placed tandem fashioned, and not only enabling the rider to guide and propel 
the machine without touching the ground with his feet, but to go at a rate of 
speed  more than  double that which  a  pedestrian  could  accomplish  in  the 
same time.
This early type was primitive in comparison with Starley’s successive models. It had 
wheels made from hickory wood covered with an iron tyre, and handlebars that were 
nearly as high as the rider’s chin.  Metal  spokes and rubber tyres were introduced, 
which together with Starley’s mechanical improvements, made the bicycle a more 
popular form of transport. His many variations on its form included patents for the 
tricycle, the quadricycle, the Velocipede Chaggir Carriage, Starley’s Invalid Chair 
and Rollerskates. These early bicycles and their associated forms offered The Time 
Machine an associative form that constituted something of a middle-class craze in 
the 1890s, one that was in Wells’s view utopian in its technological promise.
The  motion  of  time  travel  is  indicated  less  clearly  by  some  of  the 
contradictory information available in the text. When viewed from the outside, there 
are suggestions that both the model and full size machine move before disappearing 
from sight. This is clearly indicated in the demonstration of the model time machine:
One  of the  candles on  the  mantel  was  blown  out,  and  the  little  machine 
suddenly swung round, became indistinct, was seen as a ghost for a second
154perhaps, as an eddy of faintly glittering brass and ivory; and it was gone -
vanished! Save for the lamp the table was bare.330
From the outside, the model  is  seen to move, although it is  unclear whether this 
movement persists, contributing to the indistinct visual effect through spinning, of if 
it is merely an initial movement before the machine leaves three dimensional space. 
There is no account of the Time Traveller spinning, and his cinematic descriptions 
imply a fixed perspective. It is possible, but not disclosed, that the full scale machine 
makes  such a turn  as  a  singular motion  before  dematerialising.  It  has  also  been 
assumed that when travelling, the machine will be fixed to the earth somehow, as if 
the effect of gravity is sustained throughout the journey.  It is made clear that the 
machine does not change its spatial position, only it temporal location. By following 
this logic, it seems likely, unless anchored to the spot, that the Time Traveller would 
rematerialise floating  in  space,  as the  Earth  would  have  moved  in  its trajectory 
through the Solar System. An addition detail, albeit minor, is the failure to take into 
account of any change in the level of the ground underneath the machine. The Time 
Traveller’s  violent  entry  into  the  future  is  caused  by  his  rapid  halt,  not  by  any 
discrepancy  between  the  height of the floor of his  workshop and  the  ground  on 
which he arrives. His return journey finds him appearing gently on the floor of his 
workshop.
These details are somewhat inconsistent with Wells’s meticulous attempts to 
ground  the  fantastic  narrative  within  a  framework  of  convincing  everyday 
materiality.  However, they do hint at a particular narrative relating to interior and 
exterior, reinforcing a peculiar sense that the Time Traveller never actually leaves 
his domestic workshop. In the novel, distinctions between interior and exterior are 
severely eroded, providing a unifying device with which to consider a speculative 
notion of material culture. This is to be the subject matter of the next chapter, so for 
the present serves merely to illustrate a quality of movement through time. Through 
making  it clear that the  machine  is  not moving  in three  dimensional  space,  and 
therefore  never  really  leaving  the  space  of the  Time  Traveller’s  laboratory,  its 
trajectory is ultimately but inconsistently defined.
155I would like to suggest that a significant way of thinking about time in the 
universe of The  Time Machine is that offered by the world view of proto-forms of 
anthropology as they existed in the nineteenth century. The cultures that spanned the 
globe  represented  different  moments  along  a  forward  moving  trajectory  that 
culminated in the present. Those cultures that were distinct from Europe and those 
populations consisting of its recent emigrants constituted what was thought of as a 
window into the past, simultaneously manifested within the present moment. Small- 
scale cultures that did not rely on the processes, structures and materials of industrial 
modernity  constituted earlier points on  the trajectory  of evolutionary time.  They 
were the living subjects of archaeology.
The role of material culture as a loose disciplinary category was to determine 
and judge the various degrees of sophistication that a particular non-Westem culture 
might have  attained.  A  virtual  scale  of evolution  could  thus  be envisioned,  that 
placed European and Victorian society at the top, as the most advanced.  Societies 
outside  of this  category  were  marked  according  to  a  descent  that  marked  their 
relative position along a scheme of temporal progression. At the bottom of this scale 
were  cultures that were  categorised  as hunter-gatherer groups,  whose  social  and 
technological  evolution  was  seen  as  corresponding  directly  to that of stone  age 
humanity. As Victor Buchli points out, such a rationalised conflation of space and 
time in the form of an evolutionary schema to account for cultural difference served 
specific purposes:
This naturally justified European dominance in expansionist imperial affairs, 
but also served liberal notions of Enlightenment thought which advocated the 
universality of human experience and justice.3 3 1
The scale of differentiation, when confirmed by an evolutionary sequence, could be 
read as confirmation that despite the degree of ‘civilisation’, all peoples of the world 
were subject to the same social and technical processes. Once this scale attained its
156status as proof, then all of the activities and institutions encompassed by humanity as 
a whole were connected and therefore unassailable as indicators of progress.
The irrefutability of this evolutionaiy temporality as a form of evidence was 
such that Edward Tylor observed its value not only in thinking of history,  ‘but as 
even laying down the first stages of curves of movements which will describe and 
affect  the  courses  of future  opinions  and  institutions’.332 So not only does the 
disciplinary study of material culture provide a key to constituting the past, it might 
also be drawn upon to extrapolate upon the future, which is precisely what Wells’s 
has either attempted, or perhaps knowingly exploited, in the material world that is 
The Time Machine. This overall scheme was articulated in detail by the influential 
American anthropologist Lewis Henry Morgan in his work Ancient Society (1887), 
in  which  he  laid  out the  progressive  changes that spanned  the  most ancient and 
therefore primitive to the cultures of civilised modernity. It posited a universality of 
responses to given limitations, allowing the whole of humanity to be incorporated 
within  the  temporal  and  spatial  curve  of  progress.  His  direct  experience  had 
demonstrated the disappearance of the cultural specificity and uniqueness of Native 
American peoples in the face of devastating European expansion, and cited isolation 
as  the  principle  that  allowed  certain  cultures  to  remain  in  a  state  that  so  much 
resembled the earliest forms of human. The  role of material culture was to allow 
readings of all other forms of social form and structure within the scale of progress. 
No matter who or where the social  structure may be encountered, people could be 
understood by the relative qualities of the societies as material worlds.
Other manifestations of this evolutionary structure of time could be read as 
deeply encoded forms. Such forms are particularly visible within Victorian culture, 
which has left much in the form of a legacy of fossilised remains of this model of 
material  culture and evolutionary temporality.  For example,  it can  be seen in the 
Albert Memorial in Kensington Gardens. Completed in  1876 and instigated by an 
overwhelming swell of demand for an appropriately fitting and permanent tribute to 
the Prince Consort who died in December 1861. George Gilbert Scott’s response to 
the criteria of the commission was radical in its form, favouring Gothic Revival over 
the predominant tendencies for a neo-classical structure:
157The idea which I have worked out may be described as a colossal statue of 
the Prince, placed beneath a vast and magnificent shrine or tabernacle, and 
surrounded by works of sculpture illustrating those arts and sciences which 
he  fostered...  From  the  upper  platform  rises  a  Podium  or  continuous 
pedestal,  surrounded  by  sculptures  in  alto-relievo,  representing  historical 
groups or series of the most eminent artists of all ages of the world: the four 
sides being devoted severally to Painting, Sculpture, Architecture, Poetry and 
Music.... Besides the sculpture already described as surrounding the Podium, 
there are on pedestals projecting from each of its angles, groups illustrating 
the  industrial  arts  of  Agriculture,  Manufactures,  Commerce,  and 
Engineering. Above these, against the pillars, and also in the angles of the 
gables,  are  statues  which  represent  the  greater  sciences,  and  in  the 
tabernacle-work  of the  spire  are  figures  of angels  and  of the  Christian 
virtues.
In  addition  to these  sculptural  representations  are  a  group of sculptures that are 
perhaps more prominent when walking around the Memorial than the golden figure 
of Albert. They depict race and nationality in terms defined, without ambiguity, by 
Imperial Britain. Each pedestal represents one of four groups ‘allegorically relating 
to the four quarters of the globe and their productions: thus referring indirectly to the 
International  Exhibition of  1851’.334This was an intended representational form 
referring  to  an  earlier  form  of  representation,  specifically  that  of  the  Great 
Exhibition as a means of Victoria’s nation defining the world in relation to itself, 
while simultaneously transforming that world.
The group representing Asia, by the sculptor John Henry Foley, is described 
as follows:
In  this  group  the  central  figure  alone  is  a  female.  She  is  seated  on  an 
elephant, and the action of removing her veil is an allusion to the important
158display of the products of Asia, which was made at the Great Exhibition of 
1851.3 3 5
While  ultimately  the  glorified  subject  of  the  memorial  personified  by  the 
achievements of an individual, deified as a golden giant, Scott’s gothic fantasy pays 
equal  attention  to  the  codifying  of  the  glory  of  a  sequentially  constructed 
civilisation.  The artists of all  ages of the world depicts a simultaneous history of 
classical antiquity, the Renaissance and Early Modernity, while the continents of the 
world are allegorically represented in relation to the epitome of Victorian society as 
its god-like apex. While this structure is discussed here with specific reference to the 
construction of time, the analysis of such an object for the speculation of historical 
allegories  is  useful  in  referring to the  structures of the  Sphinx and the  Palace  of 
Green Porcelain in landscape of 802,701, which will be further addressed both later 
in this chapter and in the following one.
A  more  explicit  realisation  of  this  underlying  view  of  an  evolutionary 
temporality that stretched across the globe can be found in the Pitt Rivers Museum 
in Oxford. The Museum’s founder, Lieutenant-General Augustus Henry Lane Fox 
Pitt  Rivers,  embarked  upon  a  project  to  not  only  map  but  demonstrate  an 
evolutionary scheme of time, simultaneously articulated across space, through the 
collection and display of objects. Early in his military career, Pitt Rivers was given 
the task of investigating methods that could potentially improve the type of rifle 
used  in  the  British  Army,  its  use  and  the  methods  of instruction  employed.  In 
seeking to determine qualities of improvement in weaponry, he speculated that this 
was effected by means gradual changes,  ‘arrived at as a cumulative result of slight 
modifications’.336 Asserting the regularity of this process, he believed it to be a 
universal rule of evolution that applied to other ideas and objects and it was in order 
to test and illustrate these views that he began, in  1851, to collect systematically. 
The date of 1851  is no coincidence, as the Great Exhibition was certainly a most 
formative influence on his desire to collect and the importance of a grand, instructive 
sequence of display.
159His system of classification comprised of groups into which objects of like 
form or function were associated to form a series, introducing the term typology to 
describe his method. Within these main groups objects belonging to the same region 
could then form local  sub-groups.  Where objects could be  utilized to do so, they 
would be arranged so as to suggest a sequence that suggested the possible evolution 
of the particular class. This type of arrangement was particularly applied to objects 
from the  same region, as this  was thought to be more  illustrative of a sequential 
continuity.  This  sequence  was  envisioned  as  one  that  moved  from  the  most 
primitive337 to the most complex and specialized, the primitive end of the scale in 
closest proximity to natural forms. He allegorized typology as a tree of progress that 
distinguishes  the  leading  shoots  from  the  inner  branches  and  believed  that this 
method was itself the evidential key to understanding human culture. Typology is a 
making solid of temporality, as well as a construction of a sense of time itself. It is 
both  a  system  for  illustrating  a  process  of change  over  duration,  as  well  as  a 
constitutive invention of how duration might be conceptualised. The invention is of 
a form of disciplinaiy analysis that must necessarily construct its own subject.
The  system devised  by  Pitt Rivers is the  most ambitious of museological 
attempts to visualise the general form of evolutionary temporality. As a form that 
was both simultaneous, in the various stages represented by different cultures, and 
linear in its overall trajectory, typology can be seen as a subtle and systematic formal 
response. Pitt Rivers made a most ambitious attempt to illustrate the suggestion of 
this temporal flow that cut across space, in a manner that involved the recreation of a 
uni-dimensional object.
At the time his typological collection began, the anthropological discipline 
was still in an embryonic state. Social phenomena had been identified as a subject of 
study by Saint-Simon in France, and the subject of sociology had been named in the 
nineteenth century by Auguste Comte, whose laws of social life were based on the 
assumption  that  all  societies  evolved  through  the  same  stages  and  that  a  drive 
towards improvement was a fundamental principle, a belief that was recognized in 
Pit Rivers’ system:
160It  was  a fundamental  principle  of Colonel  Lane  Fox  that in  the  arts  and 
customs of the still living savage and barbaric338 peoples there are reflected 
to a considerable extent the various strata of human culture in the past, and 
that it is possible to reconstruct in some degree the life and industries of Man 
in prehistoric times by a study of existing races in corresponding stages of 
civilization.339
Nineteenth-century thought in this area was characterized by an evolutionism largely 
influenced,  in Britain, by  Herbert Spencer, whose ideas about the  survival of the 
fittest were later attributed to Darwin. Pitt Rivers’ notion of evolution, that was only 
solidified by the interpretations that followed the publication of Darwin’s The Origin 
of Species  in  1859,  is  a  model  that  privileges  his  present  moment  of Western 
civilization.  In particular, it is Britain as the core of Empire that is posited as the 
inevitable conclusion of successive progression, rendering other cultures as different 
stages of primitive, inferior development:
The  Earth,  as we  know,  is  peopled  with races  of the  most heterogeneous 
description,  races  in  all  stages  of culture.  Colonel  Lane  Fox argued that, 
making due allowance for possible instances of degradation from a higher 
condition, this heterogeneity could readily be explained by assuming that, 
while  the  progress  of some  races  has  received  relatively  little  check,  the 
cultural  development of other races  has been retarded to a greater or less 
extent,  and  that  we  may  see  represented  conditions  of at  least  partially 
arrested  development.  In  other  words,  he  considered  that  in  the  various 
manifestations of culture among the less civilized peoples were to be seen 
more  or  less  direct survivals  from  the  earlier  stages  or  strata  of human 
evolution; vestiges of ancient conditions which have fallen out at different 
points and have been left behind in the general march of progress.340
For Pitt Rivers the central point in his thinking about the development of material 
culture was analogous to the evolution of natural forms described by Darwin, and his
161ideas really only took form after reading the book in  1859. However, there was no 
such convincing analogy there for Darwin, who rejected the idea that the idea of 
adaptation was bound to the notion of progress.3 4 1  There is an apparent scientific, 
objective quality to evolution, as Darwin attempted to outline, but this is lost in the 
idea of social evolution.342
Pitt Rivers’  typographic  system was dependent on very  specific modes of 
display in order to best demonstrate his theories of evolutionary progress. Inherent in 
this was the close proximity of archaeological and ethnological material. It is clear 
that for Pitt Rivers, objects defined by these two disciplines possessed a degree of 
inter-changeability:
Following the orthodox scientific principle of reasoning from the known to 
the  unknown,  I  have  commenced  my  descriptive  catalogue  with  the 
specimens of the arts of existing savages, and have employed them, as far as 
possible,  to  illustrate the  relics  of primaeval  men,  none  of which,  except 
those constructed of the more imperishable materials, such as flint and stone, 
have survived to our time. All the implements of primaeval man that were of 
decomposable  materials  have  disappeared,  and  can  be  replaced  only  in 
imagination by studying those of his neatest congener, the modem savage.3 4 3
In this schema, ethnological artefacts can stand in as substitutes for objects from the 
distant past that have  not survived.  The  so-called primitive  societies are literally 
representative of prehistoric stages of humanity’s development, therefore, objects 
from these societies can be fitted comfortably among objects from geographically 
and historically distant locations. The material civilization, if the world of 802,701 
could be described as such, encountered by the Time Traveller, is one that enacts 
this virtual temporal distance in the most literal of ways.
The prominently central  presence of the Palace of Green  Porcelain  in the 
novel  is  no accident in  relation to the tendencies mapped out here.  Shortly  after 
entering the vast building, The Time Traveller declares the Palace to be in fact a 
museum:  "Clearly  we  stood  among  the  ruins  of  some  latter-day  South
162Kensington!'344 This is a monument, it seems, to the nineteenth century, carried out 
in some far-distant age that still precedes the age of Eloi.  As a super-museum, it 
represents a culmination of civilization on such a temporal scale, as well as the site 
for its organization and interpretation. More than this it signifies without ambiguity 
the distant moment of such  an  apex.  Progress is long  over.  All  that remains  are 
decaying ruins. The image is one not of the height of Empire and Victorian culture, 
but its distant and fantastical futurity, as a failed civilisation, long since vanished. 
While this civilisation may have come to an end, there remain material traces upon 
which to gaze and reflect. The Time Traveller's encounter with the Palace of Green 
Porcelain as a ruin of a future version of his own time strikes a resonant cord with a 
visual  image that predates the novel by more than twenty years. The image is an 
engraving by Gustave Dore, the final plate in London: A Pilgrimage (1872), written 
by Blanchard Jerrold and illustrated by Dore. While, as Linda Nead argues, the book 
maps  London  as  a  social  form  in  the  1870s,  creating  'a  geography  of contrasts 
through its scenes of high life and low life',345 this final image is not of contemporary 
London, but a fantasy of its future.
This is still an image of a familiar London, as it then appeared, but as a ruin, 
as  if  the  catastrophe  were  very  recent.  This  is  in  contrast  to  the  symbolic 
embodiment of the present in an exaggerated and grander form, as is the case with 
the Palace of Green Porcelain. London: A Pilgrimage ends with a fantasy image of 
London's future, in which a traveller from New Zealand sits by the now rocky banks 
of the Thames, looking upriver towards St Paul's Cathedral. Nead suggests that the 
text that describes the scene is perhaps a formulaic nod to conventional tropes of 
imperial  history,  but  that  it  has  been  transformed  into  a  dramatic  and  striking 
conclusion by Dore:
It is a dark image, even by the standards of Dore's distinctive style of ruled 
engraving,  with  its  dense  blacks  and  dark  greys.  (...)  The  buildings  are 
strangely compacted within the vertical frame of the picture and recall both 
the  ruins  of imperial  Rome  and  a  more  apocalyptic  vision  of the  end  of 
civilisation.  The  shattered  dome  of St  Paul's  and  surrounding  desolation
163might  be  the  consequence  of inertia  and  slow  decline,  or the  result of a 
sudden and terrible disaster. Victorian Babylon lies at some indeterminate 
time in the future, wrecked and shattered, under a heavy, foreboding sky.346
The  image  is  one that suggests a way  of understanding London  as it was in  the 
1870s, as a site, Nead suggests, of diversity and urgency. Modernity's contradictory 
impulses find resolution in this image of ruin. Nead also argues that this image is 
one that was not without a context of familiarity - a context that was constituted in 
two distinct ways. The first is the familiar literary trope, relating to the genealogy of 
empires and writings on myth and political history.
The  other  constitutive  form  of context  in  which  Dore's  image  might  be 
situated is one that is more significant, as it reflects to a greater extent the complex 
temporalities of the Palace of Green Porcelain and The Time Machine in general:
The  Metropolitan  Board  of  Works  and  the  railway  companies  were  re­
making London:  widening and straightening, levelling and tunnelling, and 
the image of ruin had become part of the visual vocabulary of the historical 
present. The ruins of London were not just a rhetorical figure for the cyclical 
evolution of empires, but were a feature of the everyday experience of the 
modem metropolis.3 4 7
The vision of ruined future London is therefore something of a reconfigured collage 
of the moment in which it appeared. The ruin functions as a distillation of essential 
qualities  drawn  out  of the  contemporary  scene  it  is  trying  to  represent.  While 
operating in a different manner, I would like to suggest a firm correlation between 
this visual operation and the textual manifestation of The Palace of Green Porcelain. 
The ruin in Dore's image serves to argue, according to Nead, that modernity itself is 
built upon an image of ruin. Modernity, in Wells's future world, has built into it the 
seeds of its own destruction. It is a condition, as Carlyle expounds, that must address 
its own riddle of the Sphinx, or face destruction.
164Wells's  ruin  is  distinct from  Dore's.  While  the  latter's is  a  ruin  based  on 
contemporary  London's  transformative  and  technological  condition  and  its 
resemblance to a ruin, the Palace of Green Porcelain is an embodiment of a distinct 
form of modernity as a museological form. It is a form constituted with some very 
specifically constructed elements. The Time Traveller's citing of South Kensington 
is  an  unambiguous  reference  to  what  is  now  known  as  the  Victoria  and  Albert 
Museum in London. The South Kensington Museum opened in 1881, just two years 
before Wells started at the Normal School of Science, which was just across the road 
where  Imperial  College  is today.  The  Museum  grew  out of the aftermath of the 
Great Exhibition, held in nearby Hyde Park. The whole geographic area of South 
Kensington became known as Albertopolis, in acknowledgement of the legacy of the 
Exhibition and his primacy of place within its conception and execution.  It is this 
aspect that the giant golden statue of Albert looks out over from the throne of his 
memorial. However, the growth of institutions in this area was as much do to anxiety 
brought about by a lack of favourable comparison in the international  show, as it 
was by any notions of progressive optimism. A general  but dire shortcoming was 
identified by holding Britain's material culture up to that of the rest of the world as it 
was represented. The South Kensington Museum was a concrete manifestation of the 
need to respond to this. The Museum at South Kensington, and the disciplinary order 
it embodied and articulated, was an integral part of Wells's education at the Normal 
School of Science. As Parrinder says of Wells's student time:
At South Kensington, Wells studied the  ‘science of life’  on the dissecting 
table and under the microscope.  His statement that he  ‘had man definitely 
placed in the great scheme of space and time’  suggests an organisation of 
dead  forms  like  that  of a  museum  -   a  ‘Universal  Rigid’  spread  out  for 
inspection. ‘Natural selection’, he later wrote, ‘is selection by Death’.348
Evolution  itself is conflated with  museological  tendencies to naturalise the equal 
privileging  of the  two  as  suggestive  of a  near-ontological  simultaneity  and  an 
elemental character, rather than as something historical and institutional.  Nature is
165already like  a museum,  not something  invented  by the  museum.  The museum is 
generated by this objective tendency that precedes it.
The  Palace  of Green  Porcelain  first  seen  in  the  far  distance,  and  is  later 
sought by the Time Traveller as a refuge in which he hopes that he and Weena will 
find a haven inaccessible to the Morlocks. It is one of several buildings explored by 
the Time Traveller and described as 'palaces', due to their overblown scale. All of 
these  buildings are described as  'living  palaces',  and  seem to be filled only  with 
dining halls and sleeping chambers. The museological status of the Palace of Green 
Porcelain comes as a great surprise to the Time Traveller, but is actually signposted 
from the outset of its appearance. The descriptive name given to this building by the 
Time Traveller is in reference to the Crystal Palace, which after the Great Exhibition 
of 1851, was rebuilt in a larger configuration in Sydenham, South London. Like the 
Palace  of Green  Porcelain,  it was also a form  of super-museum that played  out 
history as a vast but mappable evolutionary structure.349 Upon first seeing the Palace 
of Green Porcelain, it is made clear that this is unlike any other structure that the 
Time Traveller has encountered in the future:
It was larger than the largest of the palaces or ruins I knew, and the fa£ade 
had an Oriental look: the face of it having the lustre, as well as the pale-green 
tint,  a  kind  of bluish  green,  of a certain  type  of Chinese  porcelain.  This 
difference in aspect suggested a difference in use(.)350
The image is one that fits well  with  what the view  would  have been like of the 
Crystal Palace as it stood on Sydenham Hill.
The temporality suggested by the presence of the Palace of Green Porcelain, 
and its status as, in part at any rate, a fantasised version of the Crystal Palace, is not 
straightforward. Perhaps the most vocal, and sustained, critic of the Crystal Palace's 
life span from its initial construction, to its permanent relocation, was John Ruskin. 
If  Carlyle's  arguments  as  they  are  unambiguously  presented  within  The  Time 
Machine  can  be  summarised as the  'Riddle  of the  Sphinx', then  I  would  like  to 
suggest that Ruskin may also be introduced, albeit more  speculatively, under the
166general  banner of The Seven Lamps of Architecture (1849). The focus of Ruskin's 
ideas will be specifically related to temporality and the Palace of Green Porcelain, 
through Ruskin's disdain for the Crystal Palace, which was in fact neither made from 
crystal,  nor indeed  a  palace.  As  M.  Christine  Boyer  suggests,  Ruskin  sought to 
demonstrate not only architecture’s ability to express meaning and morality, but that 
it could be utilised as a constructive form to ensure social stability in the face of a 
modernity’s developmental momentum:  'Architecture, for Ruskin, was not an issue 
of aesthetics  but one of moral  reform'.3 5 1  His work, as read here through Boyer, 
owed much to that of Carlyle,  whose writings he reread and assimilated into his 
mode  of thought.  Drawing on  a comparative approach  between  modernity  and a 
fantasised medieval past, Ruskin, through the lens of Carlyle, sought to draw distinct 
combinations of past and present to highlight an urgent need of reform in the face of 
fragmentation and a dangerous lack of social cohesion. This perspective is reflected 
and inverted in the discourse of The Time Machine, looking to the future to articulate 
the apparent dangers and anxieties of the present.
The Crystal Palace became a central motif in Ruskin's comparative method, 
'a metonym representing the dementia of his age'.352 It was an alienated form, one cut 
off from  his  idealised  synthesis  of categories,  that would  bring together art and 
nature, labour and design, as well as function and beauty. Perhaps more significant is 
what Ruskin saw as the blankness of the Crystal  Palace. This blankness was due 
partially to Ruskin's idea that it was impossible to determine any sense of natural 
beauty or ornamentation in the repetitive iron and glass elements that through sheer 
seriality made  up the  vast building.  But the  blankness was also a historical  one, 
detached from time, history and memory:
This monumental building in glass, or so Ruskin believed, killed the ability 
of architecture to speak to the emotions or memory of an observer. (...) To 
the contrary, Ruskin professed that it was the duty of noble architecture to 
speak precisely, to act as if it were a book of history and express its story so 
very well.353
167The muteness of the Crystal Palace therefore was a temporal silence as well, one that 
failed  to  announce  its  connection  to  history.  The  Palace  of Green  Porcelain  is 
similarly mute, revealing little of historical value as an enormous and silent ruin. It 
represents a complete detachment from history and memory, in a manner analogous 
to Ruskin's disdain for the Crystal Palace:  'its novelty erased all the monuments of 
the past, enabling a new people to arise without a record or trace of their history'.354 
Boyer's reading sounds uncannily like a description of the Palace of Green Porcelain 
and its symbolic status as an artefact relating to history, memory and continuity in 
the Eloi  world. The distant view of the Palace of Green Porcelain, as seen by the 
Time Traveller, also brings to mind the visual obstruction that the Crystal  Palace 
provided for Ruskin when relocated to Sydenham, near Ruskin's home in Heme Hill, 
South  London.  While  literally  blocking  his  view,  Ruskin  complained  that  the 
obstruction could be sustained metaphorically so that it might be said to block his 
ability to think about architectural  history. The Crystal  Palace obstructed the very 
shadow of the past upon the present. In medieval architecture, 'Ruskin could read in 
the stones and textural details of a nation's buildings the strengths and weaknesses of 
its soul and spirit'.355 Yet this was an embodiment of Victorian modernity, and by the 
eighteen nineties, a deeply historicised one.
Ruskin's despair with the form of the Crystal  Palace seems not only based 
upon his inability to see beyond it to the architecture of the past, but also an inability 
to  look  through  its  glass  walls,  which  he  saw  as  horrifically  opaque,  upon  its 
contents. A star exhibit of the Great Exhibition in 1851, that was subsequently given 
a  prominent  role  in  the  rebuilt  Crystal  Palace,  was  Augustus  Welby  Pugin's 
Mediaeval  Court.  Its  gothic  form  was  no  less  than  an  articulation  of that  very 
connection with the past that Ruskin deemed necessary. In its first incarnation, the 
Crystal  Palace  was  a  hyper-modem  structure  that  housed  within  itself a  set  of 
continuities through the presence of gothic discourses in architecture and design. 
Specifically, these tendencies were characterised by the term Gothic Revival, which 
has  already  been  introduced  in  this  chapter  in  the  discussion  of  Scott's  Albert 
Memorial as a Victorian fantasy of temporal continuity. Gothic Revival was a set of 
ideas that looked to a medieval past, but unlike the historicist reiterations of popular
168forms of classical and Renaissance style Gothic Revival was a tradition of modernity 
which  constructed  a  past and  a  set of traditions for itself.  Charles  Barry’s  New 
Palace of Westminster (1837-67)  had  established  Gothic  Revival  in  Britain  as  a 
prominent  form  of the  architectural  languages  of  government,  one  based  on  a 
constructed historical trajectory. Through the established continuity of an order of 
legitimate authority, specifically relating to an idealised version of the medieval and 
the continuation of a tradition of gothic, architectural form could be made to read as 
an embodiment of patriotic national  values relating to religion,  learning,  law  and 
freedom.  Replacing the parliament building which  had been destroyed by fire  in 
1834, the new palace was a demonstration of the ability to use gothic to remake the 
past  itself  by  remaking  its  buildings.  The  decoration  of  the  new  Palace  of 
Westminster was  overseen  by  Pugin,  who  in  the  1830s  crystalised the  symbolic 
power  and  urgency  latent  in  Gothic  Revival  architecture.  He  advocated  the 
conflation of structure and  symbolic function,  which he believed was inherent in 
medieval  architecture:  ‘A  pinnacle,  to  take  one  example,  is  both  ‘mystical  and 
natural’,  its  verticality  making  it  ‘an  emblem  of the  Resurrection’,  while  it  is 
simultaneously ‘an upper weathering, to throw off the rain’.356
However, the place of Gothic Revival was not unconstested, and at the time 
of the  Scott’s monument proposal,  there  were few  prevalent examples of recent 
gothic buildings in Britain. Scott himself was pressured into abandoning his gothic 
design  for the  Foreign  Office  in  Whitehall  (1856-9),  which  he  substituted for a 
Renaissance style scheme. His plan for Albert’s monument, however, would see no 
such compromise. Scott’s design for the monument had an odd quality of modernity 
about it.  It was a recently revived form in European architecture, yet takes as  its 
precedent medieval forms.357 There was another particular quality to the shrine that 
Scott favoured. He described these shrines as:
...imaginary buildings,  such as had never in  reality  been erected; and my 
idea was to realise one of these imaginary structures with its precious metals, 
its inlaying, its enamels, etc., etc. This was an idea so new, as to provoke 
much opposition.358
169That Scott took as his precedent for his structures a form of architecture that was 
ancient, yet suggestive of a previously unrealised fantasy, signifies something other 
than a reductive historicism in their conception. To translate these fairy-like forms 
into actuality was to aim for a type of building that had never existed before. The use 
of a style of building that did not necessarily exist is echoed by the present form of 
the Memorial, restored to a condition that never existed prior to restoration.399 There 
is  a  strange  quality  of modernity  in  this  strategy,  particularly  in  relation  to  an 
opposition to Renaissance models.  Gothic provided a resistance to an established 
tradition  of  language  and  reference  in  architectural  practice.  Chris  Brooks  has 
pointed out, with reference to the construction of gothic as a fantasised medieval 
source, that ‘modernity could only create itself by also creating a past from which 
the present was different’.360 Yet any sense of modernity was also based on ideas 
relating  to  construction  itself.  Of  paramount  importance  to  Scott’s  interest  in 
medieval architecture was that it offered lessons in building, especially in relation to 
an integrity towards the architectural elements that it included. Gothic was a system 
of architecture for Scott, one that could be applied with a degree of flexibility and 
invention, a system that could absorb new materials and innovative practices without 
risk to its integrity or authority. His design for the Midland Grand Hotel (1868-77) at 
St  Pancras  Station  is  a  magnificently  stylish fusion  of the  most  up  to date  iron 
construction technologies with thirteenth-century  French  gothic.  Scott’s  interests 
were also consistent with the Gothic ideal  of a collaborative approach to making 
buildings, not only between architect and sculptor, but towards a broad range of craft 
skills  and  traditions.  For  Scott,  the  inclusion  of  engineers  into  the  field  of 
collaboration was also a desired necessity.
For the Crystal Palace, from the point of its inauguration, to contain within it 
as content much material that could be characterised as Gothic Revival, suggests a 
situation far more complex than Ruskin is able to read into its looming presence. Its 
radical newness is simultaneously a model of continuous and evolutionary history. 
The Palace of Green Porcelain is its unambiguously rendered successor in the distant 
future, now abandoned as a decaying ruin. Its green surface, described as so different
170from  the  material  surfaces  of  every  other  building  encountered  by  the  Time 
Traveller, is suggestive of the radical alterity of the Crystal Palace in its architectural 
context, clearly alien to all other buildings in both scale and facture. That the Crystal 
Palace occupies a formative place in Wells's make up is revealed by a reference in 
his  autobiography.  It appears as a site of influence on the childish  but formative 
dawning of his sexuality:
(...) in the Autobiography Wells attributes his childish sexual awakening to 
his  ‘naive, direct admiration for the lovely bodies, as they seemed, of those 
political  divinities of Tenniel’s in Punch, and  ... the plaster casts of Greek 
statuary that adorned the Ciystal Palace.3 6 1
A  new  temporal  dimension  is  added  to the  presence  of the  Crystal  Palace,  as  a 
nostalgically rendered site of the author's own embodied subjectivity. Yet the most 
specific character of the Crystal Palace as a structure of temporality is to be found in 
its content after the Great Exhibition, as a form of originary but ecstatically distorted 
museum.  I  would  like  to  suggest  that  the  Crystal  Palace  is  rendered  without 
ambiguity as a material and historical form within the text of The Time Machine.
At  the  beginning  of  the  21st  Century,  prior  to  the  hotly  contested 
redevelopment of the site, it is still possible to walk along the decaying terraces of 
Crystal Palace Park, which once served as a dramatic foreground for the building, 
but  now  stand  as  ruins.  A  handful  of statues  are  visible,  situated  amongst  the 
extensive but structurally unsound balustrades. Their form, makers and subjects have 
fallen into obscurity. These statues are fossilised clues to the dreamworld that was 
the Crystal Palace, yet it is their advanced state of decay that is the most suggestive. 
At first glance, they resemble an idealised image of classical  ruins.  However, on 
closer  inspection  of the  eroded  surfaces,  it  becomes  clear  that this  is  concrete, 
reinforced  with  rusted  metal  rods  -   an  adaptation  of the  Roman  invention  of 
concrete as an industrial technology. Most of the figures have cracked to the extent 
that they  have  open  chasms,  revealing  that they  are  totally  hollow.  These  ruins 
appear to be some obscure historical footnote, a melancholic suburban anomaly soon
171to be effaced by the ongoing transformation of the city’s geography. They do not 
convey  the  scale  and  impact  of  the  Crystal  Palace,  or  the  influence  that  this 
dreamworld has had on either our contemporary psychic and material environment, 
or that of Wells in the 1890s.
Originally  built to  house  the  Great Exhibition  of  1851  in  Hyde  Park, the 
Crystal  Palace was dismantled after the close of the show, relocated, significantly 
enlarged in  a new  configuration and  set within a specifically  landscaped park in 
Sydenham, South London. It opened to the public in June  1854 and remained open 
until it was destroyed by fire on the night of 30 November  1936. Today, the only 
objects to survive intact, and in fact have recently been subject to restoration, are a 
series of sculptural  representations of various prehistoric creatures that inhabit an 
archipelago of miniature  islands,  ancestrally  distant forms of both  contemporary 
palaeontological and popular images of such. It is difficult to imagine a sense of the 
contemporary  without  the  depth  of the  past  that  our culture  now  describes,  to 
imagine  all  of time  to  have  been  within  the  scale  of the  existence  of culturally 
developed humans. Yet this sense of temporal depth is a factor developed only in the 
period  of early  modernity.  The  ‘discovery’  of non-biblical  time -  a chronology 
distinct from that set out in the Bible -  was analogous to the ‘invention’ of history, 
and the two were brought together in a spectacular form before a mass audience at 
Sydenham  in  a  way  that  is  still  detectable  thanks  to  the  dinosaurs  that  survive 
amongst the ruins.
A key factor in the formation of modernity’s discourse on time is the fossil. 
Their importance is central to the development of a methodology for reconstructing 
history, particularly in the assessing of the relative ages of rocks. In early geology, 
fossils satisfied the need for geologists to have a criterion of history, identifiable 
references  that  opened  up  new  routes  of  discursive  navigation.  This  type  of 
historicism, based on observation and a scientifically methodical  practice, can be 
read  as  possessing  a  critical  impulse,  as  it  was  a  means  of  dispelling  both 
misconception and mythic -  religious -  dogma.  Susan  Buck-Morss has identified 
this  kind  of mythic  historicism as dominated by  Social  Darwinism,  which was a 
target for critique in Walter Benjamin's Passagen-Werk, or Arcades Project. This
172unfinished work was to be an attempt to re-read the obsolete shopping arcades of 
Paris as phenomenally accessible sites of critical reflection. By presenting the relics 
from an earlier order of capitalism, Benjamin sought to disrupt the mythic form of 
capitalism, as a form of progress, exemplified by evolutionary Social Darwinism:
Originally,  Darwin’s theory had a critical  impulse (....) But within  Social 
Darwinism, that critical impulse was lost. The idea of social  ‘evolution’  in 
effect glorified the blind, empirical course of human history.362
The idea of the fossil is therefore one with an inherent critical potential within the 
context  of  its  historical  interpretation.  For  Benjamin,  industrial  objects  from 
previous eras were viewed as fossils, ‘as the trace of living history that can be read 
from the surfaces of the surviving objects’.363 The Crystal Palace Dinosaurs can be 
read in these terms as fossils, as the surviving objects of another epoch, which, as 
images of extinct, evolutionarily obsolete phenomena, could only exist as mediated 
representational forms. The origins of the obsolete dinosaurs of the Crystal Palace 
and the gap between them and those of Jurassic Park serve as narrative history that 
suggests the  potential  to bring the mediated representations of prehistoric life to 
speech as models of culture.
For Wells,  the dinosaurs of the  Crystal  Palace  were  already obsolete.  He 
occupies  a  point,  as  author  of  The  Time  Machine,  within  this  gap.  Their 
configuration  having  been  long since modified  by  research  since the mid  1850s, 
these recreations of pre-history were already fossils. But palaeontology still, it could 
be argued, possessed a radical status in its depiction of deep temporality, and the 
fossil,  perhaps,  was just as  radical  a tool for Wells as it was for Benjamin.  The 
Palace  of Green  Porcelain  itself is the  ultimate fossil  encountered  by  the Time 
Traveller,  made  explicit  by  his  initial  entrance  to  the  building  and  the  first 
impressions gained of the Palace as a museum:
Here, apparently, was the Palaeontological Section, and a very splendid array 
of fossils it must have been, through the inevitable process of decay that had
173been  staved off for a time, and had, through the extinction of bacteria and 
fungi,  lost  ninety-nine  hundredths  of  its  force,  was,  nevertheless,  with 
extreme  sureness  if  with  extreme  slowness  at  work  again  upon  all  its 
treasures.  Here and there I found traces of the little people in the shape of 
rare fossils broken to pieces or threaded in strings upon reeds. And the cases 
had in some instances been bodily removed - by the Morlocks as I judged.364
The fossils present extinct forms, earlier orders that have long since disappeared. 
This, of course, is the fate of human civilization itself in this far-off future. Yet as 
well as offering a dire warning, the fossil can also be read as the means of reading, 
with a critical impulse, the structures of history. In this case, however, it seems as if 
hysterical  polemics  have  dominated  the  kind  of  rupture  of myth  suggested  by 
Benjamin's reading of industrial fossils.
The  relation  between  this museological  department and  the  notion  of the 
fossil  is two-fold.  It is literally comprised of the fossilised  bones of long extinct 
animals. In addition, however, the very technologies of display that transform these 
indexical remains into a discursive structure of history and display have also attained 
the condition of fossils. The gallery and its contents have been subject to processes 
of decay and transformation. The Time Traveller describes, as working with extreme 
slowness,  evidence  of the  natural  ravages of time  having  destroyed  most of the 
exhibits. The collection is thus exposed to the same register of temporal process that 
the artefacts themselves had previously been. Yet there has been another order of 
destructive  intervention,  detectable through  inscription  upon the  scene,  as traces 
upon the surface of a fossil. Both the Eloi and Morlocks receive blame for depleting 
the collection.  It is further evidence of the decadent stupidity of one race, and the 
wanton barbarism of the other. The Morlocks are accused of having 'bodily removed' 
entire cases, for some unknown purpose. The Eloi, being beyond actual purpose, are 
merely  charged  with  mindless  and  accidental  damage,  making jewellery  from 
fragments of the collection. Not only are they ignorant of the knowledge within the 
Palace of Green Porcelain, both races have actively contributed to the destruction of 
history in the future.
174By the  1890s, the kinds of gallery which the Time Traveller finds as a ruin 
were well  established  sites of educative spectacle. The Palace of Green Porcelain 
retains this sense of pedagogical  narrative through visual  and spatial  articulation. 
Wells's super-museum is the climatic pinnacle of such enterprises, as described by 
Parrinder:
His Palace of Green Porcelain in The Time Machine is an imaginary museum 
containing the story of human culture, science and technology as well as the 
whole  of earth  history;  and  it  is  also  the  last  of all  museums,  marking 
humanity’s forthcoming extinction.365
Parrinder suggests that the exotic fascination conjured by dinosaurs plays a specific 
role in their representation of a dethroned order. By representing dinosaurs as extinct 
forms, they are precursors to the empire of human mastery, embodied by the order of 
the museum. Wells's Palace, however, situates such self-assured dominance within 
the same realm of obsolete order, of extinct and failed empire:
Wells  was  not  the  only  nineteenth-century  writer  to  respond  to  the 
fascination  of these  museums.  Jules  Verne’s  Captain  Nemo  has  his  own 
museum  aboard  the  submarine Nautilus,  while Herman Melville’s Moby 
Dick, with its exhaustive discussions of the whale and cetological  science, 
itself resembles nothing so much as a vast museum. Melville’s explanation 
that ‘To produce a mighty book, you must choose a mighty theme’ may also 
explain why the great, exotic animals such as whales and dinosaur contribute 
so  powerfully  to  the  appeal  of natural  history  museums.  They  represent 
alternatives to human mastery which, however, have been dethroned.366
While  Parrinder  situates  natural  history  museums  within  a  Wellsian  context  as 
centres  of propaganda for evolutionary theory,  this  perspective fails to take  into 
account the role of the Crystal  Palace as just such a site for the construction and 
dissemination of evolutionary ideology. Therefore it is necessary to expand further
175upon  the  Crystal  Palace  in  its life  after the  Great Exhibition  in  order to further 
constitute  the  temporal  nature  of  the  Palace  of  Green  Porcelain  in  The  Time 
Machine.  However,  before  doing  so,  it  is  necessary  to  reflect  upon  Parrinder's 
conflation of South Kensington with the discourse of evolution.
If, as Foucault maintains, every science invents the object of its study, then 
the  dinosaur  was,  arguably,  invented  by  Richard  Owen  in  1841.  Owen  was  a 
comparative anatomist, the chairman of a panel of judges in the Great Exhibition and 
was  later instrumental  in the founding of what was  initially  an  extension  of the 
British  Museum,  but was later to become the Natural  History Museum, in  South 
Kensington. He is considered, after Darwin, as one of the most important figures in 
the foundation of Victorian natural history as well as the leader of the nineteenth- 
century museum movement. In  1841, he announced to the scientific community in 
London that recently  discovered fossil  teeth  belonged  to a  new  group of extinct 
creatures, which he named ‘dinosaurs’, or terrible lizards. Owen has been accused of 
championing the prehistoric and inventing the dinosaur as a means of emphasising 
the fact that these fossilised skeletons were distinguishable from any other animal 
ever known. This emphasis would, for him, have reinforced his opposition to the 
principle of evolution. Although  Darwin  would not publish his Origin of Species 
until  1859 (even though he had finished the text many years previously), arguments 
for and against concepts of evolution within natural  history had been developing 
through the early nineteenth century.
Owen’s  opposition to evolutionary theories can  be  seen  in the decorative 
animals that populate the fa?ade of the Alfred Waterhouse's building that houses the 
Natural  History  Museum.  The  apparently  random  mixture  of  contemporary, 
prehistoric and mythic creatures is a deliberately provocative attempt to disavow any 
notion of an evolutionary progress of animals, as it shows a class of reptiles that 
appears to be higher than lizards and crocodiles but which are all extinct, therefore 
seemingly undermining a simplistic reading of evolution. This opposition appears 
absurd today as coming from the man who invented the dinosaur, which is a subject 
that is particularly evocative of concepts of temporal and biological evolution. Yet 
for him, it was intended to represent a dead end, a line that did not progress as an
176example to dismiss the notion of a changing temporality. It seems as if he favoured a 
continuous but staggered theory  of creation,  in which God introduced successive 
species in different eras, then wiped them out, or allowed them to die.  Since the 
notion of a great flood  had  been dismissed  by  recent geological  advances as the 
cause of their extinction, he speculated that changes in carbon dioxide levels in the 
air were to blame -  a rationale that although flawed could have some appeal in a 
polluted industrial city such as Victorian London. Despite the complicated variations 
in the evolutionary discourses which give structure to the Palace of Green Porcelain, 
the ambiguities rendered by Owen's resistance to Darwin's teleological threat does 
little  to  stifle  the  evolutionary  nature  of  Wells's  Palace  in  the  light  of that  of 
Sydenham.
The Great Exhibition of the Works and Industry of all Nations (1  May-15 
October  1851) was the first international  exhibition and the largest public visual 
spectacle  then  to  be  staged,  based  on  an  international  trade  and  production 
competition leading to an unprecedented display which I would argue helped forge 
our understanding of the concepts of display, spectacle, surveillance and commodity. 
This helped to determine the form of the modem museum and gallery as well  as 
spaces of commerce, denying any possibility of conceptually separating these sites. 
The building in which the exhibition was housed, which had acquired the Crystal 
Palace as an unofficial but appropriate name, (from the satirical magazine Punch) 
was to be dismantled according to the original terms of the exhibition in order to 
restore Hyde Park to something approximating its original state. Joseph Paxton, the 
building’s architect, formed a company that was able to purchase the building from 
the contractors who built it, as well as buying a 200-acre wooden parkland on the 
summit of Sydenham Hill in south-east London. The huge profits generated by the 
Great  Exhibition  had  made  Paxton  very  wealthy,  and  he  chose  to invest in  the 
extension of his building, both temporally and spatially.  Unconstricted by time or 
cost, it doubled in its surface area of glass. It was an extended, enlarged and mutated 
form  of  its  original,  free  from  external  considerations  such  as  surrounding 
architecture or lack of space.
177The rebuilding of the Crystal  Palace in its enlarged configuration began in 
1852 and was completed in 1854, during which time the grounds in Sydenham were 
transformed into an enormous landscaped park, which was as much an element of 
the  spectacular display  as any  of the objects  in the Great Exhibition.  This is the 
demonstration that the museological form of the exhibition hall has a greater scope 
than the notion of the displaying of portable, or confinable objects. The artefact of 
material culture is, as Susan M. Pearce suggests, expandable to the extent that ‘the 
whole of cultural expression, one way or another, falls within the realm of material 
culture’.  As  material  culture,  this becomes potential  museum  material,  as does a 
more conventionally scaled ‘thing’ or ‘specimen’:
Strictly speaking, the lumps of the physical world to which cultural value is 
ascribed include  not merely those discrete lumps capable of being moved 
from one place to another...  but also the larger physical world of landscape 
with all the social structure that it carries, the animal and plant species which 
have been affected by humankind (and most have), the prepared meals which 
the animals have become, and even the manipulation of flesh and air which 
produces song and speech.367
This is a vital concept in the understanding of the outlook of the new Crystal Palace: 
it  was  looking  upon  the  visible  domain  as  its  own  spectacle,  and  therefore  as 
included within its own narratives. The panoramic landscape and all that it contained 
was held in the discourse of the display. This was unprecedented on such a scale as a 
public, commercial, entertainment. The sprawling, expansive and mutated nature of 
the  new  Crystal  Palace  was  reflective  of this  attempt to encompass  as  much  as 
possible. The technology of the panoramic display at Sydenham is that of selection, 
which is the technology of the museological, in which an object
has  been  turned  into  material  culture,  because,  through  its  selection  and 
display, it has become a part of the world of human values, a part which,
178evidently,  every  visitor  wants  to  bring  within  his  own  personal  value
system.368
This  is  a  process  that works  against a  romantic,  sublime  notion  of landscape  in 
which the subject is encompassed by infinite scale which cannot be comprehended. 
Instead,  the  appearance  of the  sublime  is  rendered  as  a  controlled  attraction  or 
entertainment.
Paxton  envisaged  a  spectacular environment.  He  bought trees,  plants  and 
flowers, some of the very rare, for both an internal  ‘winter garden’  as well as the 
surrounding  grounds.  A  network  of fountains  was  created  with  the  intention  of 
rivalling those at Versailles. In order to power the water circulation system, two very 
tall  and technologically  elaborate water towers  were  built by  Isambard  Kingdom 
Brunei,  flanking  the  building.  Throughout the  grounds  were  laid  out  a  maze,  a 
grotto,  a  rosary,  groves,  temples,  lawns,  lakes  and  islands.  A  process  of 
appropriation on an international scale was initiated to provide material to be cast to 
help fill the internal courts, as well as to ornament the external terraces, with statuary 
that would be drawn from as broad a base of classical European sculpture as possible 
in order to convey a representational conception of civilisation. The remains of this 
project are the figures that can be found amongst the ruins of the site.
Inside the central transept was Osier’s Crystal Fountain -  27 feet high and 
made from four tons of pure crystal glass - which had been a star exhibit of the Great 
Exhibition.  From there,  running down the north nave was the series of ‘fine art’ 
courts, each one illustrating a particular period in the embryonic discourse of the 
‘history of art’. Another star exhibit from Hyde Park, Pugin’s Mediaeval Court, had 
been put on display, inspiring an entire series of related simulacra. It was placed in a 
teleological  series  which  included courts of Grecian  and  Roman  style, Assyrian, 
Egyptian  -   which  contained  Sphinxes,  obelisks  and  a  collection  of  artificial 
mummies that were overlooked by full sized reproductions of two colossal statues - 
Byzantine,  Romanesque,  a  recreation  of a  house  disinterred  from  the  ruins  of 
Pompeii,  ancient  Chinese  architectural  style,  a  version  of the  Alhambra  and  a 
Renaissance court. This was an attempt to build a spectacularised illustration of the
179development of architecture. Sculpture and mural decoration up to the  16th century 
so that the visitor:
(...)  might  gain,  in  practical  fashion,  an  idea of the  successive  stages  of 
civilisation which have from time to time arisen in the world, have changed 
or  sunk  into  decadence,  have  been  violently  overthrown,  or have  passed 
away, by the aggressions of barbarians, or the no less degrading agency of 
sensual and enervating luxury’/ 69
This impermanence seems aimed at suggesting the permanence and superiority of 
the British Empire. It reflected European prejudices of non-western societies, either 
as  home  to  once  great  but  now  decadent,  degraded  cultures,  or  as  examples  of 
‘primitive’ antecedents -  echoes of which can be found in the dinosaur sculptures, 
representations  of a  previous  impermanent  order  now  extinct.  The  progressive 
development of the  courts,  perhaps focusing  on the fountain  as an  apex,  clearly 
places an emphasis that could be read as evolutionary.
There were also displays of thousands of natural history specimens, which 
included displays of various ethnographic groups of people:
Life like and life sized groups of Bushmen, Zulu,  Kaffir, Mexican Indian, 
Hindoos,  Tibetans  etc.  with  zoological  and  botanical  specimens  of  the 
several countries.370
This horrific display turned people into crude, racially categorised, signifiers that 
were  equivalent  to  the  trophies  and  curiosities  of  natural  history,  hunting  and 
colonial domination.3 7 1  Again, there is an evocation of some notion of a  dominatory 
process of evolution which serves as the history for the time of display.  It is also 
worth noting that in addition to the equivalence that these representations bestowed 
on people with the flora and fauna of their homes, they were not actually stuffed 
specimens.  Therefore  a  level  of  equivalence  is  achieved  between  the  actual, 
preserved, bodies of animals as items of display, and convincing replicas of people.
180The notion of a distinction between authentic and replica, as with all the displays in 
and around the Crystal Palace, is therefore never implied.
Also contained within the Crystal  Palace was a tropical department which 
included Paxton’s favourite lily. This was the Victoria Regia lily, for which Paxton 
designed a glasshouse at Chatsworth,  Derbyshire.  In  1849,  his daughter -  Annie 
Paxton -  demonstrated the structural  strength of its leaf by sitting upon one in its 
water tank. The underside of the leaf inspired the two way spanning structural rib 
system of the lily  house  and  subsequently of the Crystal  Palace.  Other botanical 
features included an orangery and representing live fauna. A monkey house added to 
the impression of a tropical biosphere to withstand the English climate. There was a 
gallery  of old  and  contemporary  paintings,  of which  little  has  been  recorded,  a 
‘carriage department’ providing an assortment of ‘approved styles’. It also contained 
an extensive library and reading room, a court of kings and queens, a hall of fame, a 
theatre, a concert room with 4000 seats and a Grand Orchestra built around a giant 
organ  with  over 4500  pipes.  There  was  an  area  described  as  a  museum,  which 
specialised  in raw  materials for food,  industrial  and craft based  production from 
around the world. There were photographic facilities for public and professional use, 
a  school  of art,  which  incorporated  lessons  in  science,  literature,  geography  at 
elementary and advanced levels. Furthermore, lessons in decorative art, university 
style lectures in English and German literature and general history were available, in 
addition  to  a  school  of  engineering,  a  music  school,  secondary  schools  and 
departments for catering and refreshment. A tradition of various side shows had also 
been established at an early stage.
During  its  first  thirty  years,  the  Crystal  Palace  received  an  average  of 
2,000,000 visitors per year. Two new railway lines were built to facilitate the huge 
numbers of visitors, creating a profound influence on the shaping and development 
of South London as a whole. As well as the addition of the huge marine aquarium in 
1872, an enormous zoetrope  was opened in  1868.  Powered  by a gas engine, this 
provided the first mass audience with examples of moving images. As well as the 
regular attraction  of balloon ascents, there  were all  manner of temporary events, 
such as rose shows, dog shows, poultry shows, in addition to trade fairs and various
181kinds of arts, crafts and industrial exhibition. It was commonly used as a meeting 
place  for thousands  of large  organisations.  There  were  also  numerous  concerts, 
music festivals, circuses and pantomimes. There were special performances, such as 
John M. East’s Invasion, each performance drawing at least 25,000 spectators. This 
was  carefully timed to begin just before dusk.  On the open  space in front of the 
terraces a full-sized village had been built in great detail. The village was completed 
by a crowd of inhabitants, complete  with carriages and horses and a regiment of 
soldiers. The village was then attacked by an overhead Zeppelin, dropping bombs on 
the school and the church, before invading troops parachuted down onto the village 
leading  to  a  full-scale  battle  on  the  ground.  The  ruined  village  had  then  to  be 
reconstructed for every performance. One of the Crystal Palace’s speciality events 
was the holding of vast and elaborate fireworks displays, which became a common 
feature. The Palace also had a great symbolic importance in its first 30 years. For 
example,  in  1872, Disraeli  gave a speech promoting the Empire as central to the 
Conservative  party,  utilising  the  site  as  both  a  representation  of the  nation  and 
Empire. However, the popularity of the site began to wane towards the end of the 
century. Two factors that were influential in this drop in attendance were the Lord’s 
Day Observance Society, which won an injunction to have the Palace and grounds 
closed  on  Sundays,  and  the  increasing  appeal  of  seaside  resorts,  which  were 
becoming more accessible due to the  growth of railways networks and a general 
increase in national earnings. Although The Times newspaper said in  1904 that the 
Crystal Palace was  ‘becoming an illustrated encyclopedia of this great and varied 
universe’, it was by the 1890s in financial crises and starting to resemble the shadow 
of its former greatness.
The scale and diversity of the Crystal Palace is mirrored in Wells’s fossilised 
equivalent from the future. There is much more to the Palace of Green Porcelain 
than the palaeontological displays among which the Time Traveller initially finds 
himself:
To judge from the size of the place, this palace of Green Porcelain had a
great deal  more  in  it than  a Gallery  of Palaeontology;  possibly  historical
182galleries;  it  might  be,  even  a  library!  To  me,  at  least  in  my  present 
circumstances, these would be vastly more interesting than this spectacle of 
old-time geology in decay. Exploring, I found another short gallery running 
transversely to the first. This appeared to be devoted to minerals(.)372
As his exploration continues, he passes quickly through the mineralogy displays, and 
enters into another hall running parallel to the first one he had entered containing the 
remains of prehistoric fossils. While recognising its original designation, this gallery 
is described as 'ruinous’:
Apparently this section had been devoted to natural history, but everything 
had  long since  passed out of recognition.  A few  shrivelled and blackened 
vestiges of what had once been stuffed animals, desiccated mummies in jars 
that had once held spirit, a brown dust of departed plants: that was all !3 7 3
The  Time  Traveller  expresses  regret  at  the  condition  of  the  remains  of  this 
collection, as he ' should have been glad to trace the patient re-adjustments by which 
the conquest of animated nature had been attained.'374 His sorrow is one of failing to 
recreate what the Palace represents - the visualisation of incremental and, ultimately, 
progressive change. Yet the impossibility of his perception of such a process from 
the collection is due, precisely, to the polarised inverse of evolutionaiy development 
in the form of temporal degeneration.
In  his  further  exploration  of  the  Palace  of  Green  Porcelain,  the  Time 
Traveller passes through more galleries, and discovers what he is able to identify, 
from what look like hanging tattered flags, as a library:
The  brown  and  charred  rags  that  hung  from  the  sides  of  it,  I  presently 
recognized as the decaying vestiges of books. They had long since dropped 
to pieces,  and every  semblance of print had left them.  But here and there 
were  warped  boards  and  cracked  metallic  clasps  that  told  the  tale  well 
enough. Had I been a literaiy man I might, perhaps, have moralized upon the
183futility of all ambition. But as it was, the thing that struck me with keenest 
force was the enormous waste of labour to which this sombre wilderness of 
rotting paper testified. At the time 1  will confess that I thought chiefly of the 
Philosophical Transactions  and  my  own  seventeen  papers  upon  physical
T 75 optics.
After this comes what he describes as a 'gallery of technical chemistry',376 in which 
the Time Traveller finds the matches and camphor that promise to be his redemptive 
advantage over the photophobic Morlocks.  Here, as discussed in Chapter  1, these 
discoveries  are  unusual,  in  that  the  materials  have  escaped  the  ravages  of  an 
unimaginable span of time, and remain intact and perfectly functional:
Now, I still think that for this box of matches to have escaped the wear of 
time  for immemorial  years  was  a  most  strange,  as  for me  it was  a  most 
fortunate, thing.377
It could be suggested that such an improbability stresses the metaphorical nature of 
temporal  distance  at  play  in  The  Time Machine.  By  this,  I  refer  particularly  to 
Parrinder's assertion that there  is  more than one  sense of temporal  depth present 
within the text.
Parrinder states that Wells's vision  of time travel  had  been  shaped by the 
prehistoric  vistas  opened  up  by  the  disciplinary  emergence  of  geology  and 
archaeology in the nineteenth century. The panoramic spectacle of such vistas, are 
evoked  both  in  the  far distant future  in  which  the  Time  Traveller  observes  the 
twilight of the Earth, and in the Epilogue. This closing passage of the novel, voiced 
by Hillyer, the 'outer' narrator, offers speculation on where, or rather when, the Time 
Traveller has disappeared to; whether he is in  ‘Age of Unpolished  Stone’,  at the 
bottom  of  a  now  vanished  ocean,  or  among  giant  and  grotesque  dinosaurs.378 
Parrinder focuses, however, on the primary date of the Time Traveller's journey -
802,701,  and to a lesser extent on the final era of the Earth as experienced by the 
Time Traveller on  the  edge  of the  sea  another twenty-nine  million  years  in  the
184future.  In  the  genesis  of the novel,  the temporal  distance traversed  by the Time 
Traveller was expanded from ten thousand years to eighty times as much. The first 
version  of The  Time  Machine  was  serialised  in the National Observer between 
March  and  June  1894.  In  this  ur-form,  the  age  in  which  the  Time  Traveller 
encounters the Eloi and Morlocks is identified as 12,203.
However,  in December  1894,  Wells outlined an evolutionary  scheme that 
was incompatible with this relatively  short time frame.  In  his essay  'The  Rate of 
Change in Species', Wells drew attention to the fact that any possible rate of change 
was determined  by  gaps  between  generations and the average of maturity within 
each species:
Evolution by natural selection -  the strictly Darwinian model to which Wells 
and  Huxley  adhered  -  could  not  have  brought  about  significant  changes 
within the human species within recorded history, so that any such changes 
must be cultural, not natural in origin.379
The evolutionary transformation of humanity demonstrated in The Time Machine, 
according to Parrinder, had to be for Wells one that demonstrated a natural process 
of hypothetical selection and change, rather than due to any artificial processes of 
eugenics. The date is therefore determined in general scale by a credible period, at 
least  by  Wells's  understanding,  that  would  allow  the  significant changes  to take 
place and define these two forms of descendent. The appropriate depth of time is 
also taken into account for the distant temporal horizon in The Time Machine. The 
degeneration of the sun itself reflected a vision of the universe as a limited and finite 
set  of  energy  sources.  This  cosmology  is  that  of  Lord  Kelvin's  Laws  of 
Thermodynamics.  As  Parrinder  points  out,  a  young  Wells  had  played  with  the 
illusory possibilities of transcending this laws:
As  a  student,  Wells  had  once  engaged  in  a  spoof  demonstration  of  a 
perpetual  motion  machine  (powered  by  a  concealed  electromagnet)  -   a 
thermodynamic impossibility not unlike a time machine, since both depend
185on the ability to bypass the normal framework of what, in a lost article, he 
had called the ‘Universe Rigid’.380
Wells is prepared to transcend this law with respect to the time machine itself. This 
is the fantastic element that he introduces into an otherwise believable, credible and 
concretely realised world. All other processes must respect the laws to which they 
relate. The evolution of humanity's descendants requires a period long enough to 
allow  their  degeneration  to  correlate  to  received  biological  knowledge.  The 
degeneration of the Solar System is bound by the same regulatory limitations. The 
second law of Thermodynamics made clear that the sun must bum out, as energy 
tends towards dispersal. The movement is one of entropy, as is the narrative of The 
Time Machine itself. Although twentieth-century studies in radiation were to suggest 
a much longer time scale, which Wells had to acknowledge made his portrayal much 
too alarmist, in the  1890s the view of the sun was not as a vast nuclear reactor, but 
rather as a giant coal burning machine.
The depth of this credibly rendered temporal scheme represents, according to 
Parrinder, one of the two parallel and conflated forms of time that is described in the 
novel.  It  represents  a  form  of  time  that  relates  to  biological,  geological,  and 
astronomical processes. The other form of time identified by Parrinder is one that 
could be described as social in character:
The order of the figures in 802,701 suggests a suitably entropic and cyclical 
‘running-down’ number. We can explain how Wells may have arrived at it, 
however, by the supposition that The Time Machine embodies not one future 
timescale but two. The two scales, those of historical time measured by the 
rise and fall of cultures and civilisations, and of biological time measured by 
the  evolution  and  devolution  of the  species,  are  superimposed  upon  one 
another.3 8 1
Parrinder's  argument  regarding  the  choice  of date  takes  as  its  starting  point the 
assumption that the contemporary focus of the narrative is actually also a forward
186projection,  so that the Time Traveller's dinner party takes place in the year  1901. 
The Time Traveller's journey can therefore be charted as 800,800 years, with  1901 
as  its  starting  point.  This  figure  is  what  Parrinder  describes  as  ’a  significantly 
bifurcated number'.382  800 years is a long enough duration to describe substantial 
changes in history, enough to see the rise and fall  of a civilisation or two. These 
changes are recorded by the Time Traveller as he journeys forward:
What strange developments of humanity, what wonderful advances upon our 
rudimentary civilization, I thought, might not appear when I came to look 
nearly into the dim elusive world that raced and fluctuated before my eyes! I 
saw great and splendid architecture rising about me, more massive than any 
buildings of our own time, and yet, as it seemed, built of glimmer and mist.3 8 3
While on the surface appearing superior to the buildings of the present, they also 
lack any lasting substance. Seemingly solid, they literally melt into air. The sight of 
these  structures  is  replaced  by  greenery,  which  seems  to  remain  without  any 
seasonal  change.  While the natural  world  seems to change  less, the architectural 
structures he sees before him appear ephemeral and move from his focus. This is a 
view that is subject to the forces of change. This is historical time.  It conveys the 
diegetic realisation of Caryle's Riddle of the Spinx.  Yet the date after such a journey 
would only be the year 2701. To this Wells needed to add an adequate period of 
evolutionary duration of nearly one million years, settling on the figure of 800,000. 
The  combination  of  these  two  timescales,  Parrinder  suggests,  leads  to  the 
satisfyingly poetic total of 802,701  as the year of the Time Traveller's encounter 
with the Eloi and Morlocks. It is both one of credibility in terms of the biological 
changes necessary, and in its sequential decreasing, suggestive of entropic processes. 
Yet  this  figure  still  relies  on  the  800-year  frame  in  order  to  account  for  the 
endurance of classical forms of architecture and landscape, and for the survival of 
the Palace of Green Porcelain and its contents, such as the matches and camphor that 
still function. The Palace is another form of remarkable conflation in the novel. The 
act of superimposition  can  be  identified  here,  not only  in  terms  of the  different
187timescales  of  historical  and  evolutionary  duration,  but  in  terms  of the  coming 
together  of time  and  space.  The  museological  impulses  exploited  by  Wells  are 
articulations of both time and space, working through the imagining and realisation 
of one through the configuration of the other.  Both take on the quality of medium 
within the Palace of Green  Porcelain  as an  imaginative reiteration  of the Crystal 
Palace. And it is to the notion of space that the next chapter will be addressed.
188Chapter 5: The Spatial Zones of The Time Machine
This chapter is premised on the apparent sense in which the Time Traveller never 
actually leaves his home, as the machine moves in time and not space. I’d like to suggest 
that distinctions between interior and exterior are severely eroded in the novel, providing 
a unifying device with which to consider a speculative notion of material culture. The 
breadth  of vision  applied  to the  scope  of museologically  orientated  material  culture, 
applicable to entire landscapes, is fused with the sense of artefactually rendered domestic 
intimacy  found  in  the Time Traveller’s  home.  The  principle  sites  constructed  in  the 
narrative can be identified as three separate, yet overlaid zones. The first is that of the 
Time Traveller's home. The second is the general landscape of 802,701, and the third is 
the apocalyptic beach at the  Earth's twilight.  A fourth,  interstitial,  zone could also be 
added to this list in the form of the space of temporal transition experienced during time 
travel. These zones are overlaid in that they all occupy the same space at different times, 
although their geographical boundaries are not fixed. The space of 802,701  is mapped at 
a much larger scale than that of the  1890s, (or arguably, as Parrinder suggested in the 
previous chapter, the year 1901) which can be generally limited to the Time Traveller's 
home, yet these spaces are inextricably linked. The details, connections and differences 
of these various zones accumulate to hint at a particular narrative relating to interior and 
exterior, reinforcing a peculiar sense that the Time Traveller is still contained within his 
domestic workshop as he journeys to the future and back again.
It is the Time Traveller's home that I would like to look at in detail first, as it is 
the zone that serves to both construct and anchor all others within the novel. This interior 
space is a meticulously crafted environment in which the politicised tension that Wells 
depicts in the future is staged with equal, albeit codified, bluntness. The readability of the 
Time  Traveller's  home  as  a fictional  interior finds  some  parallel  in  Ruskin's  public 
defence of William Holman Hunt's painting The Awakening  Conscience (1853).  This 
work was conceived as a counterpart to his Light of the  World. In order to execute this 
image, Hunt hired a room in St John's Wood in London in order to convincingly depict 
the scene. The painting depicts a seated man, with his mistress upon his knee in the room
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sexually entrapped young girl rises from her illicit lover and gazes into a sunlit garden, 
placed  behind the viewer, but reflected in a mirror.  While depicting redemption from 
moral depravity, the immediate appearance of things generated a less complex reading, as 
A.N.  Wilson  suggests:  The Awakening  Conscience,  depicting  the  world  of the  'kept 
woman', awoke some raw nerves among the critics.'384
The painting found a defender in Ruskin, who recognised a dimension beyond the 
metaphors of sexuality. In a letter to The Times of 25 May  1854, he made a case for the 
painting as a scathing critique of wealth generated by industrial capitalism. The moral 
destructiveness of this new and unchecked affluence could be read, Ruskin stated, in the 
tasteless furnishings depicted in The Awakening Conscience:
There is not a single object in all that room - common, modem, vulgar (in the 
vulgar sense, as it may be), but it becomes tragical, if rightly read, that furniture 
so carefully painted, even to the last vein of the rosewood - is there nothing to 
learn from that terrible lustre of it, from its fatal newness; nothing there that has 
the old thoughts of home upon it, or that is ever to become a part of home...385
In a similar manner, the interior at the beginning of The Time Machine is symbolically 
rendered in a manner that contradicts the initial appearance of things. Suvin has drawn 
attention to the contrast of spatial  register in the novel, which he argues is a common 
structural  element  in the  scientific  romances,  characterised  by  a destructive  newness 
encroaching  upon the tranquillity of the Victorian environment.  The  inner and outer 
framework of the narrative is also seen by Suvin as a means of establishing this collision: 
‘The framework is set in surroundings as staid and familiarly Dickensian as possible, 
such as the cozy study of The  Time  Machine, .386 However, I would like to read this 
interior space is a meticulously crafted environment in which the politicised tension that 
Wells depicts in the future is staged with equal, albeit codified, bluntness. What appears 
to be an environment of domestic refinement and comfort contains an explicit reference 
to the chairs upon which the guests in the Time Traveller’s home sit:  ‘Our chairs, being 
his patents, embraced and caressed us rather than submitted to be sat upon’.387
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direct reference to William Morris, designer, craftsman, writer and poet. As a leading 
figure in the Arts and Crafts Movement, Morris responded to Ruskin's call to arms:
In the coming decades,  William  Morris was to wage  war on the factory-made 
ugliness of Victorian domestic interiors, and to expand, even more trenchantly 
than  Ruskin himself, on the intimate connections between morality, as socially 
and privately understood, and design.388
That these chairs are uncannily comfortable sets up the Time Traveller in competition 
with Morris, who was the first to patent a cushioned chair with a backrest that could be 
inclined.  This  inexplicable quality  suggests  that  Morris’s  patent has  been  surpassed. 
Although not named in the text, Morris is also one of the guests of the Time Traveller on 
the night of his return from the future. He is described, in a manner that is designed to be 
insulting, as ‘a quiet, shy man with a beard -  whom I didn’t know, and who, as far as my 
observation went, never opened his mouth all the evening.’389 The sophistication of the 
chair design  in  relation  to  anything  that  Morris  had  been  able  to  build  indicates  an 
assumed superiority of social theory articulated within the narrative. The Time Machine is 
referentially set up as a favourable and surpassing comparison with Morris's own socialist 
utopian fantasy, News from Nowhere (1891). However, this rigidly deterministic reading 
ignores the very qualities that are supposed to indicate the politicisation of the chairs: 
their technological sophistication, the illusion of some form of agency as a result and the 
peculiar dissolution of a series of physical, psychic and technological boundaries. These 
chairs are  prosthetic extensions that respond to a form of instrumental  but unskilled 
control. The situation is described not in terms of a body in a chair, but as an erosion of 
distinctions  between  the  two.  The  chairs  are  useful  in  sustaining  a  general  sense  of 
erosion throughout the narrative, which is mirrored in a general absence of distinction 
between interior and exterior in the future landscape, as well as by the negation of spatial 
distance implicit in the operation of time travel.
Reading Wells’s novel as a material world has also initiated an engagement with 
some early positions set out by Jean Baudrillard. As a theorist of cultural forms, his work
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practices away from the more orthodox disciplinary sites of material culture discourse. In 
particular, my argument will make use of the logical and interpretative tension present in 
his  essay  ‘The  Ecstasy  of Communication’  (1987).  The  chairs  hint  at  an  unskilled 
instrumentality  that  Baudrillard  describes  as  ‘private  telematics’:  ‘each  person  sees 
himself at the controls of a hypothetical  machine, isolated in a position of perfect and 
remote sovereignty, at an infinite distance from his universe of origin.’390 For Baudrillard, 
this is a model of the realisation of a living satellite within quotidian space.3 9 1  The notion 
of interior is radically destabilised here, meaning that both the interiority of a subject and 
the  architectural  interior  are  no  longer  the  sites  where  drama  is  played  out  in  an 
engagement with objects and images. Baudrillard counters the foundation of his earlier 
argument made in The System of Objects, which relies on the meaningful opposition of 
subject/object  (material  artefact)  and  public/private,  as  well  as  the  privileging  of  ‘a 
domestic scene, a scene of interiority, a private space-time.’392 His position shifts from 
one  of  scene  and  mirror  to  screen  and  network,  a  non-reflecting  surface  of 
communication. The very space of habitation -  both psychic and architectural -  can be 
conceived  of as  a  point  of regulation  and  organisation  within  a  series  of  ‘multiple 
networks’. The telematic apparatus of the time machine allows the protagonist to travel 
without leaving his home, which I’d like to suggest, as the site of the novel, functions 
analogously to this hypothetical space.
The obvious form of apparatus of private telematics that dominates the novel is 
the time  machine  itself.  Within the  literal  operating  space  of the  machine,  the Time 
Traveller literally plays out the tendencies already revealed by the chairs he provides for 
his guests at home. The Time Traveller is placed at the controls of a fantastic machine 
that Wells has conjured as a believable but clearly phantasmatic and imaginary form. The 
machine that Baudrillard suggests as metaphor is realised as something both believably 
concrete, diegetically  real,  yet still  very  hypothetical.  The control  of the  machine  is 
certainly unskilled.393 The motion is ‘helpless’ and ‘headlong’, suggesting an extreme 
lack of control in the operation of the machine, and his first attempt to stop the machine, 
itself a panicked response to the possible danger of materialising within  solid  matter, 
results in his being thrown headfirst from the machine. While his ability to control the
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demonstrate the need for much in the form of any so-called skilled operation.
The  other aspect of the  time  machine  that  seems  peculiarly  analogous  to the 
hypothetical one described  by  Baudrillard  is the sense of ‘remote  sovereignty’  that it 
attains.  This  quality  could  be  manifested  in  two  ways.  One  is  through  the  effect 
experienced as the Time Traveller views the space outside of his machine when in transit. 
The other is as a remote and alienated subject hurled to a world of radical alterity, in 
which he is an often detached viewer and interpreter. The first of these two categories 
might also be subdivided into a form of remote sovereignty that is perhaps more practical 
in its essential definition. The very act of starting the machine, ‘with a thud’, separates 
the Time Traveller in a most profound and fundamental way, from the world. He and the 
machine,  as  it  is  theorised  by  the  Psychologist  after the  demonstration  of the  Time 
Traveller’s maquette, are rendered  invisible  by the  speed  of transit, in  the  way  that a 
spoke of a spinning wheel is unseen. In his activated machine he cannot be perceived or 
touched by anyone outside. Nor is he effected by, or seemingly connected to in any way, 
the passage of time outside the immediate zone of influence that seems to be generated 
by the machine’s motion.  He is totally separated from the world, not just at any given 
time, but so profoundly removed that the concept no longer applies. The most constant of 
boundaries, those marked  by the transition of day to night,  becomes but the like  ‘the 
flapping of a black wing’.394
His transition from the  world of temporal  and  spatial  stability to the status of 
transit is marked by a visible effect, from hazy and dark ‘then fainter and ever fainter’.395 
This is a transition from one world to another, from the shared field of all humanity to an 
isolated and singularly personal bubble-like private universe. This transition is marked 
here in the passage that describes the very beginning of the Time Traveller’s first journey 
not only by this initial visual effect suggesting the isolation of the protagonist from the 
world around him, but also subsequently through sound, followed by a change in mental 
state:  ‘An eddying murmur filled my ears, and a strange, dumb confusedness descended 
on  my  mind’.396 Whether the sound is real, or an effect of the general sense of 
overwhelmed confusion, is ambiguous, particularly as sound itself seems not to travel 
directly from the high-speed outside world.
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sovereignty is one that privileges visuality. While he is so profoundly detached from the 
world, he is at the same time able to view change at an inconceivably rapid pace. This is 
rendered before his eyes as a form of visual spectacle. While the spectacle of time travel 
resembles the commodified space of proto-cinematic visual illusions, it differs radically 
from those forms of entertainment in the lack of a contractual obligation that guarantees 
the  status  of  illusion,  and  therefore  of  safety,  that  as  Scott  Bukatman  suggests, 
characterised pre-cinematic popular spectacle:
The spectacle was a simulacrum of reality, but spectators weren’t fooled by these 
illusions -  by paying admission, the customer indicated a comprehension of the 
terms of the exhibition. Some pleasure however, clearly derived from responding 
to these entertainments as if they were real?9 1
While  the  safety  of the  contractual  agreement of commodification,  guaranteeing  the 
fakeness, and thus safeness, of spectacle, the  panoptic power suggested  by Bukatman 
sheds light on the view of the change from the perspective of the time machine:
Visual  spectacle  provided  reassurance  in  the form  of a  panoptic  power -  the 
human subject was, after all, capable of perceiving and comprehending the new 
conditions of physical reality through the projection of an almost omnipotent gaze 
out into the represented world.398
This perspective is one that is experienced by the Time Traveller, an apparent panoptic 
mastery over the visible world before him. He can seemingly control the change of pace 
before  him,  an  appearance of control  serving  to  isolate  him further from the  world, 
enforcing the status of ‘remote isolation’ that Baudrillard describes. However, despite the 
illusion of control in the form of panoptic power, the resemblance this experience bears 
to pay-to-view  spectacle collapses in the absence of the contract of commodification. 
This is genuine, and genuinely dangerous.
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experience  of  operating  the  time  machine,  another  can  be  found  in  the  resulting 
experience of the Time Traveller as an anachronism in the future. While he is ultimately 
implied in the events of the future, primarily through the theft of the time machine and 
the general threat of the Morlocks, his general position is one of passive observer. He is 
concerned with the process of deduction and analysis, and is obsessed with recovering his 
ability to escape from that time. His encounter is often one of remote sovereignty in the 
sense of his overlooking of population, history, architecture and landscape, of conflating 
them as one. At times it is as if he is an omniscient deity overseeing the progress of some 
civilization below.
When reading the account of the Time Traveller's domestic space, it is necessary 
to acknowledge that what appears from a contemporary perspective as the establishing of 
relaxed and comfortable atmosphere contained some unambiguous references:
The fire burnt brightly, and the soft radiance of the incandescent lights in the lilies 
of silver caught the bubbles that flashed and passed in out glasses. (...), and there 
was that luxurious after-dinner atmosphere, when thought runs gracefully free of 
the trammels of precision.399
Stover  has  identified  the  presence  of two  specific  charges  being  made  in  this  brief 
passage. The first of these addresses the condition of the lighting. The incandescence, 
made clear by later references to non-electric lighting, is generated by gas mantles. This 
is  a jab  at  the  failure  of the  entire  district  of Richmond,  the  location  of the  Time 
Traveller’s house, to be electrified.  In the convincing narrative Stover has constructed, 
which he argues would have been clearly identified by an audience in the 1890s, Wells is 
identifying a ruling class that has failed to take adequate control of the transformative 
processes of technological modernity.400 This was an attitude that attempted to sustain 
elements of an aristocratic lifestyle with localised interests, which was resistant to the 
idea of large-scale electrification. The Electric  Lighting Act of  1888  was seen as the 
formal manifestation of this attitude. It gave local authorities control over the process of 
electrification  and  whether  or  not  it  would  be  introduced,  which  meant that  it  was
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generated and distributed to a bewildering degree of incompatibility. The other charge 
within the passage is one I have already given an account of - a respectful conflict with 
the  political  views  of  William  Morris,  articulated  through  the  description  of 
technologically advanced and superlatively comfortable armchairs.
While a site of politicised tensions as well as covert satire and critique, the Time 
Traveller's home is introduced in the opening paragraph of the novel as a site of both 
luxurious comfort, and technological sophistication - despite the presence of gas, rather 
than electric, lighting. This is a space of conflicting tendencies, of comfort and tension, 
futuristically  elaborate  furniture  and  obsolete  services.  As  the  guests  relax  in  this 
luxurious tension, The Time Traveller begins to conversationally pave the way for his 
subsequent revelation, in the form of the miniature time machine: 'And he put it to us in 
this way (...) as we sat and lazily admired his earnestness over this new paradox (as we 
thought it) and his fecundity.*4 0 1  That the Time Traveller should be taken as describing a 
'paradox'402 does much to heighten the contradictory presence of such conflicting aspects 
within such a brief account of an interior scene.
So  what  is  it  possible  to  glean  from  the  text  as  to  the  nature  of  the  Time 
Traveller's home, its spatial contexts, and its interiors and contents? I will attempt to map 
out the materialised presence of his living and work space, as well as the objects that 
serve  to  constitute  the  narrative  fabric.  To  begin  with,  the  house  can  be  placed 
somewhere within a cartography of familiar reference points. The location of the house is 
identified by Hillyer, upriver from, but south-west of Central London, without any sense 
of ambiguity: The next Thursday I went again to Richmond - 1 suppose I was one of the 
Time Traveller's most constant guests'.403 While this fact is made clear within the outer 
narrator's own time period, the localised geography is expanded by the Time Traveller's 
explorations of the landscape in the year 802,701. After the time machine is removed 
from its point of arrival, and dragged inside the base of the Sphinx, the Time Traveller is 
resolved to the idea of gathering knowledge about the future world, that might, in indirect 
form, lead back towards a solution of how to recover the machine. However, despite the 
increasing radius of his wandering survey, he still feels restricted to a space around his 
own home, and in an oblique manner limited by its virtual and enclosing presence: 'Yet a
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point of my arrival.'404 This circle is in a sense both defined by and an extension of the 
Time Traveller's home as the focal site of the novel's spatial orientation.
Soon after his arrival, the Time Traveller explores the immediate vicinity of his
home:
At first things were very confusing. Everything was so entirely different from the 
world I had known - even the flowers. The big building I had left was situate (sic) 
on the slope of a broad river valley, but the Thames had shifted, perhaps, a mile 
from its present position.405
When seeking to recover his stolen machine, the quest of the Time Traveller could be 
imagined  as  a  process  of seeking  to  restore  the  altered  landscape  in  which  he  finds 
himself to its original  condition.  Finding himself stuck in the future is to be castaway 
upon  a distorted  perversion of a familiar terrain. This perversion is taken to its most 
extreme form after the Time Traveller's escape from the year 802,701:
The machine  was standing on  a sloping  beach.  The sea stretched  away to the 
south-west, to rise into a sharp bright horizon against the wan sky. There were no 
breakers and no waves, for not a breath of wind was stirring. Only a slight oily 
swell rose and fell like a gentle breathing, and showed that the eternal sea was still 
moving and living. And along the margin where the water sometimes broke was a 
thick  incrustation  of  salt  -   pink  under  the  lurid  sky.  There  was  a  sense  of 
oppression  in  my  head,  and  I  noticed  that  I  was  breathing  very  fast.  The 
sensations reminded me of my only experience of mountaineering, and from that I 
judged the air to be more rarefied than it is now.406
Rather than explore this monstrous scene by foot, by bodily moving about the beach, he 
explores by skipping forwards in time to observe changes and gain a better understanding 
of the circumstances around him. He travels in strides across time, rather than through a 
vulnerable clamber across the beach.
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within  that  of not only  his  own  time,  but  I  would  suggest  his  own  space.  His  only 
connection to the sanity and substance of his own time is to be physically in contact with 
the machine, to be touching it or seated upon it at all times. In response to a thickening 
darkness  of  the  sky,  the  Time  Traveller  becomes  nauseous  with  horror,  his  body 
shivering and breathing becoming painful:
I got off the machine to recover myself. I felt giddy and incapable of facing the 
return journey. As I stood sick and confused I saw again the moving thing upon 
the shoal -  there was no mistake now that it was a moving thing -  against the red 
water of the sea. It was a round thing, the size of a football perhaps, or, it may be, 
bigger, and tentacles trailed down from it; it seemed black against the weltering 
blood-red water, and it was hopping fitfully about. Then I felt I was fainting. But 
a terrible dread of lying helpless in that remote and awful twilight sustained me 
while I clambered upon the saddle.407
To be detached from the machine in this extreme perversion of his own familiar spatial 
existence suggests nothing less than the annihilation of self, lying helpless within a world 
where  humanity  has  long  since  ceased  to  exist,  except  perhaps  in  the  strange  form 
floating by the water's edge. This is not the first time in the novel that Wells suggests a 
relationship between physical contact with the machine, and the Time Traveller’s sense 
of embodied safety. When he first meets the Eloi, he is poised to operate the machine, 
fearful that he might have to make an escape. Upon beholding their physical appearance 
and  benevolent  demeanour,  he  regains  confidence:  ‘I  took  my  hands  from  the 
machine’.408
This vision of portentous horror that the Time Traveller beholds on the sea shore 
forms one end of an arc that describes a space within the novel that is both consistent and 
yet multifarious. It is one that might be rendered as singular, yet comprised of glaring 
incompatibilities that jar and compete. This suggested arc is one that traces the movement 
of the three, or possibly four, principle spaces present in The  Time Machine: the Time 
Traveller's home and its immediate environment, the landscape of 802,701, the beach at
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the  case  that  these  are  each  linked,  but  rather  I  would  like  to  suggest  that  each  is 
somehow  a  shade  of  the  other.  The  interior  space  of  the  house  and  workshop  in 
Richmond both contains and is surrounded by the oily swell and desolate beach of the far 
future.
Like the two zones of contemporary Richmond and the beach at the end of the 
Earth, the space of 802,701 is weaved within the same arc. In order to generate a sense of 
this space and how it might be thought of in terms of a sense of materiality and material 
culture, I would like to begin to sketch the general terrain of the landscape of the Eloi and 
the Morlocks from a humbly quotidian  perspective; the  weather.  The Time Traveller 
arrives in this epoch amidst a suitably dramatic storm, which reflects his violent arrival in 
the future:
There was the sound of a clap of thunder in my ears. I may have been stunned for 
a moment. A pitiless hail was hissing round me, and I was sitting on soft turf in 
front of the overset machine.409
This is severe and extreme in its peculiarity in the context of the climatic temperament of 
the 802,701. There are no other indications of such violent weather. In fact, the tendency 
observed by the Time Traveller suggests quite the opposite, that all nature and climate 
have  somehow  been  placated.  While  this  is  initially  suggestive  of  some  form  of 
unimaginably  advanced  progress,  it  actually  indicates  passivity,  decadence  and 
degeneration, reflecting the same apathy that has affected the bodies of the Eloi.
Indeed, the hail storm that marks this violent arrival, as a kind of rupture in the 
smooth veneer of the apparent achievements of future civilizations, serves as a device to 
dramatically  introduce  the  novel's  main  theme.  It  does  so  through  the  sequential 
manifestation of the Sphinx, Carlyle’s motif of immanent social degradation, through the 
shroud of hail. Although it is indistinct in the midst of the deluge, it is all that the Time 
Traveller can discern. This uncharacteristically adverse weather stands out and describes 
the unveiling of the Sphinx as a central thematic device with a distinct emphasis.
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suggestive of a classical Arcadia, yet retains its degenerative connotations:
I think I have said how much hotter than out own was the weather of this Golden 
Age. 1  cannot account for it. It may be that the sun was hotter, or the earth nearer 
the sun. It is usual to assume that the sun will go on cooling steadily in the future. 
But people,  unfamiliar with such speculations as those of the younger Darwin, 
forget that the planets must ultimately fall back one by one into the parent body. 
As these catastrophes occur, the sun will blaze with renewed energy; and it may 
be that some inner planet has suffered this fate.  Whatever the reason, the fact 
remains that the sun was very much hotter than we know it.410
The implications here are of entropic processes, of the sun loosing energy as it bums out, 
and of the planets of the solar system spiralling inwards on degenerative orbits, unable to 
sustain a consistent distance from the sun. The very order that maintains the Earth itself is 
thought to be breaking down, leading to its ultimate destruction in fire. The destructive 
conflagration that the Time Traveller inadvertently starts in his flight from the Morlocks, 
perhaps a mirror image of this ultimate fate, is also linked to the transformed climate:
I  don’t know  if you have ever thought what a rare thing flame must be in the 
absence of man and in a temperate climate. The sun’s heat is rarely strong enough 
to bum, even when it is focused by dewdrops, as is sometimes the case in more 
tropical districts. Lightning may blast and blacken, but it rarely gives rise to wide­
spread fire. Decaying vegetation may occasionally smoulder with the heat of its 
fermentation, but this rarely results in flame  .  In this decadence, too, the art of 
fire-making had been forgotten on the earth 4 1 1
The vulnerability of this climate to fire is again evidence of degenerative forces. This is a 
climate that itself propagates decadence.
Climate and landscape are not sharply differentiated in The Time Machine. This 
propinquity could be extended to the point at which climate and weather could be thought
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once that of fin-de-siecle suburban South West London, and of a far distant world. It is 
simultaneously that of fantasised alterity, and that of quotidian familiarity. It is however a 
landscape that is inescapably Western. In some senses it is the epitome of landscape as it 
appears within a Western tradition. It relates to a sustained fiction of classical ideals and 
how they represent and are represented in landscape. In her arguments around Western 
notions  of landscape  and  the  privileging  of 'views'  as  a  historical  category,  Barbara 
Bender  acknowledges  the  privileging  of  class  within  such  schemes  as  they  are 
represented. Bender suggests that landscape, as a Western construction, was something to 
be  looked  at or over,  with  dual  values  of commodity  and  aesthetic  value  conjoined: 
'beauty was in the eye of the  be-holder'.412 Landscape as a source of visual appeal is 
inseparable from notions of ownership. This can be seen both through painting, in modes 
of positioning oneself in relation to landscape,  and through the physical  creation and 
modification of the land and its contents:
We need to ask not only about the interaction between particular social, economic 
and political conditions and ways of engaging with the land but more precisely 
who is doing the interacting, and how.  Or rather, who appears to be doing the 
interacting - where, in this scheme of things, are the labourers whose villages are 
removed to make  way for the  landscaped estate and  whose  physical  labour is 
airbrushed from park and garden?4 1 3
This question holds a particular resonance for the landscape of 802,701. It is the mystery 
of the future world in The Time Machine, that the Time Traveller must gradually uncover 
through piling speculation upon speculation in his attempts to provide an analysis of this 
world.
This  is  a  landscape  that  appears  idealised  yet  that  marks  with  exaggerated 
emphasis this almost total erasure of class difference, embodied in the demarcation of 
species. The decadent Eloi inhabit a strangely decorative surface world that appears self- 
sustaining,  as  do  the  Eloi  themselves.  One  pictorial  impression  gained  by  the  Time 
Traveller sums up his initial impressions of this future landscape:
201As I  stood  there  musing over this too perfect triumph  of man,  the full  moon, 
yellow and gibbous, came up out of an overflow of silver light in the north-east. 
The bright little figures ceased to move about below, a noiseless owl flitted by, 
and I shivered with the chill of the night.414
This too perfect triumph is rendered very much in terms of visual  culture, whether in 
terms of a dramatic tableau  in the form of landscape painting, or a panorama of both 
landscape  and  history.  It  is  a  scene  of a  literally  chilling  silence,  with  an  uncanny 
combination  of stillness  and  movement.  The  emphasis  in  this  scene  is  on  the  Time 
Traveller as immobile observer of a vista as image.  I  would like to suggest that it is 
perhaps reminiscent of the diorama as a form of spectacle and display. The diorama was a 
technique  of visual  spectacle  developed  by  Louis  Daguerre  in  the  1820s,  which  as 
Jonathan Crary observes, ’is based on the incorporation of an immobile observer into a 
mechanical apparatus and a subjection to a predesigned temporal  unfolding of optical 
experience.1 4 1 5  There are two aspects to this similarity to which I would like to draw 
attention. The first is that of the immobile spectator, as suggestive of the Time Traveller 
as a tourist who doesn't actually leave home.
Crary acknowledges Marx's comments that the body in modernity was one that 
had  to  be  transformed  to accommodate  new  forms  of movement and  transportation. 
However, Crary argues that this adaptation must be seen in junction with an opposite 
movement, of vision being adapted to match a certain form of sedentary state of bodily 
movement:
One of the great technical innovations of the nineteenth century was the way in 
which  the  body  was  made  adaptable  to  ‘the  few  main  fundamental  forms  of 
motion.’ But if the modernization of the observer involved the adaptation of the 
eye to rationalized forms of movement, such a change coincided with and was 
possible only because of an increasing abstraction of optical experience from a 
stable referent416
202The  still  body  acts  as  a metaphor for a form  of stable  subjectivity,  which  as  I  have 
argued, is itself thrown into disarray in The Time Machine. The Time Traveller's views of 
landscape could therefore attain a similar form of anxious tension as those of embodied 
subjectivity in the novel.
The presence of the moon, 'yellow and gibbous', in the scene described above also 
could be read in terms of a reiteration of the previous chapter's conflation of time and 
space as there articulated within museological discourses. Here, it is nature through the 
lens  of  landscape  marking  cyclical  repetition  and  imaginative  manifestations  of 
temporality. This provides an unexpected anthropological connection to landscape, space 
and time in the narrative of The  Time Machine. The moon is a constant and universal 
form of the measuring and marking of duration. It follows sequences that can be charted 
and correlated with social activity, as E.E.  Evans-Pritchard points out in his exhaustive 
study on the social structures of Nuer society in Africa:
When  Nuer wish to define the occurrence of an event several days in advance, 
such as a dance or a wedding, they do so by reference to the phases of the moon: 
new  moon, its waxing, full  moon, its waning, and the brightness of its second 
quarter. When they wish to be precise they state on which night on the waxing or 
waning an event will take place, reckoning fifteen nights to each and thirty to the 
month.417
The moon’s specific status as a temporal signifier is lost on the Time Traveller. It stands 
in contrast to the ‘flapping wing’ effect of time travel as a visual experience, as day turns 
to night, and sun and moon shoot across the field of vision. The moon is static, and its 
predictable cycles apparently  lost on the Eloi  population. That they  have no apparent 
concept of the  moon’s  regularity  is evidence  of their loss  of time  as a  sophisticated 
concept.
However, it is inappropriate to discount the presence of the moon as a marker of 
temporality in The Time Machine:
203It occurred to me even then, that in the course of a few days the moon must pass 
through its last quarter, and the nights grow dark, when the appearances of these 
unpleasant creatures from below, these whitened Lemurs, this new vermin that 
had replaced the old, might be more abundant.418
The light afforded by the moon offers some protection against the photophobic Morlocks. 
The recognition that the moon’s light will rapidly diminish over the course of the next 
few days offers the Time Traveller a sense of horror and anxiety. The moon is registered 
by the Time Traveller in different stages. He is dependent upon its presence, as the only 
source of night in the nocturnal landscape. As full, it may cast an uncanny illumination 
over this world, but the phase of the new moon represents a source of terror: the Dark 
Nights  in  which  the  Morlocks  hold  sway 419 This is an inversion of those modes of 
temporality as exemplified by the Palace of Green Porcelain. There time is given form by 
spatial arrangement. Here, space and movement become forms of both creating a sense 
of, and marking, time.
Yet  despite  the  safety  offered  by  the  moon  at  its  brightest,  and  the  sense  of 
temporal  regularity  marked  by  its  universally  traceable  trajectory  and  sequence,  the 
phases of the moon and its very orbit are not stable. The enforced presence of Kelvin's 
Laws of Thermodynamics points towards a tendency for energy to be dispersed. This 
process  of entropy  is  a  move  from  ordered  regularity  towards  chaos.  The  moon  is 
therefore  subject to degenerative forces.  While maintaining enough of its  stability in 
802,701  to mark out one sense of time and duration through repetitive and predictable 
spatial  movement,  these  very  patterns  of  movement  are  subject  to  the  forces  of 
degeneration that permeate the fabric of the material  world of The  Time Machine. Of 
course this applies to the sun as well, which simultaneously bums with more energy as 
the earth's planetary orbit decays. These degenerative trajectories find their fully realised 
forms through the jumps in time made upon leaving 802,701. The landscape of 802,701 
can  be  extended  in  two  ways:  one  is  through  the  peculiar  temporal  overlap  that 
constitutes the general  subject of this chapter.  Each point in time seems to represent a 
constitutes section of the whole, that can only be mapped, in the Time Traveller's own 
pseudo-scientific terms, in four dimensions. The other extended dimension is through an
204extreme variation of scale, from the microcosmic local, to an immense scale that is able 
to describe the relative movements and transformations of planetary bodies.
Yet to some extent, this sense of scale is still reducible to Crary's fixed and stable 
viewpoint, or Bender's notion of landscape rendered as a pictorial field.  As he leaves
802,701,  the Time Traveller travels faster in time than he has tried before:
As  I  drove  on,  a  peculiar  change  crept  over  the  appearance  of  things.  The 
Palpitating  greyness  grew  darker;  then  -   though  I  was  still  travelling  with 
prodigious velocity -  the blinking succession of day and night, which was usually 
indicative  of a  slower pace,  returned,  and  grew  more  and  more  marked.  This 
puzzled me very much at first. The alterations of night and day grew slower and 
slower, and so did the passage of the sun across the  sky, until  they  seemed to 
stretch through the centuries. At last a steady twilight brooded over the earth, a 
twilight only broken now and then when a comet glared across the darkling sky. 
The band of light that had indicated the sun had long since disappeared; for the 
sun had ceased to set -  it simply rose and fell in the west, and grew ever broader 
and  more  red.  All  trace  of the  moon  had  vanished.  The  circling  of the  stars, 
growing slower and slower, had given place to creeping points of light.420
Laid out before him like the spectacle of a planetarium, the entropic degeneration of the 
Earth and the Solar System are played at a rate where the Time Traveller can detect a 
marked  shift  in  movement  of the  landscape  at  a  literally  astronomical  scale.  When 
making his initial jump at a much slower speed, in which he was able to reach 802,701, 
the Time Traveller was able to discern the blinking effect of light to dark in the transition 
of day to night from his fixed perspective. Yet now travelling much faster through time, 
he is able to see the  same  effect.  This  must mean that the  time taken for the  sun to 
traverse the sky is increasing as he moves forwards, which translates as the time taken for 
the earth to spin one revolution on its access.  It is of course his apparently stable and 
static viewpoint that is turning with each revolution, and not the sun moving. Yet despite 
the obviousness of such a fact, the illusory relationship of movement and stillness is itself
205strangely stable. It really is as if it is the bodies in the sky that move around his viewing 
position.
The Time Traveller's cinematic apparatus is able to animate a scene of change that 
is  certainly  hard  to  imagine,  perhaps  impossible  to  visualise,  without  such  an 
interpretative technology:
So I travelled,  stopping ever and again,  in  great strides of a thousand years or 
more,  drawn  on  by  the  mystery  of the  earth’s  fate,  watching  with  a  strange 
fascination the sun grow larger and duller in the westward sky, and the life of the 
old earth ebb away. At last, more than thirty million years hence, the huge red-hot 
dome  of  the  sun  had  come  to  obscure  nearly  a  tenth  part  of  the  darkling 
heavens.4 2 1
The scale of this scene is immense, both in terms of spatial terms and temporal. This 
image of an obese sun as it enters its last stages of life is one that evokes qualities of both 
the sublime and the uncanny. While the sublime is a term that applies most comfortably 
to  landscape,  perhaps the  uncanny  does  not.  Nevertheless,  Freud's  assertion  that the 
uncanny describes an unsettling feeling through the appearance of something familiar, 
but at the same time repressed, finds some resonance in the image of this last sunset, 
drawn out over millennia.422 The acknowledged, although historically contingent, theory 
of the sun's finite life-span emerges through this transformed image of the most familiar 
and universal of spectacles. This twilight marks not just the end of a day, but of the world 
itself.
An even more uncanny form of visual spectacle follows in the form of a dramatic 
eclipse, that leaves the Time Traveller alone in silent darkness upon the beach:
Suddenly I noticed that the circular westward outline of the sun had changed; that 
a concavity, a bay, had appeared in the curve. I saw this grow larger. For a minute 
perhaps I stared aghast at this blackness that was creeping over the day, and then I 
realized that an eclipse was beginning.4 2 3
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abhuman,  this  scene  is one of uncertainty.  The  impression is one of an un-nameable 
creeping blackness of night that threatens to envelop the day itself. Even after the Time 
Traveller has identified this encroaching darkness as an eclipse, there remains no sense of 
certainty in exactly what is taking place:
Either  the  moon  or  the  planet  Mercury  was  passing  across  the  sun’s  disk. 
Naturally, at first I took it to be the moon, but there is much to incline me to 
believe that what I really saw was the transit of an inner planet passing very near 
to the earth.424
While assuming that this is the moon, albeit in the guise of the familiar reappearing in the 
guise of a source of horror, suggesting both confusion and threat, the Time Traveller's 
uncertainty regarding the situation is such that he cannot be sure. All is unfamiliar, so it is 
impossible to even distinguish two such distinct astronomical  bodies as the moon and 
Mercury. Their relative positions to the earth can no longer be relied upon as stable.
That the beach and the eclipse might be characterised as sublime seems to be in 
little doubt, but the nature of how it is sublime and to what extent this is consistent is 
contestable.  Taking  Edmund  Burke's  influential  application  of the  term  in  the  mid­
eighteenth century, this scene maintains a sense of sublime distance, while threatening to 
overstep the division between frightening appearance and genuinely destructive threat:
(...) if pain is not carried to violence, and the terror is not conversant around the 
present destruction of the person, as the emotions clear the parts of a troublesome 
encumbrance, they are capable of producing delight; not pleasure, but a sort of 
delightful horror; a sort of tranquillity tinged with terror.425
This account of Burke's certainly conveys something of the perception of the far-future 
landscape by the Time Traveller as he observes from the safety of his proto-cinematic 
machine. As the eclipse ends, he is overcome by the sight of the returning sun:
207A horror of this great darkness came on me. The cold, that smote to my marrow, 
and the pain I felt in breathing, overcame me.  I  shivered, and a deadly nausea 
seized me. Then like a red-hot bow in the sky appeared the edge of the sun. I got 
off the machine to recover myself.426
However, as soon as he looses physical contact with the machine, he is overwhelmed. 
Recognising the grotesque living form ‘hopping fitfully about’, the Time Traveller feels 
as if he is fainting, and is overcome by a sense of dread at the idea of lying helpless in 
‘that remote and awful twilight.’ This fear necessitates his remounting of the machine.427 
It is not a tranquil or delightful horror, but becomes a consuming sense of vulnerability in 
the face of this world and its unearthly inhabitants. This encounter seems, for the Time 
Traveller at least, to go beyond the mild extremities of an aesthetic category, into a realm 
of horror with an unsustainable bodily impact. Of course, this is reading the scene as a 
form of visual  spectacle laid out before the Time Traveller.  Within the text itself, this 
sequence operates precisely within such a definition of the sublime as a material world 
created for a reader.  It operates  in  a  rather typical  manner in  that sense,  particularly 
within the genre context of gothic. Danger and threat could be perceived together with 
knowledge  of security.  Yet  what  might  distinguish  The  Time  Machine  from  the  a- 
typicality of fiction that depicts any form of horror or dread is its predictive, prophetic 
nature. This is a horror that is tied to inevitability, both socially and biologically, but also 
in terms of a received understanding of physics.
The landscape of the 'Dead Sea', as the Time Traveller describes it, is framed by 
its status as a series of composite layers that make up the constitutive space of The Time 
Machine. It depicts an extreme state of distortion of the landscapes of both 802,701 and 
that  of the  Time  Traveller's  own  home.  Such  notions  as  sublime  and  uncanny  are 
destabilised,  as is the  idea  of scopic  mastery,  by  the  real  danger faced  by  the Time 
Traveller in his journey. The landscape is one that therefore may be seen to contest its 
literary and fictional status, through such incompatible contrasts. This reflects the jagged 
composition of a single textual landscape that comprises of three distinct phases, each of 
which  is appears  awkward  and  incompatible.  The  idea that  space  and  landscape  are 
rendered as a visual technique is one that I would like to argue for and sustain, yet there
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within  the  text,  particularly  the  notion  of  the  Time  Traveller  as  an  unstable  but 
nevertheless incontestably embodied subject, bring home a crudely corporeal  sense of 
vulnerability and embeddedness within the accounts of space and landscape.
Upon arriving in 802,701, the Time Traveller is bodily subjected to a thorough 
drenching in a hail storm, marking his dramatic arrival, offering a dramatic and emergent 
view of the novel's central motif, and suggesting a kind of rupture in the fabric of time 
and space marked by this uncharacteristic weather.  It also could be seen to serve as a 
marker of the beginning of a period of relative calm for the Time Traveller. During this 
period,  he explores the new  world,  encounters its seemingly  singular population, and 
takes in the land and architecture as a primarily visual phenomenon. It is after losing the 
Time Machine, that this takes a significant turn, returning to that bodily embeddedness 
and its associative vulnerability. The matter of space and body enter into a renegotiated 
relationship as equivalent forms of crude materiality. The pictorial impression, discussed 
earlier, gathered as the Time Traveller 'stood there musing over this too perfect triumph 
of man' is quickly followed by the calamitous discovery the time machine has vanished 
from the place where it had arrived:
There was the tangle of rhododendron bushes, black in the pale light, and there 
was  the  little  lawn.  I  looked  at  the  lawn  again.  A  queer  doubt  chilled  my 
complacency. ‘No,’ said I stoutly to myself, ‘that was not the lawn.428
The interpretative framework of a new world hereto constructed by the Time Traveller, 
one of accumulative  speculation and  predominantly  visual  perception,  is thrown into 
immediate disarray and destructive uncertainty. He cannot conceive that something has 
befallen his machine, as the implied consequences expose his total vulnerability, as an 
embodied subject irretrievably lost.
Confusion and uncertainty seem to be in operation as a kind of defence from the 
implications of such a disappearance. They express disbelief that the Time Traveller's 
adventure, as a form of scopic mastery, could be so easily undermined, leaving him so 
vulnerable as a lost and exposed body. That he is lost in but a layer of what constitutes
209his own home makes this situation all the more peculiar and disturbing. The panic caused 
by the machine's disappearance is one that takes on a bodily form, incorporating the Time 
Traveller into the physical, violently haptic world of 802,701:
At once, like a lash across the face, came the possibility of losing my own age, of 
being left helpless in this strange new world. The bare thought of it was an actual 
physical sensation. I could feel it grip me at the throat and stop my breathing. In 
another moment I was in a passion of fear and running with great leaping strides 
down the slope. Once I fell headlong and cut my face; I lost no time in staunching 
the blood, but jumped up and ran on, with a warm trickle down my cheek and 
chin.  All  the time  I  ran  I  was  saying to  myself:  ‘They  have  moved  it a little, 
pushed it under the bushes out of the way.’ Nevertheless, I ran with all my might. 
All  the time,  with the  certainty that sometimes comes with  excessive dread,  I 
knew  that  such  assurance  was folly,  knew  instinctively  that the  machine  was 
removed out of my reach. My breath came with pain.429
The  Time  Traveller's  presence  in  the  future  is  now  characterised  by  raw,  physical 
experience  and  pain,  which  is  indexically  tied  to  the  landscape  of  once  distant 
speculation.  The  visual  is  replaced  through  a  violent  process  of  realisation  with 
physicality. This is not just a shift in emphasis to the bodily, but a radical redefinition of 
the landscape itself, which then becomes definable in terms of this traumatic corporeality. 
He is cut as the distinction between his stable viewpoint and the space he occupies is 
ruptured, and his own blood pollutes and dissolves the boundaries as he bleeds. His very 
breath is both valuable in sustaining his desperate search, and painful to renew.
His  own  physical  abilities  seem  to  change  too,  in  a  manner that  reflects  the 
processes of unstable bodily becoming, reflecting the argument of the body as a series of 
potentialities and contingent possibilities, as discussed in Chapter 3: 'I suppose I covered 
the whole distance from the hill crest to the little lawn, two miles perhaps, in ten minutes. 
And I am not a young man.'430 Whether this could be interpreted as a matter of the actual 
dimensions and distances of space seeming to shift within the range of his own traumatic 
reintegration to this physical, material world, or the abilities of his body being redefined
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that this moment of trauma and panic suggests a redefinition of both body and landscape 
that would allow for the co-existence of both readings. Therefore, the space of 802,701 is 
transformed  from  a  landscape  characterised  predominantly  as  visual,  to  one  that  is 
unambiguously material. The Time Traveller changes from a metaphorically disembodied 
eye, to a subject of materiality, that is bound to, indistinguishably constituted  by, the 
material world in which he finds himself trapped. This shift is one to a kind of atomic 
equivalence of substance, where matter is what matters.
This  violent contrast to the  appearance  of the future  as a  visual  technique,  a 
moment of rupture or punctum that transforms the landscape of 802,701 into a truly and 
explicitly  material  form,  contributes  to  the  generation  of  a  characteristic  sense  of 
oppositions.  This contrast and contradiction is typical of the rich and varied material 
fabric the constitutes The Time Machine. Is this emphasis on the visual apprehension of 
landscape, as if a form of display or representation, also a marked contrast to the stable 
and  comfortable  world  of the  Time  Traveller's  home?  As  suggested  already  in  this 
chapter  the  confined  space  of  the  present  is  also  one  of  various  conflicts  and 
contradiction, even though mild in comparison to the extreme worlds of the future. Just as 
these future worlds are exaggerated distortions of the Time Traveller's present, so can 
they be thought of as material worlds, whose qualities are accumulative upon a temporal 
trajectory. The chairs, advancements on any design that Morris was capable of, bodily 
envelop  their  users.  The  lighting  in  the  room  transforms  the  scene  into  one  of 
incandescent  radiance,  while  referring  to  an  all  too  physical  and  quotidian  realm of 
technological  process in the relative modernity of available services in Richmond, or 
rather the anachronistic lack of. The sharp oscillations of visual and haptic that occur and 
become increasingly pronounced as the Time Traveller travels forward, and the sense of a 
contradictory sense of materiality, only become more extreme versions of those which 
are played out at home, and the sense demonstration of the model machine likened to an 
act  of  conjuring  and  linked  to  technologies  of visual  spectacle  is  extended  to  the 
perceptual account of the journey through time.
The landscape of 802,701 is, as Parrinder argues, dually constituted by its precise 
dating, through a number that so clearly suggests an entropic and cyclical 'running down'.
211The  initial  impression  is  one  of  paradise.  This  is  reflected  in  the  Time  Traveller's 
immediate responses to the Eloi, who posses qualities of fragile beauty. Early descriptive 
accounts veer towards this position,  'this fragile thing out of futurity',  'these exquisite 
creatures'.4 3 1  Above all, this Arcadian paradise initially resembles peaceful security. Yet it 
is clear from the Time Traveller's first encounters with the Eloi that this is not so, and he 
makes an intractable connection between the population and their physical environment. 
Through the eyes of the Time Traveller, this is a land that through its ease and delicacy of 
nature, that in can generate only weakness. Initially though, there is some in some ways a 
sustaining of a favourable impression, that suggests both hopeful optimism as well as dire 
warning:
In  the  end,  wisely  and  carefully  we  shall  readjust the  balance  of animal  and 
vegetable life to suit our human needs.
This adjustments, I say, must have been done, and done well: done indeed 
for all time, in the space of Time across which my machine had leapt. The air was 
free from gnats, the earth from weeds or fungi; everywhere were fruits and sweet 
and delightful flowers; brilliant butterflies flew  hither and thither. The ideal  of 
preventative medicine was attained. Diseases had been stamped out. And I shall 
have to tell you later that even the processes of putrefaction and decay had been 
profoundly affected by these changes 432
This account describes a world that has been refined through successive and incremental 
changes. Improvement has effected the landscape, animal life, vegetation, air, even the 
causes of illness, and  more spectacularly, decay and putrefaction have been arrested. 
However, this is one of the speculative interpretations made by the Time Traveller that 
are  both  incomplete,  and  subsequently  inaccurate.  The  significant  absence  of more 
obvious  and  expected forms  of decay  have  been  substituted  by  the  omnipresence  of 
degeneration.
His early speculations, while falling short of his final account of the social reality 
of this world, suggests quite how tightly bound is the connection between a refined and 
ideal spatial environment, and the physiognomically rendered Eloi. The Time Traveller is
212struck  by  the  lack of distinction  between  sexes,  and  the  similarity  of children to the 
adults:
Seeing the ease and  security  in which these people were living,  I felt that this 
close  resemblance  of the  sexes  was  after  all  what  one  would  expect;  for the 
strength of a man and the softness of a woman, the institution of the family, and 
the  differentiation  of occupations  are  mere  militant  necessities  of an  age  of 
physical force. Where population is balanced and abundant, much child-bearing 
becomes an evil  rather than a blessing to the  State; where violence comes  but 
rarely  and  offspring  are  secure,  there  is  less  necessity  -   indeed  there  is  no 
necessity  -  for  an  efficient  family,  and  the  specialization  of the  sexes  with 
reference to their children’s needs disappears.433
The refined and progressive appearance of landscape and environment is therefore both 
the inverse of the condition of bodies, but is, speculatively, part of the very cause of their 
degenerative  status.  While  the  world  of  802,701  appears  to  have  been  perfected,  a 
veritable triumph, the Time Traveller judges that in fact, the reverse may be implied: 
‘humanity upon the wane.*434 The landscape, refined through successive 'adjustments' in 
the manner of Pitt Rivers's views of an increasing sophistication of material artefacts, 
leads to degeneration in its inhabitants. What the Time Traveller describes as the  ‘true 
civilizing process’435 has gone on to a climax, which resulted in its own inversion. The 
absence of the premium set by security on feebleness, as the Time Traveller describes it, 
have allowed the Eloi to degenerate, to become feeble. Progress and degeneration, in this 
speculative scheme of the Time Traveller's are played out in equal measure in the spatial 
world of 802,701.
These two opposites are not only constituted as simultaneous but incompatible 
forces,  but  seem  to  be  conflated  as  a  single  principle  in  the  Time  Traveller's 
interpretations of the future. The triumph of spatial environment leads, inevitably, to the 
decline  of  its  population.  The  paradoxical  appearance  of  a  landscape  of  apparent 
perfection,  and  these  creatures  who could  have  had  nothing  to  do  with  its  creation, 
signposts  a  gulf  between  them  and  their  ancestors.  Their  bodies  are  both  visually
213compared  and contrasted with the buildings around them.  While the size of the built 
environment, 'those big abundant ruins',436 seems at odds with the delicate frailty of the 
Eloi, the architecture of 802,701 also reflects their physical beauty:
No doubt the exquisite beauty of the buildings I saw was the outcome of the last 
surgings of the now purposeless energy of mankind before it settled down into 
perfect harmony with the conditions under which it lived -  the flourish of that 
triumph which began the last great peace. This has ever been the fate of energy in 
security; it takes to art and to eroticism, and then comes languor and decay 437
It  as  if the  Eloi  are  likened  to  the  buildings  as  also  being  the  product  of previous 
generations, the result of generations of successive labour. And of course, both landscape 
and  population  are  the  descendent  outcome  of  the  productive  forces  of  the  Time 
Traveller's own originary present.
In the account given of the journey to 802,701, the rapid appearance of changes to 
the built environment are one of the visual effects of time travel.  Indeed, the change to 
the whole visible world is dramatic, a melting, amorphous set of transformations:
The landscape was now misty and vague. I was still on the hill-side upon which 
this house now stands, and the shoulder rose above me grey and dim. I saw trees 
growing and changing like puffs of vapour, now brown, now green: they grew, 
spread, shivered, and passed away. I saw huge buildings rise up faint and fair, and 
pass like dreams. The whole surface of the earth seemed changed - melting and 
flowing under my eyes 438
It is as if the most reliable sense of concrete materiality is reconfigured, and allowed the 
possibility of being conceptualised  in dimensions other than those of mute and  static 
solidity.
The  change  in  architecture  described  during temporal  transit is  picked  up  by 
Parrinder, in his assertion that there are two scales of time at play in the year 802,701. 
There is that which relates to social change, which incorporates architecture, and that of
214biological change, which here also includes the general climatic and biological changes 
in the environment. The Time Traveller notices that after a certain point, there is no sign 
of seasonal variation. Early on in the journey, at his pace of a year a minute, he describes 
such a pattern as visible: ‘and minute by minute the white snow flashed across the world, 
and  vanished,  and  was  followed  by  the  bright,  brief green  of  spring.’439 Yet as he 
advances into the future, this cycle is no longer noticeable.
I saw a richer green flow up the hill-side, and remain there without any wintry 
intermission. Even through the veil of my confusion the earth seemed very fair.440
The depth of this time is perhaps, as Parrinder suggests, somewhat out of synch with the 
scale needed to view the witnessed changes in architectural structures. Nevertheless, it is 
visible  in  the  age  of improved  climate,  as  part  of the  construction  of this  new  and 
reconfigured world. These changes in climate are part of the greater forces of progress, 
with their degenerative connotations, that are responsible for the building and eradication 
of new and unknown civilizations.
The presence of two timescales is, Parrinder argues, important in that it allows for 
the recognisable forms of the buildings to stand for contemporary references, and for the 
overall spatial context to resemble so closely classical forms although set in so far-off a 
future:
Without the 800-year timescale we cannot easily explain such crucial details as 
the survival of unmistakably classical forms of architecture into the far future, 
creating  an  essentially  familiar  landscape  dominated  by  the  Sphinx  and 
surrounded by ruined palaces and gardens.4 4 1
The Sphinx is, as already discussed, the first thing that the Time Traveller is able to see 
through the obfuscatory veil brought over the world by the violent storm that marks his 
dramatic  arrival  in  802,701.  It  is  dramatically  revealed,  looming  through  the  hazy 
downpour. It is not quite a Sphinx, or rather is different to the precise image of a Sphinx, 
while it retains, without ambiguity, its identity as one:  It is described as composed of
215white marble, and its shape being ‘something like a winged Sphinx’, but then consistently 
refers to is as the  ’White  Sphinx'.  However, the Time Traveller notes a change in the 
position of the wings:  ‘instead of being carried vertically at the sides, were spread so that 
it  seemed  to  hover.’442 The differences between this Sphinx and that of the Time 
Traveller's own era suggest a change, as if in seeing the failure for Victorian humanity to 
answer its riddle, the White Sphinx demonstrates its triumph, or despair, in the act of 
spreading its wings.  However, 'the faint shadow of a smile on the lips' would seem to 
suggest the former. From the outset of the Time Traveller's arrival in 802,701, the White 
Sphinx indicates not only the mere presence of degeneration, but also a very specific 
warning  about  a  precise  social  outcome  of  such  forces:  that  which  is  grotesquely 
caricatured/characterised by the physical embodiment of the Eloi and the Morlocks and 
their social structure, all rendered as mockery of the protagonist/author/reader’s present.
There is a perhaps an echo of that embodiment of degenerative, self obsessed, 
narcissistic decadence, Des Esseintes.443 Huysmans’ proto-Eloi embarks on a trip from 
Paris to London, but before leaving the city decides that between his journey thus far, 
sensory experience and his own solipsistically involved reflections, he is able to consider 
the trip achieved without leaving his home city. His intended stay in the foreign capital is 
substituted by an internal, psychic experience, sensually augmented by the early stages of 
preparation and journey. He returns home to enjoy his trip to London. The Time Traveller 
realises that in recognizing the social conflict of his own time in the future, he too has not 
left home.444 Social metaphor not only serves to reinforce the idea of the space of the 
Time Machine as a multifarious but singular conflation, but indeed relies on this very 
principle in order to function as dramatically within the novel as it does. Space, in this 
unique configuration, becomes a part of the binding substance of materiality and material 
culture. This constitutive presence within the novel is one that facilitates both diegetic 
momentum, and social metaphor.
Not only is the White Sphinx a metaphor for the presence of Thomas Carlyle's 
polemical  social  warnings, it is also a site of diegetic significance.  It is a consistently 
important and dramatic location within the driving narrative. It is the image that emerges 
through the storm of history to greet the Time Traveller upon arrival. It is the site of his 
desperate flight from 802,701, but is also, upon investigating the disappearance of the
216machine, the suspected hiding place of the time machine. Examining the lawn in detail, 
the Time Traveller suggests that unlike the Eloi, the 'turf gave better counsel', at least 
suggesting a series of clues and inferring the base of the Sphinx as the point at which all 
trace of the  machine  seems to end.  Finding  a rip  in  the turf where the  machine  had 
overturned upon arrival, he is able to piece together some rudimentary material evidence 
in the form of traces upon the fabric of the turf itself. These footprints, which indicate 
through  indexical  imprints  within  the  substance  of the  physical  landscape  the  first 
presence of the Morlocks in the novel, lead to the base of the Sphinx, indicating that is 
has been taken inside.445 The Sphinx becomes an obsession for the Time Traveller. It is 
his main point of focus, to which all thoughts and plans must return, a riddle written anew 
for the Time Traveller to solve in the face of the failure of his own society to do just that.
It even seems to set a mocking challenge to him, one that is both spiteful and 
personally  directed.  When  first  reaching  the  lawn  upon  which  the  machine  had 
materialised,  which  of course  occupies the  same  space  as  his  own  home,  the  White 
Sphinx compounds his distraught condition:
Above me towered the Sphinx, upon the bronze pedestal, white, shining, leprous,
in the light of the rising moon. It seemed to smile in mockery of my dismay.446
This  infuriating  act of smiling,  suggesting  not benevolence  but rather the  powerless 
insignificance of the Time Traveller, is reflected to uncanny effect by the faces of the 
Eloi. Their smiles and laughter, although innocent are those of the Sphinx.447 They both 
resemble that mocking face that looked down upon the Time Traveller and embody a 
symptomatic cause of humanity's descent into this age of apparent foolishness.  Even 
though the Time Traveller is at this point yet to realise the extent of the inversion of his 
present day  society,  the  playful  incomprehension  of the  Eloi,  which  I  would  like to 
suggest is bound to the smile of the White Sphinx, is all that is left of the qualities of 
decadence and social blindness that have allowed this transformation of both the social 
and the biological.
The obsessive need to solve the Sphinx's new riddle leads to the Time Traveller 
setting out upon an investigation of this world, and the role and  nature of this White
217Sphinx in particular. From the moment he traces the mysterious footprints to its pedestal, 
it becomes the focus of detailed scrutiny. When first seeing the Sphinx, he describes the 
lower part of the structure: The pedestal, it appeared to me, was of bronze, and was thick 
with verdigris.'448 The bronze shows signs of ageing, as  verdigris alludes to some kind of 
encrustation  upon  its surface,  or of a richly  developed  patina,  brought about through 
oxidation.  Yet  this  is  ageing  that  would  hardly  require  the  temporal  distances  of 
biological change, but rather seems to suggest a social, historical timescale. The material 
of the pedestal's construction is confirmed upon following the Morlock tracks the led 
from the site of the disappeared time machine. The discovery of the tracks:
(...) directed my closer attention to the pedestal. It was, as I think I have said, of 
bronze. It was not a mere block, but highly decorated with deep framed panels on 
either side. I went and rapped at these. The pedestal was hollow. Examining the 
panels  with  care  I  found  them discontinuous  with the frames.  There  were  no 
handles or keyholes, but possibly the panels, if they were doors, as I supposed, 
opened from within.  One thing was clear enough to my mind.  It took no very 
great mental effort to infer that my Time Machine was inside that pedestal. But 
how to get in there was a different problem.449
Thus the conditions of the Sphinx's new riddle are set, one that defines the sensationalist 
diegetic arc of the novel, and one that flows as a parallel to Carlyle's, albeit as a question 
that has at stake but one life, rather than that of an entire culture. If the Time Traveller 
cannot resolve this problem of how to get inside this interior zone, he will not have the 
power or agency to recover his machine.
The  Sphinx  indicates  a  space  outside  of sight  or  accessibility  for  the  Time 
Traveller. The hollowness of the pedestal describes a negative space within, a cut into the 
material reality of 802,701  as the Time Traveller is able to conceive of it and interact 
within it. This discovery of a mysterious void within this world also appears to the Time 
Traveller to have a substantial  but unaccountable social  status, as he finds out almost 
immediately after discovering the pedestal to be hollow. Upon seeing some of the Eloi 
approach,  he attempts to enlist their help in  his endeavours. The Eloi  are part of the
218landscape. They are 'orange-clad' amongst apple-trees, which are themselves 'blossom- 
covered'.450 This language suggests a relativity between these elements, and a sense that 
there is no inconsistency between them, indeed almost a degree of interchangeability in 
the connections between fruit, colour and foliage in this description of these Eloi. Their 
sense of harmony in the landscape is contrasted with their apparent disgust at the Time 
Traveller’s suggestion that they assist him in gaining access to the pedestal interior. The 
insult  seems  to  be  in  part  the  transgression  of  the  world  from  which  they  are 
indistinguishable, to a space of incontrovertible alterity and taboo.
Despite the reaction that he has had to his attempts to gather help to gain access to 
this interior zone, the Time Traveller asks another for help. This time round, the Eloi is 
not compared to the spatial landscape of their world, but to the apparent disposition that 
favourably characterises their banal indifference:
I  tried  a sweet-looking  little chap in  white next,  with  exactly the same result. 
Somehow,  his manner made me feel  ashamed  of myself.  But,  as you know,  I 
wanted the Time Machine, and I tried him once more. As he turned off, like the 
others, my temper got the better of me. In three strides I was after him, had him 
by the loose part of his robe round the neck, and began dragging him towards the 
Sphinx. Then I saw the horror and repugnance of his face, and all of a sudden I let 
him go 4 5 1
This example is not, as before, of an incompatible contrast of inside and out, but of the 
nature of character in the Eloi and Time Traveller, and of the emergent tendencies within 
the Time Traveller that are in a process of becoming due to the absence of reiterative and 
normative forms of social context. The Sphinx is, perhaps, a catalyst in the initial of the 
Time Traveller's embodied descent from an apparent condition of stability.
Indeed, the pedestal of the White Sphinx almost immediately transforms the Time 
Traveller into a being of violence, at least of sorts, first fruitlessly banging his fists upon 
its panels, then with a large pebble 452 This is a raw, almost brutal, form of interaction, an 
act of initiation for the Time Traveller as he is transformed by this spatial environment 
from one imagined form of late Victorian subject, philosophically speculative and adept
219at technological invention, to something resembling a two-fisted adventurer with a lust 
for  the  satisfactory  and  immediate  results  of action.  The  latter  could  be  seen  as  a 
consistent and necessary undercurrent of Imperial masculinity, brought into the forefront 
by the Time Traveller’s displacement. However, as he starts to pound upon the metal of 
the  pedestal,  the futility  of his  nineteenth  century  physiology  and direct approach  is 
demonstrated in dual fashion. He both hears, or at least seems to hear, mocking laughter 
inside, and achieves nothing more than the destruction of some of the formal details of 
the  bronze.  There  is  also  a  suggestion  of  regression  in  his  actions,  which  is 
simultaneously a sign of the Time Traveller's innate ability, as Homo Sapiens rather than 
Eloi, for the use of tools. While inventive enough to use a pebble as a crude hammer, 
perhaps this suggests the evolutionary scheme exemplified and refined by Pitt Rivers. 
The artefacts and tools of the most chronologically distant and technologically primitive 
will be those that most resemble an unaltered state as natural forms, such as a pebble. The 
Time Traveller,  while  displaying  more  ingenuity and  ambition than any Eloi,  is also 
nothing more than a primitive savage.
Parrinder emphasises the familiarity of the landscape of 802,701, overseen by the 
recognisable  form  of the  White  Sphinx.  The  survival  of this  structure  and  the  neo­
classical  environment  suggests  a  timescale  that  is  social  and  historical,  relating  to 
Parrinder's figure of an 800 year distance from the Time Traveller's own  present.  In 
addition to Parrinder's commentary on the  presence  of ruined  palaces and  gardens,  I 
would like to suggest that the general landscape and architecture resembles that of the 
Crystal Palace. This is not just in reference to the connections drawn out in the previous 
chapter between the Palace of Green Porcelain, and the rebuilt Crystal Palace itself, but 
rather a suggested overlaying of the entire spatial zone of 802,701 onto the larger site of 
the  building's extensive  grounds.  It is worth noting, for example, that one of the few 
remains present among the ruins of the present-day Crystal Palace are a pair of Sphinxes 
either side of a staircase along one edge of the terraces that once formed the space in 
front  of  the  building.  Today,  the  hieroglyphics  inscribed  upon  their  sides  are  but 
palimpsests, forming strata beneath other forms of pictorial  writing. Graffiti is applied 
and erased upon their bodies, perhaps in answer or defiance to the legacy of their one-tine 
significance of symbol of prophetic foreboding.
220As well as evoking the already declining grandeur of the Crystal Palace, and its 
narratives of progress, leisure, education and distraction, the landscape and architecture 
of  802,701  refers  to  a  visual  tradition  that  encompasses  visual  art  and  notions  of 
ownership and power as traditionally English forms of authoritative meaning. They also, 
like the chairs in the Time Traveller’s home, evoke alternative models of socially minded 
speculative fiction:
The  palaces  and  gardens  suggest  the  landscape  of neoclassical  paintings  and 
country houses, while alluding to a line of English utopian romances which would 
have  been fresh  in the  minds of Wells’s first readers:  Richard Jefferies’ After 
London (1885), W.H. Hudson’s A Crystal Age (1887), and, above all, William 
Morris’s News from Nowhere (1890). Morris’s death in 1896 drew an affectionate 
if patronising acknowledgement in the Saturday Review -  ‘His dreamland was no 
futurity, but an illuminated past’, Wells wrote.453
Again,  like  the  chairs  in  the  Time  Traveller’s  home,  there  can  be  found  a  specific 
reference to Morris in The Time Machine. 802,701 at first seems like a future utopia, yet 
is proved to be an argument for its impossibility:
The  Time  Machine  is  both  an  explicitly  anti-utopian  text,  and  one  which 
deliberately recalls News from Nowhere at a number of points. Morris’s pastoral, 
idyllic society is centred on Hammersmith in West London, while the society of 
the Eloi is centred two or three miles upstream at Richmond. Both are placed in a 
lush  parkland  replacing the  nineteenth-century  industrial  and  suburban  sprawl 
beside the River Thames. The Eloi, like the inhabitants of Nowhere and of most 
other  contemporary  socialist  utopias,  eat together in  communal  dining  halls. 
William Guest, Morris’s  ‘time traveller’, learns about the history of twentieth- 
and twenty-first century England from an old man at the British Museum, while 
Wells’s Traveller journeys to the Palace of Green Porcelain, an abandoned old 
museum of the arts and sciences modelled on the Crystal  Palace and the South 
Kensington Museum. On the evening of his first day with the Eloi, the Traveller
221climbs  to  a  hilltop,  surveys  the  countryside  and  exclaims  ‘Communism’  to 
himself. The Communism he has in mid must be the pastoral utopia of Morris and 
Thomas More, rather than the revolutionary industrial society of Marx and Saint- 
Simon.454
I would like to suggest that both this all encompassing landscape, and individual pieces 
of domestic furniture, allude to the same point of reference. This accumulation upon a 
single point further erases any sense of clearly demarcated boundary between the various 
spaces  and eras  of The  Time  Machine.  Instead,  there  is  a  suggested  equivalence  of 
materiality,  and  a  sense  of  which  both  landscape  and  artefact  are  accessibly 
conceptualised as forms of material culture.
The other buildings that the Time Traveller has any substantial interactions with 
are those described as palace-like.
Looking round  with  a  sudden thought, from a terrace on  which I  rested for a 
while, I realized that there were no small houses to be seen. Apparently the single 
house, and possibly even the household, had vanished. Here and there and there 
among the greenery were palace-like buildings, but the house and the cottage, 
which  form  such  characteristic  features  of  our  own  English  landscape,  had 
disappeared.455
This  view  is also suggestive of the Crystal  Palace,  its landscape made up of terraces 
overlooking its grounds and the rural borders of South London. It is a fantasy of what 
such a view might suggest, the absence of all other signs of domestic dwelling that in 
reality  surrounded the site, but which would have been largely invisible from such  a 
perspective. It is this view that leads the Time Traveller to mistakenly speculate that this 
future world was one that had adopted communism, as envisioned by Morris. This is in 
fact the second appearance of the term in the novel. The first comes in the discussion at 
the Time Traveller's home about the possibilities of time travel:
222‘Then  there  is the future,’  said  the Very  Young  Man.  ‘Just think!  One might 
invest all one’s money, leave it to accumulate at interest, and hurry on ahead!’
‘To discover a society,’ said I, erected on a strictly communistic basis.’456
However, this observation comes not from the character representing Morris, a quiet, shy 
man with a beard who seems to say nothing all  evening, but from the outer narrator, 
Hillyer. His suggestion stays with the Time Traveller to the extent that he makes such a 
profound misinterpretation of the social structure of this future landscape. Yet there is 
still folly  in the suggestion that the social and architectural forms of the future might 
indeed represent some form of Morris-inspired communism. Hillyer's comment follows 
on from this other observation  based  on  greed,  exploiting  time  travel  as a  means  of 
accumulating  wealth.  This short-sighted  self interest is  symptomatic of the causes of 
humanity's division and ultimate downfall.
The  appearance  of a  communist future  in the Time Traveller's  view  over the 
landscape is compounded  by the  striking  physical  similarity of the  Eloi.  He does not 
notice this peculiarity until making the mistaken speculative judgement that this is indeed 
a form of communist society 457 Again, this is suggestive of the degree to which the Eloi 
and their spatial environment are one. They are undifferentiated from each other, as they 
are undifferentiated from the landscape and architecture of 802,701:
In costume, and in all the differences of texture and bearing that now mark off the 
sexes from each other, these people of the future were alike. And the children 
seemed to my eyes to be but the miniatures of their parents 458
The qualities of texture and bearing, strangely material, unify rather than distinguish them 
from each other. These terms seem formal, decorative, and oddly architectural. Just as the 
children are miniatures of the parents, so the Eloi are perhaps miniatures of the landscape. 
This relationship is not, however, one that is characterised by a straightforward tone of 
homogeneity. There is also a sense of sharp contrast between the refined climate, crafted 
landscape and impressive grandeur of the built environment. This is at the same time not 
their world, and yet one that they are bound to, to the point of which there is no way of
223differentiating them from it. That such a seemingly irrevocable discontinuity is possible 
is due to their alterity, their distance from humanity as the Time Traveller understands it.
This apparent paradox that I'm suggested might be made less opaque through an 
emphasis on a specificity of form. The 'too perfect triumph' of the future world relates to 
both, but is shown in radically different ways, and suggests a sense of temporal depth. I 
have already discussed the contrast between the Eloi and their environment earlier in this 
chapter. The 'physical slightness' of the Eloi is opposed to the scale of 'those big abundant 
ruins'. There is, as 1   have said, a gulf between population and environment. This is a 
temporal gulf. The Eloi did not build the structures, or tame the land, but rather are like 
the spatial environment, a product of a long term historical change. This is the root of 
their equivalence with, as well as difference to, the space of 802,701.
Such forms of contrasting equivalence dominate this landscape. There are also 
mysterious hints early on  that there are  ruptures in  the apparent ease and comfort of 
things, albeit as a most decadent paradise. After first speculating about the relationships 
between the degenerate bodies of the Eloi and the signs of splendour in the land, climate 
and architecture, the Time Traveller finds some anomalous architectural features:
While I was musing upon these things, my attention was attracted by a pretty little 
structure, like a well under a cupola. I thought in a transitory way of the oddness 
of wells still existing, and then resumed the thread of my speculations.459
This is made all the more unsettling through this initial interpretation of the well, leading 
to the interior world of the Morlocks, as a 'pretty little structure'. It seems at first like a 
decorative folly, but is ultimately viewed as a well, which makes no sense in a culture 
that is apparently  one of technological  sophistication and an absence of any form of 
labour, such as needing to manually draw water from a well. This discovery also carries 
with it another anomalous significance. Parrinder interprets this as a possible reflection 
on the creative difficulties that lay behind the writing of The Time Machine:
For six  years  (1888-94),  we  may  say,  Wells,  had  hesitated  on  the  brink  of a 
genuinely prophetic narrative. His exultation once he had succeeded in giving the
224future a body and shape is perhaps mirrored in the pun (supposing it is a pun) in 
Section 4 of The  Time Machine, when the Traveller reflects on the ‘oddness of 
wells still existing’.460
The  strangeness  of this  peculiar  well,  part  solid  structure,  part  cut  into  the 
landscape, is passed over for a while as he finds another vantage point with which to 
survey the pictorial world of the future. The interpretations of this world depend so much 
upon  such  moments  in  the  novel,  as  a  fixed  observer  making  sense  of  a  visual 
arrangement. This early overview makes use of a particular device that helps to bind the 
spaces of the novel within the pictorial scene - a chair upon which the Time Traveller sits 
to survey the outlook:
There I found a seat of some yellow metal that I did not recognize, corroded in 
places with a kind of pinkish rust and half smothered in soft moss, the armrests 
cast and filed  into the  resemblance of griffins’  heads.  I  sat down  on  it,  and  I 
surveyed the broad view of our world under the sunset of that long day. It was as 
sweet and fair a view as I have ever seen.4 6 1
Despite its mysterious composition, being made from an unknown metal, the chair is a 
peculiar reappearance of that most quotidian of objects. It seems to have been placed here 
for precisely that sense of scopic mastery that Bender describes as a dominant aspect of 
both landscape and its visual representation. It suggests control, ownership, overview, a 
point with which to construct both a stable notion of self and a coherent historical and 
visual construct of this 'too perfect triumph'. It also suggests Baudrillard's idea of private 
telematics. The Time Traveller is placed in an illusory position of control, as if operating 
a hypothetical machine, isolated in a position of perfect and remote sovereignty, and, 
importantly, at an infinite distance from his universe of origin. The chair is both alien and 
familiar, a specific device in this alien environment, and a recurrence of both the chairs 
from the Time Traveller's own home, and also perhaps the time machine itself.
225The  pictorial  view  gained  from  this  hilltop  throne,  with  armrests  shaped  in 
classical reference, is one that is both memorable and formative in the constitution of the 
spatial environment of 802,701:
The sun had already gone down below the horizon and the west was flaming gold, 
touched with some horizontal bars of purple and crimson. Below was the valley of 
the Thames, in which the river lay like a band of burnished steel. I have already 
spoken of the great palaces dotted about among the variegated greenery, some in 
ruins and some still occupied. Here and there rose a white or silvery figure in the 
waste garden of the earth, here and there came the sharp vertical  line of some 
cupola  or  obelisk.  There  were  no  hedges,  no  signs  of proprietary  rights,  no 
evidences of agriculture; the whole earth had become a garden.462
In the true spirit of an internalised sense of Empire and Colonial expansion, the Time 
Traveller makes up for the lack of any evidence of proprietary rights in the landscape by 
attempting to impose his own scopic ownership upon the scene. He does so as interpreter, 
observer and owner. This is, after all, a vastly expanded extension of his own privately 
owned home. That this overseen view is a dramatic sunset seems to play no small part in 
the  subsequent  interpretative  suggestion  made  by  the Time  Traveller,  as  he  himself 
makes explicit in the description of this scene as the sunset of mankind.
The Time Traveller goes on to develop the analogy that the earth has become a 
garden in his extrapolation of this world as the consequence of 'the social effort in which 
we are at present engaged',463 where in the absence of strength-breeding need an excess of 
security encourages and values only feebleness:
One triumph of a united humanity over Nature had followed another. Things that 
are now mere dreams had become projects deliberately put in hand and carried 
forward. And the harvest was what I saw!464
226This  harvest  is  both  landscape  and  population.  It  is  a  point  at  which,  despite  sharp 
contrasts, the Eloi and their environment are indistinguishable, embodied subjects bound 
to spatial and material and social context.
Just as principles of successive change, at once suggestive of both progressive 
evolution and regressive degeneration, have shaped the bodies and social structures of 
humanity's  descendants  in  the  future,  so  have  similar  forces  shaped  the  land  and 
environment of 802,701. Not only does the Time Traveller speculate upon modifications 
to landscape in his interpretation of this view, but also discusses disease:
After all, the sanitation and the agriculture of to-day are still in the rudimentary 
stage. The science of our time has attacked but a little department of the field of 
human  disease,  but,  even  so,  it  spreads  its  operations  very  steadily  and 
persistently. Our agriculture and horticulture destroy a weed just here and there 
and  cultivate  perhaps  a  score  or  so  of wholesome  plants,  leaving the  greater 
number to fight out a balance as they can. We improve our favourite plants and 
animals - and how few they are - gradually by selective breeding; now a new and 
better peach, now a seedless grape, now a sweeter and larger flower, now a more 
convenient breed of cattle.465
Sanitation and agriculture expand the body into the landscape. Circulatory systems that 
regulate  health  are  expanded  as  solidified  cosmologies  within  the  landscape.  Their 
refinement and apparent perfection are embodied within the corporeal forms of the Eloi, 
immune to both hunger and disease. Yet in truth they are little more than genetically 
modified cattle, one of those favourite animals that has been improved.
The  buildings  or  built  structures  visible  in  this  twilight  scene  are  limited  to 
obelisks, cupolas - possibly like the well the Time Traveller described, or 'great palaces'. 
The simplicity of the built environment is part of the appearance of a too perfect triumph, 
of humanity's decadent success. Just as the air is free of gnats, populated instead by pretty 
butterflies, and the earth is free of weeds, instead abundant with fruit, there is no sign of 
disease or even decay. This finds its analogy in the material evidence of a social triumph, 
referring to the built environment:
227I saw mankind housed in splendid shelters, gloriously clothed, and as yet, I had 
found them engaged in no toil. There were no signs of struggle, neither social nor 
economical  struggle.  The  shop,  the  advertisement,  traffic,  all  that  commerce 
which constitutes the body of our world, was gone.466
The world of the Time Traveller has a body, constituted by capital as it is translated into a 
visible  and  material  medium.  Yet  this  body  is  one  of alterity,  of social  triumph  as 
ultimate  failure.  The  building  type  categorised  as  both  'splendid  shelters'  and  'great 
palaces' are already familiar to the Time Traveller. He first enters one immediately after 
he first encounters the Eloi who greet him following his arrival, and who nearly cover 
him in flowers, throwing them at him until he is almost smothered in blossom:
Then some one suggested that their plaything should be exhibited in the nearest 
building, and so I was led past the Sphinx of white marble, which had seemed to 
watch  me  all  the  while  with  a  smile  at my astonishment,  towards a vast grey 
edifice of fretted stone.467
In bringing together the behaviour of the Eloi with the imposing exterior of this building, 
with its suggestion of intricate  surfaces.  Environment and population are rendered as 
opposing  elements.  The  building  is  big,  grey,  imposing,  serious,  well  crafted  with 
patterns that suggest tradition and cultural, perhaps cosmological, significance. This is a 
point of contradiction and contrast in the overall fabric of body and space as it is woven 
through  The  Time Machine. The fretted surface is suggestive of classical architecture, 
suggesting an ornamental  pattern of horizontal  and vertical lines requiring great skill, 
patience and strength to produce, qualities all lacking in the trivially playful Eloi.
Upon entering  it,  the Time Traveller emphasis the  scale of this  building,  and 
again,  there is a clearly defined contrast made  between architecture and the  physical 
bearing of its inhabitants:
228The building had a huge entry, and was altogether of colossal dimensions. I was 
naturally most occupied with the growing crowd of little people, and with the big 
open portals that yawned before me, shadowy and mysterious.468
There is a hint, in these big open portals, of the horror of interior space, as it is to be 
manifested later as the landscape of 802,701  unfolds further to encompass not only the 
appearance  of  decadent  triumph,  but  the  subterranean  and  shadowy  realm  of  the 
Morlocks. This is not to be realised in this vast palace, however.  Rather, the sense of 
interior and exterior suggested by these portals is illusory and misleading. Instead, there 
is a building in which the distinctions between outside and in seem to be less than stable:
My general impression of the world I saw over their heads was of a tangled waste 
of beautiful bushes and flowers, a long-neglected and yet weedless garden. I saw 
a number of tall spikes of strange white flowers, measuring a foot perhaps across 
the spread of waxen petals.469
The too-perfect foliage of the outside landscape has come to dominate the architectural 
space of the entrance. However, the forms of this fauna seem strangely architectural in 
themselves. While the building has in a sense opened itself up to the world outside, these 
plants  themselves  take  on  qualities  of  architecture.  This  is  not,  therefore,  a 
straightforward  rupturing  of  boundaries,  but  a  profound  interrogation  of their  very 
possibility in the material world of The Time Machine.
The thoughts of the Time Traveller are also elsewhere, linking him to the outside 
of the building. He refrains from examining these structural plants in detail, as he is still 
bound by preoccupied concern to the lawn on which he arrived:
They grew scattered, as if wild, among the variegated shrubs, but, as I say, I did 
not examine them closely at this time. The Time Machine was left deserted on the 
turf among the rhododendrons 470
229The mysterious plants inside are arranged against the ones that surround the machine, 
which he is able to name with quotidian familiarity. As he passes through the doorway 
into the interior of the building, the carvings around the entrance are damaged through 
decay, neglect and perhaps vandalism. Weather worn,4 7 1  this entrance is polluted by the 
exterior environment. The entrance is also used as a point of contrast between the Eloi 
and their communal space. Their tiny bodies are lost in 'a melodious whirl of laughter and 
laughing speech'472 that seems to defy the age and scale of this ruin.
The interior is not sealed, nor is it flooded with radiant sunlight.473 It is not pure. 
Rather  it  comes  through  windows  that  are  either  open  to the  outside,  or still  retain 
coloured glass that taints and pollutes the sun. This quality of light determines the overall 
impression that the Time Traveller makes of this space:
And  perhaps  the  thing  that  struck  me  the  most  was  its  dilapidated  look.  The 
stained-glass windows, which displayed only a geometrical pattern, were broken 
in many places, and the curtains that hung across the lower end were thick with 
dust.  And  it caught  my  eye  that the corner of the  marble  table  near me  was 
fractured. Nevertheless, the general effect was extremely rich and picturesque.474
The picturesque effect is suggestive of both a gothic taste for ruins, structures which are 
unable to maintain boundaries of interior and exterior, and a mirroring of the exterior 
scenes of pictorial landscape.
The  details  of the  inside  of this  building  are  described  not  only  in  terms  of 
elements  of  recognisable  familiarity,  but  also  a  sustained  sense  of  alterity.  These 
pronounced  oddities  are  indications  of  civilizations  that  are  not  that  of  the  Time 
Traveller,  or  those  that  preceded  his  own.  There  is  both  analogy  and  strangeness, 
allowing for comparison and differentiation.
The floor was made up of huge blocks of some very hard white metal, not plates 
nor slabs - blocks, and it was so much worn, as I judged by the going to and fro of 
past generations, as to be deeply channelled along the more frequented ways.475
230This material allows for the destructive and indexical presence of the bodies of the Eloi 
upon this interior space, suggesting their repetitive routines over a prolonged duration. 
One of the most striking and perhaps  significant differences  is one that relates to an 
ongoing thematic appearance of domestic material culture - the chair.
Traverse to the length were innumerable tables made of slabs of polished stone, 
raised, perhaps a foot from the floor and upon these were heaps of fruits (....) 
Between the tables was scattered a great number of cushions.476
These cushions and long tables are the sites of communal meals of unknown varieties of 
fruit. This is a proposed material and social reality of a social utopia, which in his initial 
misinterpretation, the Time Traveller takes this as a failed example of, and around which, 
the chairs in the Time Traveller’s home had suggested a discursive role. The absence of 
chairs  in  these  interior  spaces  is  perhaps  suggestive  of  the  end  of  such  hopeful 
aspirations.
This building takes on an additional dimension when the Time Traveller returns 
later that night. He has just made the traumatic discovery that his machine has gone, and 
all  is  now  different,  dominated  by  physical  sensations  and  a  new  found  bodily 
vulnerability within this alien environment. Even the White Sphinx has taken on a new 
appearance and aspect in the light of the empty space where the machine  should  be, 
appearing  as  shining  white,  leprous  and  seeming  to  smile  in  mockery  at  the  Time 
Traveller’s dismay. It is difficult to envisage this face that is both shining and white, as 
well as somehow discoloured or disfigured to the extent that it could be described as 
leprous.  Nevertheless,  it signals a transformation of the Time Traveller's situation, his 
bodily condition, and the subjectively rendered spatial environment. In a state of frenzy, 
he returns to the ruined palace:
The big hall was dark, silent, and deserted. I slipped on the uneven floor, and fell 
over one of the malachite tables, almost breaking my shin.477
231The floor and tables describe earlier now  become hindrances, even causes of physical 
injury, to the Time Traveller in this state.  Both he and this interior space have entered 
into a new state.
By  night,  which  metaphorically  mirrors  the  change  in  the  Time  Traveller's 
physical and psychic predicament, the building is changed in as much as he is able to 
encounter it. Stability and certainty are severely eroded in this change. This shift is one 
that  is  more  accurate  in  its  colouring  of the  Time  Traveller's  impressions,  and  the 
presence of the built environment in The Time Machine. The living palaces, as the Time 
Traveller describes them, are significant in his speculative analysis of this future world. 
That all the buildings he encounters on the surface, with the exception of the Palace of 
Green  Porcelain,  are  set  aside  for  eating,  sleeping  and  leisure,  is  something  of  a 
conundrum. He can find no evidence of machinery or appliances of production:
Yet these people were clothed in pleasant fabrics that must at times need renewal, 
and  their  sandals,  though  undecorated,  were  fairly  complex  specimens  of 
metalwork. Somehow such things must be made. And the little people displayed 
no vestige of a creative tendency. There were no shops, no workshops, no sign of 
importations among them.478
That there is  no indication of any  structures or machinery that might account for the 
sophistication of these material artefacts is reflected in the visible patterns of behaviour 
that the Time Traveller is able to observe amongst the Eloi. They appear to spend all their 
time engaged in playing, bathing, eating fruit or 'making love in a half-playful fashion'479 
It is impossible for the Time Traveller to make sense of this order of things, or of how it 
can be sustained.
This state of confusion is shortlived, in that it changes upon degrees of evidence 
and complexity of speculation, but ultimately is never fully resolved. He describes his 
confusion in two interesting ways. The first is through analogy. While confessing to a 
broad ignorance of many practical details of his own society, such as drains and modes of 
conveyance, the Time Traveller provides a comparison of his experience of 802,701, as
232one that would be even more alien than the experience of an African, who had never left 
home, finding themselves in London:
In some of these visions of Utopias and coming times which I have read, there is a 
vast amount of detail about building, and social arrangements, and so forth. But 
while such details are easy enough to obtain when the whole world is contained in 
one's imagination, they are altogether inaccessible to a real traveller amid such 
realities as I found here. Conceive the tale of London which a negro, fresh from 
Central  Africa,  would take back to his tribe!  What would  he  know  of railway 
companies, of social movements, of telephone and telegraph wires, of the Parcels 
Delivery Company, and postal  orders and the like? Yet we, at least, should be 
willing enough to explain these things to him!480
In part, this vagueness could be interpreted as a practical necessity. In this way, it is an 
extension of the understanding of the time machine as something that must be elusive in 
descriptive detail, as it cannot be overly determined and retain its fantastical credibility.
Yet  it  is  also  the  qualitative  connotation  of this  analogy  that  stands  out  as 
significant, that this is a world that through its distance and alterity can never be fully 
known or understood. It resists certainty of definition through its very nature as one that 
is ultimately divorced from the means to describe it adequately. It is too far distant from 
frameworks of interpretative knowledge that the Time Traveller might be able to wrap 
around it. In continuing his analogy, the Time Traveller suggests that even if what this 
hypothetical observer from Africa were to have the sights before him explained, it would 
be inconceivably alien to his untravelled friend: Then, think how narrow the gap between 
a negro and a white man of our own times, and how wide the interval between myself and 
these of the Golden Age!*4 8 1  The other summary of his confusion is given through another 
analogy, this time with the form and structure of text and its relationships to meaning and 
sense:
I felt I lacked a clue. I felt -  how shall I put it? Suppose you found an inscription, 
with  sentences  here,  and  there  in  excellent  plain  English,  and  interpolated
233therewith,  others  made  up  of  words,  of  letters  even,  absolutely  unknown  to
you?482
This account of incomplete and fragmentary text can be read as more wide ranging in its 
implications, beyond the analogy with the extreme alterity of the world discovered by the 
Time Traveller.  Rather, it can be used to shed some light on the novel and its current 
interpretation as a material world. Wells is providing a concrete analogy of the material 
world of 802,701, with text. Perhaps in this description is encoded something of both the 
very interpretative methodology which is applied to the novel through this very specific 
reading, and simultaneously, the suggested presence of textual manifestations of material 
culture that the novel itself produces.
The  Time  Traveller,  through  the  presence  of  air  currents  and  sounds  that 
suggested the workings of industrial scale machinery,483 associates the odd wells with tall 
towers  that  punctuate  the  landscape.  Above  these  towers  can  be  seen  an  effect  of 
flickering motion, similar to that visible on a hot day above the surface of a beach. The 
wells and towers are, he concludes during the early part of his visit, possibly part of a 
huge  system of underground  ventilation.  He  is able to briefly  sustain this  misguided 
interpretation both through the ignorance of what such a system might actually be used 
for in this environment, and through the ignorance of such structures and services within 
his  own  temporal  and  geographic  context.  His journey  towards  a  greater degree  of 
enlightenment on the matter takes place at a point of stark contrast between the world of 
light on the surface, the world of the Eloi, and the darkness below hinted at by the great 
shafts that penetrate the landscape. On what he estimates as his fourth morning in this 
era,  the Time Traveller seeks  shelter from the  heat that characterises  the climate  of 
futurity in the shade of 'colossal ruin' not far from the great hall in which he and the Eloi 
sleep and eat:
Clambering among these heaps of masonry, I found a narrow gallery, whose end 
and side windows were blocked by fallen masses of stone. By contrast with the 
brilliancy outside, it seemed at first impenetrably dark to me.484
234Despite the brilliant sunlight that bathes the daylight world, within it is this gallery of 
shadows, the very darkness of which suggests a negative cut of space within space, the 
intervention of one zone into another.
This is more than a division between two distinct areas, one light and one dark. 
Rather it suggests the complex spatial modelling in The  Time Machine as one of folds 
and simultaneities, as well as contrasts. Entering into this space has a disorientating effect 
on the Time Traveller: 'I entered it groping, for the change from light to blackness made 
spots of colour swim before me.*485 Uncertainty manifests itself as a form of temporary 
blindness and visual confusion, marking the transgression of an unstable and permeable 
boundary.  It  is  within  this  space  of confusion  that the Time  Traveller encounters  a 
Morlock at close range for the first time.  Yet he is not greeted by another corporeal, 
embodied subject, or even a fully constituted animal. Rather he is confronted by a pair of 
eyes watching out of the darkness. The Time Traveller is rooted to the spot, filled with 
animalistic dread as if a hunted beast, by nothing but a pair of 'glaring eyeballs'. The eyes 
appear to glow, as if generating their own source of illumination, but actually reflect the 
bright sunlight from outside. This space is made not only analogous to, but materially 
implicated in,  the  degenerate  erasure of humanity as a  stable embodied  subject.  The 
abhuman qualities of the predatory Morlock as it spies upon the Time Traveller are fused 
with this darkened cut in the landscape.
This  pair of eyes,  embodied  within the formless dark,  offers  a clue  as to  the 
textual  riddle of this landscape. The Time Traveller has observed within the apparent 
security of the world of the Eloi a conspicuous terror regarding their attitude towards the 
dark.  In order to pursue this line of investigation, he speaks and reaches out into the 
darkness with his hand, overcoming his own terror to do so. As he does so, the eyes can 
be seen darting to one side, and he sees a Morlock run across the sunlit space behind him 
and disappear inside the shadows formed beneath some ruined masonry. Following the 
ape-like creature into the shadows, the Time Traveller is unable to find it again, but does 
come across another of the openings that he thought of as wells, half hidden beneath a 
collapsed pillar. This leads him to the consider the possibility that the creature might have 
vanished into the shaft:
235I lit a match, and, looking down, 1  saw a small, white moving creature, with large 
bright eyes which regarded me steadfastly as it retreated. It made me shudder. It 
was so like a human spider! It was clambering down the wall, and now I saw for 
the first time a number of metal foot- and hand-rests forming a kind of ladder 
down the shaft. Then the light burned my fingers and fell out of my hand, going 
out as it dropped, and when I had lit another the little monster had disappeared.486
This sight is enough to lead the Time Traveller to a new understanding of the conditions 
of this spatial environment as a social order. He deduces that humanity was not present as 
a  single species,  but as two. An answer to the economic impossibilities of this age is 
suggested after thinking of the system of ventilation he had described earlier.
The features of this degenerate heir of humanity suggest a subterranean existence, 
its  bleached  look suggestive of animals that live in the dark,  its  large  reflective  eyes 
common to nocturnal creatures. Its physiology has been shaped by successive generations 
living away from the sunlit world of the surface. The Time Traveller guesses that beneath 
his feet must lie a tunnelled habitat, as extensive as the range of ubiquitous shafts that 
were  present  in  all  the  terrain  he  had  surveyed.  Although  falling  short  of the  final 
realisations of their relationship, he likens this situation as one that proceeds from the 
problematic  conditions  of his  own  age,  specifically  concerning  the  social  difference 
between Capitalist and Labourer:
There is a tendency to utilize underground space for the less ornamental purposes 
of civilization; there is the Metropolitan Railway in London, for instance, there 
are new electric railways, there are subways, there are underground workrooms 
and  restaurants,  and  they  increase  and  multiply.  Evidently,  I  thought,  this 
tendency had increased till Industry had gradually lost its birthright in the sky. I 
mean that it had gone deeper and deeper into larger and ever larger underground 
factories, spending a still  increasing amount of time therein, till,  in the end -  ! 
Even  now,  does  not  an  East  End  worker  live  in  such  artificial  conditions  as 
practically to be cut off from the natural surface of the earth?487
236In  this  he  maps  out  the  modern  city  according  the  lines  of division  that  define  the 
exaggerated emphasis of 802,701. This is an extreme form of both habitus and distinction 
as described by Bourdieu. Architectural space, matching the distortions of the body, acts 
as a literal manifestation of habitus as an unconscious set of dispositions that structures 
social interaction and behaviour, and this differentiation of spatial environment serves to 
separate the Morlocks and keep them distinct from the Eloi.  However, their common 
ancestry implies the impossibility of sustaining any concrete distinction between them, a 
fact that increases the horrific effect within the narrative of their cannibalism.
The dark world of the Morlocks is one that is impassable to the Eloi. To even 
approach  its  boundary  is  a  cause  of  debilitating  fear.  In  order  to  acquire  a  better 
understanding of this world, and primarily to further his cause of recovering his machine, 
the Time Traveller must transgress this most fundamental of Eloi taboos. He enters it by 
climbing down the rungs that line the interiors of the well-like shafts that penetrate the 
dividing ground between the two worlds. As he descends into the profoundly dark world 
of  the  Morlocks,  the  sounds  of  machinery  that  he  had  heard  earlier  increase 
incrementally, growing louder and more oppressive, as the aperture through which he 
entered becomes but a little disk of light in the gloom. The sound of machinery grows 
even louder as the Time Traveller moves along a tunnel leading from the shaft:
Presently the walls fell  away from me, and I came to a large open  space, and, 
striking  another  match,  saw  that  I  had  entered  a  vast  arched  cavern,  which 
stretched into utter darkness beyond the range of my light. The view 1  had of it 
was as much as one could see in the burning of a match.488
The space of the darkness is one that is defined by the illumination of a match, shaped by 
the rudimentary light source, defined as a material form by the smallest of flame, as an 
indistinct  and  unstable  apparition.  The  weakness  of  appearance  is  matched  by  an 
insufficiency of memory:
Necessarily my memory is vague. Great shapes like big machines rose out of the 
dimness,  and  cast  grotesque  black  shadows,  in  which  dim  spectral  Morlocks
237sheltered from the glare. The place, by the by, was very stuffy and oppressive, and 
the faint halitus freshly shed blood was in the air.489
The textual  presence of the Morlocks’ environment resists accurate constitution, as the 
Time Traveller is unable to mnemonically constitute it in any detail. It is instead rendered 
as an environment of uncertainty.
A  photographic record of this Under-world, as the Time Traveller describes it, 
would have partially addressed this problem and rendered it in the harsh light of clear and 
unambiguous  certainty:  ’If only  I  had  though  of a  Kodak!  I  could  have  flashed  that 
glimpse  of the  Under-world  in  a second, and  examined it at leisure.*490 Yet there is a 
definite and clear resistance to this possibility. Wells has given us an explorer who was 
singularly unprepared for his expedition. He brings nothing with him in terms of supplies 
or equipment:
1  have thought since how particularly ill-equipped 1  was for such an experience. 
When  I  had  started  with  the  Time  Machine,  I  had  started  with  the  absurd 
assumption  that the  men  of the  Future  would  certainly  be  infinitely  ahead  of 
ourselves  in  all  their appliances.  I  had  come  without arms,  without medicine, 
without anything to smoke -  at times I missed tobacco frightfully!4 9 1
That he even has matches is nothing but luck, and he certainly does not bring enough for 
his needs. He runs out quickly, and it is only through improbable good fortune that he 
discovers more in the Palace of Green Porcelain. What he is able to discern is indistinct: 
'the heavy smell, the big unmeaning shapes, the obscene figures lurking in the shadows, 
and only waiting for the darkness to come at me again!' It is the smell of blood, described 
as  a  halitus,  that is  perhaps  the  most significant  single  element within  this  world  of 
subterranean, and moral, darkness. It is the final clue to understanding the world in which 
he finds himself.
The space of the Morlocks reflects the darkness of the first night that the Time 
Traveller spends in 802,701. It is that emphasises physicality and vulnerability, but also a 
sense of threatening uncertainty. All this is characterised by the overwhelming presence
238of darkness. Yet the smell, and limited light, offer a glimpse of something that the Time 
Traveller is not able to make sense of within the social context of this world until later, 
when he returns to the surface. It happens at night, as the moon is on the wane, and as he 
considers the Eloi's abject fear of darkness. When in their caverns, he sees something that 
must be Morlock food:
Some way down the central vista was a little table of white metal, laid with what 
seemed a meal. The Morlocks at any rate were carnivorous!  Even at the time, I 
remember wondering what large animal could have survived to furnish the red 
joint I saw.492
In  the  conditions of uncertainty,  the  indistinct qualities  of this  visual  impression  are 
sustained by his inability to reach his final conclusion until he speculates on the matter 
further.  The food  laid  out for the  Eloi,  their care,  feeding and  maintenance  suggests 
nothing more than the rearing of Eloi as cattle, for consumption by the Morlocks. This 
realisation is one that ultimately comes to define his view of 802,701, shaping models of 
interpretative  social  theory and that determines the  relative  interpretative  readings  of 
space,  architecture  and  social  structure.  Yet  the  material  environment  still  retains  a 
complex and contradictory character. The contrasts and contradictions are reflected in the 
polarisation of this world into different spatial zones, of interior and exterior, light and 
dark. Yet it is the nature of space in the novel that although such opposing contrasts exist, 
their differentiation can never be sustained.
Similarly, it has been useful to divide this reading of The Time Machine in terms 
of the thematic categories employed in the chapter structure. Yet the forms of materiality 
and  material  culture discussed are hard to contain  within discrete  partitions, and  it is 
therefore necessary to acknowledge that the novel is comprised of a set of overlapping 
planes, and to suggest the generative properties of the dense strata that they form. There 
are two descriptive tendencies that I  would  like  to suggest,  in  their multifaceted  and 
varied  manifestations,  saturate the presence of materiality and  material culture in this 
novel:  degeneration and uncertainty. As well as characterising the qualities of space in 
the  novel,  they  colour and  shape  Wells's entire,  insistently  concrete,  material  reality,
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set up by these solid, yet peculiarly unstable constellations, allow these forces to seep in 
and determine this fictional reality.
Degeneration  is  perhaps the  more obvious tendency to  identify.  It is a clearly 
defined and explicitly modelled theme within the diegetic horizon of the novel and the 
details of its consistency.  It refers not only to the transformations of bodies and social 
structure, but to time and space, from the most domestic and magnified of scales to size 
and scope of the cosmological, determining the fate of the solar system. Uncertainty is a 
form that refers to the abhuman as a loosely defined literary tendency, that is to be found 
exemplified within the tradition of fin-de-siecle gothic. It is literally embodied by the 
notion of the abhuman, as bodily forms that are never quite human, slipping away from 
any form of definitive or recognisable categorisation. Flesh becomes an amorphous and 
threatening  form.  Yet  the  inconfinability  of  uncertainty  within  The  Time  Machine 
explodes the formless threat of the abhuman into every molecule of this material world. 
Despite  Wells's  concrete  reality  as  the  bedrock  upon  which  engaged  interest  in  the 
narrative must depend, the novel is saturated by uncertainty.
The Time Traveller himself is at one stage in so much doubt about the veracity of 
his own story that he needs to return to his time machine, to look upon its signs of wear 
and damage, to touch  it as if this physical  contact is the only proof of certainty.  The 
veracity of this stoiy for Hillyer and the other guests is not of any real substance at the 
time of its telling, yet there is an inconsistency that threatens to undermine that solidity of 
their dismissal - the peculiar flowers brought back from the future:
‘It’s a curious thing,’  said the Medical  Man;  ‘but I certainly don’t know 
the natural order of these flowers. May I have them?’
The Time Traveller hesitated. Then suddenly: ‘Certainly not.’
‘Where did you really get them?’ said the Medical Man.
The Time Traveller put his hand to his head. He spoke like one who was 
trying to keep hold of an idea that eluded him. ‘They were put into my pocket by 
Weena, when I travelled into Time.’ He stared round the room.  ‘I’m damned if it
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for my memory.4 9 3
These flowers are the last image in the novel, standing in for the absent Time Traveller, 
who's fate is one of indeterminacy:
It may  be that he swept back into the past, and fell among the blood-drinking, 
hairy savages of the Age of Unpolished Stone; into the abysses of the Cretaceous 
Sea; or among the grotesque saurians, the huge reptilian  brutes of the Jurassic 
times.  He  may  even  now  -  if I  may  use  the  phrase -  be  wandering  on  some 
plesiosaurus-haunted Oolitic coral  reef, or beside the lonely  saline lakes of the 
Triassic Age. Or did he go forward, into one of the nearer ages, in which men are 
still  men,  but  with  the  riddles  of our  own  time  answered  and  its  wearisome 
problems  solved?  (...) And  I  have  by  me,  for my  comfort, two  strange  white 
flowers -  shrivelled now, and brown and flat and brittle -  to witness that even 
when mind and strength had gone, gratitude and a mutual tenderness still lived on 
in the heart of man.494
Despite the definitive uncertainty that is the Time Traveller's fate, dissolved from the 
realm of what is concrete and certain through this act of temporal distortion, the flowers 
still hold some form of hope for humanity, as gestures of Weena's gratitude and affection.
The fate of the Time Traveller is not revealed, but Hillyer’s role as witness to his 
final disappearance implicates another in what may well be the imaginary experience of a 
single subject within the logic of the narrative. Returning to the Time Traveller's home, 
Hillyer encounters him in the smoking room of the laboratory. The Time Traveller tells 
the outer narrator that he is terribly busy, with the machine. The Time Traveller carries a 
camera and a knapsack, as if preparing for a journey, and Hillyer confronts him directly 
about whether or not he and the other guests have been subject to an elaborate prank, or 
witnesses to something remarkable:
‘But is it not some hoax?’ I said. ‘Do you really travel through time?’
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At this act of confirmation, which is no more reassuring in its veracity than any other 
fragment of the Time Traveller's yam, Hillyer is asked to wait. The Time Traveller tells 
him that he only wants half an hour in order to return with irrefutable evidence, to bring 
back physical proof. He makes a promise to provide material evidence of his ability to 
travel through time. In promising to return, he is manifesting a performative speech act, 
making language solid, embodied, and tied to the future presentation of some thing from 
another era. The request to Hillyer is both fantastic, to wait for him to return from a trip 
in time, and yet banal. It is a request to wait for half an hour, read some magazines that 
the Time Traveller has lying about his home, and then stop for lunch. In their exchange, 
there  is an  agreement to  provide  proof and certainty of the Time Traveller's  story,  a 
contract that despite the intimate face-to-face, eye-to-eye presence of the encounter, is 
never to be fulfilled. The promise is one of an eradication of uncertainty, to do the most 
obvious  thing,  prove  outright  the  veracity  of  his  claim  with  a  specimen  that  is 
undoubtedly  an  outrageous  anachronism.  It  is  to  be  a  promise  that  cannot  be  kept 
unbroken, for reasons that are left as forever unanswerable and unresolved.
However, Hiller is able to witness and perhaps verify all that he has been told 
through the experiencing of something so peculiar that there can be no other description 
of reality to account for it. He agrees to wait for the Time Traveller, but then remembers 
a  previous  appointment  -  reminded  by  so  trivial  a  detail  as  an  advertisement  in  a 
newspaper - and so enters the closed room housing the time machine that he might tell 
the Time Traveller, make his apologies and then leave:
As I took hold of the handle of the door I heard an exclamation, oddly truncated at 
the end, and a click and a thud. A gust of air whirled round me as I opened the 
door, and from within came the sound of broken glass falling on the floor. The 
Time Traveller was not there. I seemed to see a ghostly, indistinct figure sitting in 
a whirling mass of black and brass for a moment - a figure so transparent that the 
bench  behind  with  its  sheets  of  drawings  was  absolutely  distinct;  but  this
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subsiding stir of dust, the further end of the laboratory was empty.496
Despite visual evidence, and the sensation of a gust of air, and strange sounds, he is not 
clear about what he has seen:
1  felt an unreasonable amazement. 1  knew that something strange had happened, 
and for the moment could not distinguish what the strange thing might be.1 4 9 7
This is both evidence of the tale's veracity, and further mystery; yet more perplexing and 
irresolvable uncertainty. Even the reality of this fantastic story cannot be one of concrete 
and definite knowledge, even when witnessed as a material disappearance.
This disappearance, which is already present in the text -  Hillyer is witnessed by 
the Time Traveller acting as witness in the Time Traveller’s original return498 - is one that 
finds no resolution, no explanation beyond the outer narrator's emotive speculation. If it 
is  a  death,  it  is  one  of a  kind  that  is  immaterial,  or  dematerialised.  It  is  perhaps  a 
reconfiguring of death as a status that is not finite, bodily, or ritualised in any material 
form. It is simply an ambiguously defined state of ceasing to be, or rather ceasing to be 
present,  visible,  tangible or answerable to phenomenally accessible  verification.  The 
Time Traveller's disappearance, or dematerialised death, is striking and peculiar within 
the context of the  1890s, which as A.N. Wilson points out, was the Golden Age of the 
Victorian funeral and the elaborate material and social trappings of death. Complexity 
and  grandeur  of ceremony  and  materiality,  which  today  would  appear excessive  to 
commemorate the passing of a head of state, were not out of place when burying a doctor 
or even a grocer. Rather, such qualities were matters of routine:
The hearse would be a glass coach groaning with flowers, but smothered in sable 
and crepe. Four or six horses nodding with black plumes would lead the cortege, 
preceded by paid mutes who, swathed in black shawls and with drapes over their 
tall  silk  hats,  make  an  alarming  spectacle to the  modem  eye:  medieval  Spain 
could hardly produce images more macabre. Behind the coffin in their carriages
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and tall silk hats and black gloves and bonnets - all a tribute to how much money 
the mourners had, and how highly they considered themselves to have climbed in 
the  ladder-game class-system created  by  democratic  capitalism.  The  more  the 
funeral became a social status system, the more in turn it grew to be big business, 
with many undertakers in the larger cities becoming people of substance on the 
strength of it.499
This material excess of objects shaped and deployed into a formalised act of ritualising 
death as both finality of ending, and sustaining of cultural continuity, is conspicuously 
absent  in  The  Time  Machine.  Instead,  death  is  rendered  as  an  ultimate  state  of an 
uncertainty.  Instead  of  materialised  ritual,  death  -  perhaps  the  only  certainty  -  is 
transformed into an act of waiting, one that is never to be resolved or completed.
Death as a generative focus of material culture, as the end of the embodied subject 
as a material form, is excised from the landscape of the text. This uncertain end of the 
Time Traveller is not unique in The Time Machine. His fate mirrors that of Weena, who 
also disappears, presumed dead, but whose ultimate fate is one that provides no evidence 
of certainty. Through her fear of the Morlocks, she enters an immobile state, motionless 
and  scarcely  breathing.500 She is severed from the stable conditions of embodied 
subjectivity and left without even a constituent framework to define whether or not she 
lives, or what has happened to her.  It starts by an eradication of her resemblance to a 
human,  or at least her recognisability  as  a descendent of late-Victorian  subjects.  Her 
condition  increases  in  severity  in  its  resemblance of death,  until,  as  the  night  burns 
around the Time Traveller, she vanishes in what seems like  some contagious form of 
uncertainty that surrounds Weena's body, a miasma of confusion and indeterminacy.5 0 1
Death works here as a process of dematerialisation. It acts in stages upon bodies, 
until  they  are  simply  gone.  Yet bodies are  not just uncertain forms  within  The  Time 
Machine, but ones that oscillate in changeable states of mutative possibility. Nor is this 
quality  restricted to corporeal  and  anatomically  defined forms,  but instead applies to 
materiality as a field of equivalence. Part of what characterises this sense of uncertainty is 
that while, for example, bodies might be rendered in death through their dematerialization
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physical, vulnerable, destructive. The rendering of materiality is never reductive in the 
novel,  rather  it  appears  generative  and  full  of  multifarious  states  and  suggested 
becomings.  This  sense  of  instability  and  varied  transformation  lends  itself  to  the 
perpetuation of uncertainty in its more pronounced manifestations, to pollute and colour 
the entire fabric of the novel. The erasure of definitive spatial and temporal boundaries is 
the realisation of this dominant tendency.
The cloak of uncertainty  is perhaps most strikingly suggested in regard to this 
indistinct differentiation inside of the Palace of Green Porcelain, as the Time Traveller, 
preoccupied by his exploration of the buildings interior and contents, fails to realise that 
he has transgressed a subtly rendered border:
Suddenly Weena came very close to my side.  So suddenly that she startled me. 
Had it not been for her I do not think I should have noticed that the floor of the 
gallery sloped at all. The end 1  had come in at was quite above ground, and was lit 
by  rare  slit-like  windows.  As you  went down the  length,  the  ground came  up 
against these windows,  until  at last there was a pit like the  ‘area’  of a London 
house before each, and only a narrow line of daylight at the top.  I went slowly 
along, puzzling about the machines, and had been too intent upon them to notice 
the gradual diminution of the light, until Weena's increasing apprehensions drew 
my attention. Then I saw that the gallery ran down at last into a thick darkness. I 
hesitated, and then, as I looked round me, 1  saw that the dust was less abundant 
and its surface less even.  Further away towards the dimness,  it appeared to be 
broken by a number of small narrow footprints.502
One form of vague uncertainty in the mind of Time Traveller is rapidly displaced by the 
sudden and sharp awareness of the indistinct, yet very real and dangerous boundary that 
he has transgressed, moving from one interior as it gradually shifted into that of another - 
the Morlock realm. Uncertainty appears within the all of the various spatial and temporal 
zones of The Time Machine. It is there from the Time Traveller's home to the most distant 
point in time that we are privy to in the his chronic exploits. It is not a benign presence,
245but  one  of  threat.  The  threat  is  to  certainty  in  the  form  of a  stability  of  not  only 
knowledge, but a stable, embodied subjectivity.  It is a threat to being, and the stability 
necessary to sustain existence.
This manifest quality coalesces as the Time Traveller travels away from 802,701. 
the Time Traveller describes the process of time travel in terms of a journey of ‘indefinite 
time’ during which he clings to the swaying and vibrating machine.503 He is surprised to 
realise that he has pushed the operating levers forward, rather than pulled the back. These 
positions are analogues of the direction  in which the machine travels.  In this  state of 
confusion, he has ended up not only going in the wrong direction, but has gone so far as 
to enter into an age of both further ambiguity, and new, hitherto unimagined terror. Yet 
the journey itself is to reveal something of the change that he will witness in the era of 
distant futurity. As he is travelling considerably faster than on his previous temporal leap, 
he is not initially able to discern the transitional effect of night and day. Yet ‘the blinking 
succession of day and night’504 returns and becomes more marked, as does the slowness 
of the sun passing across the sky. Confusion gives way to a deduced conclusion as this 
effect becomes cumulatively more pronounced until there is left little doubt as to what the 
Time Traveller is witnessing. Before he has even come to a stop, the sun appears static 
before him, no longer rising or setting, signifying the degenerative end of the earth's axial 
rotation as it moves towards entropy and ultimately destruction.
This  resolution  of  ambiguity  and  uncertainty  is  gloomily  pessimistic,  and 
evocative of a more-than  sublime terror. The living creatures that the Time Traveller 
encounters here, on the desolate beach looking out onto a sea with no waves, only an oily 
swell, are terrible apparitions to the Time Traveller:
Far away up the desolate slope I heard a harsh scream, and saw a thing like a huge 
white butterfly go slanting and fluttering up into the sky and, circling, disappear 
over  some  low  hillocks  beyond.  The  sound  of its  voice  was  so  dismal  that  I 
shivered and seated myself more firmly upon the machine.505
While this creature is monstrous and terrifying, it is not necessarily characterised by the 
pervasive sense of uncertainty that I would like to suggest permeates and dominates the
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encounters in this distant futurity:
Looking round me again, I saw that, quite near, what I had taken to be a reddish 
mass of rock was moving slowly towards me. Then I saw the thing was really a 
monstrous crab-like creature. Can you imagine a crab as large as yonder table, 
with its many legs moving slowly and uncertainly, its big claws swaying, its long 
antennae, like carters’ whips, waving and feeling, and its stalked eyes gleaming at 
you on either side of its metallic front?506
What  makes  this  monstrous  crab-like  creature  more  disturbing  is  not  merely  its 
outlandish form, but that it was at first mistaken for a rock. It’s status as a living thing 
was not even suggested, part of the landscape until it was revealed to be a grotesque and 
potentially deadly animal.
The Time Traveller is, at least from his perspective, attacked by these creatures of 
extreme alterity. However, his highly subjective and fearful take on the situation is one 
that could be a combination of misunderstanding and sheer revulsion:
As I stared at this sinister apparition crawling towards me, I felt a tickling on my 
cheek as though a fly had lighted there. I tried to brush it away with my hand, but 
in a moment it returned, and almost immediately came another by my ear. I struck 
at this and caught something threadlike.  It was drawn swiftly out of my hand. 
With a frightful qualm, I turned, and saw that I had grasped the antenna of another 
monster crab that  stood just behind  me.  Its  evil  eyes  were  wriggling on their 
stalks, its mouth was all alive with appetite, and its vast ungainly claws, smeared 
with an algal slime, were descending upon me.507
Perhaps this is mere curiosity on the side of the crab monsters, they are approaching and 
feeling the Time Traveller in much the same way that the Eloi did soon after his arrival in 
their era. The possibility of this suggests something else disturbing in the arc of human 
devolution  in  The  Time  Machine, that perhaps these creatures are themselves  distant
247descendants of Victorian humanity. Not only is there uncertainty about whether or not 
these creatures from the earth's twilight might be actually alive, but there is also a deeply 
buried suggestion that they might in fact be abhuman forms of life - humanity's ultimate 
stage of degeneration.
The last forms of life that the Time Traveller encounters in the future are not the 
crab-like creatures that display a disconcertingly enthusiastic interest in his presence. He 
escapes them through a temporal leap forward to witness the disappearance of the sun in 
a dramatic eclipse.  It is hidden behind what could be the moon, or possibly the planet 
Mercury. This indeterminate possibility is further suggestion of the degenerative forces 
upon the planets themselves and their relative orbits. There is still evidence of life in a 
green slime upon the rocks. In looking around for further signs of life, the Time Traveller 
thinks he sees some evidentiary motion that would attest to its presence:
A shallow sandbank had appeared in the sea and the water had receded from the 
beach. I fancied I saw some black object flopping about this bank, but it became 
motionless as a I looked at it, and I judged that my eye had been deceived, and 
that the black object was merely a rock.5 0 8
The darkness, the 'rayless obscurity' of the eclipsed world heightens such uncertainty. Yet 
as  the  sun  dramatically  reappears,  there  is  a  moment  of  illumination,  and  horror. 
Illumination in the form of the sun reappearing as a ‘red-hot bow, horror in the moving 
tentacled thing, ‘the size of a football perhaps’.509 This creature is formless. It is resistant 
against  satisfying  forms  of  description.  Its  effect  upon  the  Time  Traveller  is 
overwhelming, yet perhaps this too is his descendent, an extreme form of humanity in an 
even  more degenerate form.  Humanity as an abhuman form is taken to an extreme,  a 
point at which it is barely able to sustain itself as any stable form of matter.
Embodied  in  this  formless  mass,  which  is  barely  constituted  as  a  body,  is 
humanity at its end. This end, like death in The  Time Machine, is not a clearly defined 
finality,  but  a  material  transformation  that  moves  towards  increasing  degrees  of 
instability and uncertainty. It is a destabilisation that pollutes all of the temporal zones of 
the  novel,  its  implications  rooted  within  the  material  reality  of the Time Traveller's
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cephalopodic creature that greets the Time Traveller in the far future, could be read as the 
climax  of  humanity,  or  in  Foucaultian  terms,  a  playing  out  of  the  end  of  man.  If 
humanity, described by Foucault as 'man', is an invention, then the end of its episteme is 
the end of man. It is the end of man in terms of 'the human sciences', which is of course 
inclusive  of the  anthropological  context of material  culture  itself.  In  referring to the 
human sciences, Foucault is referring to the disciplinary formation of a particular form of 
knowledge,  or  episteme.  This  epistemological  domain  was  not the  result  of a  slow, 
progressive development built over thousands of years,  but was in  Foucault's view an 
invention of eighteenth-century enlightenment and modernity, rather than an inheritance:
The epistemological field traversed by the human sciences was not laid down in 
advance: no philosophy, no political or moral option, no empirical science of any 
kind, no observation of the human body, no analysis of sensation, imagination or 
the  passions,  had  ever encountered,  in  the  seventeenth  or eighteenth  century, 
anything like  man; for man did  not exist (any  more than  life,  or language,  or 
labour).510
Humanity itself has not been a long-lived or consistent problem within fields of human 
knowledge, rather it has been a recent invention within it, at least, Foucault suggests, with 
reference  to  European  culture  since  the  sixteenth  century.  This  invention  was  made 
possible  by  changes  to  the  arrangements  of knowledge,  in  short  to  the  disciplinary 
orderings of modernity.
However, Foucault points out, as perhaps the formless cephalopod-like creature 
that flops  and  slithers  in  the  far future  also  suggests,  that  not only  is  man  a  recent 
invention, but perhaps a short lived one too. As those very arrangements of knowledge 
are but arrangements, they too might disappear:
if  some  event  of  which  we  can  at  the  moment  do  no  more  than  sense  the 
possibility - without knowing either what its form will be or what it promises - 
were to cause them to crumble, as the ground of Classical thought did, at the end
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like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea.5 1 1
Humanity  is  literally  an  object  of knowledge,  that  is  deprived  from  the  constitutive 
arrangements that define it, as they crumble and disappear. If humanity as it stands in the 
1890s  is  a  recent  invention  of  modernity,  it  is  diminished  as  the  Time  Traveller’s 
perspective  shifts further and further away along his  distant temporal  trajectory.  It is 
erased  as  a  stable  disciplinary  formation,  and  instead  reconfigured  in  excessively 
degenerate and uncertain forms. The horrific life forms on the beach could indicate the 
presence of Foucault’s theme, like a face drawn in the sand, as an idea that is played out 
through the transformative manifestations of material culture.
For Foucault, it is the arrangement of knowledge that creates man, or humanity, as 
a subject of knowledge. In The Time Machine, that arrangement of knowledge suffers a 
profound collapse. As do humans, in the most literal  sense, so that they become more 
than  abhuman.  Foucault's  notion  of  man  as  a  recent  invention  is  one  that  is  both 
dramatically thematised in the novel, through the invention and subsequent death of man, 
and also serves as a methodological understanding of the novel.  In this way, The Time 
Machine  as  a  material  world  suggests  a  qualitative  understanding  of  its  own 
interpretation. This in itself is not something suggested explicitly by Foucault, but rather 
could be read as an extreme extension of the notion of man as an object of knowledge. 
Man,  for  Foucault,  is  a  being  that  constitutes  the  representations  which  themselves 
constitute the  means of life.  This representation  is constituted from within the  social 
existence of a human being, and frames and facilitates that existence. The constitution of 
an object of knowledge in this way becomes the means to represent itself. This qualitative 
sensation is one that I would like to overlay as a lens upon the material world of The Time 
M achine,  as  an  object  of  knowledge  that  in  part  constitutes  its  own  means  of 
representation and understanding.
The prevalence of uncertainty as a destructive and threatening force is not limited 
to the embodied form of 'man', or rather the human subject as understood by the Time 
Traveller as that of his own present. The effect is one that is in part defined by the term 
abhuman. However, whereas Kelly Hurley's use of the abhuman discussed in Chapter 3
250refers to the ruination of the human subject as it is figured in the pages of gothic fiction in 
Britain  in  the  late  nineteenth  century,  its  tendencies  reach  far  beyond  anatomically 
defined bodies in the novel, and pollute its entire fabric. The spectacle of not only bodies, 
but  materiality,  is offered through  displays of matter, things,  people,  space  and  even 
temporality as metamorphic, undifferentiated, fragmented, and permeable. Uncertainty, 
together with the manifest tendencies of degeneration, as represented by the effects and 
appearances  of abhuman  bodies,  dominates  the  presence  of materiality  and  material 
culture  in  The  Time  Machine.  The  nature  of that  materiality  and  material  culture  is 
inescapably determined as text; as such all aspects of this material world are vulnerable to 
contamination by the abhuman  - a literary manifestation of social anxiety.
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In thinking through the textual nature of this material world, the role of the Time 
Traveller as a fictional character might be usefully imagined as that of an ethnographer of 
the  future,  whose  account  constitutes  the  majority  of the  novel's  text.  This  analogy 
suggests  some  further  correlation  between  text  and  material  culture.  There  are  also 
undeniable literary precedents for the Time Traveller’s form of account: Wells was keen 
to acknowledge Gulliver's Travels as an influence and perhaps seek some legitimacy in 
placing  his  scientific  romances  within  existing  traditions  of critical  fiction.  More’s 
Utopia, is also particularly formative, not just as the precedent for a utopian narrative but 
in its form. It is articulated as an account of one who has witnessed this society first hand. 
However, the contrivance of form in  Utopia is to present its narrator/author, as More 
himself,  as audience and  scriptor of a verbal  account delivered  in  person by  Raphael 
Nonsenso.  It is Nonsenso who has visited Utopia, not More. Similarly, a reader of The 
Time Machine follows Hillyer’s textual account, which itself is a recalled transcription of 
the Time Traveller’s verbal performance. The Time Traveller is just a traveller. Without 
providing  a  written  account  (or  a  visual  one)  of  his  adventure  and  the  worlds  he 
encountered first-hand, how can he be an ethnographer? These material worlds include 
speech not just as the record of conversations between protagonists  (in fact, there is no 
fully formed conversation within the Time Traveller’s account). They reconstitute with 
implausible accuracy  improbably long  spoken  accounts.  Reading Hillyer necessitates 
some  generous  positioning  on  the  part  of the  reader.  That  a  speaker  could  relate  a 
narrative with such tireless articulation and recall challenges quotidian plausibility almost 
as much as the invention of a time machine.
Similarly  impressive is the outer-narrator’s ability to remember and transcribe 
another’s  words.  We therefore  either overlook  such  matters,  or assume that this  is  a 
retroactive and necessarily flawed remembering that has been put do by the narrator with 
as much sense of immediacy as possible. Or do we imagine that, as in Henry James’s 
Turn  of the  Screw (1898),  we  are  able  to put ourselves into a  projected  situation  of 
listening to a speaker tell us the story in person? The arrangement of the narrative around
252an audience for the Time Traveller’s tale certainly holds some purchase on this notion, 
that as a reader, we are fictionalising our presence as listener. Is this an articulation of the 
motif of presence? It would seem to be, and it certainly adds a sense of dynamism and 
diegetic immersion. The reader, in their suspension of disbelief, psychically reconstitutes 
the living words of somebody to which these things have happened. The fictional writer 
(narrator) mediates or translates the excitement and immediacy of the other’s adventure.
This written presence of the written voice can be placed within modem traditions 
of reading.  Jane  Austen  wrote  in  1808  of how  her family  read  aloud  to  each  other 
frequently and regularly, and Dickens adapted his works for reading aloud for tours of 
Britain and North America. The author as live performer was a popular convention in the 
nineteenth century and Dickens was its greatest celebrity. Reading aloud was practiced in 
literary salons, and amongst an author’s friends and colleagues: Samuel Butler, the author 
of another influential utopia -  Erewhon (1872) -  advocated reading aloud as a necessary 
testing of a text:  4  I feel weak places at once when I read aloud where I thought, as long 
as I  read to myself only, that the passage was all  right.’512 There is here an affinity to 
Benjamin’s  lament  of the  excoriation  of  what  he  describes  as  'experience’  in  'The 
Storyteller’.513 Benjamin’s ‘experience’ moves from mouth to mouth, but in the early 
twentieth century has been contradicted by mechanical warfare, economic exploitation 
and moral corruption. Writing on the other side of the First World War, Wells’s narrative 
has might still assume the privilege of drawing upon this sense of experience as presence 
within its process of psychic materialisation.
Voice, presence, ethnography, suggest a complexity of textual encounter in The 
Time  Machine that might be brought into focus through  ‘The Violence of the Letter’. 
Derrida’s radical transformation of the ways in which writing might be discussed is over 
thirty  years  old  and  has  of  course  altered  the  landscapes  of  criticism  and  theory. 
However, it is of value here to look briefly at the form of his argument, in which Derrida 
reads the structuralism/structural anthropology of Levi-Strauss as phonologism. That is, 
based on contrasting  speech sounds taken as the fundamental  units of language.  It is 
therefore an epistemologically logocentric account of language. In this chapter within Of 
Grammatology, Derrida posits an archaeology of anthropology that describes it as a study 
of non-European peoples as an:
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reference to which one could outline the structure, the growth, and above all the 
degradation of our society and culture.514
Against this teleology, field-work anecdotes from Levi-Strauss are cited as witnessing the 
corruption  -  by the alien  presence of writing and ethnographer - of an  innate, almost 
animal goodness inherent within the Nambikwara of the Amazon region. Levi-Strauss’s 
own thinking is re-presented (deconstructed) in Of Grammatology as mythical, uncritical 
and bound by a logocentric binary regarding speech and writing. The Nambikwara lack, 
according to Levi-Strauss, any form of writing, or even any form of graphic sensibility 
beyond ‘a few dots and zigags on their calabashes’.515 They resemble the Eloi in that they 
are (apparently) without writing. But in the case of the Nambikwara, this is knowledge 
that as primitive forms of humanity they have yet to acquire. Whereas the Eloi have, of 
course, forgotten their use of text. Writing pre-cedes them, but it is the loss of it as text 
that permits their degeneration, despite on first appearances allowing the Time Traveller 
to imagine humanity at its peak through its Arcadian simplicity and natural harmony, a 
Rousseau-like return to a ‘zero-degree’. It might be the veiy absence of writing that, in an 
inversion  of the  yet  to  be  degraded  goodness  at  work  in  Levi-Strauss’s  a-historical 
ethnocentric fantasy of the Nambikwara, precipitates the nightmare of the future.
Yet how absent is it? That writing preceded the age of the Eloi is the suggestive 
index here. The writing of 802,701, like the writing of the Nambikwara, is arche-writing. 
It is replete with its inherent violence of difference, mirrored by more literal forms of 
brutal violence encountered as well as perpetrated by the Time Traveller. The bisection 
between  Upper  and  Lower  worlds,  the  classificatory  distinctions  between  their 
inhabitants  (and  ourselves),  and  the  stops  along the  arc  of the journey  are  prevalent 
examples of the violence of arche-writing. It is only the use of a system of appellations 
that is absent, from the Time Traveller’s actions, and almost from futurity  itself. The 
Time Traveller makes no attempts to name.  Eloi  and  Morlock are already  subject,  to 
naming. Even Weena is able to communicate her own name. There is none of the sense of 
violation that Levi-Strauss describes in the following passage:
254One day, when I was playing with a group of children, a little girl was struck by 
one  of  her  comrades.  She  ran  to  me  for  protection  and  began  to  whisper 
something, a  ‘great secret,’  in my ear.  (...) Eventually her adversary found out 
what was going on, came up to me in a rage, and tried in her turn to tell me what 
seemed to be another secret. After a while I was able to get to the bottom of the 
incident. The first little girl was trying to tell me her enemy’s name, and when the 
enemy found out what was going on she decided to tell me the other girl’s name, 
by  way  of  reprisal.  Thenceforward  it  was  easy  enough,  though  not  very 
scrupulous, to egg the children on, one against the other, till in time I knew all of 
their names.516
However,  Derrida asserts the presence of a fallacy at work here.  What functions as a 
‘proper name’ is consciousness itself. In this sense, the proper name is only a linguistico- 
social  classification,  a  designation.  The  act of war between  these  two  girls  does  not 
consist in the revealing of such designations ‘but in tearing the veil hiding a classification 
and an appurtenance, the inscription within a system of linguistico-social differences.’5 1 7  
This  is  not the desecration of an  inviolate  subjectivity  performed  in a spiteful  game. 
Instead it begins to reveal both the structure of a particular form of violence, and writing 
as its possibility. A system of differences, such as writing, or a structuralist model of a 
society, is unimaginable without the violence of inscription and separation.
Writing  as  possibility,  or  the  possibility  of  writing,  is  explicated  and 
problematised  in  Derrida’s re-constitution of the  ‘Writing Lesson’.  In this chapter of 
Tristes  Tropiques,  Levi-Strauss  tells  of how  his  own  presence  as  a  writing  subject 
amongst the Nambikwara has initiated a form of corruptive violence: As a test of their 
reaction,  Levi-Strauss  describes  distributing  paper and  pencils  amongst  his  hosts.  A 
practice that seems like something of a routine exercise for Levi-Strauss.518 After the 
passages of a few  days, they  start to produces  undulating horizontal  lines,  which  are 
interpreted as imitations of the ethnographer’s own writing:
255I wondered what they were trying to do, then it was suddenly borne upon me that 
they were writing or, to be more accurate, were trying to use their pencils in the 
same way as I did mine, which was the only way they could conceive of, because 
I had not yet tried to amuse them with my drawings.519
Their chief takes this further:
So he asked me for a writing-pad, and when we both had one, and were working 
together, if I asked for information on a given point, he did not supply it verbally 
but drew wavy lines on his paper and presented them to me, as if I could read his 
reply.520
In this story, the chief was half-fooled by his own ruse, studying his own work, with a 
look  of  disappointment  on  his  face  when  its  meaning  wasn’t  revealed.  Yet  this 
incomprehensibility is never revealed openly, and according to Levi-Strauss, there is a 
tacit understanding that there  is decipherable  meaning  in the  scribbling.  As  the  chief 
provided immediate verbal commentaries on his writings, this is an easy enough to play 
along with.
This  story  acts  a  prelude for primary  incident of the  ‘Writing  Lesson’.  Levi- 
Strauss organises a visit to a neighbouring  village,  in  order to  get a  sense  of overall 
population size by seeing another group of Nambikwara.  His hosts are uncomfortable 
with this idea, as these neighbours co-exist peacefully only with the most precarious of 
relationships. In addition to this, whites are a rare sight in the area, the last to visit having 
been  killed.  The meeting, for premise for which  will  be the  giving of gifts  by  Levi- 
Strauss’s party and some form of barter, is tense and fraught with a palpable sense of 
danger.  Upon Levi-Strauss’s urging to do so as soon as possible, the chief begins the 
process of gift exchange:
As soon as he had got the company together, he took from a basket a piece of 
paper covered  with  wavy  lines  and  made  a  show  of reading  it,  pretending  to 
hesitate as he checked on it the list of objects I was to give in exchange for the
256presents  offered  me  (...)  This  farce  went  on  for two  hours.  Was  he  perhaps 
hoping to delude himself? More probably he wanted to astonish his companions, 
to convince them that he was acting as an intermediary agent for the exchange of 
goods, that he was in alliance with the white man and shared his secrets.5 2 1
Writing has made its appearance, not as the result of learning over time, but borrowed as 
a  symbol, for a  sociological  rather than intellectual  purpose.  Its reality, it is claimed, 
remains  unknown.  It  is  not acquired  as  knowledge,  remembered  or  understood,  but 
functions as the means to increase the prestige of an individual at the exclusion and cost 
of others:  ‘A  native  still  living  in  the  Stone  Age  had  guessed  that this  great  means 
towards understanding, even if he was unable to understand it, could be made to serve 
other purposes.’522 This is contextualised by Levi-Strauss with a presence of writing 
across the world in which the majority of the member of a society are unable to practice 
it. A specific example is given of villages in eastern Pakistan where the inhabitants are 
illiterate but make use of a scribe who acts on their behalf. Writing is used ‘as if it were a 
foreign mediatory agent that they communicate with by oral methods.’5 2 3  The scribe is 
empowered,  and  often  also  acts  as  money  lender,  ‘someone  who  has  a  hold  over 
others.’524
Derrida takes the title of this chapter and preserved within finds a lesson that is 
two-fold. The first part of this double sense is a question of the learning of writing. The 
chief learns the  enslaving function  of writing  rather than  its function  as  (secondary) 
signification. The other lesson is one learned from writing, Levi-Strauss’s more general 
meditations that take the form of troubled  reflection  after the incident itself.  It is the 
presence of writing in the progressive development of mankind as a civilizing process. 
This  is  broken  down  into  two  moments  by  Derrida:  The  empirical,  phenomenally 
immediate perception of the incident, and the historic-philosophical reflection on writing 
as history and scene. But these reflections are undone by Derrida’s attention. The rapidity 
of the chief’s borrowing of writing necessitates the acknowledgement that the structures 
that make this possible already exist. As for the means of social function implicated in the 
lesson,  there  is a  problematic  opposition  between  ‘sociological’  and  ‘intellectual’.  If 
‘writing cannot be thought of outside of the horizon of intersubjective violence,’525 then
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includes speech. The voice of the Time Traveller perhaps reflects Levi-Strauss’s scornful 
insistence on writing in its most literal sense is an imaging of writing as vulgar concept, 
opposed to the praise of an illusion of speech. The mythical authenticity of presence is 
certainly at play in the narrative contrivance of the two narrators.  However, as literary 
and textual convention, it functions according to the temporal and spatial distinction of 
differance.
This  return to ‘The Writing Lesson’ is not merely some nostalgic desire to look 
once again at a form of argument that might be taken so far for granted as to have become 
somewhat  obscure  in  its  specificity  of form,  but  is  emphasised  in  that  it  evokes  a 
somewhat uncanny sense of affinity with my attempted generation of a material culture 
from a text. Firstly, the writing lesson itself takes place at a ceremony of gift exchange, 
that most profoundly influential form of binding (inter)subjectivity to objects. A brief 
genealogy of reflection upon such economies might begin with Bronislaw Malinowski’s 
Argonauts of the  Western Pacific (1922) and the construction of an institution model of 
the Kula tradition among the Trobriand islanders. This form of reciprocal gift exchange 
provided an alibi for regular and peaceful  social  contact between neighbouring social 
groups, as well as stabilising a secondary network of trade around the ceremony. Marcel 
Mauss’s Durkheimian model of social cohesion - The Gift, originally published in Annee 
Sociologique  in  1923-24 - is a further explication on exchange  in  which objects are 
indissociable from giver.  Reciprocity is inverted from structural functionalism into an 
irrational and destructive economy of excess in Bataille’s first volume of The Accursed 
Share. Together with Mauss, this shattering of an ontology of use value -  with as its core 
example the conspicuous destruction of potlatch ceremonies - finds its resonances in both 
the earlier works of Baudrillard that attempt to rethink Marxian commodity fetishism 
(System of Objects, The Consumer Society) as well as in his subsequent - and it seems 
increasingly prolific - models of a form of writing suitable for the saturated and extreme 
characteristics of seduction and simulation, transparency and evil in the post-industrial 
West.
In their Value  of Things,  discussed  earlier,  Cummings  and Lewandowska also 
draw  upon  this  tradition  of thinking  about the  gift  rather than  relying  on  a  Marxian
258opposition of use value against commodity fetishism. The gift was subsequently made the 
focus of their work, Capital (2001). The central gesture of this work was the staging of an 
act of gift giving. In an area set aside for visitors to sit, read a selection of books laid out 
on tables and admire the view across the Thames, gallery staff would select a recipient 
for the gift, presenting it with the words  ‘This is for you’. This act would be repeated 
several times a day, not only at Tate Modem,  but also across the river at the Bank of 
England Museum. The gift was a two-sided limited edition print, rolled up inside a silver- 
coloured tube with an elaborately scripted label. The print had also been displayed on the 
wall of the space in the form of two framed photographs. These showed the two ends of a 
spoon,  part  of a  silver  cutlery  service  owned  by  the  Bank  of England,  the  division 
suggestive of a split according to one side for giving and one for receiving. The gift of the 
print served as an anchoring device for the other elements of the project, which took the 
form of a seminar series and a book. The act also performed a gesture of reciprocity. An 
institution that relies on money drawn from taxation gave something back, implying the 
possible need for a subsequent act of return from the recipient.  In staging this central 
transaction within the two co-operating institutions as the central gesture of the project, 
Capital attempts to suggest the complexity of the relationships that constitute a financial 
economy and an artworld. Both institutions, it is suggested, underwrite the integrity of 
two parallel  and  immensely complicated economies,  guaranteeing value and ensuring 
stability.526 Capital, as project, and also publication, was an elegant means of implicating 
art objects within an a broader social  and material  economy, and its exploration of an 
inalienable reciprocity is echoed in more recent activities collaborating with others on 
forms of debate and practice, specifically Open Congress (2005-ongoing) that use as their 
model forms of freely available open source software.527
But not only does find an affinity to this discussion of material culture because of 
Levi-Strauss’s dramatic appearance of writing appears at a ceremony of gift exchange, 
that most profoundly influential and revealing of economies, but it leads to a division in 
the form of difference; spatial, temporal, intersubjective, material and textual, the very 
space that I am attempting to invoke in The Time Machine. Perhaps, then, the status of 
the Time Traveller as ethnographer is less clear-cut, as is the process of ethnography 
itself. He is not so in terms of any scientific method of fieldwork, but does provided an
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might help to address the disparity concerning the legitimate equivalences between the 
fictional  world  of The  Time  Machine,  and the  assumed  use of material  culture  as an 
interpretative set of conditions and ideas that make sense of the phenomenally accessible 
world of real, solid and tangible reality. This is the assumed reality of anthropological, 
archaeological and museological investigation.  It is the real world of artefacts, spatial 
environments, living, or once living subjects. To forge an equivalence necessitates some 
detachment from the rigorous specificities of disciplinary concerns. It also requires some 
liberty  in  the  interpretation  of those  disciplines,  and  their  subjective  and  contextual 
understandings of their subject matters.
However, the desire to expand the boundaries of material culture discourse comes 
from within as well as from the exterior. Anthropological thought may also be learning 
from the writing lesson. In particular, my own project can find a sympathetic resonance 
in the form of Christopher Tilley's work on relationships between material culture, text 
and  metaphor.  Tilley  is,  essentially,  making  a  general  case  for  modes  of analysing 
material culture, both in anthropological and archaeological contexts, with reference to 
text:
Material culture is  ‘written’  through a practice of spacing and differentiation in 
just the same manner as phonetic writing. Both result in the material fixation of 
meaning which, by contrast to speech, is indirectly communicated in the sense 
that I decorate a pot by dividing up the empty space of the clay or write a letter by 
inscribing marks on a blank sheet of paper and at some time in the future you read 
and interpret the visual  medium, able by virtue of the material fixation to read 
what I have produced.528
To consider text then, is to reconfigure this application of archewriting back into its more 
vulgar form of text.  It is in part a reversal of direction, from a thinking about material 
culture as text, to the conceptualising of text as material culture. But this really a case of 
taking the violence of spacing and differentiation back in words.  The  Time Machine is 
dominated, I have argued, by themes of degeneration and uncertainty. The articulation of
260these themes is carried out through an open appellation of the text as material world. The 
text announces itself as material  world. That it can be thought to do so owes much to 
Tilley’s assumptions about the relative positions of text and material culture. They share 
common qualities but equally are differentiated from speech. Text and material culture 
both  involve  transformation,  although they  are  very  different.  These transformations 
affect  spacing,  differentiation  and  articulation.  Both  are  structured  through  spatial 
ordering and distinction, and the articulation of units of difference. While there are shared 
structural  properties between text and material culture, and also speech, Tilley is also 
clear on the obviousness of difference and incompatibility:
However, as everyone knows, to make even the simplest statement such as ‘It is 
raining’  with  material  objects  would  be  rather difficult.  In fact it  would  be  a 
complete waste of time and effort.529
The meanings constituted by material culture are not communicated forms of meaning 
content in this sense.  Communicative statements through the articulations of material 
culture are  better thought of as,  at least in part,  analogous.  However, Tilley’s textual 
metaphors  are  tame.  He  recognises  a  structuralist  grammar  of  things,  and  a 
poststructuralist emphasis on metaphors of text. Yet he fails to grasp Derrida’s sense of 
writing and difference.  Language  is  ultimately  bound to a predominantly  structuralist 
understanding of it as a series of differential units. It is perhaps not too far removed from 
Levi-Strauss’s  own  phonologism.  In  a  move  beyond  this  limitation,  I  would  like  to 
extend this notion of material culture as a set of communicative properties that can exist 
outside  of the  confines  of its  artefactual,  or physical,  definitions.  A  more  complete 
recognition of the extent to which archewriting is something without discursive exterior 
would  serve  Tilley  more  fully  here,  and  allow  the  erasing  of  such  a  well-defined 
boundary  between  text  and  material  culture.  The  space  between  them  becomes 
traversable  and  bi-directional.  This  is  to  imagine  the  possibility  of  analogous 
manifestations in text taking the form of material culture, as in the ambiguously rendered 
flesh of the  Eloi, their sexually generic, neo-classical  tunics, and the ruinous halls in 
which they eat and sleep.
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and text as a site of material culture, is predicated upon the credible presence of acts of 
transformation. Such acts include the transformation of units into readable configurations, 
but also refer to the processes and frameworks of the disciplinary boundaries of material 
culture. As a discipline, the existence and identity of archaeology could be described as 
consisting of textualization. In short, this description applies to the need to conceive of 
material culture as an archaeological world through the use of language, making objects 
intelligible through their transference of transformation  into  words, as  Bjornar Olsen 
suggests:
In  short,  archaeology  is  text,  and  to  realize  that  we  participate  in  the  same 
structure  as  the  epic,  the  novel  and  the  drama  is  to  let  out  own  practice  as 
producer of this text be examined  by  the  same  procedures as those applied to 
literary texts.530
Of course,  in  this  instance,  it  is  the  literary  text  that  is  being  read  in  terms  of the 
disciplinary boundaries of archaeological investigation in the form of material culture. 
Yet within this assertion of material culture's discursive field as one that is text, is the 
possibility of the transformation of text into material culture.
Taking the transformation of a material object into meta-language and reversing 
the flow is a metaphorical proposition. As Tilley points out, both language and material 
culture are in part metaphorical constructions of the world. Metaphors could be seen as 
providing a basis for an interpretative understanding of the world. If this is conceivable in 
terms of social sciences and history, it is also, I would like to suggest, applicable to works 
of fiction. The narrative of The Time Machine is itself one that is based on metaphor. It 
works within the diegetic horizon as a series of allegorical and qualitative suggestions, of 
varying degrees of explicitness and authorial  intentionality. Yet it is also present as a 
principle of thinking about and interpreting material culture. This is the route by which 
the translation of text as material culture takes. If material culture itself can be read in 
terms of metaphor, then the material culture of The Time Machine, through its reliance on 
metaphor, is able to translate this principle in the reconstitution of material culture, itself
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towards interpreting a novel as material culture, not as the singular artefact of a printed 
book,  but as  a  rich,  complex  material  world,  occupying  a  literary  and  psychic  space 
somewhere between actuality and illusion. But perhaps it is an internalised recognition of 
the import of deconstruction that makes possible the imagining of The Time Machine as 
material world.
As  a  material  world,  this  interstitial  location  of  The  Time  Machine  can  be 
identified more specifically, between the illusion of diegesis in the form of an adventure 
story, and the actuality of South Kensington. Yet this zone of historical and geographical 
fact is one that has been atomised and reconfigured into the fabric of a more verifiable 
future  London  in  which  the  Time  Traveller  might  find  himself;  that  of the  present 
moment. South Kensington can itself be interpreted as a temporal structure that arcs from 
1851 into futurity. The area of South Kensington is today overlooked by the giant golden 
statue of Albert atop his memorial, as it would have been in the Time Traveller's own era. 
As  a decisive figure  in the execution  of the Great Exhibition and  the  afterlife  of the 
Crystal  Palace  in  Sydenham,  Albert's  legacy  can  be  seen  amongst  the  complex  of 
institutions that stand beneath his gaze, and that were built in the metaphorical shadow of 
the Crystal Palace as it briefly stood in Hyde Park, a defining moment in the formation of 
the  material  culture  of  modernity.  In  the  nineteenth  century,  their  ur-froms  were 
conceptualised as a city  built in  his  memory,  referred to as Albertopolis. Today, this 
consists  of their modem  descendants:  the Victoria  and Albert Museum, The  Science 
Museum, The Natural History Museum and Imperial College.
The ever-expanding arc that reaches between  1851  into a futurity that is always 
moving away from this point is characterised by  what Tony  Bennett describes as the 
exhibitionary complex, an arrangement of institutional forms that are museological, but 
also  encompass  modes  of public  spectacle,  and  sites  of commodity arrangement and 
exchange:
(...) the Great Exhibition of 1851  brought together an ensemble of disciplines and 
techniques of display that had been developed within the previous histories of 
museums, panoramas, Mechanics Institute exhibitions, art galleries, and arcades.
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ordering objects for public inspection and ordering the public that inspected, were 
to  have  a  profound  and  lasting  influence  on  the  subsequent  development  of 
museums, art galleries, expositions, and departments stores.5 3 1
This list is suggestive of spaces in which material  culture is ordering and interpreted, 
which  in  part  frame  and  determine  the  appearances  and  understandings  of material 
culture within the field of the social context of objects.  Yet in  The Time Machine, the 
presence of South Kensington as an originary site for such an exhibitionary complex is 
exploded  to  describe  an  entire  material  world,  which  covers  a  temporal  scheme  of 
millions of years and encompasses objects, climate, buildings and people. The world of 
The Time Machine is made in the image of South Kensington, but extended to the point at 
which materiality and material culture appear as something to which there is no exterior 
to. They actually constitute the world itself. But this is a nightmare vision of Albertopolis 
as an endless sprawl, in which order and stability are eradicated in favour of degeneration 
and  uncertainty.  In  The  Time  Machine,  material  culture  exceeds  its  containment  by 
institutional forms, suggesting that such orderly containment might itself be nothing but a 
fantasy.  This logic  of the  novel's constitution  as a material  world intersects  with  the 
present along the temporal trajectory from the Time Traveller's own version of South 
Kensington, historically binding this moment of futurity to the same hallucinatory dream.
It  is  to  a dream that  Wells  likens  his  own  scientific  romances,  or rather,  the 
experience of reading them is like a dream from which we awaken upon their completion. 
But this would be a dream of troubled reflection rather than the mythic and fetishising 
dreamworlds of spectacular modernity. Or alternatively, a dream of imagining things as 
other than they are. Unlike News From Nowhere however, the dream as the literal thing 
itself cannot function  as a device  in  Wells’s romances.  Whereas Morris has William 
Guest simply fall asleep and ‘awaken’ within a dream in which he has somehow appeared 
in the future, the form of journey, its very possibility, is a part of the constitution of the 
material world of The Time Machine. It is the imagining of time as fourth dimension, as 
medium that can be traversed and differentiated that makes this tale possible. And of 
course, it is a difference (difference) that is temporal, and only spatial in that it is place
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seems to consciously work towards forms of pointed distinction.
However, despite Wells’s own distaste for using the dream as device, the dream 
as effect lingers and resonates as utopian form. And that it does so helps to reveal that it 
is  the  presence  of  utopia  as  impulse,  rather  than  that  as  project,  that  is  ultimately 
articulated by Wells both here and within his more explicitly utopian thinking. In a way 
that Jameson  -  who,  as  discussed  in  Chapter 2,  is  eager to  separate  the  branches  of 
impulse from project -  has failed to sufficiently acknowledge, it seems clear that impulse 
lies within project. The entire Volume 2 (Part IV) of Bloch’s argument for the presence 
and  necessity of the  utopian  impulse,  The  Principle of Hope, is after all  dedicated to 
political/social, geographic and technological forms of utopia. The large scale planned 
project is imbued at the most quotidian of levels with impulse.
The discussion of the internal presence of the one within the other here calls for 
another of the rare insertions of artworks into this text. The work is The House of Dreams 
(2005) by Ilya and Emilia Kabakov,532 and its attendance here serves the function of a 
coda for this thesis. The specific work is framed by a more general approach to form in 
the work of the Kabakovs, that of a particular conception of installation as medium. Ilya 
Kabakov moved to the West from the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and in an interview 
published  in  1995, commented on  an  apparent desire  to hear about how  things  were 
different there:  ‘(...) I have often been asked about the differences in both lifestyles and 
artistic principles which are accepted in Russia and ‘here’. And whether I could formulate 
these distinctions in one sentence.’533  Kabakov’s response is that he does have such a 
formulation.  It  is  to  do  with  a  difference  between  how  an  object  correlates  to  its 
environment.  In the West, the space surrounding an object is ignored, and attention is 
primarily upon the artefact itself:
This  attention  is  all  embracing.  The object is  being  dissected  and  assembled, 
everyone is interested in how it functions, it is imbued with all inventiveness. The 
objects in their turn look beautiful, they are always new, clean, shining, brightly 
painted, each one has its own  individuality, one could say that they are almost 
animated, they have an independent life.534
265However, the interrelationships between these objects are indifferent; both to each other 
and more significantly, to their surrounding space. Of that space itself, Kabakov argues 
that the only thing demanded of it is that it must not interfere with the object’s existence, 
and its demonstration of itself.
The environment must be protective, and visually must not impede concentration 
on  the  object:  ‘In  principle,  it’s  as  though  the  space  shouldn’t exist at all.’535 When 
created intentionally, the space around an object is shaped from the objects themselves. 
The Russian correlation between object and space is presented as the diametric opposite:
Items as real objects don’t have any significance there, for a few reasons. In the 
first place, they are all old, dusty, broken, ‘previously used’, and if they are still 
new, they are poorly made, don’t work, ugly, shapeless. In the second place, they 
mostly don’t server pragmatic goals -  to work, to help, to make life easier (they 
are not capable of doing this at all) -  but symbolic goals: objects act as indicators 
of the  social  membership  of  its  owner,  his  social  status.  Therefore,  it’s  not 
important for us ‘what kind of thing it is’ and how it works, but where and in what 
sense it is presented. For us, a thing doesn’t speak about itself, but about the one 
who owns it and why he owns it.536
This speaking about the owner is of course a reading of objects that returns us to Mauss’s 
evaluation of the gift -  that objects are inalienably bound to the subject - and is perhaps 
universal  rather than functioning as a  specific distinction  between  ‘East’  and  ‘West’. 
However,  I  will  not  attempt to  critique  this  position,  but  rather use  it to think  of a 
relationship between materiality and utopia. This is made possible by the more general 
shifting of emphasis from object to environment in Kabakov’s argument.
Environment is also accounted for by the term ‘incidental circumstances’, forms 
of instantly readable information. It is an inseparable connection between material object 
and remote meaning that forms a dense contextual (and perhaps textual) substance around 
a  thing.  It  is  the  circumstances  that  are  important.  Kabakov  provides  some  obvious 
example:  ‘The very same table in your home and in an office is two different tables. A
266conversation at the train station or a conversation about the very same thing in the office 
is two different conversations.’  Similarly, one finds oneself as two different people in 
different  circumstances.  And  these  circumstances  are  themselves,  in  Kabakov’s 
argument, repressive and stifling. This is all pervasive. A medieval notion of spirit of the 
a  place  seizes  those  within.  But  the  spirit  is  oppressive.  Kabakov  goes  through  the 
qualities of interior space in Russia:
In the first place, the rooms are always deconstructive, asymmetrical to the point 
of absurdity or, on the contrary, insanely symmetrical. In the second place, they 
look dull, oppressing, semi-dark, but this is not so because the windows are small 
or weak lamps are on. The main thing is that the light both during the day and at 
night  is  arranged  so  excruciatingly,  so  awkwardly  that  it  creates  a  peculiar 
discomfort distinctive to that place alone.5 3 7
Space is also affected by an inadequate or perhaps malicious attention, to the degree of 
absurdity,  to  construction  from  planning  to  realisation.  All  is  crooked,  unfinished, 
cracked and stained. Place is haphazard, based upon a low standard that is just fit to pass. 
Everything is old, without any sense of when it was made. There is no patina of time, 
rather just a  sense of useless decrepitation even  if it were completed only yesterday, 
while dust and dirt appear to be everywhere. There is also an overwhelming sense of 
spaces,  even  private  apartments,  belonging  to  no-one.  They  are  temporary  places  of 
residence.
There is something of a contradiction in Kabakov’s argument. He makes a case 
for thing not mattering, as they are decrepit, but then describes their environments in the 
same terms, as places one wants to ignore and will forget. They are perhaps akin to the 
invisible  institutional  spaces  of the  West  (or  at  least  its  art).  But  Kabakov  instead 
suggests an extreme sensitivity to place based upon these qualities of places, as they were 
places that he would be thrown into, and pass through, for his entire childhood. He tells 
how he lived in dormitories until the age of twenty four, while his mother spent sixteen 
years  without a  living  permit, constantly  moving from one  landlady to another.  This 
sensitivity to place goes further, to become a pervasive socialisation of consciousness.
267External life seeped in to the pores of consciousness like thick syrup. Sociality was total 
and  dominated  everything.  Sociality  was  Soviet  government  structure,  but  also 
community. Intersubjective relationships could transform surrounding space. At a small 
level, it can be a making ‘positive’, but the model of family expanded to scale of state is 
catastrophic. Dissolute, space belongs to no-one, everything is transformed to ‘common- 
use’,  or  ‘uselessness’.  There  is  in  Kabakov’s  distinction  between  material  cultures  a 
possibility of hope, then, as well as despair. Hope is present at the level of a small-scale, 
accountable intersubjectivity, but lost in the saturation of totalitarianism in the everyday. 
And  at the  centre  of these  possibilities,  a  space,  or a  no-place  belonging  to no-one. 
More’s  Utopia -  which is of course from the Greek for ‘no-place’  - was overseen by 
Ademus, whose name derived from ‘no-people’. We have in both Utopia and Kabakov’s 
material culture, therefore, no-one as the mediator of the law of no-place. Independently 
of any Blochian analysis, Kabakov is describing utopian impulse and possibility within 
the totalitarian actuality of the Soviet Union. This is translated directly as a principle that 
determines an operational aspect of art.  Not its function within society,  but the way it 
functions  in  a  more  phenomenally-orientated  and  formal  manner within  institutional 
space. So Kabakov returns to the oft asked question:
If we turn to the difference between artistic principles in our country and in the 
West in this sense,  it can  be formulated this way:  if in the  West the object is 
exhibited as the main hero and the surrounding space doesn’t exist at all, ‘we’, on 
the  contrary,  should  perhaps  primarily  exhibit  ‘space’  and  only  then  arrange 
objects in it.538
This  exhibiting  of  space  rather  than  object  is  what  Kabakov  describes  as  ‘total’ 
installation.  The  term  functions  as  a  recognisable  shorthand  for  the  large  scale 
installation-based work that Ilya and Emilia, his wife and collaborator, have been making 
since the late  1980s. It has become something of a brand identity for their work, in has 
lost something of its critical impulse, hence necessitating an account of its specificity. 
While I have tried to suggest that utopia is at the core of total installation, The House of 
Dreams addresses both project and impulse, as explicit and implicit.
268At its spatial centre is a radial arrangement of oversize pedestals, complete with 
steps,  at the top of which  is situated  a divan to rest or sleep upon.  Inside each  large 
pedestal  is a  small  chamber, again furnished for institutionalised rest.  In the circular, 
domed space of the Serpentine Gallery, there is something of the observatory about this 
arrangement.539 The adjoining rooms have become hallucinatory adaptations of a hospital 
ward.  Beds are separated from each other by floating white curtains. The form here is 
derived  from  a  scheme  within  the  history  of  Soviet  utopias  devised  by  architect 
Konstantin  Melnikov.  After identifying  the  problem  of fatigue  as  a  hindrance  to the 
growth and development of the Stalinist collective, he proposed a Laboratory of Sleep 
(1929), which would allow up to 4,000 workers to rest in order to restore them to their 
full productive potential. The plan of a central rotunda flanked by two wings is mirrored 
in the creation of the Kabakovs’  installation, as is its promise of a restorative slumber. 
However, in its (reconstruction, the Laboratory is detached from its pragmatic attempts 
to  improve  both  efficiency  and  the  overall  functional  productivity,  as  well  as  the 
operation of totalitarianism through mechanised forms of the cooperation and conformity 
of its subjects. What is on offer here, perhaps, is a chance to dream. There is more than a 
reflection of the (clumsy and slightly embarrassing) utopian project in facilitating a space 
of  contemplative  reflection.  The  dream  in  itself  is  not  the  object  of  interest  here. 
Although Wells likens his scientific romances to dreaming, it is that this is a state from 
which  one  will  awaken  that  is  more  significant,  as  an  analogy  that  depends  on  an 
ontological certainty that the dream/fantasy is not inimical to wakefulness/reality.
Wells’s  reference to Morris  within  the text instigates a direct and  adversarial 
relationship  with News  From  Nowhere,  published five  years  previously.  In  Morris's 
utopia, a socialist with a hatred of modernity awakens in, or rather dreams of, a medieval 
fantasy  of the future  in  which  capitalism and  technology  have  been left behind  by  a 
society favouring an egalitarian and rural existence. Morris's utopian dream is dismissed; 
to imagine progress in the image of a pre-capitalist, pre-industrial arcadia suggested no 
answer for Wells, and failed to address the conditions of modernity as he saw them. And 
although his future is a nightmare, the momentum is still forward-looking in its call to 
arms. But Wells was also unlike Morris in how he constructed his utopias. Morris took 
the process literally, and saw himself as a purveyor of pure authorial intent. There was no
269subtlety  in  his fantastic  worlds.  They  were  meant to  represent in  a  clear,  unclouded 
manner, the views of the author.
Wells,  on the other hand,  constructs  a narrative that is  polemical,  but utilises 
materiality as a set of raw materials for cognitive engagement, as well as estrangement. 
Rather than spell out a utopian fantasy, as a panorama of the present through a dream of 
what might be, The Time Machine explores aspects of utopian possibility. Wells’s future, 
although  addressed  as  a  stark  warning,  is  still  a  future,  and  therefore  perhaps  more 
utopian a discourse than Morris’s nostalgic paradise.  It is concerned with addressing, 
ultimately to facilitate resolution, the complexities and difficulties of the present moment, 
of not wallowing in fantasies of the past. The gaslight in the Time Traveller’s home is 
evidence of slowness and  inefficiency,  modernity’s failure  to  move  in  a  smooth  and 
organised action, instead more likely to lurch forward in stops and starts like the Time 
Traveller’s machine at the mercy of his clumsy operation.
Whatever potential technological futurity may possess is nevertheless determined 
by the limitations of crude and flawed subjects.  Despite such limitations, the telematic 
apparatus of the time machine allows the protagonist to travel without leaving his home. 
Within this contested space of habitation, a sense of utopian discourse as a narrative of 
distance and alterity is collapsed within the present and the familiar. I’d like to suggest 
that this  site  functions  analogously  to  Baudrillard’s  hypothetical  space  -   screen  and 
network rather than scene and mirror:  a non-reflecting surface of communication,  the 
very space of habitation -  both psychic and architectural -  can be conceived of as a point 
of regulation and organisation within a series of multiple networks. Within this space of 
habitation, a sense of utopian discourse as a narrative of distance and alterity is collapsed 
within the present and the familiar. The space of the novel is one in which an anti-utopian 
nightmare is played out, a necessary evil before the fulfilment of any utopian dream. As 
in  The House of Dreams, impulse lies within project. More significantly, a meditation 
on/facilitation of utopian thought and  practice is articulated through a highly  specific 
discursive engagement with material culture:  material culture and dream are conflated 
within The Time Machine to form a speculative form of utopian thought. Alternatively, it 
is this conflation that articulates the presence of these relationships outside of the realms 
of fantasy.
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